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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: AnthonyB on June 24, 2008, 08:48:58 PM
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The chap on the link below has spent 4 years researching the infamous Summerland Fire on the Isle of Man in 1973 and produced an extensive book on the subject also on this link.
From scanning through the chapters it appears a good new insight into the events and worthy of a look & hence why I've posted the link.
http://www.gees.bham.ac.uk/people/index.asp?ID=156
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His jacket alone is worthy of a look!!!!
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He has a point compared to the reaction to other "mainland" fire events.
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If you can get hold of a copy of the Stardust Fire report then this is very interesting as it also looked at the role of the regulators prior to the fire. The building authority, licensing authority and fire authority were all closely scrutinised on there actions and involvment on the licensing of the club and in some instances critisised.
A sobering read for anyone involved in fire safety, not sure if it is still available I have not been able to track down a copy for a number of years.
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Tracking down the reports is the problem - of all the major fires that influenced thinking (& sometimes law) I've only managed to get reports for very few of them - Bradford & Woolworths from Technical Index/OHS, Summerland and Sao Paolo from eBay, a bit of useful stuff on the Rose & Crown from people on here and a couple of paragraphs on Eastwood Mill from the intro to a 60s FBU book for FPOs required to enforce the 'new' Factories Act fire regulations (eBay).
Stardust, Hendersons, Top Storey club etc I have very little. Other than buying all the back copies of Fire, FPA & IFE journals since 1950 on eBay to extract their reports on these fires I'm stuck!
The internet has some film footage of summerland burning on a link too
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AnthonyB, I have a huge range of research material into the great historical fires and also a superb (some say the best) library and archive to draw on (those who know my tag-name from other forums will now know my name too!) If you want specific stuff I can try to help out although
a) it is all on paper (apart from the post-war building studies which I have on pdf)
b) someone helpfully moved my office and most of the historical stuff is stored. I can get to it, but it's all over the place.
i actually used to metion Summerland and the top storey club in and effort to define 'disaster'. When I read the fopening of Dr Gee's paper I was reminded. Dr Jonathan Sime (the late, died of a deep vein thrombosis a couple of years back) did his PhD thesis on Summerland and escape patters. i once asked him in person (around 1993) "why do you call Summerland a disaster, 2950 people escaped?" The Top Storey Club in Bolton, 19 out of 24 died, THAT is a disaster.
(by the way, I also have access to the back issues of Fire, FPA & IFE journals since 1950 (and earlier, remember the Empire Palace, the Paisley Cinema, overseas the Paris Charity Bazaar, the Iriquous Theatre in Chicago and so on)
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Sounds impressive! My areas of historical interest are the key fires as referenced in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_fire_safety_legislation_in_the_United_Kingdom and as you may have guessed from my postings portable extinguishers through history (which forms the bulk of my non 'current' technical library).
Scans & photocopies of key info are always appreciated and costs refunded to expand my collection, with reciprocal access to my files of course
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It would help if you could be a bit specific! To digitise a library is a bit more than I have time for if you know what I mean.
For Woolworths, there is the small yellow Joint committee report and the GMC report which is significantly larger. a lot of my students do a third-year module comparing the Hendersons fire in liverpool 1960 with Woolworths. same fire, same result, yet Hendersons coroners inquest recommended fire service overview of fire safety and led to OSRA certificates, they were absorbed into the FP Act in 1976 after the HASAWA amendments, in 1979 GMC had a certificate virtually ready for issue, then 'woof' Woollies goes up (I was standing by at London Road, I could see the fire, hear the fire, smell the bloody fire, but sadly, I wasn't 'there'.), so twenty years of certification did jack s**t, sorry, very little for safety in department stores.
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so twenty years of certification did jack s**t, sorry, very little for safety in department stores.
Do you have the fire death statistics, for non domestic premises in the seventies in comparison with the nineties? It would be interesting to see them. May be a graph starting in 1970 going through to the end of the century.
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I can get them, they are public documents, only snag is, they tend to be broken down in quite complex ways. Will dig out some headline figures though if I can make the time.
Remember, my comment was specifically in relation to department stores and the fact that the Hendersons fire that started certification (indirectly) was so very similar to the Woolworths fire 19 years later.
Statistics additionally are only one tool in the armoury. If we took domestic stats from 1976 - 2006 we would find that the trend is largely downwards, but at a very low angle and relatively consistent over the period (there are two glitches in individual years). if we then looked at the number of domestic smoke alarms in 1976 (~0) and in 2006 (~>80% of households) we would stop wasting money on smoke detectors! Now, I do not believe that they are a waste of time, but the stats seem to say they are! , I do, however, believe that people should look at statistics carefully.
