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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Operational => Topic started by: Old legend on October 15, 2007, 02:05:49 PM
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Hi folks,
Just starting an MSc dissertation and thought I'd use this forum for some anecdotal research. My belief is that firefighters are now unsafe because the craft knowledge and skill required to apply Dynamic Risk Assessment has eroded. Would anybody care to agree or disagree with me by answering one of the following questions:
"I think new crew managers/commanders understand how to apply DRA because..."
"I think new crew managers/commanders don't understand how to apply DRA because...."
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"They don't understand the question!"
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OK, thanks, as you can tell I'm new at this. I've given it another approach but not much different I'm afraid. My fear is that someone's going to get hurt because they don't understand the concept of DRA.
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Sorry, i just couldn't resist. But seriously, my experience has always been that if the crews were outside it got defined as defensive, and inside squirting water as offensive. Many, if not all, FRAs require a DRA to be carried out (that's why firefighters are not Relevant Persons under the RRO when engaged in emergency work), but i suspect that it comes down to a simple tick list, such as have you turned off the electrics and gas, provided a covering jet etc.
The actual concept of carrying out a risk assessment, dynamic or not, is not one to be taken lightly, and requires certain skills and training for someone to be competent at it - just ask many of the correspondents on this forum! I'm sure that crew managers will eventually become more competent in this area, but by stating a defensive/offensive mode, Brigades can claim a DRA has been carried out. It would be interesting to know if any FRAs audit the DRAs to see if they are 'suitable and sufficient', and compare them to accident and near-miss stats on the fireground.
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It would be interesting to know if any FRAs audit the DRAs to see if they are 'suitable and sufficient', and compare them to accident and near-miss stats on the fireground.
How can you audit something that is dynamic without having a safety officer to monitor and audit the actions and decisions at the time they were carried out? I know some brigades do have monitoring officers but these usually attend the incident separately from the first attendance so their use is limited.
The tactical mode is just one outcome and very coarse summary of the significant findings.
What is really important is if offensive mode is selected, what are the hazards and the risks at the time of arrival, how are they being controlled, which SSOW are appropriate to this incident, are we working inside the SSOW and do the benefits of selecting offensive mode outweigh the risks?
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ALL FRS require DRA is carried out and by ALL staff. That 'many, if not all' was siad should be entirely disregarded. The importnace of the DRA in achieving the safe person is not something that any FRS would disregard. It is set as a crucial elemnt in allt he training and development we deliver, at every level. The modern CM is far more likley to apply the principles than his forebears, who, while doing basic RA that is common sense, was never trained in what it actually was. From the mid 90's onwards DRA has become core to what we do, indeed every single member of the FRS was sent a glossy A4 booklet and handy card on DRA, and we still issue these as partof every trainee course. The present day Ff knows what DRA is, applies it constantly and their managers get further training (such as IOSH) to aid supervisory decision making. That the FRS on scene are now far more likely to take a defensive role at soem incidents clearly demonstrates that DRA is now embedded within the service. Indeed such a move was unheard of in the not-too-distant past. Declaring the operational mode is the way that all FRS now ensure that they have a record of the DRA by the IC, and is a reminder to the IC that he/she must so declare, but is not DRA itself. DRA starts when you get up in the morning and select correct clothing, come to work and check equipment, when you then turn out, en route, don relevant PPE, on arrival and throughout every action that subsequently take splace - that is why it is DYNAMIC. (Not complete just examples).
Out of interest defensive does not mean outside suirting water in, no more than offensive means inside. You are operating in an offensive mode at any tiem where the RA has determined that additional control measures are required (we always wear fire kit so anything more than that) - so that you would be offensive if standing outside with a jet but having either a safety officer watching for building collapse (you are close enough you could eb affected) or wearing BA becasue thereis smoke present in your area - again examples. Defensive is water from monitors well back able to work without any additional controls.
Also there is no 'tick list' to do a DRA - it maybe includes awareness of hazards such as services supplies to a premises, but they are simply some of the hazards and subsequent risks that the person carrying out the DRA will consider. The Ff, in the building wearing BA in smoke and heat, has no tiem to use a checklist, or record the findings, they apply DRA by examining the situation using their skill, knowledge, training and experience to determine what controls they need apply - such as gas colling, door entry techniques, BA search pattern, withdrawal etc.
