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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: Paul2886 on September 06, 2007, 08:35:19 AM
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When is an inner room not an inner room? We probably all know the rules about inner rooms and access rooms re. vision panels and detection etc.
A client of mine has insisted that the status of an inner room room has been removed simply by removing the door between it and the access room.
So advice please, is it still an inner room, or does in now form part of the access room and if yes; how wide does the now permanant opening need to be before it all becomes one room.
Incidently both the rooms are being used as bedrooms in a resi home. Now its claimed that it's one bedroom with two clients sharing. Hmm
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It all looked pretty a simple issue until the last sentence. I would say it is still an inner room.
If a room is made bigger you should be able to swing a bigger cat in it. Can you do that in this case?
Sorry to make light of it so early in the morning.
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Had my caffeine fix so in better form to give an opinion.
I don't think the labelling is the issue but more of the layout of the two rooms and why we apply VPs or AFAs.
The main question is will the fact that it is a sleeping arrangement be an issue. Some will say that it should not provided the compensatory factors are applied. Myself I have to say that, being a code hugger, especially when it comes to sleeping risks, I would go for the inner room bit where codes say that, other than for dwellings, they should not be used for sleeping.
If the codes did not say it I would be inclined to assess it as probably OK.
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It all comes down to the travel distance (if you can get to exit with 6metres) then in principal there shouldn't be too much of an issue however by virtue of that it would mean that both rooms wouldnt be very big.
And also CSCI may not accept that scenario as all service users should be entitled to privacy, and clearly if the door is removed the resident of that bedroom clearly wouldnt have any privacy.
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CSCI do accept shared rooms. You see my point here it was a simple scenario. When first visited as it was an inner bedroom. Now the door is removed claims are that it's now one room.
So the question is, does the removal of a 762mm door alter its status and if not, what size of permenant opening would. Both rooms have smoke detection within. Is it too early in the day for this?
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A number of issues here of course. The new code higger guides allow the access room to be used for sleeping so thats ok. The term is now adequate vision and you will have that if you can see from one room to another. Travel distance is always a key feature and should meet the single distance of travel tables unless risk assessment means otherwise. My question is about the Fire Alarm system and where the detection is sited inthis sleeping risk premises?
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For me, our post crossed by the way, with detacetion that will give arly warning provided the travel distances are ok, I would not consider it an inner room.
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Thanks for your comments. However the question of adequate vision is not my concerns.
My problem is that if any removal is required of the resident in the 'inner room' it will only be done by staff members as its a nursing home.
The resident, like most in nursing homes, will not react to a fire alarm sounding or the visible signs of smoke. If a fire occurred in the 'access room' then that person at the rear is not reachable by staff. The FA made no mention of this situation on a recent visit.
Does it just require specific staff fire awareness training and careful look at any potential heat sources in the 'access room' to make the risk acceptable?
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A number of issues here of course. The new code higger guides allow the access room to be used for sleeping so thats ok. The term is now adequate vision and you will have that if you can see from one room to another. Travel distance is always a key feature and should meet the single distance of travel tables unless risk assessment means otherwise. My question is about the Fire Alarm system and where the detection is sited inthis sleeping risk premises?
Jokar.
An access room has always been allowed as a sleeping risk. What did you mean?
The vision bit is not an adequate compensatory feature for inner rooms which are used for sleeping. When someone is asleep there is no vision of any adequacy.
A risk assessment will always mean otherwise if the travel distance is in excess of the code.
As a matter of interest does anyone have a label for non code hugger? Respectfull answers only please.
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As a matter of interest does anyone have a label for non code hugger?
try 'heretic' or 'philistine !!! :-)
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an artiste
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'outlaw'
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What about "Misguided One"?
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I think the removal of the door doesn't necessarily make the inner room issue go away. If that was the case then under advice for the inner room situation the guidance would mention "remove the door" as one of the 3 options to get around it. I would suggest removing the door is not enough. The door must go and the plasterboard/bricks above it all the way to the ceiling.