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try looking at table 30 of this pdf
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/fire/pdf/firestats2006.pdf
will save me a lot of hunting /scanning if the gen is there.
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Just to get us back on topic here:
extract..
During the Summerland fire in the Isle of Man,
the greatest number of injuries was clustered around the main entrance. 51% of the occupants used this as their exit
route. Of these 37 were guests and 1 was a member of staff. In contrast, 49% of the occupants used the emergency
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exit but 23 were guests and 14 were members of staff. This higher proportion of staff has been used to argue that
additional drills will help people to familiarise themselves with emergency exits and therefore prepare them to use
them during any subsequent evacuation.
from;
Lessons from the Evacuation of the World Trade Centre, September 11th 2001 for the Development
of Computer-Based Simulations
C.W. Johnson,
Glasgow Accident Analysis Group, Department of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United
Kingdom, G12 8QQ.
E-mail:johnson@dcs.glasgow.ac.uk http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson
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I have nothing on Hendersons and only the Joint Committee Report on Woolworths so that would be an area to start - I don't expect you to replicate an entire library, nor would I have the time (sadly) to read it all if it was possible.
For the others mentioned (top storey, stardust) rather than loads of different things just single articles detailing the events and their causes would do.
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I'll see what I can do, most of the stuff is on paper, so I'll need to scan. The Kelly (chief of Liverpool) is the best report on Hendersons, but it is huge, however some of the stories in there are very sobering reading.
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Isn't Google wonderful!
THE TOP STOREY CLUB DISASTER OF MAY, 1961:19 deaths that shocked a nation
From the Bolton Evening News, first published Tuesday 8th May 2001.
IT numbed Bolton and horrified a Britain where the club culture was just starting to be king in those Swinging Sixties.
But exactly why 19 people died at the Top Storey Club has never been discovered.
And today, 40 years on, although there were allegations of arson at the time, the authorities are no nearer finding the cause of the worst peacetime fire tragedy ever to hit the borough.
The club's name has passed into the local vocabulary of those old enough to remember the shock waves of what happened on that evening of Monday, May 1, 1961.
But the real legacy lives on in the massive change in the laws governing safety in clubs, licensed premises and entertainment venues that followed the national outcry over the Bolton club.
Today there is now no chance of a Top Storey Club being opened anywhere in the land, including Bolton. Controls are simply too tight.
It was, as the name suggested, on the upper two floors of a warehouse, with a kitchen furniture makers on the ground floor. But it was a deceptive building, much higher on the side where it overlooked the River Croal.
There is no sign of the original building today. It stood where the multi-storey car park stands today, and even the river is hidden from view in a culvert.
Inside, a single timber staircase led to the dance hall and bar.
On the fateful night customers were upstairs, drinking and dancing to tape-recorded music and playing the elaborate one-armed bandit which was a feature of the place.
Downstairs, club manager Bill Bohannon smelled a whiff of smoke and investigated.
His search took him to the ground floor where he noticed smoke creeping under the door which led to the workshops.
He kicked in the door and found himself looking into a blazing inferno. The Top Storey Club disaster had begun.
He tried to get back upstairs, but was forced back by the intense heat.
The narrow staircase acted as a chimney of death, funnelling the smoke and flames directly onto the dance floor.
The men and women enjoying a night's drinking and dancing just moments before had nowhere to go -- no way to avoid the choking inferno the little club quickly became, save for the windows opening into the black night.
One survivor, Gillian Grimshaw, later spoke of those moments from her hospital bed. As the heat built up alarmingly, most of the people crowded to the windows on the river side of the building.
They were gasping for air. Some sought protection by crouching beneath the bar, the men trying to shield the women with their bodies.
Gillian was one of those at the window. Somehow, she lost her balance and fell out backwards, down the 80 feet towards the river.
The next thing she remembered was being on the river bank, not knowing that she had been saved by her brother-in-law, Bill Bohannon. He held out his arms and tried to catch her as she fell. Sadly, Mr Bohannon, himself injured, could not save his own wife, Sheila, who was later named among the dead.
Fifteen of the dead were clustered in the bar areas. Three others had jumped from the window into the rain-swollen waters of the River Croal below, and lived. Four others didn't make it.
The body of one young man was washed a mile downstream in the fast-flowing water.
As a graphic account in the BEN stated: "As onlookers -- including policemen on their way home from a dance at the former Palais -- watched horrified and helpless, bodies fell one by one from windows, thumping down on the paved bed of the river."
