Lifts for MoE.

[Tom Sutton]

The DCLG guides say for mobility impairment you can consider firefighters or evacuation lifts which is not new to me but it also says, "Normal lifts may be considered suitable for fire evacuation purposes, subject to an adequate fire risk assessment and development of a suitable fire safety strategy by a competent person". Apparently architects are now considering using normal lifts as a means of evacuating mobility impaired persons do you consider with adequate risk assessment they could be considered safe?

[kurnal]

in conjunction with compartmentation and diversity of power supplies it can be possible but I am worried at the  prospect of architests pushing the boundaries in this way. The fire strategy needs to be considered in a holistic way in order to assess the suitability of such proposals.
 

[Tom Sutton]

Combined with a manual override I would agree, but you now have an evacuation/firefighter lift so you are simple upgrading the lift, it is no longer a standard lift? Are these architects considering not bothering with these modifications subject to a risk assessment?

[Fishy]

If the standard of acceptability for the risk assessment is that there would be no more risk faced than if the lift were "compliant", then it's fine.  The problems will come if someone thinks this means you can discount all the good stuff that BS 9999 recommends on the basis that there probably won't be a fire that knocks out the BMS; the lift controller(s); the power supply(s) etc, etc... 

I think what this is intended to achieve is to allow the use of "normal" lifts remote from a fire for evacuation - e.g. if they were a two ends of a large building with suitable compartmentation separating them, such that if you have a fire you can treat one end as a protected area relative to the other.  Airports might lend themselves to this, for example.  You can then dispense with the small, protected refuges etc, as the whole of that end of the building becomes a protected refuge. What might be missed is the potential for a single fire to knock out both lifts - their power supplies or control systems - so that's a crucial matter for the risk assessment (and probably requires detailed technical analysis).  I've also heard of problems with lift engineers agreeing to install the over-ride functionality on the basis that because they're not "compliant" evacuation lifts it compromises compliance with BS EN 81 & their Notified Bodies won't sign them off.

[nearlythere]

If the standard of acceptability for the risk assessment is that there would be no more risk faced than if the lift were "compliant", then it's fine.  The problems will come if someone thinks this means you can discount all the good stuff that BS 9999 recommends on the basis that there probably won't be a fire that knocks out the BMS; the lift controller(s); the power supply(s) etc, etc... 

I think what this is intended to achieve is to allow the use of "normal" lifts remote from a fire for evacuation - e.g. if they were a two ends of a large building with suitable compartmentation separating them, such that if you have a fire you can treat one end as a protected area relative to the other.  Airports might lend themselves to this, for example.  You can then dispense with the small, protected refuges etc, as the whole of that end of the building becomes a protected refuge. What might be missed is the potential for a single fire to knock out both lifts - their power supplies or control systems - so that's a crucial matter for the risk assessment (and probably requires detailed technical analysis).  I've also heard of problems with lift engineers agreeing to install the over-ride functionality on the basis that because they're not "compliant" evacuation lifts it compromises compliance with BS EN 81 & their Notified Bodies won't sign them off.

As Fishy says a significant issue is the reliability of the power supply and in the case of a building with two lifts the loss of power to one does not affect that to the other. But there is the chance that power to each could come from the same point of supply. There would have to a be quite an intensive assessment of this aspect. Another is in relation to the control of the lift whilst being used for the evacuation of those who need it.

[Mike Buckley]

I think the usual answer to this question is a fairly definite maybe. I would first look at the lift, if it complies with a fire fighting lift independent power supplies etc. then there is little problem in using it for disabled evacuation. With normal lifts I would tend to look at them as being a backup if they have cage override facility. I would expect a means of evacuating disabled persons without the lift but bear in mind that if the lift was available and usable that would be the better method of evacuation.

Another issue is that lifts may now be fitted with controls linked to the fire alarm system so that they automatically revert to ground level on activation of the fire alarm and become inactive. Obviously unless the cage control overrides this feature they would be useless in an emergency.

There also need to be staff procedures for the use of the lift whilst it is switched to cage control. I remember an incident in a high rise block where we took control of the lifts and one of the crew turned his back and missed the little old lady who walked into the lift and took it up to her floor, we then had to find the thing!

[Fishy]

Another issue is that lifts may now be fitted with controls linked to the fire alarm system so that they automatically revert to ground level on activation of the fire alarm and become inactive. Obviously unless the cage control overrides this feature they would be useless in an emergency.

It's likely that all recent lift installations will have this control mode - when the fire alarm goes off they'll go to the level nearest a safe exit and sit their with their doors open & the landing & car controls disabled.  Even those with a key-switch can't be overridden with the fire alarm actuating, unless the override has been configured as a BS EN 81 evacuation lift controller.  People might assume that the key switch does override the fire alarm - but this would need to be physically verified as with the modern CE marked lift you shouldn't be able to.

[kurnal]

One thing that bothers me about BSEN81 is that the lift doors are only fire rated from one side. Some EN81 compliant lifts have the hydraulic reservoir and pump in the lift shaft and typically 200 litres of flammable oil in the reservoir.

I first came across this in an entertainment venue being made accessible under discrimination legislation. I have raised it several times with the lift industry and when I asked about pinhole leaks and aerosol sprays and electrical sparks I was just told that the risk of a fire is very low and not to worry my pretty head about it. But if it does happen and the lift doors are open next to the reservoir (the doors which aren't fire rated anyway)   then it doesn't bear thinking about.

And irrespective the doors should not remain open if they are part of the enclosure to the protected shaft.