Realistically it is still an inner room and because it is used as sleeping accomodation a smoke detector is required in the access room.
A non code hugger is known as an "asset" or "cost effective"
Please note "assets" are not to be confused with "incompetant, live life on the edge, nut jobs"
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When is an inner room an inner room is probably a little like the question of what is the difference between a boat and a ship?
Well, put simply, the boat is the thing you get into when the ship is sinking
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What about "Misguided One"?
or even 'unguided one'!
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If one is unguided then one is possibly lost.
Therefore "Lost One"
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In my non code hugging opinion inner rooms should not usually be used for sleeping regardless of wether there is a door between them. The new CLG guides think it's ok though!
Please don't confuse moving away from guidance with lowering of standards. Those competent code huggers amongst you will know the difference. Sometimes alternative approaches achieve safer and more cost effective solutions.
If your reason for sticking rigidly to a book is lack of confidence in your professional judgement may I respectfully suggest another profession may be in order!
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Hi PhilB, Of all said regarding inner rooms you last comment sums up my sentiments completely. For instance, regarding code huggers, who's idea was it to put push bars on final exits in care homes where access can't be gained by staff from the outside to remove residents from an unaffected area.
Yet never seen a mention of a device that should be fitted to the outside of the fire exit door that maintains the necessary security but can be breached by staff to evacuate the residents from an unaffected compartment. Does any code ask for this?....never seen one myself.
All of this is assuming that the internal route to these residents is cut off by the products of fire....hope all that makes sense
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I must admit to having suggested the removal of doors between rooms at times to create a more effective space and overcome 'room off room' type issues - but only in non-sleeping accommodation. I have however also asked for the removal of the door frame to discourage ready replacement of the solid door. Provided that all other considerations such as travel distances and fire protection are OK and the only remaining issue is one of vision panels, a great door-shaped gap should be more effective than the usual G-wired pane. All subject to risk assessment - of course. Does this make me a heretic?
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Hi PhilB, Of all said regarding inner rooms you last comment sums up my sentiments completely. For instance, regarding code huggers, who's idea was it to put push bars on final exits in care homes where access can't be gained by staff from the outside to remove residents from an unaffected area.
Yet never seen a mention of a device that should be fitted to the outside of the fire exit door that maintains the necessary security but can be breached by staff to evacuate the residents from an unaffected compartment. Does any code ask for this?....never seen one myself.
All of this is assuming that the internal route to these residents is cut off by the products of fire....hope all that makes sense
Hopefully with proper fire seperation and protection of corridors and stairways, staff should not have to go out of a building to try and make an entry through an other door to effect a rescue.
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How do you define a room?
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Really, This is a big deal about nothing. The reason that inner rooms are a problem are that the fire can develop within the access room unoticed by the occupant thereby making escape impossible. The reason for the AD B solutions is to stop this occurring by either in the case of vision panels allowing the occupant of the inner room to observe the fire or leaving a gap at the top of partition walls allows the occupant of the inner room to smell or hear the fire. AFD obviously detects the fire in its early stages and alerts the occupant. The fact that the door is removed gives the occupant three potential methods of detecting the fire , hearing, smell, sight.
I would suggest that this is probably enough. The fact that the occupant is non ambulant and can not save themselves is effectively niether here nor there because in that case they are reliant on outside help and therefore another party needs to be alerted therefore AFD would be reqiuired for that purpose as is the case in all Res Care premises.
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Nearlythere, sorry rushing at the time I meant an inner room is now allowed for sleeping.
More to the point, is there any reason why the door cannot be reinstated. AFD in the access room will allow early detection, the door willl give privacy and travel distance is whatever it is.
As regards Greg's post, perhaps an area bounded by walls, a ceiling and a floor.
