FireNet Community
FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: shaunmckeever on March 31, 2006, 01:02:20 PM
-
Can anyone advise me on electronic door locking devices (not magnetic door hold open devices). Should they be linked to the fire alarm system?
I am aware that some fire authorities have local guidance on this issue but I cannot locate any definitive national guidance. What is the problem if the system is not linked to the fire alarm system so long there is a manual over-ride button and the device fails safe on loss of power?
Can the manual over-ride be seen as a key albeit not in the usual sense?
Any advice gratefully received, thanks.
Shaun
-
An escape door should be able to be opened with one simple action.
Having a button then a lever handle is two.
Personnaly if the lock is a maglock or similar (opens if power cut) and there is an electric panic bar fixed to the door (that cuts the power directly to the lock - not via the control panel) then this is the same as a conventional panic bar so no need for any interconnection.
-
Hi Brian
Thanks for your reply. There is no lever handle to operate. It is just a steel plate push door to open.
-
So its essentially the same as a conventional, mechanical, panic bar.
If thats the case then I don't see a need to connect it to the alarm system.
-
In my business we use them extensively to stop theft from the shop floor. To ensure they are available for use we have push bars to keep them close when the magnets switch off when the fire alarm sounds, we also have the green BGU just in case.
I am aware that the FIre Authority in Sheffield won't allow them.
If you need more info let me know.
Simon
-
There are 2 issues here, Fire & Security. Where the door is secured by electronic means, this is to fail safe - open. Usually a swipe card system is used for entry /exit allowing control and monitoring of people. Overide such as BGU make it a one operation exit unit in emergency. It does not need to linked into fire alrm system.
-
Take a look at the IFE website- publications. Graham Shiel authored a document which was adopted by the IFE and CACFOA and thereby became the basis for most brigades policy notes.
To see an excellent interpretation of the guidance have a look at the following link:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/efd/maintenance/construction/fire/PDF/Access-SecuritySystems-Means_of_Escape.pdf
Heres the information from the IFE publications list:
“IFE 13 Guidance on Acceptance of Electronic Locks to Doors Required for Means of
Escape by Graham Shiel BSc(Hons), GIFireE (£9.00)
The pressure on authorities to accept an increasing level of security on doors required for means
of escape will persist for the foreseeable future, as crimes against property and people increase.
The past stance of requiring doors to be freely available in all situations, can now be re-examined
as advances in technology offer alternatives. In which circumstances, and to what extent we are
prepared to accept electronically secured means of escape is a matter for comprehensive debate,
but this guidance will allow new options to be considered.”
-
Graham Shiel's work was very good at the time but is getting a bit long in the tooth now. The widespread use of these devices, sometimes for conveinience rather than any real need, cobbled together systems, time delays and very poor management and training (always denied but virtually guaranteed), mean that FRS are constantly being challenged. We have moved a long way from the 'imediately openable' principle. I would like to see how South Yorkshire FRS have been able to maintain their position.
We all wait with baited breath for Colin Todd's, et al, standard on these devices. (Hopefully it will be a management and usability code rather than a simple technical specification.
-
Val
I fear that it will not. Hopefully CT himself will respond to your point himself but in case he doesn't heres a selection from an email I received after commenting:
"BS7273-4...... will only deal with the electrical interface with door hardware, but no the hardware itself, etc. The purpose of the code is, as it were, to make sure the signal is delivered reliably.......".
Or maybe there are other draft standards in progress?
-
Kurnal
Thankyou for the clarification. If that is the case then there is a gap for CFOA (after all they want to be the voice of the FRS), to redraft Graham's work and set a national benchmark. The ODPM's guides do contain some fairly good advice on this subject but it will need expanding with more detailed arguments to cover all aspects of this market/trend. Unfortunately, the ODPM guides always have to have the qualification of 'should' or 'in most cases' which leaves that chink of light for argument and we are all back at the beginning again.
-
I love this forum it is so good for debate and a great source for learning.
