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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: Brian Catton on April 17, 2006, 01:18:17 AM
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I have a situation in an old part of a Hospital. There are three offices at second floor level served by an external and internal staircase. The internal staircase discharges into a corridor where there are offices that have to be passed to reach the main staircase. Two of these offices have windows that are under or directly to the side of the external escape and they do not have FR doors. AFD is installed in every risk room and the corridors. The windows to the offices have been sealed wiyth FR glazing in frames fixed shut and ventilation provided by a motorised extraction unit in each office. The problem is that the offices get very warm and are practically inhabitable during the summer and the fans are so noisy they have to be turned off. I am tempted to do a FRA that would result in findings that say the risk that an undetected fire would occur in these offices of such magnitude that it would prevent persons using the external staircase is very low indeed. Based on this we would reopen the windows. I know however this would be contrary to the Building Regs and HTM 81. My point is what is the point of doing a Fire Risk Assessment when you know that the outcome would be contrary to Design Codes. The estates manager is considering windows that would close on actuation of the AFD but this would cost £5000 and is it really necessary? We could also put FRSC doors with auto releases on the two offices, again very costly. I would be grateful for your views.
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Brian,
I assume the issue here is the occupants of the offices complain of hot working conditions in the summer months. If this is the case, would it not be better to look at improving the current ventilation / air con, rather than reducing the current fire precautions to achieve more comfortable working conditions.
I know prescriptive standards can be restrictive but I would be a little concerned to see you put your name to FRA that reduces the level of compartmentaion to achieve a cooler office. Yes in terms of the welfare regs you have to provide a balanced working environment, but I’m not sure that a FRA is the medium to achieve this.
Sorry if I’ve interpreted this the wrong way, but it is late.
Paul
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Brian,
I agree totally with Ps. The hospital needs to look at the root cause of the problem rather than compromise the integrity of the protection. You know what they say about compromise - everyone gets what nobody wants!!! IMHO The ventilation / aircon needs to be sorted.
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To raise an old argument, I do not believe you can use your risk assessment to determine that the risk of a fire occurring is so low that standards that have been set for life safety can be reduced.
The fire may occur only once in 400 years but it could occur tomorrow. What you can do is determine that if a fire does occur the speed and development, coupled with the time to detection and time for evacuation results in a safe building.
I don't think we have enough information here to answer the question you pose Brian. I am not suggesting the opening of the windows is ok, but I am sure I am not the only person who has seen unnecessary fire protection provided on the recommendations of over zealous inspectors or BCOs.
It may be perfectly acceptable to open the windows if no-one has to pass the window i.e. are there alternatives that could be used. Are we talking about patient access areas together with office use or are no patient access areas involved here?
Come on chaps we must move away from the idea that if a code or guide recommends something it has to be there regardless of the risk.
I repeat I am not talking about risk of fire occurring. I am talking about the risk posed by the consequence of a fire.
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Completely agree Phil.
I think all of us are very well aware of BCO's being over zealous in trying to enforce prescriptive standards. I don’ think any of us actually believe you must always stick to the letter of the design codes etc.
I think the issue here is the fact that Brian has told us that there are two escape stairs, one internal and one external. Occupants working in the offices must traverse the offices internally or pass over windows for the same offices via an external escape.
You would assume occupants working on a floor where the only method of escape is vertically are able bodied and can escape unaided ( yes wrong to assume but this is the information we have). Brian already states that AFd is provided in all risk areas, does this mean all offices? What type of AFd is provided?
As you suggest Phil, you would assume that occupants would be able to escape given the active fire precautions provided, and the ability of the occupants to escape. My thread above was more concerned with using a FRA as the medium to reduce the level of fire precautions to achieve a more comfortable working environment. Challenge the building regs and design codes with adequate justifications yes, FRA to this no.
Paul
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Working on the basis that a Fire Risk Assessment is actually the journey to an outcome and that the assessment will look at hazards and then the likelihood/severity of an incident occurring, there is no problem at all with undertaking the FRA. Regardless of the guidance in HTM or B1 or any similar document, we are talking about risk, the reduction and prevention of it. Without knowing the whole circumstances, it is, as has already been discussed, difficult to work out exactly what is required to do the 2 things above. A fire in the circumstances stated with not develop unnoticed by staff or AFD, therefore, in its incipient stages it could be tackled by trained staff. It is unlikely, unless an arsonist chose to do this, that 2 or more fires will commence at the same time in the same place and thereby take out both escape routes. It seems an anomaly then that an external escape staircase should require protection if the other staircase has sufficient capacity to allow all persons present to escape. Of course if both staircase are required then this is a different ball game.