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Nearlythere, sorry rushing at the time I meant an inner room is now allowed for sleeping.
maybe I am still confused about what you meant,but according to ADB latest edition you should not have a bedroom as an inner room (3.10 para b)
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Jokar,
Does it need a door? I presume you mean an enclosed space. If thats the case then removing a door between two adjacent rooms just makes a bigger enclosed space therefore one room no inner room situation.
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Pip,
That is only for new builds. The guidanceand it is only guidance from CLG allows sleeping in inner rooms.
I would not have thought a door makes a difference unless it is required for protection and I agree with you.
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Nearlythere, sorry rushing at the time I meant an inner room is now allowed for sleeping.
maybe I am still confused about what you meant,but according to ADB latest edition you should not have a bedroom as an inner room (3.10 para b)
Right Pip. According to us Code Huggers that is the case but according to the Unguided you can.
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personally i don't like the idea,even with AFD I would still like the additional(if possibly small) chance that I might be alerted by smell etc and wake up.Maybe I just like my 'comfort zone'.
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Hi PhilB, Of all said regarding inner rooms you last comment sums up my sentiments completely. For instance, regarding code huggers, who's idea was it to put push bars on final exits in care homes where access can't be gained by staff from the outside to remove residents from an unaffected area.
Yet never seen a mention of a device that should be fitted to the outside of the fire exit door that maintains the necessary security but can be breached by staff to evacuate the residents from an unaffected compartment. Does any code ask for this?....never seen one myself.
All of this is assuming that the internal route to these residents is cut off by the products of fire....hope all that makes sense
Hopefully with proper fire seperation and protection of corridors and stairways, staff should not have to go out of a building to try and make an entry through an other door to effect a rescue.
Hopefully Nearlythere...but ifyou do a little research you will come across the example Paul referred to above. Elderley persons unable to operate the push bar device and staff unable to reach them.
Yet the building complied entirely with the guide. As I have said many times before the guides/codes do not always offer the best solution.
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Paul said "Yet never seen a mention of a device that should be fitted to the outside of the fire exit door that maintains the necessary security but can be breached by staff to evacuate the residents from an unaffected compartment. Does any code ask for this?....never seen one myself."
Other than a key which can be dropped, lost or left at home, is there such a thing as an intellegent lock which can tell the difference between friend or foe? Never seen one of those either.
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Pip,
That is only for new builds. The guidanceand it is only guidance from CLG allows sleeping in inner rooms.
I would not have thought a door makes a difference unless it is required for protection and I agree with you.
aha just read that in the guide.still dont like it though!:-(
But I guess it must occur in some Hotel suites.
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Regardless of what any book says the situation Paul describes in my opinion is far from ideal. As he points out it's the difficulty staff may have evacuating residents if there is a problem in the access space.
But if the book says it's ok, it's ok. I'm beginning to get the hang of this!
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PhilB, You seem to get the point I'm making.
I have undertaken a number of mock evacuations in care homes and this problem arises on a number of occasions where I deliberately block the 'access' space saying its smoke filled, leading to a final exit fitted with just a push bar .
The staff are absolutely stumped on how to gain entry to the 'safe' space via a final exit that is fitted with a push bar which in most cases cannot be opened externally. Where this situation may arise, where it often does, I strongly recommend an external lock also on the door. Ok, not ideal as it may require a remote key or other method.
My point to others is that just a push bar accords with the codes, which can fall short of suiting all situations. And why do you need a push bar on a final exit in a care home where only a very small number of residents and staff may use it. They used to be called 'panic bars' remember. Fire risk assessments in care homes are not a matter of just ensuring the codes are met but looking at the logistics and the ability of evacuating elderly infirmed people.
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Paulm I agree with you entrirely on the subject of panic bars on final exits in care homes and the evacuation strategy needing to consider whether in some cases staff may need to gain access from the outside - there are many cases where the layout of the home may need them to do this. And sometimes a key is the only way to achieve this. But my experience is that when I come across these situations and try to explain the logic to the staff or management I am met with bewilderment- We see what you mean but why hasnt someone pointed that out before?