I have a copy of LFB's guidance note. I have also contacted several brigades directly regarding this issue. It concerns me that there is no consistency of approach between brigades. I can foresee a fire risk assessment carried out on a building which accepts the use of electronic door locking devices not linked to the alarm where an IO from one brigade will look at the assessment and disagree with the use of the device and a similar assessment in another brigade where the use of the device will be acceptable to the IO.
This is just one issue. Whether an IO can make a judgement as to the suitability and sufficiency of a fire risk assessment where there are going to be inconsistencies in approach by different brigades over several other issues needs to be addressed.
-
Some flexibility with mag lock exits is sometimes sensible, but there are times when you would need to insist on all three failsafes - break glass, power loss & fire alarm relay - the situation that I normally require these is any exit which, by virtue of the nature and number of persons who may have to resort to it, needs to be panic proof. If the premises insists on a mag lock & panic bolt combination, it isn't panic proof if you have to remember to smash a glass before your weight on the panic bar opens the door - we don't want to regress to the fatal key in glass fronted box type situations of Summerland & Woolworths.
-
What is accepted practice when it comes to 'security' applications such as prisons, mental health units, and care homes?
Is it possible/acceptable for a magnetically locked door (final exit or otherwise) without a BGU override?
If so, is there any written guidance anywhere (cos I can't find it)
-
Dont know if this may be of any use messy- Like you I was struggling to find anything definitive. This was a secure school for teenage children. Sorry for the length of the posting- if its not of use I guess Chris can delete it!
Xxxxxxx xxxxxx School- Specific risk assessment for the use of security devices on exit doors
A- The problem- hazards
The current arrangements for the security and availability of exit doors are unsatisfactory and require urgent review.
1- The system may be insufficiently robust as the doors are secure and can only be opened on the operation of the fire alarm system. Fire is by no means the only reason for possible evacuation of the building. Where electronic locks are fitted all the building codes consider it necessary to provide some mechanism for the door to be used independently of the operation of the fire alarm. Persons needing to leave the building in an emergency may be unable to do so unless their local fire alarm sounder is operating.
2- The doors appear to be linked to the local sounder circuits of the fire alarm system so the doors re-lock on silencing the alarm- making testing very difficult and leading to difficulty during fire evacuation procedures.
3- Testing is not carried out in accordance with and at the appropriate frequencies in accordance with the relevant standards
4- The school is completely unstaffed during holiday periods and false alarms during this time leave the building insecure. The current configuration of all alarms across the site leaves all buildings potentially insecure if an alarm operates in any one.
5- Due to the policy of total evacuation, it becomes inflexible for the senior manager to reallocate any members of staff to the areas of greatest need as all will be evacuating the students under their care to the assembly areas and none will have information on the location or nature of the emergency. Roll calls will be taken for all buildings and this may divert attention from the areas of greatest need
6- All students and staff will face the disruption caused by an alarm in a separate building and may suffer unnecessary distress
The Fire Authority, in their letter dated 28 February 2005, recommended a system incorporating emergency green break glass door release mechanisms in accordance with “section 3” of the “guidance on the acceptance of electronic locks required for means of escape” published by the Institute of Fire Engineers and CACFOA.
This advice would create potential difficulties for the school. There is an ongoing problem of the malicious breaking of alarm call points- recently an average 6 per month. The students are closely supervised but additional break glass devices would become an obvious target for malicious operation. This would very quickly create problems for the staff as security and supervision of the pupils is paramount due to their special needs. Such a system would not offer any impediment to a child wishing to abscond and may jeopardise the ability of the school to provide the appropriate level of care and
supervision. Malicious operation of the door break glass point would allow escape without operation of the alarm – thus further jeopardising the care of the child.
B- Persons at risk
The staff, students and the security of the business are placed at risk as a result of the current arrangements
The situation at Xxxxxxx House and other similar establishments is not unique- similar means of escape and security conflicts are encountered in some care homes, some types of hospital and some types of childrens remand homes. In such cases solutions are normally found by risk assessment and liaison with all parties involved.