It took firemen from Horwich, Leigh and Radcliffe almost two and a half hours before they could even recover the bodies from the still-warm club.
Those who died were found huddled in the bar area.
The fact that the club was on the top storey had hampered the rescue severely. Even the turntable ladders did not reach the upper windows.
Hinges
Tragically, there was a loading door which two people had tried to open, not realising that the door's movement was restricted by a false floor and it had to be lifted off its hinges to open.
On the night of the fire, on the other side of a door, a large furniture van had been parked outside the club close to the wall.
Clubgoers could have jumped onto it in an easy escape route. Safety had been only feet away, but they never knew.
Investigators found an empty thinners' tin near the seat of the blaze, but it was never established that the blaze was started deliberately.
One of the few survivors, jazz singer Pedro Gonzales, who had worked at the club, alleged that his ex-bosses there "had a lot of enemies".
An inquest returned an open verdict on all 19 dead.
But the lessons of the Top Storey were swiftly learned. Safeguards were put in place that formed the framework of official controls today.
A spokesman for Bolton police confirmed that, if new evidence on the tragedy ever came to light, it would be considered. However, everything would have to be looked at in the context of the passage of time.
Archive Home
From the Bolton Evening News
http://www.theboltonnews.co.uk
© Newsquest Media Group 2001
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1. Remember, my comment was specifically in relation to department stores and the fact that the Hendersons fire that started certification (indirectly) was so very similar to the Woolworths fire 19 years later.
2. Statistics additionally are only one tool in the armoury.
Thanks for the link on stats
1. I accept what you say but you can't make a decision that twenty years of certification did jack s**t based on two fires one before and one after, you would need to do a lot more research than that. I do not know the findings of the two reports but I do know in the case of Henderson’s that people would not leave the store until they had paid for their purchases, until a StnO told them in no uncertain terms to leave the store. How do you take that into account when certificating premises.
2. I agree, but statistics will show trends and in the case of fire fatalities in other premises during the life of the FPA and it showed a reduction of about 75% which I would say the act worked, very expensive, but worked. Why it worked is far more complicated but one factor I believe was the frequency of inspections 10yrs, 5yrs and 1yr depending on risk, which gave fire safety a high profile. I also believe there were other initiatives but the FPA was the main one. I also believe a similar argument could be made for the smoke alarm campaign it’s the high profile that achieves the results. But with the domestic situation there was so many initiatives it would difficult too say which one had the most effect.
During the Summerland fire in the Isle of Man, the greatest number of injuries was clustered around the main entrance. 51% of the occupants used this as their exit route. Of these 37 were guests and 1 was a member of staff. In contrast, 49% of the occupants used the emergency exit but 23 were guests and 14 were members of staff. This higher proportion of staff has been used to argue that additional drills will help people to familiarise themselves with emergency exits and therefore prepare them to use them during any subsequent evacuation.
A similar situation was found during a research project by the Portsmouth Poly for “Human Behaviour in Fires” they found most people don’t move unless prompted by something other than the fire alarm and then go for the route they used to enter the building. Their conclusions were, some means of confirmation is required, like voice instructions in addition the fire alarm sounders. Last week I was on holiday and at breakfast the fire alarm sounded and the guests acted exactly as the research showed. The area I was sitting there was a fire exit within 10 meters, but most used the main entrance. The sheep scenario I would think.
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I do not disagree with any of your points.
The issue of FP Act certification was summed up in parliamentary debates as early as 1969, can't remember the reference offhand, but the comment was " the act concentrates upon premises, not upon people".
The reason I made the contentious statement about the department stores is a further extension of that idea, we know that the only factor preventing department stores being very dangerous in fire terms is the sprinkler system. They almost invariably have relatively low ceilings, relatively high and mixed fire loads and relatively unclear lines of travel. Once you add the human factor in, the department store remains an area of poorly understood risk. i would welcome any discussion on the specific nature of the risk, I still hold my view that the Henderson and Woolworths fires were remarkably similar. To further the comment on people 'paying for their purchases', there is a paragraph in the Kelly report from the Liverpool Echo stating that a woman was invited to enter the changing rooms by a member of staff to try on a new coat, however she declined stating she could smell smoke; on leaving the building there were already pumps in the street. it seems there were staff training needs too!
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Staff training and awareness can be a key factor and was reflected in Summerland - although the design was flawed the staff response to fire wasted valuable minutes that would have saved some lives - a noticeable change in the way fire safety was run is documented after the changes in General Manager, which soon filtered down through the staff in general.
