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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: memnon30 on July 24, 2008, 01:39:05 PM
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Just had a very very quick scan and it seems to me like a backward step. Didn’t like the idea that on some 3 story prems smoke seals should not be fitted so that smoke in the room can get out activating the detectors in the escape routes. Poor old occupier. Looks like sacrificial rooms are back when an interlinked detector would save all the mess. Hope our service doesn’t adopt much of what I have read.
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Big glaring error I spotted - requires fire blankets to BS 6575 which ceased to exist (as did new blankets to that standard) over 10 years ago in 1997, BS EN 1869 obviously escaped them!
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Horrified at the inclusion of paragraph 21.3 as identified by memnon30. Wow. Table C2 in the lacors guide contradicts table 1 in the RRO sleeping guide. The latter deos not recognise LD3 as set out in BS5839, stating that in addition all rooms leading off escape routes should be provided with detectors.
Look at it from the landlords point of view.
If I dont put detectors in rooms I also dont need to put smoke seals on doors.
If I put detectors in rooms then I need to put smoke seals on doors as well.
I conclude that a house without smoke seals and with detectors in the escape routes only is as safe as a house with both installed, and safer than a house with smoke seals but no detectors in rooms.
I'm off to see Matron now for another dose. I may be gone some time.
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Stop it !!
You're making me laugh now !!!!
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memnon30
If you were a codehugger you could say it's just guidance and ignore it!
At the end of the day its all about judgement eg in a house being converted to offices do I upgrade the doors due to single MoE or do I fit L1?
davo
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It’s a pity LACORS didn’t read Colin Todd's submission at http://www.fire.org.uk/punbb/upload/viewtopic.php?id=786 item 4
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Hi folks, Some help required on the requirements for front doors to Council flats (both towers and 4/5 storey walk up blocks). I know there's lots of helpful threads on here and have read most of them but now am further confused by this LACORS document!
In short, we have various flats which dont have FD30s fitted as front doors. We came to the conclusion (after liasing with our F&RS) not to retrofit FD30s to all props but to fit them as and when current doors become past their useful lives. Should say, none of our stock counts as a HMO under the RRO or HA04. This approach applied to tenants, for leaseholders, we intended to give advice on FDs but came to the conclusion we couldnt enforce replacement under bldg regs or anything else.
What are the implications of this LACORS doc? Does this place a requirement on us to retro fit FD30s to every flat? Any other guidance on this major headache of mine would be much appreciated.
Thanks in advance,
Colin
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Where the inner room is any other type of habitable
room (for example a living room, sleeping room,
workroom or study) it should only be accepted if:
• the inner room has access to a suitable door
opening onto an alternative safe route of escape,
or it is situated on a floor which is not more than
4.5m above ground level and has an escape window
leading directly to a place of ultimate safety;
Why is there a need for an alternative safe route of escape? Does this include an additional stairway?
• an adequate automatic fire detection and warning
system is in place (see paragraphs 22-25); and
Didn't read paras 22 - 25 so assume this is OK.
• a fire-resisting door of an appropriate standard is
fitted between the inner and outer rooms (typically
FD30S standard for non-high-risk outer rooms).
Why?????????????????????.
The only thing missing from this guide is pictures of cows and horses. Remember?
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Hi folks, Some help required on the requirements for front doors to Council flats (both towers and 4/5 storey walk up blocks). I know there's lots of helpful threads on here and have read most of them but now am further confused by this LACORS document!
In short, we have various flats which dont have FD30s fitted as front doors. We came to the conclusion (after liasing with our F&RS) not to retrofit FD30s to all props but to fit them as and when current doors become past their useful lives. Should say, none of our stock counts as a HMO under the RRO or HA04. This approach applied to tenants, for leaseholders, we intended to give advice on FDs but came to the conclusion we couldnt enforce replacement under bldg regs or anything else.
What are the implications of this LACORS doc? Does this place a requirement on us to retro fit FD30s to every flat? Any other guidance on this major headache of mine would be much appreciated.
Thanks in advance,
Colin
The LACORS document has no legal standing and does not affect your legal duties in any way. The Fire Safety Order and the guidance on sleeping risks is the benchmark. Having carried out your risk assessment and determined your action plan, if you find that you cannot meet the benchmark standards as set out in the Sleeping guide you may then look at other National guidance documents for ideas on alternative approaches and if they appear to meet your requirements then you may adoopt them and record the basis for your decision in your risk assessment, other guidance may include BS5588 part 1, CP3, the LACORS guidance etc.
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Colin,
In my opinion (I look after 3500 blocks of flats that are housing association stock) Your risk assessment should Identify that the front doors are not FD30s doors. Your action plan should read along the lines that retroffiting with intumescent strips and cold smoke seals is not practicle due to the doors being old style doors, disruption to residents, budgetry issues etc. You should ensure that a suitable budget is in place to replace over a suitable period of time if possible or if not as you say in your post upgrade to the modern spec when the door is no longer serviceable or in the couorse of a significant decoration of the block where this change could be budgetted.
Other mitigations could for example involve installing a fire alarm system and changing the building to an evac strategy (I tell you now though that this will not work as the tennants will ignore the alarm and false alarms/hoax alarms will be significant.)
In real terms the doors on the flat entrances were probably installed to CP3 so will be FD30 doors but without the s (for smoke) suffix.
The building will cope with a fire as generally blocks of flats are designed to not require a full evac as the fire would be contained within the individual flat. (the assessor should be able to judge this)
The LACoRS guide is pants and has little appeal to the real world of fire safety in a social context (based on the 4 hours I have given it so far to read) It may be of use if you have buildings converted to provide flats or HMO's. Other than that it describes fire safety within dwellings which is outside the remit of the RRO.