It is also a complete nonesense to suggest any FRS requires a DRA and there is therefore a connection with the RRO. The RRO does not include Ffs as relevant persons is that we are not going to be there while the premises are in normal use - it will already be on fire/other emergency event and normal risk reduction by the occupier could not be reasonable. It isn't our DRA, but the unfairness of placing the risk assessment upon the premises occupier that is the rationale for our exclusion from the RRO. We are covered when carrying out duties such as FS Act inspections (7 2 ds) and we would carry out DRA even then such is the meaning of DRA!
DRA is what any employee of any employer is requiured to do under HASAW and ours is more formalised through training, demonstration and some recording because of the very dynamic nature of our work. Other organisations have far more rigid working conditiosn so their RAs can be more readily written and the DRA is more a dra. If we didn't have our set DRA procedures, training na dbasic recording we would still be required, by law, to achieve safe working at any incident.
I conclude by saying that DRA is now widely understood, applied and embedded in everyting we do. The skills and knowledge of risk assessment of all staff are well above that of thos ein the past and development of managers has further H&S training at its core. Furthermore risk assessment is now a key performance criteria in every unit of every role within the FRS, sonot only is the individual intially trained they are constantly assessed against heir skill and knowledge. As a result the Ff of the 21st century is safer than his predecessors.
Sir the basic belief, on which your dissertation is based, is misheld.
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I would suggest that every potential OIC should get themselves to Moreton for the IMF course as providing a basis for new officers being competent as an OIC at an incident..
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To add to Fireftrm's already comprehensive post ....
Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations requires all employers to carry out suitable and sufficient risk assessments. Unfortunately, when outside a burning building or at an RTC, it is dificult to carry out a suitable and sufficent risk assessment when what is being assessed is in a continually changing state.
The HSE recognised this and allowed us to carry out a dynamic risk assessment in order to implement the necessary controls to minimse risk. The declaration of a tactical mode in the first message to service control identifies that this has been done. It does not negate the need for a full and proper risk assessment to be carried out and recorded at some time in the incident (depending on the nature of course).
The IMF is a base course ... it provides the basics. It does not make you competent.
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Old Legend
Well I agree with your assessment of the current situation for the following reasons. I think most fire authorities are just playing at risk assessment because as you say, the core firefighting skills are being eroded due to a reduction in incidents and most firefighters perception is that their managers feel that practical firefighting skills are secondary to IPDS and the gathering of a portfolio, Which is again secondary to Community Safety initiatives and Performance indicators (as they were called, I think)
Most people who can quote DRA inside out have never really had to apply it where it matters and that is in a life or death situation.
The reduction in the number of instances where new Crew Managers can apply DRA for example, and learn and develop their skills in a real-life situation will mean that their knowledge will be reduced.
the ideal scenario is an experienced person who has gained that knowledge through dealing with a vast number of fires and can use that experience to develop Crew Managers and explain how DRA really works- not quoting it verbatum from the book which means nothing to most firefighters if the truth be told.
Again, like yourself Old Legend, I will probably be classed as a Dinosaur but I served my "apprenticeship" in an era when Glasgow and most surrounding areas had really poor housing schemes and these created serious fires, usually with persons reported on most occasions. You learned by your experiences and this on the job training made you better at dealing with this type of incident.
PS.
we still used DRA but it was more related to practical firefighting skills and building construction and how it affects a fire as opposed to all this theory that most quote without really having had to apply it.
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Interesting comments ........
How can you say that "most fire authorities are just playing at it"?
Based on what evidence might I ask?
This is not something to "play" at, it is a requirement of law and must be applied. All firefighters must be able to identify hazards and risks and apply appropriate control measures ...... perhaps they don't realise that it is risk assessment.
Learning by experience is, in my opinion not acceptable. You gain experience by dealing with incidents and become adept at identifying hazard and risk. It is also not acceptable in this day and age to expose firefighters to unnecessary risk, even at a persons reported incident. Appropriate control measures must be applied and if that means defensive tactics, then that is what should be used.
Let us not forget that firefighter safety is paramount and we will take no risk to save life or property that is considered to be already lost. A harsh statement, but a fact of life.
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Let us not forget that firefighter safety is paramount and we will take no risk to save life or property that is considered to be already lost. A harsh statement, but a fact of life.