Brian, do the FRA and find the outcome on a logical basis, at least that way expenditure on air con etc, can be justified wothout impinging on peoples safety. To work the other way around just invites a problem to occur. You never know you may find justification.
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You are all absolutely right more info is required. Phil I have considered the consequences but could not put a score of more than two to the assessment based on the 5 x 5 matrix.
If we look nat the hazards and control measures we have.
Electricity - Circuits tested according to a PPM
Electrical appliances - tested in accordance with a PAT programme.
Arson. - The offices are within an area secured by coded locks. All staff are trained annually and it is a none patient area
AFD - is tested in accordance with BS 5839 Part1 2002 by a national certified company on a contract basis.
Housekeeping - flammable waste is removed daily and combustibles in the offices are kept to a minimum.
The Fire Risk assessment is reviewed annually by an external consultant.
The risk according to my assessment would probably be scored at 4 Likelihood 2 Consequences 2
That still leaves me with my original dilemma and one that I have always found perplexing. Why do we need additional protection just because national guides say so..
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Brian
I repeat my belief that likelihood x consequence is not appropriate for fire risk assessments. It is not the likelihood you are interested in as I said in my first reply it may not be likely to happen but it may happen tommorow.
What is of importance is likely development and time for evac vs tenability.
Take your fish-gutting factory, stone masons, church etc...the type of premises that so many people claim have a low possibility of fire occuring...I think many people miss the point.
You still have a reasonably foreseeable chance of a fire occuring unless you have no electricity supply and no persons are ever allowed to enter. Not a very practical building I would suggest!
Once you introduce these two possible ignition sources surely you have a likelihood of fire. What you don't usually have is likelihood of significant or rapid development that would compromise means of escape.
There are in my opinion a lot of defective methodologies....PAS79 to name but one that considers likelhood of fire a factor to consider when providing protective measures.
Likelihood is of importance so that property protection & mission continuity can be improved but you cannot remove necessary life safety protection because likelihood of fire occuring is considered very low.
On your final point I do not think you do need additional protection just because a guide says so. Guides are good benchmarks but we need to look at the actual risk and provide what is appropriate.
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National guides serve as abenchmark, without which risk assessment is meaningless. Ideally we could just set the level of acceptable risk using an absolute value (say 42!). But this is almost impossible to do and fire risk assessments would take so long to do that the country would grind to a halt.
The simple risk matrix you are talking about is nothing more than a handy way of comparing risks relatively. They do not give an absolute value.
Instead we have standards and guides that suggest what should be done in different types of building. If, for some reason, you wish to do something else then you need to consider the implications.
In the case you are talking about the national guides say use FR glass to protect the escape route. This would be based on a presumption about the level of risk in the offending accomodation. The powers that be are saying that we should take account of a potential fire in this accomodation on the escape routes from above.
If this accomodation contained no fire loading or such a low fire load that a fire likely to threaten this escape route was very unlikely then (this is where I disagree with Phil) you could argue that the FR Glass is unnecessary. However what you have said so far does not convince me. The provisions you have listed would be (near enough) what would have be expected in a code compliant building.
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Sorry Brian but on which point do you disagree with me? It appears very spookily that you are agreeing with me. If there is little or no chance of fire development I don't see the need for fr glazing.
That is entirely different from doing away with fr glazing because a fire is unlikely to occur. It is not likelhood of occurence but likelihood of development that matters.
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Brian and other friends
I hope to cause no offence or frustration by stating what may be blindingly obvious but in practical terms:
You are absolutely right to minimise the risk of a fire breaking out and developing in this building, definately the right first consideration. But in every H&S arena we need to have an emergency plan to cater for something going wrong. In the Chemical Industry its a bund wall, in the healthcare industry its standard precautions, and electricians use insulated tools to work on circuits that they know are isolated. And in our industry its the right level of passive and maybe active precautions and good procedures.
In practical terms, in the building in question,
How many vertical exit routes do we need in this building (according to the guidance given in benchmark codes)?
What is the minimum standard of passive measures that would be recommended by the benchmark codes?
If we need two escape routes is there any chance of a fire cutting off both routes simultaneously?
If we need to separate the routes, does the separation between the routes have to be via fire resisting glazing or could the line be drawn elsewhere, for example the corridor doors?