BS5588 pt 1, the sleeping accomodation guide and common sense should prevail.
The RRO applies in the common areas of your block and not the housing act. Risk assess in accordance with the RRO. Use the LACoRS document as a door wedge
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Where the inner room is any other type of habitable
room (for example a living room, sleeping room,
workroom or study) it should only be accepted if:
• the inner room has access to a suitable door
opening onto an alternative safe route of escape,
or it is situated on a floor which is not more than
4.5m above ground level and has an escape window
leading directly to a place of ultimate safety;
Why is there a need for an alternative safe route of escape? Does this include an additional stairway?
• an adequate automatic fire detection and warning
system is in place (see paragraphs 22-25); and
Didn't read paras 22 - 25 so assume this is OK.
• a fire-resisting door of an appropriate standard is
fitted between the inner and outer rooms (typically
FD30S standard for non-high-risk outer rooms).
Why?????????????????????.
The only thing missing from this guide is pictures of cows and horses. Remember?
Surely if "the inner room has access to a suitable door opening onto an alternative safe route of escape" it is not an inner room!
I am also confused as to the need for FD30s door between the rooms.
Quack Quack Mooooooo!
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Kurnal & BigT - Thank you both v much. That's the approach we intend to take and it's good to hear that this new doc has little relevance. Incidentally, it's a really badly written guide IMO. Right, back to work! Thanks again..........
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Makes me wonder if the 'alternative escape' refers to the bypass balconies between neighbouring flats with kick panels as seen in several 60's high rise blocks
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Kurnal & BigT - Thank you both v much. That's the approach we intend to take and it's good to hear that this new doc has little relevance. Incidentally, it's a really badly written guide IMO. Right, back to work! Thanks again..........
Must have been written by a Senior Fire Safety Officer. An Inspecting Officer would have been more appropriate.
If the guide is considered stupid by those who have to make sense of it then it must be considered a complete waste of taxpayer's money and the balloon who scribed it sacked.
Forgot. This is local government we are talking about. Squandering taxpayer's money is the norm and nobody is ever held to account.
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I agree a big step backwards! Is it a drive to save landlords money? what about the risk to occupants after all according to our stats there in a high risk group!!
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Kurnal & BigT - Thank you both v much. That's the approach we intend to take and it's good to hear that this new doc has little relevance. Incidentally, it's a really badly written guide IMO. Right, back to work! Thanks again..........
Must have been written by a Senior Fire Safety Officer. An Inspecting Officer would have been more appropriate.
If the guide is considered stupid by those who have to make sense of it then it must be considered a complete waste of taxpayer's money and the balloon who scribed it sacked.
Forgot. This is local government we are talking about. Squandering taxpayer's money is the norm and nobody is ever held to account.
My my!
So that long consultation that took place with over 200 resposes, nearly all of which were accomodated, passed you by! It was actually written by a very, very experienced Housing Officer with support from a whole range of stakeholders including the biggest landlord representative group, the National HMO Network, CFOA and the CIEH. Multiple balloons!
It was not funded directly out of taxpayers money, (although indirectly, everything is). Much of the outlay will be re-couped through sales.
Please read the guide carefully as it tries to address a whole range of conflicting advice/enforcement options in difficult premises. It takes a pragmatic approach to existing premises. It could have gold plated everything and turned half a million socially needy tenants out on the street. That would have been good.
If you like, I'll make sure that you are invited to sit on the next steering group so we can all benefit from your charming considered opinions!
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Val
no doubt that much effort and discussion went into producing the document but where a new guide such as this is produced and includes such departures from accepted good practice- such as the recommendation to omit smoke seals from doors to rooms to ensure the smoke detectors in the corridors go off sooner, and no justification or research is given to justify this approach, then credibility is bound to be questioned.
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Kurnal & BigT - Thank you both v much. That's the approach we intend to take and it's good to hear that this new doc has little relevance. Incidentally, it's a really badly written guide IMO. Right, back to work! Thanks again..........
Must have been written by a Senior Fire Safety Officer. An Inspecting Officer would have been more appropriate.
If the guide is considered stupid by those who have to make sense of it then it must be considered a complete waste of taxpayer's money and the balloon who scribed it sacked.
Forgot. This is local government we are talking about. Squandering taxpayer's money is the norm and nobody is ever held to account.
My my!
So that long consultation that took place with over 200 resposes, nearly all of which were accomodated, passed you by! It was actually written by a very, very experienced Housing Officer with support from a whole range of stakeholders including the biggest landlord representative group, the National HMO Network, CFOA and the CIEH. Multiple balloons!
It was not funded directly out of taxpayers money, (although indirectly, everything is). Much of the outlay will be re-couped through sales.
Please read the guide carefully as it tries to address a whole range of conflicting advice/enforcement options in difficult premises. It takes a pragmatic approach to existing premises. It could have gold plated everything and turned half a million socially needy tenants out on the street. That would have been good.
If you like, I'll make sure that you are invited to sit on the next steering group so we can all benefit from your charming considered opinions!
With absolute respect to you Val I am extremely pleased to hear from someone who seems to have been involved in or is in support of the drafting of national guidelines on Fire Safety. What a pity that more like you could not join our discussions more often.
The Housing Officer? Experienced in what Val? Housing? Can you have the experienced housing officer explain the rational behind that part of the document I immediately picked up on at the eary stages - inner rooms?
I have not read the rest of the guidance carefully as I am still trying to make something of the horse and cow hotel document. Remember? Maybe you know who wrote it also?