I visited a recent build retail premises recently and because it was new all the latest standards of active & passive protection were there - but training and awareness (or lack of) reduced it's effectiveness, including not knowing about clearances for sprinkler heads, not knowing not to paint sprinkler & AFD heads, poor awareness of the fire strategy, basic fire prevention, etc. Tens of thousands of pounds worth of fire protection defeated simply by a lack of knowledge
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That newspaper cutting on the top storey club is useful (wonderful internet!). I like the official reports or even the extended articles in things like 'Fire' as they give more background in installed precautions (or lack of) and other factors.
Bolton news' easily accessible e-archives have several other snippets -
THE TOP STOREY CLUB DISASTER OF MAY, 1961:Store opened its doors to rescuers
From the Bolton Evening News, first published Tuesday 8th May 2001.
ONE of Bolton's most famous family-owned stores opened up to serve refreshments to police and firemen at the Club fire.
Mrs Ida Whitehead, whose son Gordon was managing director of the well-known Whitehead's store which closed only recently, remembers the night vividly.
The family owned much of the property along Crown Street on both sides, but not the Top Storey Club building.
They owned two flats opposite the club, however, and when the fire broke out opposite, the Whiteheads were contacted by these tenants.
"Gordon took the call and we all rushed down there immediately to open up the store, some of us still in nightclothes," said Mrs Whitehead, now 91.
"There were eight of us altogether, including Gordon and his wife Margaret, and we got the canteen going and started serving cups of tea to the ambulancemen and firemen.
"So many of them came in that there wasn't enough room and they had to sit on the stairs. They were all deeply affected by what they'd seen.
"Someone would come in and say: 'We've found another one', and we knew they'd discovered another body. It was awful."
Mrs Whitehead recalls the "stench" of the smoke, and how the flames lit up the sky close to the store. "It was amazing that it didn't spread right through the adjoining buildings, but it didn't.
Soaking
"There were hardly any people not in uniform along Crown Street -- it was full of firemen and policemen.
"At one stage, they found a young man who had jumped from a window. He wasn't too badly hurt but he was soaking wet, and one of our group lent him some clothes.
"My memories of that night are that it was very busy, very emotional. We didn't get home until around 5am."
THE TOP STOREY CLUB DISASTER OF MAY, 1961:Practical steps that make today's buildings safer
From the Bolton Evening News, first published Friday 29th Jun 2001.
IF the Top Storey Club existed today, it would have to comply with the latest national building regulations.
Senior Building Surveyor Bernard Carter explained that this applies to newly-built premises and those whose use is changing.
Regulations cover anything from the number and width of fire escapes and staircases to accessibility for fire engines and emergency lighting.
The fire service is consulted on these aspects throughout.
The town hall department also advises magistrates on planning applications.
These days, any club would have to have an "alternative means of escape", said Divisional Officer Gleaves.
Windows aren't classed as such even though these provided the only remaining way out for those who jumped 80 feet from the inferno at theTop Storey.
He said: "At one time, windows were acceptable in limited circumstances, but you wouldn't accept windows as a means of escape in any way, shape or form now."
Instead, there has to be at least "one proper door of a suitable width, outward opening, probably with a push-bar and without a key."
It has to be able to be "instantly opened", preventing the danger of people getting crushed at the exit.
Divisional Officer Gleaves also explained that surface finishes on walls, furniture and fittings are "much improved" in these days of fire-retardant materials.
Today's Top Storey would also feature smoke alarms.
Said Divisional Officer Gleaves: "We would look at some means of forewarning and for an alarm system."
After all, he explained, "products of combustion contain all sorts of toxic gases and that's predominantly why people die in fires" -- as they did at the Top Storey.
These fire precautions are covered by the Fire Precaution Act 1971.
Premises with more than 20 people employed at any one time, or more than 10 anywhere in the building other than the ground floor need to comply with this Act in order to get a fire certificate.
There are "periodical" inspections, which especially target "high risk" premises -- such as clubs, hotels, hospitals and nursing homes.
If there are serious shortcomings, the use of premises can be "prohibited or restricted as a last resort" under section 10 of the Act.
Additional legal obligations apply to any employer who employs at least one member of staff under the Fire Precautions Workplace Regulations, 1997.
The size of premises is also important when it comes to sprinkler systems, which aren't usually required in clubs.
Requirement
"They aren't necessarily a requirement in those places, only, for example at large shopping centres," said Divisional Officer Gleaves.
John Musso, Bolton club boss of the Temple and Club Mezzo as well as Bar Peru, has first-hand experience of fire regulations.
"Every material used -- seating, wall coverings, ceiling -- is checked by the fire brigade and has got to be of British Standard," he explained.
