Fire Officer Recommending the replacement of old flat entrance doors

[Golden]

"solid wood (44mm depth) outer edge (which is around 100mm thick) and a large central panel (I will attach a photo shortly)."

Auntie Lin these dimensions were mentioned in an earlier post. If the door is single panel with a 44mm outer edge I'd assume it must have a decent amount of timber to hold in a large central panel. There is a lack of information regarding the doors and I remain of the opinion that they could not support a 'stay put' strategy - even given the secondary escape route. I've never been a great fan of intumescent paper, or paint, for upgrading doors in sleeping accommodation.

[Auntie LIn]

I'd seen that, but I didn't see mention of the thickness of the panel.   It's not easy to measure so often gets missed and then described as "thin" or "slightly sunken" or "thick in the middle and thin at the edges" - none of which help to evaluate the potential performance.

[Davo]

Are we talking 40 fire doors or 40 fire door sets?

Re-reading, starting to feel twitchy..........

davo

[kurnal]

Hi All,

 Furthermore, each flat has access to an external fire escape stairwell at the rear of the property, meaning that even if the main common escape route (accessed via the flats entrance doors) is compromised the residents will be able to use an alternative means of escape.

In view of the above would you consider that requiring the replacement of the doors is not proportionate to the risk, particularly given the presence of an alternative means of escape?

How likely is it that a fire could affect both staircases simultaneously ?

[Golden]

Kurnal its difficult to know without full details of the apartments but the discussion should be centered around whether this is suitable for 'stay put' where the doors are possibly sub-standard? How long is it going to take the fire service to arrive and control any fire - would both MoE be compromised by this time? Its a good discussion point and I'd just like to add that I'm often in favour of keeping older style FR doors but something is bothering me about this situation!

[kurnal]

Its certainly an interesting one. Most unusual from the point of view of every flat having access to an alternative means of escape, it would be interesting to look at the layout. From the description it sounds like an alternative that is directly accessible from each flat without the need to enter the communal areas? That would be worth a lot in my view.

I am finding it difficult to reconcile the comment on proportionality. It sort of implies that if one occupier had put a pvc door on their flat this would be unacceptable and full weight would be applied to them to re -instate it but if all 40 flats have the same it is disproportionate to make every one change because of the cost? To me in that case its not a consideration, if the non fire rated doors are a problem then they need to be replaced.

I would also assess each existing door against the tests carried out by IFC on behalf of English Heritage. The reports are still in the public domain and have been referred to in this forum in the past.

To me this block sounds like it could predate CP3 1971, remember the previous 1962 edition only covered buildings over 80ft high. Sounds even a bit like a typical 1930s building.

[Dinnertime Dave]

I have dealt with something similar in a building converted into flats (sheltered housing) 3 floors, but only one flat per floor, they each had an alternative to a separate stair. Front and back door were FD30S, but a panel next to the front door was UPVC with a ventilation plate in it. I accepted this but they did have an L2 fire warning system.

Guess though as an inspecting officer if I put it on the file it has been accepted it's OK, don't know how I would treat it as an assessor

[Suttonfire]

Hi All,

Sorry, I have been away. Just to respond to Kurnal's point earlier, I can confirm that the occupants of all flats have access to external fire escape stairwell, which they can reach without having to enter the internal common areas. The block is purpose built, and as far as the managing agent can ascertain all 40 flat entrance doors are the originals (and all still in sound condition).

When looking at which additional risk control measures are practicable for this property I am considering the cost and effort involved with replacing the 40 flat entrance doors, weighed up against the risk (which I feel is not great given the short travel distance on the internal stairwell and the availability of a totally separate external means of escape).

[Golden]

They are flats and therefore a sleeping risk - are you proposing a stay put strategy?

[Mike Buckley]

I would think a major question would be, could a fire in a single flat knock out both means of escape? If so then protection would be needed.

[Golden]

My reason for banging on about this one is that in my opinion the time factor has to be a major consideration in the risk equation. The proposal I believe is for stay put therefore the amount of time available to stay put is the key factor and it is almost irrelevant whether these doors were classified as fire doors when they were fitted. What is relevant is the judgement of the risk assessor and RP in deciding how long the doors are going to last in a fire situation - therefore what is the 'notional fire resistance' of these doors which should be based on knowledge of how doors behave in a fire. Remember there is no detection or alarm in a stay put situation so those above the fire may be sleeping soundly while the fire grows.

Agreed there are other issues with the alternative escape route but there are no details on the layout of the flats with the alternative - for example would a fire in the lounge/bedroom/kitchen where the room door has been left open (common occurrence) have direct contact with both the internal and the alternative?

[kurnal]

Absolutely agree Golden. The OP would be best to follow the approach set out in the LGA guidance written by Colin Todd with particular regard to the flowchart. Compare the building against benchmark guidance both contemporary and current, identify both strengths and weaknesses of the design and then make a decision if the building can safely support a stay put strategy and if so any further work needed to achieve a stay put strategy, if not what additional work needs to be done to achieve a full evacuation strategy. 

[Mike Buckley]

OK, just come across a Brigade where they claim not to recognise the LGA Guide!

[Suttonfire]

I have indeed followed the approach in the purpose built flats guide. Having taken all factors into account (and having recommended several practical risk reduction measures - including the fitting of adequate self closers to the sound doors in place) feel that a stay put policy is preferable to a full evacuation policy, which would necessitate the installation of a communal fire alarm system (likely with multiple system control panels) and would be very difficult to manage.

[AnthonyB]

OK, just come across a Brigade where they claim not to recognise the LGA Guide!

You wouldn't care to enlighten us would you? It would make an interesting Court case!