Thats the easy bit though isnt it. The hard bit comes when on balance of evidence it seems possible that a life may be saved but this involves committng firefighters into a risk situation. The DRA system says its ok to take a little risk to save a life. Nobody has ever quantified what a little risk is.
Number games would be useful for example -
-Consequences
-Liklihood of something going wrong
-Liklihood of success
-number of persons at risk needing rescue
-number of firefighters exposed to risk
and that would be a good subject for someones PHD.
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Not wanting to appear pedantic here, but I think this subject should contain the correct information.
The philosophy of the fire services approach to risk assessment (and this is taken directly from the Fire Service Manual Volume 2 (Fire Service Operations) Incident Command) is:-
Fire fighters will take some risk to save saveable life,
Fire fighters will take little risk to save saveable property
Firefighters will not take any risk at all to try to save lives or property that are already lost.
Personally, I don't think the decision to commit personnel is that easy. As an Incident Commander I have to accept the risk to my crew(s) and consequences should it all go the shape of a pear. No-one should be committed to a risk area until there are adequate resources and control measures in place to ensure their safety.
It's the balancing act of benefit and risk.
On the balance of evidence, there are other factors which I would look at, not just the hazards and risks. Again, a difficult call, but an assessment has to be made of the survivability of the conditions presented, information gathered on location of those missing, resource requirements etc etc ....
Modern houses are better insulated, construction techniques have changed and evolved and they themselves pose different risks when involved in fire to a "traditional" build.
Modern training course such as the IMF centre around incident command and risk assessment ...... and operating using safe working practices to ensure the safety of personnel.
There is no doubt that this is a good subject not just for a dissertation, but for a healthy debate also.
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If DRA is to ensure the safety of crews, why do we still suffer loss and injury? The use of the word ensure is a misnoma on the fire ground - surely it's got to be 'beyond reasonable doubt' to use a legal analogy?
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Ok I am a dinosaur but the job is dangerous and always has been. If we want to avoid loss and injury on the fireground, leave the crews in the station!
I always found that the major decision I had to make as an Incident Commander was to stop people entering the risk area and not whether to commit people. I had to trust on the experience and training of my crews not to over commit themselves and to withdraw if they thought fit. The whole thing was a team effort and relied on the training and experience of everybody.
As an Incident Commander I was always glad when one of the experienced firefighters sidled up to me and said "Guv would you like me to do..... or wouldn't it be a good idea if you....." and most of the time I took the advice. If I didn't I had a good reason not to.
At the end of the day the difference between a hero and a bloody idiot is that the hero got away with it!
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The other key words in the risk assessment process are "as low as is reasonably practicable"
Unfortunately loss and injury occurs because, despite every effort to reduce, eliminate and control risk, the environment is changing and there are occurances which cannot be predicted or contolled.
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Well, just thought I'd leave it a couple of days to see which way the wind blows. I can see the debate clearly has two camps and I will, respond with my views but to further fuel debate one of the influences behind my hypothesis is taken from the unprecedented publication of the detail in the Hertfordshire report of the investigation into the Harrow Court fire where two colleagues tragically lost their lives.
At the time they entered the compartment in which they lost their lives, they were without supervison, the decison to enter, the method of entry and the fact the entry was without the protection of water was 'their' decison. DRA starts with a safe person, asks that a split second decision on risk and benefit is taken. Is this DRA at work? I don't know anymore. After 36 years I thought I did, after being the author of a number of 'safe systems', I though I did. My fear, tinged with a little sadness for the potential conseuences is that just like stamping the tactical mode on a job in the early stages of deployment, DRA is simply a 'get out of jail free' card.
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Point of interest does anybody know how many firefighters lost their lives in the last 10 yrs since DRA has made the job so much safer and the 10 yrs before that when we just let things happen?
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The incident at Stevanage was tragic, but highlighted a number of issues and failings, not just the DRA.
I do not see the process as a "get out of jail free card". To declare a tactical mode, a risk assessment must have been carried out. It is not cast in stone and as the incident progresses continual asessment of hazard and risk will confirm that tactics are correct or require changing.
I refer to my previous post which says "Unfortunately loss and injury occurs because, despite every effort to reduce, eliminate and control risk, the environment is changing and there are occurances which cannot be predicted or contolled."
I stand by this statement having been at an incident where a colleague lost his life.