C- Available guidance and existing control measures
There is considerable guidance on acceptable measures in a range of building design codes. Whilst none of them offer specific solutions, they all indicate a need for a flexible approach taking into account the circumstances of the case. Such documents include:
• The HTM series (Hospital technical Memoranda) ,
• The draft guide to fire precautions in existing residential care premises,
• Building Regulations approved document B,
• BS5588 series.
• Children’s Act 1989 ,
• National Standards under the Care Standards Act 2000
• Guidance on the acceptance of electronic locks required for means of escape
• Home Office 1990 Fire Standards in Prison establishments
However whilst all of the above documents consider the conflict between availability of exit and door security, in most cases the security considerations are in respect of persons breaking in from the outside. Only the “guidance on the acceptance of electronic locks” properly considers situations where for internal security reasons, persons inside the buildings may not be given immediate access to a mechanism which over rides the electronic door lock. (in section 4). It would not be reasonably practicable to implement the solutions suggested in this part of the document in this case due to the character and nature of the building.
Whilst none of these documents offer specific solutions appropriate in this case, they all suggest the need for risk assessment, liaison and agreement in special cases, between all parties with responsibility to oversee the fire safety measures at a premise.
All of the technical documents listed above do share some common ground. For example all documents:
• Do not consider an electronic door release on its own to be satisfactory as the sole means of opening a fire exit door without some other measure which may include a range of measures from an opening mechanism to video surveillance and remote control
• do not consider a mechanism requiring the use of a key to be acceptable,
• most do not support the use of number key pads on the risk side of a door.
• They do not recommend the connection of door release mechanisms to local sounder circuits and if this is the only way, then latching relays should be used.
• All components of the system to fail safe (Door open) and be designed, constructed and installed to a life safety standard and not breaching the recommendations of other standards eg BS5839.
• Electronic security devices must fail safe in the event of system or power failure- i.e. any failure causes the door to unlock.
Site specific factors- control measures
The special circumstances at the school to be taken into account are as follows:
• Xxxxx building apart, the buildings cannot conform to current design codes- the sleeping accommodation on the first floor of A block is served by two staircases, one being external, the main one having a number of rooms opening directly into it, without fire doors to a good standard. The fire resistance of elements of structure in the portacabin units cannot be accurately assessed
• In xxxxx Block there is two way travel though not in a protected route- and an unprotected dead end condition on the first floor teaching corridor though this is covered by automatic detection
• New fire alarm and detection systems have been installed in xxxxx Block - radio linked to an L1 standard. This system is fully addressable and has been configured to link in all other alarm panels across the site- though not addressable. A mimic panel has also been provided in a separate location.
• The students all have special educational needs and a secure environment is essential. Most are fully dependent on the staff for leadership and instruction in case of fire, though none of the current students have significant sensory or mobility impairment.
• Staffing ratios are very good with an average of 5 students per staff member under constant supervision at all times day and night
• Staff members have all received training in fire procedures
• It is most unlikely that in the event of a fire the students would need to use a fire exit door outside the direct supervision of their member of staff
• Visitors and contractors are not allowed unaccompanied access to the building.
Recommended additional measures to be taken
A. Each exit door should be provided with a means of opening by staff independent of the operation of the fire alarm. In this case the doors may be secured by mechanical keypad on the side from which escape is needed. Alternatively, subject to compliance with the relevant life safety technical standards, a swipe card or tally system would also resolve the security / escape conflict in this case.
B. The system should be reconfigured such that the door lock mechanisms are correctly wired back to the main panel rather than local sounder circuits, or if this is not possible, use latching relays of the life safety standard (see guidance document). It should be possible to test the door release mechanisms without the need to maintain the operation of the sounders.
C. The system should be reconfigured to allow the alarm systems in the out buildings to be tested without the alarms sounding across the whole site.