I'm also sure that many others on this forum have a specific query on this document also. So if you hang about a little you should hear from them soon.
Are you honestly telling me that at a round the table meeting the landlord representative group, the National HMO Network, CFOA and the CIEH scrutinised these guidelines to the full and to a man voted it through as a policy document? Are you honestly telling me that Val?
I can just visualise the support given to the Very Experienced Housing Officer, who I have no doubt is a member of the salt of the earth society, by the bodies you referred to.
"We are too busy. You write it and we will sign it off."
I would love to sit on the next steering committee Val but you know what? My contribution from 15 years in a Fire & Rescue Service Fire Safety Department would be far too sensible. Much better to leave it to experienced people.
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Nearly There
Yes, those groups really did scrutinise the document on a number of occasions, Experienced fire officers from London, Notts, South Wales and Manchester did work extensively on the document.
The author knows more about real HMOs and the real problems caused by prescription than I, (or maybe even you), will ever know. Your description is rude and tasteless and has no place on this forum.
Your approach reminds me of those people in Moreton who used to wet themselves because they had found some exotic contradiction in CP3 or BS 5588.
As for the guide having no status...try telling that to the RPT or Magistrates Court next time you stand before them.
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a fire-resisting door of an appropriate standard is fitted between the inner and outer rooms (typically
FD30S standard for non-high-risk outer rooms). Why?????????????????????.
Nearly There
Yes, those groups really did scrutinise the document on a number of occasions, Experienced fire officers from London, Notts, South Wales and Manchester did work extensively on the document.
The author knows more about real HMOs and the real problems caused by prescription than I, (or maybe even you), will ever know. Your description is rude and tasteless and has no place on this forum.
Your approach reminds me of those people in Moreton who used to wet themselves because they had found some exotic contradiction in CP3 or BS 5588..
Val I appreciate that you feel annoyed but I do think Nearlythere and Kurnal make valid points. It does seem strange that some areas of confusion were not identified in the extensive consultation procedure. Perhaps that procedure needs improving.
Can you answer the question Nearlythere posed regarding the fire door between an inner room and access room?
Having personally worked in two of the brigades that supplied the experienced fire officers who worked on the document it does not surprise me that some glaring errors are included.
Whilst the author may know more than most about real HMOs and problems with precriptive fire safety, the guide does appear to have too many flaws.
...... & I have also worked at Moreton but I rarely wet myself, well not that often as far as I recall.
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Hi Val
Personally I am accustomed to finding my nether regions rather damp from time to time.
So sorry now I have admitted this please who if anybody can shed some light on some of the logic behind these clauses? I am not hostile - just interested to learn? Especially the smoke seals query and where this idea came from?
Or is it another of those cases in which people take credit for the producton of the document but nobody will discuss or take responsibility to explain any of the detail - like the table in the sleeping guide where the guidance quotes and then re-writes the definition of LD3 in BS5839? Was it intentional or was it a cut and paste error? Nobody will tell me- but I am having the RRO guidance quoted by enforcement officers on a regular basis as over riding BS5839?
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Nearly There
Yes, those groups really did scrutinise the document on a number of occasions, Experienced fire officers from London, Notts, South Wales and Manchester did work extensively on the document.
The author knows more about real HMOs and the real problems caused by prescription than I, (or maybe even you), will ever know. Your description is rude and tasteless and has no place on this forum.
Your approach reminds me of those people in Moreton who used to wet themselves because they had found some exotic contradiction in CP3 or BS 5588.
As for the guide having no status...try telling that to the RPT or Magistrates Court next time you stand before them.
Val. Again with respect, I would find it much easier to explain to a magistrate how the the guide has no credibility than explain to a barrister the benefits of having a fire door between an access and an inner room.
Are you honestly saying that experienced fire officers from London, Notts, South Wales and Manchester did work extensively on the document? What were they experienced in? It certainly wasn't Fire Safety.
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As a late contributor to this full blooded debate, I would like to mention the following points:
I have come across the no smoke seals theory before in relation to dwellings. The thinking being that if you have detection in the escape routes only, then you would want some smoke to enter these escape routes at an early stage of the fire (hence no smoke seals) in order to set the detection off. The alternative would be having a severe fire that would only be discovered when it violently forced its way out through some other route (door, ceiling etc) cutting off the escape of the occupants. If you adopt this approach I think the detection in escape routes only then no smoke seals would make sense. If there is smoke detection in the rooms as well then the smoke seals would provide extra protection. I realise it is a perverse incentive but I can see the thinking behind it.
With the inner rooms - if a bedroom, for example, has 2 doors leading from it with each door leading into a seperate lounge then is it still an inner room. I would say it probably was, as an inner room is a room which you access through another room, which would be the case here. You access the inner room through lounge 1 (access room 1) or through lounge 2 (access room 2). I have come across this before where a 2 houses have been linked to form 1 HiMO. Again in this situation maybe the fire doors would make sense.
Only a thought!
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With the inner rooms - if a bedroom, for example, has 2 doors leading from it with each door leading into a seperate lounge then is it still an inner room.
John,
In my humble opinion an inner room is only an inner room if the only escape route is through an inner room. If the escape route is via one , two or many access rooms the room is not an inner room.
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Phil,
If the bedroom had 2 doors, one leading to lounge 1 and the other leading to lounge 2, and lounges 1 and 2 are also connected by a single door, would you not consider this to be an inner room?
If not, would it be an inner room if the non FR door between the 2 lounges was left open; or
If the door between the 2 lounges was removed?
