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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: jasper on December 14, 2007, 12:04:01 PM
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Could anyone point me in the right direction for some research I am doing on fire safety and risk assessment in multi-storey blocks of flats (apart from the obvious ABD)
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Narrow it down a bit.
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current standards and trains of thought, as in lessons learned from high-rise fire throughout the world
also I cannot understand how no detection (even heat) to the common areas is required
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In the UK its a defend in place strategy, so theres not much point having a common alarm.
Theres the BRE report on smoke control http://www.bre.co.uk/adb/page.jsp?id=555
And I think the findings of the incident in Herts where two firefighters is now on the Herts website.
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BS5588 part 1 gives more information and commentary than ADB. For the history of fire safety design of flats it would also be useful to look into the former guidance CP3 Chapter 4 part 1 1971.
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Could anyone point me in the right direction for some research I am doing on fire safety and risk assessment in multi-storey blocks of flats (apart from the obvious ABD)
One of the main areas of interest in these buildings is the ventilation of common escape routes. This can be very relevant to the fire risk assessment. There's been recent work on this - suggest you google "ventilation flats" or similar, but look out for the BRE research. Also, I think Howard Morgan published something a year or two ago in the IFE magazine - can't recall the details - check the mags. Fire engineering firms have tried to be quite inventive in the last few years when designing ventilation systems in such areas. They haven't always proved sufficiently effective.
Stu
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Here's a tale. Consider it anonymous. Consider that it didn't happen last night in a block of flats just like 10,000 others throughout the country.
Low rise block of flats.
Three flats per floor.
Common escape corridor leading to single staircase.
Corridor ventilated by permanent grill at one end, no ventilation at the other end (staircase end).
Fire in a flat on an upper storey.
Occupant runs out flat.
No self closer on front door and door left open.
Occupant knocks on doors of neighbours in his corridor to alert them to fire.
Dead end corridor.
(Front doors are fire doors, though as stated, no closers.
Windows (not fr) between flats and corridors.)
Heavy smoke logging of corridor due to fire flat door being left open.
No subsequent evidence of smoke penetration into neighbouring flats.
Neighbours probably would have been perfectly safe if they had stayed in their flats watching the telly.
Neighbours, because they knew of fire, wanted to leave the building but were unable to because of smoke logged corridor.
Attending fire service confronted with neighbours shouting for rescue from their flat balconies.
Neighbours 'rescued' by fire service by ladders.
Fire contained to flat but evidence of heavy smoke logging in corridor.
Quite clear that corridor was impassable during fire.
I'm not going to suggest an end to the 'defend in place' fire strategy but I have concerns about it and about ventilation of common corridors. Anything you can add, Phil?
Jasper, I think this is an important area for research.
Anyone else any thoughts about how to improve these buildings?
Stu
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How about giving instructions to the tenants in what to do incase of fire. It is not the building design or the building fault it is how we use them.
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Stu
Your posting reminds me of of the early 1980s when the then current hotels guide did not recommend self closers on bedroom doors where there was two way travel. Everybody closes their hotel room door dont they.
Then one night a staff member had a fire in his room and in the panic evacuated leaving the bedroom door open and I think this led to a death. The guidance was then changed so all bedroom doors were self closing.
BS5588 part 1 has always recommended fire safety advice to be given to tenants trouble is nobody bothers to issue it and nobody reads it, remembers it or brings it to the attention of tenants.
In any case in the situation you describe a stay put policy would not be tenable with plain glazing between flats and corridors. (Just like in many 1960s blocks)
The answer- upgrade the glazing, provide self closers and educate the tenants. It may just work a bit.
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The problem with the example you refer to Stu was two-fold.
1) There was no self-closer on the front door,
2)FR glazing between flats and common parts has been replaced with nice double glazed units.
The person who risk assessed the common parts, if it has indeed been assessed, cleary has not identified these problems.
That failure to identify and rectify the problems placed relevant persons at serious risk.......consideration should be given to a prosecution but I won't even go there!!
It was an interesting job, several rescues by ladder.
How many identical problems exist throught the UK I wonder?
The answer as Kurnal points out is to replace glazing and fit self-closers......perhaps try and educate the occupants but are they likely to stay put when they can see smoke and flames?
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this is becoming an interesting topic (for me)
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Didn't Alan Wroclawski and Pat Carey write a tome on High Rise buildings in the late 80's? I have a copy of what I think they did somewhere, mind you I might be going mad and be refering to something completely different. As regards self closers, as soon as the individuals locks themselves out once they will come off and the problem will not go away. Education is a better method but how you go about that is difficult.
The problem is at work, get out and stay out, very few people die, at home stay in and people die. We in the fire industry send mixed messages and expect that everyone understand different strategies. After 9/11 those in the tower in canary Wharf wanted out as soon as an alarm sounded, not good in a phased evacuation building. Now after numerous drills and test they don't want to move.
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Picking up on Joker's comment we have done a lot of FRA's in these types of premises from new builds, conversions and very old properties. The common findings we have found are the replacement of the flat doors with UPVC ones, or the glazing in the door has been replaced with non FR type. We have included guidance from BS 5588 Part 12 in each of the FRA's which we suggest that the management companies communicate to all residents where possible. See below for info.
Any emergency plan should be communicated to all relevant persons where possible.
Example of a fire instruction notice for use in flats.
(based on that suggested in British Standard 5588-12: 2004)
This building has been built in such a way as to protect the people in it if a fire breaks out.