Nearlythere- You could look at biometric locks that recognise fingerprints but I have never come across one of thses with a fail safe function- usually they are used for access to high security rooms.
The inner room situation- I dont necessarily see the inner room rules in the codes as the main issue in this situation becuase the rules as generally written are all about being made aware of a fire inthe access room before your escape is cut off.
I asssume there will be full detection covering both rooms to an L1 standard.
If in this case the occupant of the room is entirely dependent on staff then the issue is whether a fire in the access room could prevent the staff reaching the inner room and this is dependent on layout, contents, management etc.
Within reasonable travel distances and with good control and safe layout I dont think it needs to be seen as a problem.
One last thought on vision panels- ADB says they should give a good view of the access room and needn't be bigger than 0.1m2. How on earth that can give a decent view of an access room has always been beyond me.
A non code hugger is probably a risk assessor.
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One last thought on vision panels- ADB says they should give a good view of the access room and needn't be bigger than 0.1m2. How on earth that can give a decent view of an access room has always been beyond me.
A non code hugger is probably a risk assessor.
And if the vision panel could give a decent view of the room despite it's small size and position they are often covered with notices or posters etc. because their purpose is not understood by the occupants.
On Pauls point about push-bars in care homes I can see little point in fitting them as the occupants are usually unable to operate them. Furthermore you don't often get stampeding hoards of residents during an evacuation so such devices are not necessary.
As I have said previously this is an example of a building complying with a guide/code yet being unsuitable for the proposed use.
Some posters on this forum seem to think that I advocate reducing standards to save money, that is not the case. I do however recommend risk appropriate solutions that sometimes step outside published guidance.
Guides are just guides and should be treated as such and not clung onto regardless of their relevance in particular situations.
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Surely a panic bar is easier to operate as an 88 year old arthritic resident who couldn't operate a thumb turn or similar. I was always under the impression that push bars were supposed to be opearted by all, including the elederly and children?
I don't see the problem with not being able to access via a final exit. If the building is on fire, nobody should be going back into the building, assisting with the evacuation if you are already in the building perhaps but I would like to see the risk assessment that recommends employees should enter a building that is on fire, especially a building thats main entrance is smoke logged....
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OK Big T
Consider a single storey res care home designed for progressive horizontal evacuaton.
The main entrance in the centre, each wing extends outwards at either side and may have one or more protected areas one leading to the next (with or without their own finalexit door) finally terminating in a final exit at the end of either wing.
The residents are wholly dependent on the staff for their safety and evacuation.
The fire occurs in a room halfway down one wing. The final exit doors are secured by panic bolts with no access from outside. How can staff get past the fire to assist those at the far end of the wing without going outside the building and coming in through the exit door?
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Surely the room on fire should have a self closer so the fire should be contained sufficiently to allow staff to evacuate the immediate area. Therefore the staff would operate the push bar and evacuate residents.
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What if it was a store cupbard on a corridor that contained a central heating clock and should have been shut but wasn't, and allowed the corridor to become smokelogged?
Or a pc in anursing station sited on the corridor itself
And there are many care homes that havn't yet got self closers on bedroom doors- yes its in the new guide since Oct 06 but many have not yet complied and are still designed to the old green guide standard with up to 12 bedrooms in a protocted area without self closers.
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Surely a panic bar is easier to operate as an 88 year old arthritic resident who couldn't operate a thumb turn or similar. I was always under the impression that push bars were supposed to be opearted by all, including the elederly and children?
I don't see the problem with not being able to access via a final exit. If the building is on fire, nobody should be going back into the building, assisting with the evacuation if you are already in the building perhaps but I would like to see the risk assessment that recommends employees should enter a building that is on fire, especially a building thats main entrance is smoke logged....
Well it happened in a care home in Tyne & Wear a few years ago. Residents trapped in a lounge unable to operate the push-bar. Staff unable to reach the lounge from the inside due to smoke filled corridors.