Or if we dont provide passive separation could we use active measures to provide an equivalent or better degree of safety?
The benchmark codes tend to go a little overboard in always recommending the protection of external escapes. Internal stairs in offices etc only require one door to separate them so why should we always require two lines of separation if one of them is external?
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Kurnal, you are perhaps correct. However, wasn't Buncefield built to prescriptive standards? I think we would all agree that we need benchmarks but the interesting thing is that we can veer either side of them if we carry out a risk analysis. Knowing what the benchmark is can be a start, knowing the risk a second and computing the risk against the benchmark may give you an answer. If we apply benchmark standards all the time nothing would get built, certainly not the Gherkin in London and other equally fine buildings across the UK. The substitution of one thing for another to enhance the opportunity to build has taken place for many years, we certainly would not build a Pyramid now. Surely the approach should be to analyse the risk against the benchmark standard, in this case HTM, and assess it. The interesting point of course, is where the prescription came from in the first instance, if anyone knows or can remember and, is it suitable now. "You cannot reverse a fire engine more than 20 metres, why, because horses in the long ago days would not walk backwards further than that or its imperial conversion rate". However, B5 and BS5588 Part 5 still say the same thing, is it relevant to those vast new trucks and their skilful drivers? I could be more boring, the point is do an FRA assess it all from benchmark standards and make a decision based on "as low as reasonably practicable" and defend that if necessary in a court of law.
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Phil,
I agree that your point raises a fundimental question about fire safety.
There does not seem to be a consensus that the risk of ignition should be considered separately from the risk to life from fire development.
I tend to agree that if there is a significant (whatever that is) chance of ignition then sufficient measures should be in place to allow safe escape.
However do you consider that a system like OxyReduct that reduces the likelyhood of ignition without removing the fuel would compensate for removal of basic escape route protection?
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Excellent point Steve! There is always an exception to the rule, except in mathematics which is the exception to the rule that there is always an exception to the rule......
Yes with a oxyreduc system I concur there would not be a risk of fire occuring and so some protection could therefore be removed. But usually in normal conditions there will always be a risk of fire occuring.
In my opinion this is a fundamental point that many seem to miss.
I believe when we talk about fire risk we should be looking at the potential for a fire to cause harm when it occurs not the potential for a fire to occur. Because in all premises (except those with oxyreduc) containing people and/or electricity you have an ignition source and so a potential for a fire to occur. If the only fuel available is a wet fish you may reduce fire protection because rate of development will be very slow.
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Yes with a oxyreduc system I concur there would not be a risk of fire occuring and so some protection could therefore be removed. But usually in normal conditions there will always be a risk of fire occuring.
Assuming the system works, the ingegrity is maintained and that oxygen levels are reduced to the correct level for that fuel. Fuels need different oxygen levels to burn. A new fuel might be introduced.
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Absolutely Chris..
We must surely be assuming the system works!....or are you suggesting we need additional control measures in case it fails?
................and if a new fuel were introduced the risk assessment should be revised and changes may be required.
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PhilB Are you suggesting we can totally rely on an active fire precautions, assuming they work, and not as a complimentary feature to a under parr passive means of escape.
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I don't like relying totally on active systems but we must be assuming the systems provided work. In some cases that will mean providing additional control measures.
We are never going to persuade people to install expensive preventitive & protective measures if we then tell them that they also have to install additional measures in case of system failure.
My opinion only of course.
I mean what's the chance of a fire occuring when your sprinkler system is down....unless you run a Primark store in Leicestershire!!!!
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Interesting isn't it, nowadays we give away passive fire protection for technology, electronic fire alarms with AFD, but want to go no further. We also would not allow electronic devices to open doors or hold them open. If a fire occurred we would be hung out to dry. Where are the fires? Technology has moved on, we have moved on, the question is, have the people and their human behaviour moved on as well. Technology and passive protection, belt and braces all we need now is a piece of string and we will be happy.
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No jokar in my opinion if you cannot achieve a satisfactory MOE by passive means, because of design or other reasons, then you supplement it with technology which I consider is not belt and braces. Technology has moved on but as to its reliability I saw in the news today people were suspended in a cage above a river in New York because the electric supply failed and the backup system failed also.
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I mean what's the chance of a fire occuring when your sprinkler system is down....unless you run a Primark store in Leicestershire!!!!
don't you mean what's the chance of a fire "developing"?
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No Brian, of course there is every chance of a fire developing when the sprinklers are down.... a tad unlucky for a fire to have occurred that very day.