D. Whatever solution is adopted, it would be wise to incorporate the facility of access via use of a key from the outside of an exit door, so in the event of persons being trapped within the building, staff or firefighters can access the door from outside. This is relevant at the School as due to the age, character and nature of the building passive fire precautions can never conform to modern standards.
E. Regular staff training should be carried out to cover the reasons for the design and use of the access control system and should any combination be changed robust means of ensuring staff awareness of the new details
F. The evacuation procedures should be reviewed – consider the current full site wide evacuation strategy, the effective use of the alternative control position at the mimic panel, and communications with staff in an emergency
G. The alarm systems should be tested in accordance with BS5839. Daily checks, weekly tests and periodic inspection and test by an engineer should be carried out. For the older panels, during the weekly test it is important to check each alarm panel by operating a call point in each zone. The new installation should be tested in accordance with the manufacturer’s specification- more recent panels have much improved fault monitoring and reporting systems.
H. The alarm system should be monitored by a call centre.
All of the above points should be discussed and agreed with the enforcement agencies and alarm engineers before commencing work. It is presented as a reasonable compromise between the conflicts of escape and security in this special care environment
-
Messy, I did some work for The Government, FRA's in Crowm and County Courts. The approach that the Government wanted was no electronic locks but to have BGCP that actuated the door.
-
now I am confused - how does that work?
-
Sorry, I did not make that very clear. A red box was used instead of a green box without a manual overide. Operated on the FA and a power failure. A deterent in case the "criminal mind" knew that escape was possible by opening the door. Mind you if they read this they could get out anyway. Have I committed an offence?
-
So they did have electronic locks? just that they were operated in a secret squirel kind of way.
-
I attach extracts of the text copied and pasted from page 128 and 129 of the new factories and warehouses guide.
Electromagnetic devices
These devices comprise a magnet and
a simple fixed retaining plate with no
moving parts and are therefore generally
considered to be more reliable due to
their inherent ‘fail-safe unlocked’ operation.
Electromagnetic locking devices go some
way to addressing the particular concerns
surrounding electromechanical locking
systems. The release of this type of device is
controlled by the interruption of electrical
current to an electromagnet either manually
via a switch or other means, break-glass
point (typically coloured green), or by
linking to the fire-warning and/or detection
system of the premises.
( cut from page 128)
In premises where there may be large numbers
of people, the devices should only be considered
when linked to a comprehensive automatic
fire-detection and warning system in accordance
with BS 5839-1.16 There should be an additional
means of manually overriding the locking
device at each such exit (typically a green
break-glass point). (cut from page 129)
Am I reading too much in to the guidance if I suggest that it is now ok to omit the green break glass box UNLESS there are a large number of persons present?
I always thought that it was totally confusing having both a red and green break glass box at a fire exit door. Which one should I smash? If I have discovered a fire smashing the red one will both sound the alarm and open the door. If I just smash the green one I may escape but I have not raised the alarm for the benefit of others. So I would much prefer just to provide the red one and now I think the guidance sets a benchmark recognising that this may be an acceptable solution.
-
Smash both. Much more fun.
totally agree that having one bgu that does all is simpler.
-
Smash both. Much more fun.
totally agree that having one bgu that does all is simpler.
So what we really need is a double pole BGU that can be wired to break the supply to the lock, and to also signal the fire alarm system.????
-
as the green bgu is supposed to be double pole,why are some poular brands only singular?
The older models were but the new only have common,NC and NO with the brand i have seen.
-
So what we really need is a double pole BGU that can be wired to break the supply to the lock, and to also signal the fire alarm system.????
David you are exactly right.
My risk assessment for the premises ( see my post of 6 June) where I went for just a red bgu box, double pole of course, and staff training for fire and for incidents other than a fire has brought the following comment from the fire authority-
"The decision to install a red BGU only may create a hazard to the occupants of the building. In the event of a failure of the fire alarm they may be unable to exit the building. The risk assessment should be reviewed"
The alarm is L1 to the current 5839. For events other than fire there are exits at remote ends of the building without any mag locks. (The building which in this case is 200m long). The intermediate fire exits are secured on mag locks linked to the fire alarm and a panic bolt. The red bgu operates the fire alarm, if people follow their training their first action is to sound the alarm, if not already sounding. The alarm will release the mag lock and so only one action will be necessary to open the door- ie the panic bolt.