"We also have to have systems in place to shut down the music in case of fire so the DJ can make an announcement before evacuation.
"And we do fire drills -- that's the most essential thing of all because the problem is evacuation."
But John added that there is too much "red tape" involved in the safety of his clubs. It should just be one agency in charge because there's a lot of confusion and conflict."
THE TOP STOREY CLUB DISASTER OF MAY, 1961: Terrible dilemma for firemen
From the Bolton Evening News, first published Friday 29th Jun 2001.
FIREMEN who arrived at the Top Storey Club were faced with a terrible dilemma.
They couldn't reach the people trapped on the upper floor of the building because the fire had roared up the wooden stairs destroying this exit.
And, as they used the turntable ladders outside to try to form a bridge to reach clubgoers screaming from the club's lofty top windows, they found these were simply too short to reach them.
"The screams just gradually faded away," said ex-fireman Thomas Cornwell, of Green Lane, Bolton.
He was a 36-year-old fireman based at the old Marsden Road fire station on that night. His crew of five were already fighting a small fire at a local scrapyard when a message came over the newly-installed fire engine radio about the Top Storey fire.
His crew arrived at the club to join the many firemen already there about half an hour after the fire began.
"The building was full of smoke, more smoke than flames really by then, but it was still very warm. The staircase was completely gone and we had to put ladders up inside the building to get to the top floor."
There, the firefighters met a terrible sight.
"There were bodies all piled up near the bar. No-one inside that room who had not jumped had lived.
"The bodies weren't very burned, though. They were just quite pink -- almost like they'd been on their holidays.
"But they were piled up in two areas, one with about three bodies and another of about 12. They had panicked when they couldn't get out and were just piled together, like a pack of cards."
Mr Cornwell and fellow firemen then had the heartbreaking task of wrapping the bodies in tarpaulins and taking them down the ladders to the outside of the building.
"It really shook up some of the lads, it was such a terrible sight there. There were youngsters and middle-aged people. They never stood a chance."
"I don't think the ones who jumped knew just how high up they were," he added. "The building was built on two levels, and you wouldn't know by just going into the club and up the couple of flights of stairs that at the back you were around 80 feet up.
"I think that when they saw people jump and began to realise just how high it was, they stopped jumping. But they had nowhere else to hide."
The tragedy helped speed through the Fire Precautions Act, which had been held up in Parliament. In the national outcry following the Bolton fire, it was rushed through to create a new system of controls -- and to ensure that there was never a fire like the Top Storey Club again.
THE TOP STOREY CLUB DISASTER OF MAY, 1961:Jack jumped 80 feet - and lived
From the Bolton Evening News, first published Friday 29th Jun 2001.
JACK Breen knows he's a lucky man today.
He fell 80 feet from a window of the Top Storey Club -- and lived.
Now aged 68 and managing director of estate agency Gran Sol Properties Europe Ltd, Jack spoke to the BEN from Calpe on Spain's Costa Blanca where his company has an office.
"I'd started going to the club regularly right from the start. In fact, my membership card is numbered No 1", he said. "On that night, I went in at around 11pm. I knew about half the people in there.
"I was sitting having a drink at the opposite end of the room to the stairs, near the bar, when Bill Bohannon (the club manager) said that he could smell smoke and he went off downstairs.
"The next thing I knew the lights flashed out.
"Then, about half a minute later, there was an explosion in the room. A whoosh of hot air, no flames at all then, and all the oxygen went out of the room.
"It was pitch black and everyone was stumbling about in the dark. You couldn't breathe and we all went towards a window, which was broken somehow, possibly by the explosion.
"The next thing I remember was standing on the window ledge and people shouting at me: 'Don't jump -- the fire engines will be here soon.'
"Then I don't remember anything at all until I woke up the next morning in Bolton Royal Infirmary."
Jack had badly damaged his left hand in the fall, and had suffered 20 per cent burns in the explosion. He spent three months in hospital before being discharged, but counts himself lucky.
These days he spends his time between his Spanish estate agency businesses in Calpe and Preston, where he lives, and doesn't dwell on what might have been.
"I just get on with it," he insisted. "I must have a charmed life."
A charity fund was set up in the wake of the disaster. Later, Jack Breen received a cheque for £7.50. "I think I've still got it somewhere -- I never cashed it."
THE TOP STOREY CLUB DISASTER OF MAY, 1961:Indian meal saved Jackie
From the Bolton Evening News, first published Friday 29th Jun 2001.
JACKIE Webb believes in miracles. She knows they exist because she should have been in the Top Storey Club on that May night.