Good to see you're paying attention though!
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Oh I see, so probability is relevant then?
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jokar
You touched on a very important point that is easily overlooked but but is a predominant factor in all of this, human behaviour. The risk assessment may well be spot on on the monday and the office accommodation may pose little cause for concern. On Tuesday, however, the new photocopier arrives and the old one is temporarily stored in the corner - it was faulty anyway, and the bags of shredded paper are usually puit out on a tuesday but , well, 'the phone went and I had to pick the kids up, so i'll do it on wednsday, and this damn printer is playing up again. Never mind, i'll sort it tomorrow after i've dealt with that big delivery we are expecting, havn't got time today. etc, etc,etc. By Friday, the office is a completely different environment, the person doing the risk assessment is the other end of the building completely oblivous to the changes, and the office staff are unaware of the increase in risk they have created by everyday occurances.
PhilB
I totally agree with your point regarding the risk of development being the crucial factor but would suggest that the risk can be variable from day to day and the protection should take into account the worst case scenario and not the 'average' day to day risk.
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I get told off for saying "worst case"- reasonably pessimistic is a more acceptable term- worst case is that the office workers all decide to soak their desks in petrol and have a fireworks party.
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To All who have contributed to this Topic, so far.
I have folled the postings on the various opinions, [ because that is what they are] regarding RRA's... and i'm astounded by a lot of the comments.Instead of reducing the onus on Indusry what has been suggested bythe many parties involved with the RRO, in fact increses the financal burden, instead of doing the exact opposite, the Government is announciating. BSI PAS 79.. must be a good guide to follow, but relying on the RRA alone, by people who may not be fire safety professions, then a set of fire losses, and infinately more important life losses, is waiting to happen. I confess to being a former FPO of the " Old School".....so may leave myself open to be called " living in the past", but I am willing to wager a small bet that in say 5 years from now fire safety in this country will be in a worse state, than it is now, under the FPA. The suggestions, by some on here, that not only do premises need satisfactory active and passive systems but may need back-up to thosesystems, almost beggers belief, and what I find more distrubing is the constant, apparent lack of reference to " LIFE SAFETY". Providing the most luxurious devices is not the answer, although of course the manufacturers will lead you to believe so, but by keeping things simple, providing value for money and always seek the best advice available, should ensure that the values of safety are maintained.
I will .look forward to reading any responses.
Conqueror.
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Conqueror
Nice rant.
I dont think you fully underatsand what people have been saying (or maybe I don't).
Back ups are nothing new, are you suggesting that fire alarms and escape lighting shouldnt need secondary power supplies?
As for The FPA I think people overestimate how good it has been. Most premise are not covered by the certification process. Many premise with certificates are ina poor state because certificates dont get updated.
In practice I dont think business will have too many problems with the new approach. The real benefit (assuming F&RAs dont sack all their staff) is that inspectors should spend more time inspecting and less time drafting certificates.
Obviosely we have been talking about life safety - what did you think we were talking about?
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As for The FPA I think people overestimate how good it has been. Most premise are not covered by the certification process. Many premise with certificates are in a poor state because certificates dont get updated.
I agree with you wee brian most premises were not covered by the certificate process but they were covered by the FPA and other legislation admistered by the fire service. To the effectiveness of this legislation check out the fire fatalities in the early seventies (1000+) and by the end of the centry almost zero for non domestic premises. I do not think people overestimated how good it has been.
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The future is bright, the future, well is the future. If we could read or know what will happen then we could bet on Arsenal winning the European Cup and have a double with Brazil winning the World Cup. One thing is for sure we will all have to embrace change, a significant culture change for FSO's and those who control premises. Fires, who knows, shopping centres with their innovation were supposedly the fires of the future, engineered solutions in premises the same, but still fire deaths in commercial buildings are falling. Is that because of FPA, I think not in total, is it about educating the public, possibly, is it about responsibility, probably. We have no choice but to work on together, fire safety professionals and non professionals. The point about releasing FSO's to do more inspections is not the case, they will have more time but will also have more premises. The emphasis will be on communication with those responsible and educating those people further. "How have they made their premises safe for people to work in and to leave in case of an incident". The FRA is a journey that the Responsible Person or their representative will undertake to assess, audit, if you prefer the current position in a premises. Additional control measures may be required, either technology, passive fire safety or in certain instances, management and staff policies. Thats one side, the other is the FSO who will want to know the outcomes of the journey, what was found, what happens next and in what time frame. A comms process away from a complete physical inspection. The FRA is useless to an FSO, the outcomes are the bits they should be interested in. The fact that there is an FRA may be a bonus but if the managers are unaware of the content or how the safety issues from fire come out of it, the document is useless, you may just as well throw it away. The other bit of course that fire deaths are in non commercial premises and it may be that enforcing authorities just deal with those areas to reduce that impact and leave those with commercial premises to their own devices.