I had not considered a total failure of the fire alarm system which would prevent the alarm operating but would maintain the power to the mag lock but Davids suggestion would cater for this event.
Do you think the fire authority are being reasonable in this case?
-
I can answer the query regarding secure mental health units.
The decision has to be made having regard to the security culture and the level of security required.
By the security culture I mean. Do all staff carry keys to all parts of the unit as part of their normal function. If they do then (provided that the doors can be unlocked from both sides, including final exits) keys are acceptable. To have a situation where all doors unlock on operation of the fire alarm is clearly unacceptable in a secure situation.
If final exit doors open into a secure fenced area then electronic locks may be acceptable.
In one instance I have allowed a 30 second delay to allow staff to get to the door before the patients abscond.
It is also important that where electronic locks unlock on a mains failure there is a battery back up relayed into the fire alarm system to maintain security.
Of course it goes without saying that the green boxes are not installed.
All fire alarm call points are either key operated or in areas under staff control.
As a matter of interest we had a situation recently where a patient knocked a key operated ACP off the wall, the door unlocked and he absconded.
Secure situations have to be assessed individually and there are exceptions in the law to allow flexibility.
-
Had an incident the other day where the door lock system failed to fail safe. 2 foors apprx 10 x 40 m, one stairway (lobbied). Apparently this was 'only the 5th time in 12 years'! Being an evening call there was ony the locking up person left trying to exit. My advice was to lock open the doors during normal working hours (and to get the system fixed), but, they said due to certain security issues they were prepared to take the risk.
-
Mr P
Not sure if you meant to say " they were not prepared to adopt the open-door policy". I would report the matter to the Fire Authority.
Conqueror.
-
Mr P
Just out of interest was the device that failed an electronic keep or a magnetic lock?
-
They were not prepared to adopt open door policy even short term. The device was electronic keep. My understanding was that the closed circuit kept the door locked, on fail to fail open, with out of work hours being secured by physical lock and key method.
-
Thanks Mr P.
I think it is fairly common for electronic keeps, even when intended to fail safe, not to let go. In my experience if there is any maintained pressure on the keep at the same time as the power is disconnected, although the solenoid will release very often the latch which holds the keep closed will stick in position. The pressure may be as a result of someone pushing the door at the same time as the release switch is operated, or by a poorly fitting door where the latch is under constant tension through warping or poor fitting.
-
Mr P
If this electronic door security system is prone to failures of what ever kind, it is quite clearly not fit for purpose. Does the premises have a fire certificate , if so I say again you have a duty to inform the fire authority, now that this failure has been brought to your notice.
Conqueror.
-
Conqueror,
Yep did all that. Just added for interests sake on this thread.
-
Thanks Mr P.
I think it is fairly common for electronic keeps, even when intended to fail safe, not to let go. In my experience if there is any maintained pressure on the keep at the same time as the power is disconnected, although the solenoid will release very often the latch which holds the keep closed will stick in position. The pressure may be as a result of someone pushing the door at the same time as the release switch is operated, or by a poorly fitting door where the latch is under constant tension through warping or poor fitting.
I can highly recommend the following product, found by following the link below, to reduce the very common problems identified by Kurnal above;
http://www.cdvuk.com/_htmlpages/firelockpage.htm
It is an expensive bit of kit costing around £250 but It will still function even with 100Kg of side pressure.
This product is distributed by a number of companies including www.sasss.co.uk Just enter the word FIRELOCK on their site's search facility to find it.
-
It would be wrong to discuss the actual methods of operating prison locks, but they can be operated elctronically, they fail in the 'locked' position, and they do not have by-pass switches of any description.
-
I was wondering if someone can give me a bit of guidence please and tell me where I can find the relevent info?