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There was lots of discussion on how to make certain undesirable, though common, interior layouts more safe. None of the options were very attractive. Where the (generally) sleeping accommodation has to exit through risk rooms such as kitchens or lounges, the options considered were window exits, detection and 'buying a bit more time'. I know the presence of a window exit makes the inner room technically not an inner room. The FR door does buy more time and you could argue that it effectively relies on some other party coming to rescue the occupant but it is not a perfect world. Much of the guide is based on early, reliable AFD which is designed not to generate too many false alarms and therefore may actually be left working.
Similar principles were adopted for back to back terraces where the stairs come down, typically, between the lounge and kitchen. They could never be made properly safe in the traditional sense but there are tens of thousands of them and they make cheap accommodation. Recommendations of separating the base of the stairs with FR to give true alternatives looks feasible on paper but in practise these doors would be wedged open as it is the main thoroughfare between kitchen and lounge.
Johno67 has perfectly given the rationale behind the ommision of smoke seals.
Other areas you might like to consider for discussion are;
Substantial construction rather than 30 mins FR
Acceptance of solid doors rather than fire doors
Limited FR between basements and ground floor
Use of escape routes via adjoining premises or roofs
FR to protect external escapes (not always possible)
Provision of fire fighting equipment
No E/L in familiar low risk premises
No pictures of cows!
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Phil,
If the bedroom had 2 doors, one leading to lounge 1 and the other leading to lounge 2, and lounges 1 and 2 are also connected by a single door, would you not consider this to be an inner room?
If not, would it be an inner room if the non FR door between the 2 lounges was left open; or
If the door between the 2 lounges was removed?
Answer to question 1, no.
Answer to question 2 If the door is open they would still be two rooms but yes they would act as one room.
If the door is removed, yest it would be like one room. Do you really think the authors were trying to cater for this rather wierd scenario?
But the questionremains, what good would a fire door be between the inner room and the access room(s).
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There was lots of discussion on how to make certain undesirable, though common, interior layouts more safe. None of the options were very attractive. Where the (generally) sleeping accommodation has to exit through risk rooms such as kitchens or lounges, the options considered were window exits, detection and 'buying a bit more time'. I know the presence of a window exit makes the inner room technically not an inner room. The FR door does buy more time and you could argue that it effectively relies on some other party coming to rescue the occupant but it is not a perfect world. Much of the guide is based on early, reliable AFD which is designed not to generate too many false alarms and therefore may actually be left working.
I see so the fire door is to hold back the fire while the person awaits rescue by ladder, who came up with that cracker?, it's better than the pictures of the cows!
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Answer to question 1, no.
Answer to question 2 If the door is open they would still be two rooms but yes they would act as one room.
If the door is removed, yest it would be like one room.
Agreed
Do you really think the authors were trying to cater for this rather wierd scenario?
Probably not, but the debate does seem unbalanced. The people who write this type of guidance will always come up with the best options they see fit at that time. It seemed like a pack was forming with poor Val being lined up as the target. I wish more people would try to look at why a particular item has been included instead of scoring easy points rubbishing it, often at the expense of others.
But the question remains, what good would a fire door be between the inner room and the access room(s).
Again I'm not sure but I am sure this would be the best fit solution for the problem they were looking at at the time.
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Thanks Johno67
My shoulders, like the rest of me, are fairly broad.
PhilB
Have you any suggestions to the issues we struggled with other than forcing landlords to re-arrange tens of thousands of premises?
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Thanks Johno and Val for your explanations.
Personally I am unable to come to terms with paragraph 21.3. I thank Johno for your your explanation of the logic but it still does not rest easily with me. This clause did not appear in the draft consultation version of the guidance- it appeared only in the final version and so I wonder if it was fully debated;.
If smoke in escape routes is the most serious threat to safe escape and being exposed to smoke or combustion products is the most common cause of death from a fire then any measures recommended in official guidance should address these hazards. Rather than recommend the omission of seals in order to deliberately promote the passage of smoke into an escape route (which also contradicts the principles of prevention) then the guidance should have addressed the issue by recommending LD2 coverage in three storey or taller premises with a single staircase. The cost / benefit analysis of LD2 in these circumstances will stand up to any scrutiny.
As the guidance is written I agree that with a single staircase and an LD3 system smoke seals will delay the operation of an LD3 system, but by omitting them although the time to detection will be shorter the tenability of the escape route is likley to be seriously degraded and the route available for a much shorter time.
The worst case could be from a smouldering fire in the room, the smoke passing through the gap between the door leaf and frame would be cool and possibly lack the bouyancy to reach the ceiling in the hallway and operate the detectors.
That why I feel this recommendation is flawed.
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"re-arrange tens of thousands of premises" or save lives?
The choice is yours
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Thanks Johno67
My shoulders, like the rest of me, are fairly broad.
PhilB
Have you any suggestions to the issues we struggled with other than forcing landlords to re-arrange tens of thousands of premises?
Sorry Val I was being flippant, I apologise and I do appreciate that you are trying to make the best of a bad situation.
I don't suggest landlords should rearrange lots of premises, unless the risk assessment deems that there is no other way.
However I was trying to make a serious point, I dont think a fire door between an inner room used for sleeping and a risk room would help the sleeper, particularly as the door according to the guide should be without smoke seals. and if landlords went out and purchased and fitted such doors as the guide appera to recommend, it could cost thousands of pounds and achieve very little.
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Thanks Johno67
My shoulders, like the rest of me, are fairly broad.
PhilB
Have you any suggestions to the issues we struggled with other than forcing landlords to re-arrange tens of thousands of premises?
Sorry Val I was being flippant, I apologise and I do appreciate that you are trying to make the best of a bad situation.