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twsutton,
I have most of the data that answers your question but unfortunatley due to copywright and confidentiality am unable to reproduce it here. I can say that the relationship of pre/post DRA has other dynamics that must be taken into account such as systems of work, frequency of response, quality of PPE, likelihod of entry pre 'defensive' tactics, appliances, equipment etc etc.
baldyman,
the issue for me is not the concept, its possessing the craft skill and knowledge that enables application of the concept, the mantra contained in the manual is the same found in the Home Office guide issued in 1997/8. We seemed to know and understand then. For the LFf/ SubO of the day they had been well tested in their craft knowledge having had to study a broad syllabus to answer a handful of questions as confirnation of that knowledge. Subsequently they had to demonstrate skill in safely deploying their crews. Then and only then would they 'qualify' to make such decisions.
Is the ITOP, are PQA's providing a stable of crew and watch managers/commanders with the same underpinning skill and knowledge? There is an 'expertise' element to the DRA equation whether we like it or not.
I wonder if the view that it's not a Performance Indicator, so train when you can also has some substance?
I am merely fuelling debate.
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fireftrm
I have to disagree with the statement that the "modern CM is more likely to". DRA was adopted at a time when we became all too acutley aware of the need to open doors and use water differently (or some of us anyway). Hot fire training became the new way. FRS invested many thousands on simulators that complied with the 'realistic training' requirement of the National Industries Group. Constraints on their use in recent years means a drastically reduced availability even though their use was a training watershed, when does the modern CM in the mission to gain competence evidence across the entire role map get the time to maintain such craft skills and knowledge?
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Old legend
I agree with you there are other factors to take into account but the principle factors are the numbers of injuries and fatalities. All the other factors you indicated post DRA should be improving the safety situation. I also do not understand why giving two numbers pre/post infringes copywrite and confidentiality we would not require a list of references.
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twsutton
Numbers I have look like 17 before and 9 after. With closer scrutiny from the HSE there were 7 Improvement Notices before and 19 after.
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twsutton
Numbers I have look like 17 before and 9 after. With closer scrutiny from the HSE there were 7 Improvement Notices before and 19 after.
Seventeen firefighters lost their lives operationally in the ten years prior to DRS (1997) I am extremely surprised at those figures I was operational then and I can only recall a couple of fatalities.
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Be careful about the broad figures the total number of fireifghters killed include those who were killed in RTAs on the way to incidents etc. DRAs will have no effect on these incidents.
The other side is to compare the death rate with other industries compared to agriculture, construction etc. the death rate in the fire service is very good.
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The increase in the number of improvement notices reflects the increase in activity by the HSE and our 'coming under the spotlight' far more than in the past. In addition H&S regulations have been extended over that period giving rise to more areas for HSE concern. Looking at some historical incidents I am fairly sure that improvement notices would have been a weekly affair, had the regulations, or enforcement body existed then.
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It would be interesting to see some statistics, I have often wondered whether firefighters were at greater risk when working outside their traditional core skills, ie whether there is a greater risk of accidents or death when involved in special services- on the roads, cliff, confined space or water rescues, compared to firefighting.
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It would be interesting to see some statistics, I have often wondered whether firefighters were at greater risk when working outside their traditional core skills, ie whether there is a greater risk of accidents or death when involved in special services- on the roads, cliff, confined space or water rescues, compared to firefighting.
You will be lucky Kurnal I have tried to get historical data on firefighters fatalities because I cannot accept that 17 firefighters died between 1987 and 1997. I was able to get limited data from 2000 to 2006 but before that a closed door. In America you have no problems you can go back to 1988 and get detailed information even there names.
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I had a look at the In Memorium part of Firenet (www.fire.org.uk/deaths.php) which gives the following numbers:
2007: 1
2006: 2
2005: 2
2004: 2
2003: 2
2002: 1
1996: 2
1989: 1
1987: 2
1977: 2
1958: 2
These refer to firefighters killed at incidents and I suspect that there are names missing from the list. From this there have been 10 killed after 1998 and 3 killed between 1988 and 1998.
Could I suggest that members of this forum check the list against the knowledge they have from their own brigade and add any additional details. Then perhaps we may get a better picture.
Also our fallen comrades should be remembered.
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As an Incident Commander I was always glad when one of the experienced firefighters sidled up to me and said "Guv would you like me to do..... or wouldn't it be a good idea if you....." and most of the time I took the advice. If I didn't I had a good reason not to.
