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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: Tom Sutton on November 12, 2007, 10:55:37 AM
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Can I take it back to the first fire door bit? It may be non compliance it may not. It depends on the FRA and the outcomes of that document. A risk analysis is exactly that. A hazard may be present that presents a risk but the RP may be prepared to live with it, do not forget Alarp and that the onus is on the RP not an enforcer. As regards offences it is far easier to discharge the enforcement function after an incident because of the reactive nature of the legislation than to do it before. Proving that an area of non compliance places a person at risk of death or serious injury is not easy before an event has taken place but much easier after. Hence the difference in fines and costs.
I am still trying to get my head around Risk Assessment and I noted the above submission in another thread “Breach & Offence".
It talks about ALARP which I was not aware of, consequently I checked out the HSE website and read up on it. I did not study it to any great depth but one guidance note did concern me and it was “HSE principles for Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) in support of ALARP decisions.” Do many of you use these principles?
The submission also appears to favour a reactive approach to enforcement not a proactive. I know this is favoured by the HSE and the greater part of non domestic premises are dealt with this way but high risk premises still use the proactive approach. Is there many assessors and enforces would prefer to go the way of the HSE?
It did work for them the H&S Inspectorate were decimated and loads of money was saved.
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I've worked in the Building Trade most of my career. Many of my coleagues are dead or maimed as a result of their reactive approach. I wouldnt like to see FRSs going the same way.
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if you put ALARP into a search engine you will get some surprising results and you are coreect it is a cost benefit analysis and that my friends may be Risk Assessment.
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It's only logical that cost comes into establishing what is reasonable.
If there is a small risk and eliminating it would be disproportionately expensive then you adopt a different approach- staff training for instance.
The Principles of Prevention give you an order of priority (ish)
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Quite so Joker.
"Practicable" is usually taken as meaning "that which is physically possible in the light of current knowledge and invention. It is often seen in the context of "all practicable steps" or "best practicable means.
Obviously, "reasonably practicable" cannot be such a strict standard as that denoted by the word "practicable". The commonly accepted definition is that found in the judgement of Lord Asquith in the case of Edwards v. National Coal Board.
Mr Edwards was killed when an unsupported section of a travelling road in a mine gave way. Only about half the whole length of the road was shored up. The company argued that the cost of shoring up all roads in every mine was prohibitive when compared to the risk.
The men in funny wigs said:
" 'Reasonably practicable' is a narrower term than 'physically possible' and seems to me to imply that a computation must be made by the owner in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it be shown that there is gross disproportion between them - the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice - the defendants discharge the onus upon them. This computation falls to be made by the owner at a point of time anterior the accident."
The test for what is reasonably practicable was set out in this case.The case established that risk must be balanced against the 'sacrifice', whether in money, time or trouble, needed to avert or mitigate the risk. By carrying out this exercise the responsible person can determine what measures are reasonable to take.
If the measures to be taken are grossly disproportionate to the risk, then the measures need not be taken.
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As I see it the whole matter of fire safety is (in theory) now a mix of proactive and reactive. The building regs provide the proactive approach where they specify how the building should be built and the structural precautions required. The building regs require that the Fire Authority be consulted and this is the opportunity for the FA to be proactive in this respect. It is then up to the Responsible Person to carry out Fire Risk Assessments to provide an overall picture of what is going on and to take account of matters which are not covered by building regs. Again the FA has the opportunity to assess the FRA and advise or enforce as necessary. Finally if the whole thing goes pearshaped the FA has the opportunity to prosecute.
So building control, the Fire Authority and the Responsible Person should all be proactive in fire safety with a reactive aspect available if things go wrong.
In theory this looks great and it should work if everyone is carrying out their role.
All pigs are watered, fed and ready to fly!
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If there is a small risk and eliminating it would be disproportionately expensive then you adopt a different approach- staff training for instance.
I accept that approach but the HSE’s view of what should and should not be considered in a duty holder’s CBA for health and safety ALARP determinations I personally cannot accept fully and the example shown fills me with horror. Check out http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpcheck.htm
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I've worked in the Building Trade most of my career. Many of my coleagues are dead or maimed as a result of their reactive approach. I wouldnt like to see FRSs going the same way.
Were these sort of deaths not more common before HSE started prosecuting people for getting it wrong? (Not being argumentative or stroppy, its a genuine question)
I personally don't want to end up akin to a 'traffic warden of the fire world'. I would rather be able to visit premises proactively, helping those who want to be helped, but still enforcing/prosecuting reactively where necessary. It is the responsible persons and relevant persons out there who pay my wages through tax and rates. We offer a public service and it should be kept that way.
That being said, if the HSE's way of doing it has cut deaths and accidents then I can see the reasoning behind it. My main gripe is that even if it works and they manage to severely cut the amount of fire safety inspectors down, will the rate payers ever see the benefit or will it simply be going in someone elses pocket?