Surely the staff would be expected to enter the building to rescue those cut off!!! The fire was not in the room that they were trapped in.
The building complied with the current guidance, code-huggers take note.
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Kurnal, Although I see your point on the staff not being able to access the non affected areas, it would appear that that was due to a failing elsewhere in the fire strategy or fire precautions for the premises.
However, having said that, if the fire evacuation strategy was to access the building from the outside to assist escape then the fact that staff could not enter though external doors would be noted and access would have to be provided. This coould probably be done with mag lock doors attached to the fire alarm. Or a great big hammer:)
Since this has not been done one can only assume that that is not the strategy I've got to say that if I was a worker where the expectation was that I left the premises and then attempted to re enter the premises with no garauntee that it was not the fire compartment or likely to have become one then I would request BA, Fire Kit training etc. This might prove to be a bit onerous for the premises managers/owners than putting on self closers and employing enough staff to evacuate the residents properly and securely first time around.
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I certainly wish that these places would always have enough able staff to assist evacuation as needed in one operation. From experience, they may possibly have enough during the day but the night shift tends to be an entirely different matter.
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Greg - what you would ask for and what you would recive are two very different things. Many care workers do not have the clout to receive even the basic minimum wage.
Theres a huge pool of migrant workers willing to maintain this situation. But I dont entirely blame the care home operators, margins are so very tight because of th funding mechanism - local authorities dictate the maximum fees a care home will receive for those residents who are socially funded which is way below the commercial rate- I have a relative in a nursing home where he is self funding til his money runs out - £679 per week. The social services pay £275 per resident. Its time something was done about this crazy system.
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Re PhilB comments regarding the fire in Tyne & Wear if this is the same fire I attended, the reason the residents did not escape was due to their mental ability and not their ability to operate a panic fastening.
Staff actualy spoke to the residents by breaking a window from outside and tried to persuade them to leave via the fire exit but they did not respond. Fortunately the lounge door to the corridor was a fire resisting door fitted with smoke seals and this prevented any smoke from entering the lounge from a serious bedroom fire almost directly opposite the lounge.
The value of smoke seals was clealy demonstrated in other areas of this fire as residents were found in areas separated by compliant doors, totally unaffected by smoke.
This is one incident that I quote as a reminder that smoke seals are life savers and should always be recommended.
It is also a reason why I now ensure that final exit doors in residential homes have a handle on the outside so that staff assiting persons to leave can re open the doors in the event of it closing. However if the door is fitted with a self closer and a relocking panic fastening this can prevent them from re entering.
Most of the homes I now deal with have electromagnetic security locks on final exit doors that release on the fire alarm or by green break glass box, with no selfclosers that can cause the door to shut.
One more thing to think about when discussing evacuation procedures.
If any one would like more details of this incident let me know.
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I am starting to compile a list of errors in the fire safety order guides. Its to help me in possible future appeals/ legal cases because the local magistrates appear to be treating the guides as ACOPs and sacrasanct. I think that if I produce a list of errors in the documents it will help to discredit the code huggers arguments when push comes to shove.
Do we have any consensus on the comment on page 73 of the sleeping accommodation guide?
I think the bullet point that says "The inner room should only be used as sleeping accommodation if smoke detection is provided in the access room" is a mistake.
It would not be permitted for alterations or new buildings under the building regulations approved document B paragraph 3.10 b. I personally have a lot more confidence in the AD than I do the guides. I would be very nervous about justifying inner rooms as bedrooms in hotels and guest houses. All opinions welcome.
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A few 'problem areas' might include listed historic buildings used as hotels/guest houses and hotel suites where, if the situation is considered acceptable in risk assessment, smoke detection in the access room would be essential. However the bullet point seems to need 'beefing up' to emphasise that an inner room should not normally be used for sleeping accommodation unless entirely necessary for reasons of this nature.