I don't suggest landlords should rearrange lots of premises, unless the risk assessment deems that there is no other way.
However I was trying to make a serious point, I dont think a fire door between an inner room used for sleeping and a risk room would help the sleeper, particularly as the door according to the guide should be without smoke seals. and if landlords went out and purchased and fitted such doors as recommendation, it could cost thousands of pounds and achieve very little.
Am I being a little picky by asking why no mention of the standard of the wall or partition the door is in?
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Many years ago now, the defunct GLC had a nice orange guide that covered most if not all premises. It seems now that we have to have a different guide for each type but within them we lose the basic principles of fire safety. We know that we should have greater protection for sleeping risk premises and for all of us, nearlythere's post above is a valid question that needs an answer. What would be the point in a BS 476 door set put in a non fr partition?
Having sat on a few BSI and other comiittees, I understand some of the problems as they go on a consensual basis and the srongest voice often wins out. I think that the old HMO guide with the correction on some of its diagrams was as good as the LACORS one.
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Although I agree with all of the sentiments expressed on bringing HMO's up to the standard, that as Fire Safety Professionals, we would want them to be, I fear that in practice this will be far from easy to achieve.
Lets face it, if landlords are forced into a position whereby they are going to have to spend significant amounts of money on bringing sub-standard accomodation up to scratch then many will not do so, or will withdraw the service they provide. If enforcing authorities are comitted to inspecting these premises and issuing prohibition notices or enforcement notices then many HMO's will be forced to close.
The result in both cases will be many more of the most vulnerable people in society on the streets, and I'm sure that's not what any of us want, wherever we view it from, and something that our paymaster will not accept under any circumstances.
"re-arrange tens of thousands of premises" or save lives?
The choice is yours
Who is that aimed at? Do we insist on and enforce the absolute standards and turf 100's maybe 1000's of people onto the streets, or do we work with what we have and try to make the best of a bad situation? I know as a F&RS employee I would want the latter of those choices.
And why have HMO's suddenly come to the fore as such a high risk. I know that when we looked into this as a brigade not so long back, we found very little evidence of fires causing deaths or serious injuries outside of the room/flat of origin. Historically we viewed them as such a problem as every flat fire that was attended by a brigade would be recorded on the FDR1 data as a fire in a same use, multi-occupied building. The Small Landlords Association carried out a study into HMO fires in London a few years back and their conclusion was that there were a higher proportion of fires within HMO's because of the people that the housed. However they found little evidence of this affecting others outside the room/flat of origin. Now I know that they are looking at it from their point of view, but I would ask the question of F&RS personnel - how many fires have you been to in HMO's that have caused death or serious injury to those outside the room/flat of origin?
I know there are some pretty awful places out there, I have seen quite a few myself, and I understand that it may be a problem that is being stored up for the future, but I have to ask why the sudden concern, is it down to the fact that a new guidance note has come out? Surely the biggest problem for society is the amount of deaths and serious injuries resulting from RTC's and dwelling fires?
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Hello Johno67
Can I say that nobody is questioning the purpose of this guidance. What is being questioned is its quality and the rationale for some of the advice given. I have asked if anyone can explain the need for a fire door between an inner and access room. Have I missed an explanation somewhere?
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Hello Johno67
Can I say that nobody is questioning the purpose of this guidance. What is being questioned is its quality and the rationale for some of the advice given. I have asked if anyone can explain the need for a fire door between an inner and access room. Have I missed an explanation somewhere?
Nearlythere
Your attention to detail is similar to your manners...see 10.31 yesterday for at least an attempt at an explanation.
Pragmatism is seldom pretty but is often the only way to move things on.
I assume that under your direction the issues raised in this article in 2004 has now been addressed.
FIRE DEATHS AND INJURIES STILL TOO HIGH HERE - MINISTER
Minister with responsibility for Health, Social Services and Public Safety, Angela Smith, MP, today outlined the Government’s proposals for strengthening and improving the fire service and fire safety legislation here.
Launching the consultation document ‘Northern Ireland’s Fire and Rescue Service’, the Minister said: "Fire deaths and injuries in Northern Ireland have been falling over recent years, but the figures are still too high. Our proposals are designed to reduce the risk of fire; improve the fire service’s response when fires do occur; and develop an even more highly skilled and safer workforce.
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Good morning Val. I hope I find you well and trust you had a relaxing weekend.
Thank you for directing me to the post which, as you say, is an attempt to offer an explanation. Have you considered why there is no mention of the standard of the partition the fire door is in? I would have though that this very important point should have been covered. Indeed the diagram C3 showing the inner room condition does not even mention the fire resisting door and, although a minor detail, shows the door in the open position.
Can't quite get the point of the reference to Angela Smith's proposals. Is the purpose of the fire resisting door in question to reduce the risk of fire, improve the fire service's response and develop an even more highly skilled and safer worhforce?
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All,
If i am 100% honest the LACoRS guide is causing me more of a headache than the RRO at the moment. I now find myself looking for all the contradictions between 5588pt1 and the LACoRS guide and presenting to the board on 6 of our operating companies. Great stuff. As if looking after the risk assessment of 3500 blocks of social flats wasn't enough. Ta.
In my opinion the guide is not very helpful. Its wooly. Again. Like all the other guides that have been released. And provides another book of contradiction for the landlords of dangerous properties to hide in.
"No intumescent strips or cold smoke seals Mr enforcing officer? I don't need to install them, I have removed the smoke detection from the bedrooms instead"
The government would have been better off writing a fire risk assessment template. One that all fire brigades accept and covers every single aspect a landlord should consider.