She had been going there as an impressionable 18-year-old with a few girlfriends each Monday evening since it had opened a few months before. "I loved it there," she recalls. "It was very smoky, atmospheric, quite jazzy and we loved the kind of music they played."
But May 1 was Jackie's 19th birthday and she and a friend had decided to go for a meal at a town centre Indian restaurant.
And she escaped the carnage that took place only a few hundred yards away.
Rickety
She was Jackie Lomax then, working in Greedy's photographer's in St Georges Road, and living at home in Staton Avenue, Tonge Moor. "The Top Storey wasn't big -- it was basically just this room with tables, but we thought it was great," remembers the 58-year-old grandmother, whose home is now in Sandford Close, Harwood.
"We never missed a Monday. We'd go there around 9pm to 9.30pm, up the rickety wooden staircase, into the main club room.
"We knew the club manager, Bill Bohannon, and his wife, Sheila, just to nod to, and there were plenty of regulars. We'd usually leave around midnight."
"When we left the restaurant to go home, I could hear a bit of a commotion in the town centre, but thought nothing of it.
"It wasn't until the next day that I heard about the fire. I was just so shocked. I couldn't believe that all those people had died, and I could so easily have been there.
"In the end, none of my friends had gone either. So we were all saved."
THE TOP STOREY CLUB DISASTER OF MAY, 1961:Building should never have been club
From the Bolton Evening News, first published Friday 29th Jun 2001.
THE Top Storey Club was destined for a brief life.
The club was started in December 1960 by Mr Stanley Wilcock, who originally rented the building for his business, Gregg Construction Company which made kitchen furniture.
Then he had the idea of converting the upper two floors for use as a night club.
In March, 1961, he sold the club to a Mr Denis Wilson of Manchester, but continued to run Gregg Construction on the ground floor.
Mr Wilson had an associate, 53-year-old Richard Sorrensen, formerly called Rawlinson.
After the fire, rumours spread that Manchester underworld characters had a grudge against Sorrensen and had threatened to wreck the club. These stories were never confirmed.
However, the owners of the building were very concerned about a club of this type being operated in the premises. They considered the building unsuitable.
The first they had learned about the club being there had been an advert in the BEN.
At 10.35pm on May 1 one of the building owners, Mr Norman Balshaw, went to the building to give the club owners notice to quit.
He saw Wilson and Sorrensen in the club office on the ground floor. He told them the club tenancy would not be continued, and that they must be out by June 24.
The two men returned upstairs to join customers. They had only been back 10 to 15 minutes when the tape recorder paused, and club manager Bill Bohannon smelled smoke.
Both Wilson and Sorrensen died in the blaze.
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The issue of FP Act certification was summed up in parliamentary debates as early as 1969, can't remember the reference offhand, but the comment was “the act concentrates upon premises, not upon people".
We know that the only factor preventing department stores being very dangerous in fire terms is the sprinkler system.
I totally disagree with who was debating on that occasion it was the complete reverse of that statement. All are teaching both locally and national was to save lives, once you got he occupants out, the building was not our concern. This was the concern on building control to prevent the building being raised to the ground. Sprinklers were installed not for life safety but to allow the doubling of the compartment size. Travel distances and protected routes was the main technique use by us.
When I joined, Henderson’s was still the main topic of discussion and at that time I had no interest in fire safety so I did not go too deeply into the subject. It was a long time ago but I believe Henderson’s had sprinklers but they were of the run at the time and the main reasons for the loss of life were the reluctance of shoppers to leave the premises. Also the fire which was hidden in the ceiling space, no cavity barriers then, and burned through the hangers to allow the ceiling to fall instantly igniting the whole of the forth floor. Now I would imagine even if it had been possible and the premises had been certificated the outcome would have been very similar.
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The issue of FP Act certification was summed up in parliamentary debates as early as 1969, can't remember the reference offhand, but the comment was “the act concentrates upon premises, not upon people".
We know that the only factor preventing department stores being very dangerous in fire terms is the sprinkler system.
I totally disagree with who was debating on that occasion it was the complete reverse of that statement. All are teaching both locally and national was to save lives, once you got he occupants out, the building was not our concern.
I don't think that was the point of the quote - more that buildings should be built in a certain way and that will save lives, more than focusing on educating people.
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AM. I agree it could be interpreted that way but unless you could study the debate in full then we cannot be certain? Because the code for the act used passive protection methods to achieve its aims I have heard many times people claiming we were protecting property not people which is incorrect it was always understood we protected people and BC protected the buildings. However I would agree there was an element of property protection but it was incidental.