Mike
When your experienced firefighter was using his/her initiative and suggesting ideas, you were risk assessing the suggestion before you made your decision. We make dynamic risk asessments every minute of the day. When we come to a road junction we stop and consider our options on how to proceed safety taking into consideration the other traffic using the road. It is a normal everyday function except someone has now given it a label.
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Thanks Mike those figures appear more in keeping to what I remembered. Although this calculation is very crude, it appears the number of firefighters killed on duty has doubled since 1997.
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I think I may have started something of a controversy folks but I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of my source and between 1987 and 1997, 17 firefighters are listed as Operational Fatalities which tragically occurred at 14 separate incidents. From 1997 to date there are 9 fatalities relating to 7 incidents.
To answer Kurnals inquiry, in total 20 have sustained fatal injuries at fires, 3 at SSC's. two at undisclosed 'explosions' and I now know that one of the more recent 'operational' fatalities is described as a heart attack. I hope this helps but I have to emphasise that I cannot provide anything further until my work is complete, and then only 'by kind permission' etc....sorry folks.
I must admit I do find it difficult to talk about such a truly emotive subject in such a dispassionate way. As Mike Buckley signs off, "they sould be remembered", I wonder if there's a firefighters section at the new National Monument at Alrewas?
I've found the direction you've taken my DRA inquiry so far has informed yet more research, sufficiently so to encourage me to maybe submit a paper for conferencing to promote debate on whether DRA is broke and where the fix may be.
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Yes there is a memorial dedicated to firefighters, it has been rather controversial as it was based around a steel drill tower so typical of retained stations of the 1970s, whilst we in the job can recognise it for what it is it has been seen by others as something akin to a watchtower at a prison camp.
I believe there are plans to replace the drill tower but dont know what is being suggested.
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The first thing to do is to establish what you mean by an operational incident where DRA would be implemented. I know about the heart attack the firefighter concerned was in the appliance en route to a call.
Do you include personnel who have died en route or just those actually killed at the incident and do you include retained who die as a result of an accident en route to the station?
I am not trying to denegrate their loss but if you are looking at the effect of DRA you need to look at incidents where it is in action.
Also remember there is the national memorial in London with a list of firefighters lost but this does not include how they died.
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How do you justify your existance if you do not do the job that you are paid to do. There is and will always be risk of injury or death from fire by firefighters taking risks to save life and property. At some stage surely the public will question the necessity of an operational response team that does not save life or property but costs them money through the Council tax that could be better spent on good warning and detection and residential sprinkler systems with an insurance company back up. ( sounds like fire marks I know). Any opinions?
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Jokar. It is not encumbant on any firefighter to risk his/her life to save anybody but on many ocassions they do ignore health and safety policies to try and save savable life. Usually it comes off and no more is said about the matter. There is and always will be risk of injury or death, as you say, but there doesn't have to be if firefighter did their jobs as per health and safety guidance. It is only when individuals take a calculated risk, not take a chance, that injuries can occur. If a firefighter did not want to take a chance he/she would not make an entry into a seemingly impossible situation to try and effect a rescue of someone who has been trapped. Those willing to take a calculated risk will, and hence many members of the public have been and always will be rescued and firefighter have been and always will be injured or killed.
PS. Firefighters are not buried from public funds.
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I think you have the wording the wrong way round. I don't believe that firefighters should take chances, however they should take a calculated risk which is where the dynamic risk assessment comes in.
There used to be guidance from the HSE on training for hazardous work which basically said that if it could be envisaged that a person could be asked to carry out a hazardous job then they needed to be gradually trained to do it with the exposure to the hazard increasing during the training. Hence if it is expected that a firefighter operates on a slated roof to sheet it down then they should have had experience of operating up there starting from the cotton wool stage but introducing more realism as they gained experience.
It is only through realistic training that firefighters can gain the experience to give them the knowledge to make the correct judgement.
I was involved in arranging Brigade exercises where we made an effort to make the situation as real as possible. We had an agreed set of rules beforehand i.e. if there is a band of tape across a doorway that door does not exist and we won't hide a dummy beyond it to catch you out. There were risks involved but they were the risks firefighters should be able to identify and deal with.