The recommendation to install fire extinguishers in all floors of blocks of flats has annoyed me. A lot. It ommitts the (flipping sensible) line in 5588pt 1 about installing extinguishers "Where vandalism is unlikely" Which in my opinion is a headache that will haunt anybody whio decides to install extinguishers in the communal area of a social housing block. And lets face it, this guide is aimed at the social houing sector and not the glistening modern high rises built by Barratt and Co.
It was discussed about the 200 people consulted many from the housing industry but Local council input versus housing associations were to the tune of 26:3 and of those three where were the biggies? Riverside, places for people, Affinity Sutton, London and Quadrant etc. The companies who have tens of thousands of residents and thousands of properties?
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Since when did anybody put smoke seals in houses?????
Brand new houses dont have them (other than the garage) so why would you impose it on an existing one.
The LACORS guide had to try and get consensus from dozens of FRAs and HAs. Its never going to be perfect but the alternative was the madness caused by FRAs trying to enforce the Sleeping risk guide in HMOs where it was totally inapropriate. At the same time HAs were enforcing the HHSRS and Doe 12/92 in other bits of the same building.
Theres a common standard for both systems now. Over the years it will get tweaked and fiddled with but its not as bad as some of you guys suggest.
Everybody on this forum was made aware of the consultation draft so I'm sure you would have raised all of these issues then.
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Since when did anybody put smoke seals in houses?????
I see smoke seals installed in HMO's everywhere. And IO's stipulate the requirement all the time accross our HMO stock.
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Since when did anybody put smoke seals in houses?????
I see smoke seals installed in HMO's everywhere. And IO's stipulate the requirement all the time accross our HMO stock.
Ditto
We arent talking private, single domestic dwellings Wee Brian.
We are talking HMOs which house vulnerable people.
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Wee B
I have looked through the consultation draft and have not found any reference to the omission of door seals as a compensation to the lack of detection. Please correct me if I am wrong.
If I am right, then could this have been inserted in direct response to an individual consultation- indicating a possible fault in the QA process and short circuiting the procedure?
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It is as bad as we are all making out Wee B other wise we wouldn't bother typing. And in all fairness the only support for the document has come from the people who wrote it.
It is wooly, everyone here who has read thinks that certain elements of it are dangerously worded espcially the smoke detection intumescent strip issue I have highlighted above, I am miffed that it talks about extinguishers in the communal areas of flats which has nothing to do with the housing act and is enforceable Fire and rescue services.
I guarantee that Fire services will attempt to enforce properties to provide greater fire safety provision than that recomended in the LACoRS document.
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I have read the LACORS document three time through, cover to cover now, and each time get slightly more frustrated by it.
Poor old Val has had to field some flack about it on this thread but the fact in my opinion remains that this is a poorly written document, and one which I'd be very wary of adopting as best practice.
I appreciate that some buildings are very hard to adapt and that the aim of Lacors was to try and give guidance to fix most issues we find.
I also appreciate landlords should be subjected to balanced and fair enforcement, but Im afraid alot of the logic in this document makes my jaw drop.
Our own brigade's guidance document is much clearer, much better, and much easier for punters to understand so that and the sleeping guide would be my preferred option to follow.
Consultation did take place on this document but as we all know consultation can be flawed, often the biggest group with the biggest voice gets heard.
Im kust very skeptical about how the guide was produced.
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I have spoken to a couple of people today who were involved in this publication. As in all things committee wise everyone had a say and some bits are from a consensus point of view. The document is a vandalisation of a number of documents used by a variety of housing and FRS staff and reflects this in its wording. The theory of the no smoke alarm?removal of strips and seals is that a fire in a risk room would allow the smoke to actuate an alarm in a non risk area thus giving detection and warning and allowing occupants to escape and the door still having enough integrity to hold back the fire.
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jokar this theory has been tried before and it doesn’t work. Read Colin Todd’s posting at http://www.fire.org.uk/punbb/upload/viewtopic.php?id=786 item 4.
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TW, I am aware of that and Colin's post. Just trying to assist others understand the supposed theory.
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Fair enough jokar but don't you agree, considering Colin's posting the theory dosen't work.
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The reason it's bad, in places, is because its a consensus guide. Consensus amongst HAs and FRAs was always going to be daft.
I dont blame the author for that.
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TW, I agree but I haven't had a detailed look at the whole guide in its new format as I am waiting for a printed copy.
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Jokar.
Take a look at the online guide available at the lacors site.
I think we all understand the theory of why the new guide suggests no strips and seals. Our point is that it is flawed theory that doesn't work (proven to not work). And is worded in a way that some landlords could use the guide to justify not upgrading systems within a building.
I understand fully why the guide has been written, and why in places laurel and hardy music plays in my head whilst I am reading it, but, and i know i'm not alone, I am quite dissappointed and in places shocked with it.
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Where possible I try to read the book rather than on screen, it is easier to refer back when they say look at para 9.7 when you are at para 21.
Interesting comment on electronic locks in para 16.3 which goes against BS 7273 part 4. Again why? If BS are a recommended standard why give advice to lower the standard and to what effect?
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That paragraph has a post it note with "what about earth frame faults" written on it
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Where possible I try to read the book rather than on screen, it is easier to refer back when they say look at para 9.7 when you are at para 21.
Interesting comment on electronic locks in para 16.3 which goes against BS 7273 part 4. Again why? If BS are a recommended standard why give advice to lower the standard and to what effect?
I was reading that today as well and Im in disbelief as you say why they would do this
We are a forum and thus a voice can we not collectively send a concerned communication to Lacors about the guide?