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I accept that approach but the HSE’s view of what should and should not be considered in a duty holder’s CBA for health and safety ALARP determinations I personally cannot accept fully and the example shown fills me with horror. Check out http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpcheck.htm
It only gets scarey in my opinion when certain persons confuse fire risk with the risk of a fire occuring.
In my view we should be looking at the risk of a fire causing harm or damage when it occurs, not if it occurs.
A fire is a reasonably forseeable event that may happen, however unklikely you can prove that to be by clever sums.
It is old ground again but some methodologies will allow you to reduce protective measures if fire is less likely to occur....that cannot be correct.
If injury or damage is less likely when a fire occurs then yes you can reduce the protective measures.
A fire may only occur once in 400 years in your particular class/use of building.....but it may happen tomorrow...that is reasonably foreseeable and reasonable measure must be taken to reduce the risk of injury or harm.
I know some of you will throw up the old arguements like churches, stone masons and wet fish shops...........yes you can usually take less precautions in such buildings because the fires that occur will be slow developing, recognised in early stages etc. etc.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,but it is not the likelihood of fire that is important......that remains the same........people + electricity......you may get a fire so you must take reasonable precautions.
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I disagree, it should be a two pronged approach. The first aspect is to reduce the hazard of a fire occuring down to the good old ALARP. Then the second aspect is to reduce the effect should a fire occur both from the life risk and the property loss.
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I disagree, it should be a two pronged approach. The first aspect is to reduce the hazard of a fire occuring down to the good old ALARP. Then the second aspect is to reduce the effect should a fire occur both from the life risk and the property loss.
Apologise if I did not make it clear but I'm not suggesting that we should not take measures to reduce the risk of a fire occuring.
Yes of course it's a two pronged approach, reduce risk ALARP and then manage residual risk.
What I am saying is you shouldn't try to justify a reduction in protective measures because fire is unlikely to occur.
If you disagree please explain why you think this is an acceptable approach.
Don't forget that the Fire Safety Order is only there for safety of relevant persons, not property.
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I disagree, it should be a two pronged approach. The first aspect is to reduce the hazard of a fire occuring down to the good old ALARP. Then the second aspect is to reduce the effect should a fire occur both from the life risk and the property loss.
May I suggest a correction to the terminology? I don't believe you can reduce a hazard to 'ALARP'. You reduce risk to 'ALARP'. This is done by identifying the hazard, considering relevant good industry practice, and reducing the risk to the ALARP level. This can be done by either adopting the good industry practice (e.g. the CLG Guides), or demonstrating that you have achieved an equivalently low level of risk in other ways.
It's the equivalence that normally rules out cost-benefit analysis as being useful to assess fire risk. If you try CBA, you might commonly come to the conclusion that for most premises the probability of having a significant fire is so small that, even recognising the serious consequences (death), if you were to eliminate the risk entirely the risk reduction benefit would be very small (perhaps a few £10k). On this basis, the cost of any fire protection might very rarely be supportable purely via a CBA. My personal view is that fire protection 'standards' are driven more by societal intolerance of death in fire than a 'pure' risk basis (hence the major incident = new legislation progression that we've seen over the years).
So, to put it crudely, for the vast majority of cases ALARP = good industry practice or an equivalently low level of risk achieved by other means. CBA doesn't enter into it.
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Fishy, nice ideas but unfortunatelt the HSE do not agree and as the RR(FS)O and risk assessment is H&S led I think you will find it difficult to persuade good H&S Directors or Fire safety mangers that you may be correct. I agree that without further knowledge then the guides may be a standard, but where Assessors or other professionals have agreater knowldge then they have the abiity to use ALARP.
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I just all hope you wear crash helmets when you are driving you car.
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I just all hope you wear crash helmets when you are driving you car.
No Wee Brian but I don't disconnect my brakes and airbag due to the fact that I have reduced the frequency of my accidents by driving carefully.
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Exactly - your response to the hazard is proportionate to the risk.
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Exactly - your response to the hazard is proportionate to the risk.
Of course it is!!!!!!
So do you believe that if we can reduce the frequency of the fires we can reduce the protective measures.
How do you know exactly when this infrequent fire is going to happen?????
Does the fact that I have driven safely to work for the past twenty years mean that I am at less risk tonight when I drive home?????
No an accident is a reasonably foreseeable event that I must account for.....but only to the extent that is reasonably practicable.....hence the lack of crash helmet!
I look forward to the court case where the responsible person has removed the protective measures because his sums proved that a fire was extremely unlikely.
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So if there is a premises where there is a greater risk of a fire occuring would you not consider putting more protective measures in place?
Formula 1 drivers wear crash helmets cos they crash more and when they do its a real doozey.
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So if there is a premises where there is a greater risk of a fire occuring would you not consider putting more protective measures in place?