Noone should say a firefighter must go in it is up to the judgement at the time. On the same basis noone should criticise a firefighter who comes out because they think it is too hazardous.
Safety comes down to the correct training and procedures. But there are times when the saying that "rules are for the obediance of fools and the guidance of wise men" comes into play.
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I think you have the wording the wrong way round. I don't believe that firefighters should take chances, however they should take a calculated risk which is where the dynamic risk assessment comes in.
There used to be guidance from the HSE on training for hazardous work which basically said that if it could be envisaged that a person could be asked to carry out a hazardous job then they needed to be gradually trained to do it with the exposure to the hazard increasing during the training. Hence if it is expected that a firefighter operates on a slated roof to sheet it down then they should have had experience of operating up there starting from the cotton wool stage but introducing more realism as they gained experience.
It is only through realistic training that firefighters can gain the experience to give them the knowledge to make the correct judgement.
I was involved in arranging Brigade exercises where we made an effort to make the situation as real as possible. We had an agreed set of rules beforehand i.e. if there is a band of tape across a doorway that door does not exist and we won't hide a dummy beyond it to catch you out. There were risks involved but they were the risks firefighters should be able to identify and deal with.
Noone should say a firefighter must go in it is up to the judgement at the time. On the same basis noone should criticise a firefighter who comes out because they think it is too hazardous.
Safety comes down to the correct training and procedures. But there are times when the saying that "rules are for the obediance of fools and the guidance of wise men" comes into play.
Every hazardous job has guidance to be followed to ensure safe working practices.
Life saving jobs are somewhat different in that, at times, people abandon elements of the guidance and take a risk, not a chance, in order to try and save the saveable. The expectation of life savers is to safe life regardless and they know it. We are a highly trained, professional and proud organisation but we are by no means death proof.
If we wanted to ensure total personal safety then we should stay outside and do nothing.
If we want to take a calculated risk, outside of the laid down procedures, and enter the unknown then we have to expect the possibility of an injury.
If we take a chance then we cannot expect to come out at all.
Procedures and policies are really only a stick to beat you with if things go belly up.
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Nearlythere .... I disagree with two of your last statements at the end of your post.
There are times when we have to stay outside and adopt defensive techniques, although we will not stand and do nothing, we will do something, such as get jets to work, arrange hydrant feeds etc etc. An example of this tactic would be a large retail unit such as B & Q Warehouse ..... half brick, half lightweight cladding around a steel frame. Rapid fire growth and spread means these building collapse quickly, so to commit personnel into them is, in my opinion not an option.
Procedures and policies are there to provide a framework for dealing with incidents, the Standard Operating Procedure. They are not a stick to be beaten with, they are there to be adhered to and as a manager, if I have operated outside the procedure and something goes wrong, I would expect to take the full rap for it ....... I would also expect a visit from the HSE!
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The only time that people should and will take the calculated risks I am thinking of is when there is a life risk, not property. Firefighters nowadays have adopted the ethos that building can be replaced quite easily.
I do however stand by my beating stick allegation. You are quite right in that it should not be so but it is. When firefighters enter the building you as a manager have effectively lost control of them. They are then guided by SOPs and their own initiatives. Only they can see the conditions that confront them and your only hope is that any dynamic risk assessments they make are the correct ones.
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I don't like the idea of catagorising the risks. The whole thing is a balance between the perceived risks and the perceived benefits and the balance will shift dependant on the circumstances. You would not apply the same ethos to a B&Q warehouse as you would to Windsor Castle.
The problem with standard operating procedures is that they tend to grow in size and number so it is too easy for the whole thing to get out of hand. They do become a stick and can be used to hide other deficiencies. It is easy to blame a manager and discipline for not following a SOP and forget about asking why the SOP was not followed. This then leads down the line that nobody uses their initiative which is what really needed. In one Brigade I served in there was a witchhunt if there was a reignition and full discplinary action tended to follow. The result was that pumps kept on returning to check even a small fire over an extended period and the reverse also happened that the crews concentrated so much on the initial fire that they missed heat damage elsewhere that led to a reignition.