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AM. I agree it could be interpreted that way but unless you could study the debate in full then we cannot be certain? Because the code for the act used passive protection methods to achieve its aims I have heard many times people claiming we were protecting property not people which is incorrect it was always understood we protected people and BC protected the buildings. However I would agree there was an element of property protection but it was incidental.
True, but I think the City Logistics case and subsequent appeals, showed that the FPA was for life safety, and could not be used by the Fire Authority to get sprinklers in a building for property/aiding firefighters.
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I think the quote is still accurate. although the FP Act certificate was issued on 'use', it was the physical precautions provided in or from the premises that the certificate controlled. If Section 8, specifically 8.2 had been interpreted and used as intended then there could have been a better degree of response to changes, but as it was, once a fire certificate was issued for the given use, unless there was a 'material change' the certificate stood. It never once asked anything about the people in the premises. good inspecting officers, of course, tried to use the system sensibly, but the quote remains true. I never once saw a S 5.4 notice requiring the change of behaviour of the occupants, but I saw many requiring the substance of the building to be altered in ways that were never intended. {for example, 'making up', guidance always said 'If ... does not meet the standard then travel distance should be reduced' (or other 'compensatory features' provided), yet everyone demanded the increase of the fire resistance. sadly a misunderstood and poorly enacted piece of legislation. (nothing new there then.)} even more sadly, i can practically recite all 44 sections of a now totally redundant statute! Oh well, 'interesting' is a relative term...
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phlogisten we will have to agree to disagree I accept some of your arguments and the FPA was far from perfect but "travel distance should be reduced' (or other 'compensatory features' provided)" this in my eyes is risk assessment and we only did prescriptive. We only accepted passive fire safety and active fire safety was the last resort mainly because it was so unreliable the only exception was hotels and boarding houses and we got that wrong.
Having said that I still think it worked, will it be possible in thirty years to say that about the RR(FS)O?
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I don't think we do have to disagree, I think we agree very much, just approach the issue from different angles.
The FPAct and the (later!) guidance was risk based.
i used to astound students by asking them to read a page in the 'Blue Guide' where travel distance was number 5 on the list of issues to be considered in assessing the risk.
What makes the difference between what was possible and what was generally done was advice from HMFSI. I deplore the disestablishment of the inspectorate, i think it was the only 'British' influence on fire service matters (and, yes i appreciate that Scotland's inspectorate was different from England & Wales, i used to work with them!) which are now at the whim of 50-odd CFO and advisers, but by the individual inspectors gave some poor steers over the years.
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i used to astound students by asking them to read a page in the 'Blue Guide' where travel distance was number 5 on the list of issues to be considered in assessing the risk.
What makes the difference between what was possible and what was generally done was advice from HMFSI. I deplore the disestablishment of the inspectorate, i think it was the only 'British' influence on fire service matters (and, yes i appreciate that Scotland's inspectorate was different from England & Wales, i used to work with them!) which are now at the whim of 50-odd CFO and advisers, but by the individual inspectors gave some poor steers over the years.
Unfortunately Colin as well you know the red, blue, pink & primrose guides are not found in many fire safety offices these days, and if they were not many auditors would understand the general principles of fire safety contained in them. Post War Building studies doesn't often get an airing!
The books have been replaced with poor guidance containing diagrams of horses with their backs to vision panels and many other colour pictures which try but fail to provide answers to questions that the authors clearly didn't understand or knew existed.
We have guidance note No.1 that took too long to come out and when it did failed to even scratch the surface, and in my opinion contains several misleading and inaccurate statements.
Just as the new fire safety law came into effect many FRS decimated their fire safety offices and then failed to provide the training that their few remaining or newly appointed civilian inspectors needed.
But what really worries me is that apart from the few anorak wearing mass-debators to be found in places like this...no one seems to care, including CLG.
....and even scarier is the fact that many hug their new guides believing that if they stick to guidance that has been 'approved by ministers and has official status' they can't go wrong!
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I feel to have the best understanding of the subject the past is as much of an education as the current - although the RRO guides, various current BS series', etc are the main tools,I like to delve into the old rainbow of FPAct guides, major law influencing fires & other older stuff as clues as to what went before & importantly why it did and why it didn't work - after all a lot of our building stock dates back to times when these guides were used.
Even my library of old fire product literature is of use when encountering older systems and equipment as it gives me a clue as to the exact capabilities (or otherwise!) and can influence action plan time scales and help justify to clients exactly why I am requiring ££££ to be spent on a new install other than 'it doesn't meet the new standard' or 'its just too old' - if they can see more practically why I'm saying something they are sometimes more willing to act.