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Jokar,
16.3 Electrically operated locks must fail to safety (open) or
have a manual over-ride in the event of power failure.
Why is this short paragraph contrary to BS 7273 Part 4? I accept it is a slight abbreviation of the 80-odd page BS but is it wrong in this type of premises?
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As a small landlord, who has had immense frustrations with my local housing authority and rigid standards, a friend directed me to this site and to be honest, I am slightly amused by what I'm reading. Surely this new guide is just that. A guide. It is all about risk assessment and not about prescription.
This issue of whether or not to have smoke seals.
Having read earlier posts and the post by Colin Todd in the other thread, surely the answer is:
If the HMO is big enough to have smoke detectors approaching 15m apart (and that is some considerable shared house) then perhaps LD3 and no smoke seals won't work and therefore isn't appropriate. If as in the case of my house the detectors are no further than 1.5m from any bedroom door and the time to leave the building is about 30 seconds, then LD3 and no smoke seals might be appropriate. I happen to have detectors in all rooms in my properties. That makes me comfortable.
In any case, the types of properties that the guide considers this to be appropriate for are generally low risk. Let's ask some questions:
Who generally live in shared houses? Students.
How old are they usually? About 18 - 22.
How many 18 - 22 year olds die in fires in buildings? (Any buildings, not just HMOs.) In 2006, according to the Office for National Statistics that would be about 3 in England and Wales.
So, as the population of England and Wales is about 60 million the odds of an individual 18 - 22yr old person dying in a fire in England or Wales in any building would be about 20 million to one. This is the same odds that William Hill offered on a bet that Elvis Presley would ride into London on Shergar and play Lord Lucan in the Wimbledon Tennis final. (That's true. Google it!)
I know I'm being flippant and stretching statistics, but the point is that it's about risk. I see the expression 'code huggers' dotted about the forum and a lot of the posts in this thread seem to suggest that some of the posters, would be more comfortable with a set of rigid standards than guidance (however well or poorly written) which allows them to use their professional judgement on a case-by-case basis.
Please, let's look at guidance as just that. Guidance. If what's in the guidance results in adequate safety for the occupiers, then great. If it doesn't, then increase what is required. If the risk is already low, then perhaps you don't need everything mentioned in the guidance.
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So, as the population of England and Wales is about 60 million the odds of an individual 18 - 22yr old person dying in a fire in England or Wales in any building would be about 20 million to one.
To work out the odds like that you need to know the number of 18-22 year olds in the country. Working from www.statistics.gov.uk I estimate the number to be in the region of 400,000 in the whole of the uk. Lets imagine that nobody lives in Scotland or Ireland, and use that number of 3 deaths from England and Wales. 1 in 133,333 18-22 year olds died in a fire. That is 105 times more likely than any set of 6 numbers winning the national lottery, and many of use are happy to continually waste money on that hoping our numbers come up.
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As a small landlord, who has had immense frustrations with my local housing authority and rigid standards, a friend directed me to this site and to be honest, I am slightly amused by what I'm reading. Surely this new guide is just that. A guide. It is all about risk assessment and not about prescription.
This issue of whether or not to have smoke seals.
Having read earlier posts and the post by Colin Todd in the other thread, surely the answer is:
If the HMO is big enough to have smoke detectors approaching 15m apart (and that is some considerable shared house) then perhaps LD3 and no smoke seals won't work and therefore isn't appropriate. If as in the case of my house the detectors are no further than 1.5m from any bedroom door and the time to leave the building is about 30 seconds, then LD3 and no smoke seals might be appropriate. I happen to have detectors in all rooms in my properties. That makes me comfortable.
In any case, the types of properties that the guide considers this to be appropriate for are generally low risk. Let's ask some questions:
Who generally live in shared houses? Students.
How old are they usually? About 18 - 22.
How many 18 - 22 year olds die in fires in buildings? (Any buildings, not just HMOs.) In 2006, according to the Office for National Statistics that would be about 3 in England and Wales.
So, as the population of England and Wales is about 60 million the odds of an individual 18 - 22yr old person dying in a fire in England or Wales in any building would be about 20 million to one. This is the same odds that William Hill offered on a bet that Elvis Presley would ride into London on Shergar and play Lord Lucan in the Wimbledon Tennis final. (That's true. Google it!)
I know I'm being flippant and stretching statistics, but the point is that it's about risk. I see the expression 'code huggers' dotted about the forum and a lot of the posts in this thread seem to suggest that some of the posters, would be more comfortable with a set of rigid standards than guidance (however well or poorly written) which allows them to use their professional judgement on a case-by-case basis.
Please, let's look at guidance as just that. Guidance. If what's in the guidance results in adequate safety for the occupiers, then great. If it doesn't, then increase what is required. If the risk is already low, then perhaps you don't need everything mentioned in the guidance.
The problem is not the code huggers johnny99, it's the code writers. In regards to professional judgement over code hugging isn't it comforting to know that most drivers hug the highway code. Professional judgement can be dangerous.
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CivvyFSO
I apologise for trying to inject a little humour into this thread. I was simply trying to make the point that perhaps the risks are not so high as to be frightening. There is no evidence to suggest that any of those unfortunate fatalities occurred in a shared house or any type of HMO, or that any smoke detectors or fire doors would have prevented them dying in any case. If none of those three people died in shared houses at all, then the odds could be infinite, which is lots higher than the chances of winning the lottery.
nearlythere
I am a little surprised by that. Firstly, I don't see that most drivers are 'professionals'. Secondly, I have no idea what your background is, but I would expect that Local Housing Authority Inspectors, paid Risk Assessors and Fire Brigade Inspectors should all be able to exercise professional judgement in a safe manner. Isn't that what the Housing Health & Safety Rating System, the Enforcement Concordat and all the other legislation is about?