I have an office building that is being refurbished and is nearing completion. The building is approximately 65m in length with first and second floors. There are fire exits on all floors sited at each end of the building. The main entrance is at the centre of the building and forms a foyer and protected central stairwell. The main door is a sliding glass door (it defaults to open on activation of the fire alarm system).
Now, given that the maximum travel distance for offices with escape in more than one direction is 45m, should the main door be fitted with a "green box" to over-ride the opening mechanism should it fail to (sod's law) open when the fire alarm is activated? A "green box" was shown on the original set of plans but has since been removed.
Two other buildings have a similar set up but these are fitted with a "green box" to over-ride the door mechanism.
-
In an emergency evacuation, most people will try and use the main entrance that they used to enter the building. So even though you may comply with the 45metre guidance using the exits at the ends of the building, there is no doubt that even if signed not to be used in case of fire many people will arrive there in the event of a fire- especially visitors. If they cant get out panic may arise and they may then act irrationally. For this reason the main entrance should also be available in the event of an emergency.
If the door opens on operation of the fire alarm, and will still open on PIR in the event of a power failure( ie it has battery backup),is tested regularly and is not used by large numbers of the public it may be ok without a green box as long as no fault- including an earth fault on the fire alarm -will cause it to fail. Generally green boxes are also not recommended for licensed premises for obvious rreeaassoonnss!!
For well disciplined staff who know the building well- eg caretakers and cleaners it can be possible to lock off all but the essential exits backed up by training and procedures.
-
Can anyone tell me any code that allows a timer to be fitted to an electronic release door.
This is a medium secure mental health establishment with electronic releases that require timers for the staff to react before the inmates.
-
Brian
Are you suggesting a green break glass box with a delay between operation and the door unlocking?
If so then this is probably not a suitable solution. The delay would apply at all times and so should a member of staff be first at the door even then a rapid exit may not be possible. It sounds as though a greater level of security is appropriate and apart from keys, electronic card readers, security code locks there is quite a lot of biometric based security equipment coming on the market, some of which may be suitable for exit doors in secure units where staff will always be required to supervise evacuation and security in an emergency. Better to avoid keys and cards if possible due to the staff becoming a target to obtain the key.
If I have misinterpreted your question then please accept my apology.
-
Kurnal,
My guess is that Brian means that there is a timed delay before electromagnetically locked doors release on a fire alarm condition, so the staff have a bit of time to prevent unauthorised people leaving. In these circumstances there is probably no green call point anyway. My guess is Brian wants to know if there are any written recommendations in respect of the set-up he is questioning.
In respect of biometric being more secure than cards or prox. tokens, what if someone chopped off a finger or gouged the eye out of an authorised person? I've seen in done in sci-fi films so it's only a matter of time before it happens in real life! (I think it is probably this method Lucky uses to enable his wanderings around this home for the slightly bewildered we all inhabit so frequently!)
-
Thanks for your replies chaps. I actually mean a timed delay before an electronic keep that is linked to the fire alarm system unlocks the door when the fire alarm actuates.
-
Brian
How can you be sure that the staff will be in position before the timed delay expires? If I recollect a variation on this approach was discussed in the early IFE document by Graham Shiel - I an sure you have seen this Brian but if you have not email me and I could photocopy and post to you.
Wiz- get your finger out.
-
Wiz- get your finger out.
Kurnal - I'll have to keep an eye out for you if you are keeping tabs on me
-
Clearly there are situations where there has to be an element of security in some types of premises with a need to control ingress and egress but still providing a level of freedom of movement and independance within. The provision of electronic locking on final exit doors is probably the only reasonable way of doing so but this tends to be completely nullified by the placing of a green box beside it available to all.
These types of secure premises which prefers freedom of movement within the building are an alternative to incarceration in locked cells.
A risk assessment would take these special circumstances into consideration and the usual requirement for a manual override, I believe, could be dispensed with in this case.
A risk assessment is just a means of preventing the exposure of persons to risk taking the circumstances of the environment into consideration.