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Okay, whilst I understand where you are coming from but surely, the reactive side of a fire brigade is there to undertake certain tasks. If those tasks are not to be completed such as in Baldyman's post about watching B&Q burn down and create a car park, how do you justify the reactive job you do? The other bits, CFS and the like can be done by anyone given a little background info and knowledge at a much lower cost. In the end the oublic pay for an FRS that doesn't do much and the insurance costs as they rise to rebuild buildings that individuals may have watched burn down. You would not expect the armed forces not to go to war, can a soldier undertake a DRA to say whether they will go out on patrol or not or a fighter pilot to say taking off is too risky!
What about the other services, you do not see the RNLI saying the seas are to rough to send out the volunteers to save a live at sea, yet their record of lives lost is far greater.
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I think there are a lot of semantics being used which all come down to the same thing, knowing what I know about risk and hazard, do I fight or take flight?
Probabilities: If I do I could get hurt, if I don't the victim gets hurt.
Chance: Chances are I could get hurt if I do. chances are somebody else gets hurt if I don't.
Benefit: If I do............etc
Baldyman is only working to the maxim firefighters will not take risks to save a proprty already lost, the B & Q case is a good example, there's enough in the description to recognise that the building construction will quickly fail therefore the building is not saveable. As for recogniton primed decision making, wasn't Fleur Lombard claimed from us in a DIY warehouse?
The eye blink that passes in reaching that moment in time I choose to break a door down, whether or not my Incident Commander has been part of the decision making loop is when my knowledge of risk and hazard, systems of work, available controls and recognition of past experience all comes to one thing: I'm dammed if I do and dammed if i don't!
P.S. The count of fatalities is authentic to incident activity, if we add travelling to; and travelling from incidents as well as on duty and any others the count exceeds 60 in the 20 year period 1987 -2007.
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I agree with jokar. The public pay for the reactive side of the work, they want a big red lorry arriving when they are in trouble and they expect to be helped. I always disagreed with the policy of charging for special services like flooding on the grounds that that was what the public paid for.
There is a difference between the assessment on arrival that the building is lost don't commit, to the idea that as no life is at risk don't commit. The knock on effect in hardship, loss of jobs and personal distress needs to be taken into account.
I would agree that if a life is at risk the boundaries are pushed harder but at the end of the day it is a dangerous job.
I have always been amazed not at how many fatalities there are but in fact how few. If you look at the construction trade that is killing 2-3 hundred a year and they are working in a controlled environment. The fire service is working in an uncontrolled high risk environment and the losses are 1 or 2 a year.
I would agree that every job needs to be debriefed to see where improvements can be made, but that is a far cry from a witch hunt to find a scape goat.
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I'm aware of operational personnel and OIC with very little operational experience even less being a sector commander on the fireground responsible for the safety of personnel within thier sector.
They have not got the basic understanding of building construction and signs of collaspe.
Large cracks in brickwork and external walls bulging out. In both instances completely unaware they were exposed to a dangerous sitution.
New entrants into the fire service are not even taught the basics on training school. Worrying times, who will be held accountable god forbid if anybody is serious injured or dies through the lack of basic training and/or understanding of building construction.
The OIC who has not done the DRA or the fire authority for not giving suitable training on recruitment.!!!!!!!!!
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Given the tragic circumstances that have occurred overnight in Warwickshire I would like to draw a line under this discussion thread and thank those who have both informed and directed my unfortunate studies.
Many thanks for your candor.
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I am afraid I disagree with Old Legend, whilst speculation on what happened in Warwickshire must not occur and we must wait for the results of the investigation. We must learn from this incident to protect firefighters in the future. The study old Legend has started is now more important than ever.
This incident has occured in the culture of DRA which was meant to stop this type of thing happening.
My sympathies are with the families and the comrades of the lost. However having seen the news footage it looks like a very good stop.
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I have always been amazed not at how many fatalities there are but in fact how few. If you look at the construction trade that is killing 2-3 hundred a year and they are working in a controlled environment. The fire service is working in an uncontrolled high risk environment and the losses are 1 or 2 a year.
Mike
I could not disagree with you more. Because of time schedules and financial penalties many building sites are disasters waiting to happen. Many bosses want corners cut to save time and money and this is why the fatality and injury rate is so high. Poor working practices by employees and employers and the disrespect for health and safety within much of the building industry is why construction sites are such dangerous places to work. A safe and competant builder, big or small, is the one which has the fewest accidents among its employees.
Because of H&S Legislation, and especially because of the FBU, the Fire & Rescue Service operational workplace in a highly controlled environment and that is why the fatality and injury rate is so low.