By all means look to the future but never forget the past.
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Thanks, phil. You know my copies of the Post-War building studies are falling apart from over use. They did get a bit of an airing in the initial planning stages for the 9999 project, but as you say, the recent guidance is, as ever, giving potential solutions to problems that don't exist and offering little or no help to those trying to equate building use to personal risk.
AnthonyB, I agree totally, "those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it" (Santayana, I think!) just don't expect to be taken seriously by anyone in CLG if you hint that the world existed before 1997.
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i used to astound students by asking them to read a page in the 'Blue Guide' where travel distance was number 5 on the list of issues to be considered in assessing the risk.
phlogisten you are rattling my cage again, STOP IT.
I am assuming you are referring to "14.11 Assessment of means of escape". This list is not a priority list as you seem to be suggesting, I would say it is a logical way to assess to means of escape and the first paragraph clearly states the factors are inter-related.
I refuse to bite anymore.
As for your dog eared PWS go to http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/project/research/structures/strucfire/DataBase/References/defaultOther.htm they never get dog-eared.
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Ok, I'll stop... soon... that list (full marks, 14.11 it is) came directly from PWBS incidentally. AND, I have virginal new copies of No 20 & No 29, but I'm saving those in my anorak cupboard. I do actually have the pdf versions as well, but thanks anyway. The new ones were a gift from Don Christian who picked them up in a junk shop and gave them to me shortly before he died, nice way to remember a gift from someone who had been almost a mortal enemy on occasions in terms of attitude towards fire safety concepts for many years.
Going to wind my neck in for a week or so now. business has got a bit hectic.
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Don Christian thats a blast from the past.
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Re sprinklers in stores:
They were either installed under local acts to allow larger compartment sizes or installed at the behest of the insurers or the occupant for property protection.
Henderson's was before my time but I have recollection that although there may have been sprinklers they were not covering the whole of the building.
Following the Manchester Woolworth's fire, the Fire Research Station was commissioned by the Home Office to look at the effect of sprinklers on this fire. As a result of the measurements taken during that work, further work was commissioned to look at the wider use of sprinklers for life safety, particularly the use of fast-response sprinklers. This concluded in 1992 by the publication of a summary report: Research Report 51, 'Sprinklers for life safety in Department Stores' by Harwood and Hume. In 1993 the 'Fire Safety and Safety of Sport Act 1987 (Commencement No.7) Order 1993' deleted reference in the 1971 FP Act to the provision of fire-fighting equipment for use by the occupants, and thus allowed fixed equipment, such as sprinklers, to be used as well.
Re Summerland: I cannot find the item refered to on the University of Birmingham website, only the references - the Google search just keeps taking me back to these. Anyone able to give me more details or a specific link, please?
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Is it the book you are looking for - I've downloaded it. the links have stopped working (has happened before), but pu this into google:
site:www.gees.bham.ac.uk summerland fire
& you will get 'back doors' to access the content chapter by chapter
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Try http://www.gees.bham.ac.uk/staff/phillipsid.shtml and read all the page.
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Thanks to both of you; I'll go and give it a whirl.
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An Update on Summerland:
I contacted Dr Ian Phillips and he sent me a paper copy of his book (this was before I went Broadband a couple of weeks ago). I've read through it three times and it is a very creditable effort at writing-up a fire which made considerable impact at the time but which has never been fully remembered since. There are some technical errors regarding fire-spread in particular - but as he's involved in geography and metrology that's quite understandable.
He's just received the last of my comments (amounting to some dozen A4 pages + other additional information) and hopes to do a major revision of the book late this year or early next year.
I've been encouraging him to consider publishing. If anyone has any ideas as to the publishers he ought to try, please PM me and I'll pass on the details.
Just a brief explanatory note - as far as I can make out I am the sole surviving member of the 6-man team from Fire Research that was involved in the investigation at Summerland as I was by far the youngest (and most junior!) of it. It was my first major fire and has therefore indelibly imprinted itself on my memory, so hence my particular interest in this book.
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AB this may be of interest to you http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=65466
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Anthony B
For Stardust try this link to rreport & appendices
Regards
Bleve
http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PB09000021
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For original see also
http://www.lenus.ie/hse/handle/10147/45478
Bleve
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thanks - I've sorted Stardust thanks to the British Library last year. For an extravagantly large amount of money I now own several photocopied volumes totalling about a foot thick!
Interesting reading and scandalous too - the owners made a fortune out of it thanks to the weird working of Irish law instead of being prosecuted......