The important thing to remember is that if the fire starts in your home, it is up to you to make sure that you can get out of it.
AT ALL TIMES
o Make sure that the smoke alarms in your flat are tested.
o Do not store anything in your hall or corridor, especially anything that will burn easily.
o Use the fixed heating system fitted in your home. If this is not possible, only use a convector heater in your hall or corridor. Do not use any form of radiant heater there, especially one with either a flame (gas or paraffin) or a radiant element (electric bar fire).
IF A FIRE BREAKS OUT IN YOUR FLAT
- If you are in the room where the fire is, leave straight away,
together with anybody else , then close the door.
o Do not stay behind to try to put the fire out, unless you have received suitable training.
o Tell everybody else in your flat about the fire and get everybody to leave. Close the front door and leave the building.
o Do not use the lift.
o CALL THE FIRE SERVICE.
IF YOU SEE OR HEAR OF A FIRE IN ANOTHER PART OF THE BUILDING.
o It will usually be safe for you to stay in your own home.
o You must leave your home if smoke or heat affects it. Close all doors and windows.
CALLING THE FIRE SERVICE.
- The Fire Service should always be called to a fire, even if it only seems
to be a small fire. This should be done straight away.
- The way to call the fire service is by telephone as follows.
1) Dial 999.
2) When the operator answers, give the telephone number you are
ringing from and ask for FIRE.
3) When the fire service replies tell them clearly the address where the
fire is. APARTMENT NUMBER?
ADDRESS
4) Do not hang up until the fire service have repeated the
address to you and you are sure they have got it right. The fire service
cannot help if they do not have the address.
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Don't forget that a majority of these blocks are also only served by a single stair. Simultaneous evacuation is not a good idea in this scenario for a multitude of reasons (fire service access, stair widths etc.) DCLG at a recent seminar still stated that the "stay put" method was very successful on the whole, and there were no imminent plans to change it.
It would be interesting to know how many incidents had occurred where residents other than those in the flat of fire origin were affected.
I have to admit if I was in a flat on the 10th floor and I saw smoke rising externally from a much lower floor, I would be very tempted to evacuate!!
Detection in the common areas would only be beneficial to the people in those areas (cleaners, caretakers etc) hence the recent issues that have arisen under the RRO. The issues that would arise from a communal alarm system would be massive, the potential for false alarms, neighbours to annoy each other etc etc, maintenance issues etc.
If we decide to only provide sounders in the communal areas what good would they be when you are asleep, and in many cases would have two fire doors and an acoustic separating wall between you and the sounder.
I believe the current system works quite well combined with the levels of compartmentation, and admittedly is not perfect, but I just cannot see how any other solution would be perfect either.
Historic buidlings or those that have been unofficially tampered with, will always have issues, but a compliant scheme should in general provide a decent level of fire safety.
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well said - it works - leave it alone
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It is important what you have written here saddlers. If the fire is below you and see smoke rising, you become aware and effectively become "Affected" by fire. Granted on a pshycological level but none the less your behavior will change.
I think the strategy works well if people aren't aware of a fire in their building, the moment you become aware, you wish to leave. The investigation into the deaths of the fire fighters in the Stevenage high rise fire in 2005 recommended that sounders and break glass units were removed from common areas. The alarms caused confusion.
I recently attended the aftermath of a sheltered accomodation fire and in my opinion if all occupants had stayed in their flats, no-one would have been hurt. Those who left their flats moved smoke through doors that would have otherwise been closed (Ie corridoors)
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Thats how it's intended to work.
The other issue is that there is an expectation that the fire service will decide if and when the building should be evacuated. I get the impression that some officers arent clear about how and when this should be done.
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The other issue is that there is an expectation that the fire service will decide if and when the building should be evacuated. I get the impression that some officers arent clear about how and when this should be done.
I wont take anything away from the ops guys ("guys" meaning both sexes here) and the job they do, but you're right Brian. Many aren't aware of the consequences of the construction of the building and of the fire strategies that have been assigned to buildings. Why should they be? Ops and fire safety tend not to effectively communicate with each other.
But, even when they are, the "guys" on the trucks can't carry round in their heads the fire strategies for every building they're likely to go to a fire in.
The problem may be rooted in HR within the fire service. Maybe every crew manager should be required to serve a couple of years in fire safety before progressing further in their career. Where have I heard that before?
Stu
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No, Stu, surely it would be better if they can role play and use buzz words.....a leisure centre manager for example!
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No, Stu, surely it would be better if they can role play and use buzz words.....a leisure centre manager for example!
Phil,
I think you have something there. You'll go far...
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I was talking to a guy the other day, he asaid that the fire safety course at the college was the best ops course he had ever been on. Now he understands what he was meant to have been doing for the last 10+ years!
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going back to this subject (I know it has been a while) but if you have a block of flats (10 storeys for example) if my reading of approved doc b correct that the protected landing which the flats have access to really should not have glazed elements? i.e. one near me has small glazing to the door and an openable window for the bathroom with no intumescent strips and only Georgian wired glazing (or am I looking at this too deep?)
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If what you are saying is that there is unprotected glazing between a flat and the common lobby then it does not comply with the guidance that has been in force since 1971 ...but many tower blocks built in the 60s were like that.
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cheers for the reply kurnal, it just seems odd that they have got away with this lack of compartmentation even though this is he key to them getting away with no detection etc.