Formula 1 drivers wear crash helmets cos they crash more and when they do its a real doozey.
Yes of course!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
What I am saying is you cannot drop below minimum life safety requirements....which all our current guidance is about..............because a fire is less likely to occur.
Please please explain why you think that you can,
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I would agree that although society tends to drive the legislation as a reaction to loss of life, CBA would show this is not beneficial. Where CBA should come into play is in the financial loss to the business. If the analysis of the cost of the precautions is balanced against the cost of a life then the balance is against the precautions. However if the analysis is of the cost of the precautions against the potential loss to the business then frequently the balance leans towards the precautions. It is just like the cost of a fuse against the cost of a computer.
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Phil - we've had this chat before and I'm never gonna get through to you. But "our existing guidance" is based on a presumption about the typical risk in proprties of a certain type.
If in the unlikely event that you have a premises that has a lower fire risk then why not take that into account.
There are no minimum requirements. The requirement is to assess the risk.
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Phil - we've had this chat before and I'm never gonna get through to you. But "our existing guidance" is based on a presumption about the typical risk in proprties of a certain type.
Yes Brian I know this is old ground and I think we will have to agree to differ on this one.
It does concern me when I come across consultants who try to convince me by using statistics that because a fire is unlikely they can treat it as an insignificant risk and do nothing about it...you will never convince me that that is correct and I will never as an enforcer accept that arguement.
Consider two identical buildings with identical occupants but statistically you can prove that a fire in building A occurs once in 100 years and a fire in building B occurs once in 200 years. Can I reduce the protective measures that have been provided for life safety only in building B because the frequency of the fire is halved???
In my opinion no, because that once in 200 years may be tomorrow.
I know I will never convert you Wee Brian but I will keep trying.
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I sit on both sides of this fence. The argument is at what level the benchmark is set. Like cars the benchmark for fire safety in buildings varies depending on when they were built and the use to which it is put.
You can only take the car analogy so far but here goes. To start with - varying standards in buildings. My mates 1960 ford consul has no seatbelts and legally doesnt have to have them. My 1990 corsa has seatbelts but no airbags. My wifes 2007 ferrari (only dreaming) has airbags , seatbelts etc. The law does not allow me to remove the safety precautions installed in any of the cars because these safety provisions are prescriptive legal requirements. But if I put a 900cc motor in the ferrari I can downgrade the brakes accordingly.
The building regulations et al assume I have a 2 litre engine and ABS disc brakes all round and roll cage. If I put the 900cc engine in I can probably go down to disc and drums, take out the roll cage and just relay instead on the ABC posts. The accident is still likely to happen but the consequences are likely to be less severe needing less protection.
So I vary the inbuilt crash protection and accident prevention in accordance with the level of risk.
Buildings are the same. I agree with you Phil the level of protection must always be sufficient to protect me from the forseeable risk to life from fire. But I may reduce the level of protection in sync with a reduction in fire risk taking into account not the liklihood of a fire but the potential forseeable consequences .
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I agree with you Phil the level of protection must always be sufficient to protect me from the foreseeable risk to life from fire. But I may reduce the level of protection in sync with a reduction in fire risk taking into account not the likelihood of a fire but the potential foreseeable consequences .
Kurnal leaving the car analogy aside my understanding of the last paragraph surely is what Phil is saying?
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I absolutely agree Kurnal.
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"the level of protection must always be sufficient to protect me from the foreseeable risk to life from fire"
Trust me boys - the "minimum standards" that are in guidance docs wont always protect you (hence people still die sometimes).
So what you get is reasonable protection. Our codes actually do this for us but somehow you dont think we can do it for ourselves.
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Fishy, nice ideas but unfortunatelt the HSE do not agree and as the RR(FS)O and risk assessment is H&S led I think you will find it difficult to persuade good H&S Directors or Fire safety mangers that you may be correct. I agree that without further knowledge then the guides may be a standard, but where Assessors or other professionals have agreater knowldge then they have the abiity to use ALARP.
Quite the contrary; the guidance that I have based my statements on comes directly from the HSE (their report RR151 and from the HSE website itself). In fact, they make a clear statement on their website that the HSE "does not normally accept a lower standard of protection than would be provided by the application of current good practice".
Many people assume ALARP = cost-benefit analysis. It doesn't. CBA is a tool that may inform an ALARP analysis in some circumstances. Generally speaking (and for new works, almost always), the HSE guidance is that ALARP = good industry practice or an equivalent level of safety provided by other means.
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Yeah the reason HSE uses the "good industry practice" line is because they dont know what people should do in practice.
So if your oil terminal blows up they have a look at what the other oil terminals have got. If you are as good(or bad) as them then you're in the clear.
At least we do have some established benchmarks to work from. All of which take some cognisance of likelyhood of fire.