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well said
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Yes jokar I agree with most of your last post, but the last statement "and leave those with commercial premises to their own devices" never, if this happens twenty or thirty years down the line fire professionals will saying what they are saying about domestic fire deaths now. Do not ignore history try to reduce ALL fire deaths.
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Possibly, however, we may not get the choice, enforcing authorities will choose the areas they wish to become involved with and target them as they are allowed. The fact that there has to be an Inspection programme under the FRS Act 2004, ie the National Framework document may lead to commercial premises being inspected but only those who control the enforcing authority will decide on that and the content of their own inspection programme.
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I agree with you only time will tell.
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We are never going to persuade people to install expensive preventitive & protective measures if we then tell them that they also have to install additional measures in case of system failure.
That's not my problem. One should be open about a system's limitations. If one can't persuade a client to install a system while being open about the system's limitations then either the solution or the presentation of the solution need to be improved.
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I see, so if I pay for an expensive sprinkler system in my building I cannot relax any passive fire protection just in case the day the fire occurs my sprinkler system is down.
Why then should I bother paying for an expensive system?
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I see, so if I pay for an expensive sprinkler system in my building I cannot relax any passive fire protection just in case the day the fire occurs my sprinkler system is down.
Why then should I bother paying for an expensive system?
You have changed the hypothesis, we were not talking about a sprinkler system.
I would see it differently. I would say that now you have your sprinkler system you have to know it's limitations, you can only store good of a certain type to a certain height and should it be non operational, you must provide other risk control mechanisms for that duration.
I think with a sprinkler system, you can typically have larger fire compartments, but there must be a limit to these compartments so tha if the system fails fire cannot spread unchecked. Surely this is accepted practise and not some radical idea I have put forward?
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Perhaps the sprinklers will save part or all of the building but the passive fire safety measures or the early warning systems will save lives.
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The other bit of course that fire deaths are in non commercial premises and it may be that enforcing authorities just deal with those areas to reduce that impact and leave those with commercial premises to their own devices.
Granted, there are few fire deaths in commercial premises, but to leave them to their own devices? Who exactly will be responsible for enforcement in that case?
Commercial premises have legal duties regarding fire safety, and to be honest, I've found it shocking how few of them actually comply to current legislation. Leaving them alone would be dangerous..... they wouldn't bother until something goes wrong, and I've seen quite a few where there is that possibility, even in my short time in Fire Safety.
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Perhaps the key here is that the Government and the business stakeholders believe that those in the field of commerce have the ability, expertise and reason for caring for their staff and others. In a business sense, the blue chip companies will look after themselves but there has always been a difficulty with small to medium size businesses especially with the fact that most never recover after a fire. The question is for enforcing authorities, "which are the high risk premises and where do they spend time and resources to safe life from fire? But, as Baldyman rightly queries, in a time of saving money where does it get saved, not in stock or staff bit in things that appear unimportant and unfortunately, even though the consequences can be disaster, fire safety items are an easy option.
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The risk inspection programme is mainly driven by life risk, not necessarily the premises risk.
I never hide the fact that owners/employers will be held accountable for any person being injured or, god forbid, dying during a fire at their premises as part of my introduction talk during inspections. I also find that those persoms who don't really care for the safety of their staff (and there are plenty out there) suddenly become very interested in what they can do.
This is purely my own opinion, but if an employer isn't prepared to spend, for example £1,000 on fire safety issues, then that is the value he/she places on a life....... totally unacceptable in my book.
I agree that larger companies will look after themselves, but they don't always do a good job as I have discovered. They like to make money, don't like spending it and think it's OK to sit on a quote for repairs to fire safety items for 3 months.......... but it isn't.
I have also discovered that some of the smaller companies are the ones that do a good job, and take full responsibility for safety matters. They know they can't spend large amounts of money in one go, so have a work schedule with funds allocated, usually the result of the risk assessment significant findings. Can you argue with someone who hasn't got it all in place at the time but is making progress and has identified the problems? I don't think so, but again, thats my opinion.