I am not trying to be controversial, and I do take my tenants safety very seriously. As I mentioned the detection in my houses is LD2 (I won't be reducing it as a result of the guidance) but there is a difference between a safe property and belt, braces, piece of string and a spare pair of trousers just in case.
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CivvyFSO
I apologise for trying to inject a little humour into this thread. I was simply trying to make the point that perhaps the risks are not so high as to be frightening. There is no evidence to suggest that any of those unfortunate fatalities occurred in a shared house or any type of HMO, or that any smoke detectors or fire doors would have prevented them dying in any case. If none of those three people died in shared houses at all, then the odds could be infinite, which is lots higher than the chances of winning the lottery.
nearlythere
I am a little surprised by that. Firstly, I don't see that most drivers are 'professionals'. Secondly, I have no idea what your background is, but I would expect that Local Housing Authority Inspectors, paid Risk Assessors and Fire Brigade Inspectors should all be able to exercise professional judgement in a safe manner. Isn't that what the Housing Health & Safety Rating System, the Enforcement Concordat and all the other legislation is about?
I am not trying to be controversial, and I do take my tenants safety very seriously. As I mentioned the detection in my houses is LD2 (I won't be reducing it as a result of the guidance) but there is a difference between a safe property and belt, braces, piece of string and a spare pair of trousers just in case.
Only joking with my second point johnny99.
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Doh! Apologies nearlythere. Hoisted by my own comedy petard.
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There is no evidence to suggest that any of those unfortunate fatalities occurred in a shared house or any type of HMO, or that any smoke detectors or fire doors would have prevented them dying in any case. If none of those three people died in shared houses at all, then the odds could be infinite, which is lots higher than the chances of winning the lottery.
The odds would never be infinite as you would then simply look over the course of more years. i.e. 1 death in 5 years from a group of 400,000 people would leave odds of 1 in 2,000,000 chance of dying in such an event over the course of a year. Still less than the lottery and far from infinite.
34.8% of all fire deaths and 39.2% of all fire injuries occur in HMOs. With 448 fire deaths in a 12 month period, that equates to approx 155 HMO deaths in a year. The fatality rate rises according to the number of floors, so shared 2 storey houses themselves will have low fatality rates and the guidance reflects this.
I also suspect that if you were able to dig deep into where the deaths have occurred then early warning coupled with a good protected route out of the building could have easily avoided the death in a majority of cases where the person was ambulant and coherent.
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Why oh why did I use some stats with my tongue firmly in my cheek?? CivvyFSO, as I noted in my first ever post on this forum, I was being flippant and stretching statistics.
My overall point is that with regard to shared houses, whether two storey, three storey or even, dare I say it, more storeys, there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the occupants of shared houses are at any more risk than those in similar, single occupancy dwellings. Because of my friendly local EHO, I have had to carry out a considerable amount of research into the risk in shared houses (The sort of places where the LACORS guide recommends LD3 for up to four storeys) and there is nothing to suggest that there is any raised risk in these properties. To look at the death and injury data for HMOs and to conclude that all HMOs are dangerous is like looking at fireworks factories and concluding that all factories are dangerous. There is a vast range of risk in HMOs.
If you read the ENTEC report (sadly I have) you will find that it contains no evidence whatsoever to conclude that shared houses of three storeys pose any particular risk. You do have to read the full report to get to the detail. As johno67 (no relation) rightly points out it's not the buildings that pose the risk, it is the occupants.
The Small Landlords Association report referred to by johno67 concluded, as far as I can recall that shared houses are 'stunningly safe' by comparison with all other dwelling types. If my memory serves me correctly it looked at fatalities in London over about 7 years and in those 7 years there were 5 fatalities, among a shared house population of about 500,000 people. One was a murder and two were suicides, so not much that any housing authority inspector could do about those. One was an alcoholic epileptic man who had a fit while drunk and fell on an electric bar fire. Perhaps the safety measure was central heating? The final death was a woman who set fire to her clothing while lighting candles in her room at 4am. I think I recall that she was drunk also. Perhaps she could have been saved, perhaps not.
You could have two absolutely identical buildings next door to each other. One occupied by five young, fit and healthy friends who have chosen to live, cook and eat together for a significant period of time and one occupied by five strangers who regularly move on, are alcohol and drug dependent and live, cook and eat in their own rooms. Which one is the fireworks factory and which one is the small family business making garden gnomes?
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Val,
Does not the BS say fail safe to open on a power failure, fail safe on the actuation of the FA and have a manual override, not one or the other.
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My overall point is that with regard to shared houses, whether two storey, three storey or even, dare I say it, more storeys, there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the occupants of shared houses are at any more risk than those in similar, single occupancy dwellings.
Correct but the government doesn't have control over single occupancy dwellings. And cannot improve the safety retrospectively in a normal dwelling. HMO's are covered by the government and they can (quite rightyly) demand them to be safer.
Val,
Does not the BS say fail safe to open on a power failure, fail safe on the actuation of the FA and have a manual override, not one or the other.
Jokar. quite right, BS says you have to have both
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On subject of shared housing>
Anyone any views on the relaxation of standards in "shared housing"? Seems a backward step but assume risk assesssment would identify if greater degree of fire safety would be required. However didnt I read somewhere that a risk assessment not required in shared housing.
Any comments welcome!
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Why oh why did I use some stats with my tongue firmly in my cheek?? CivvyFSO, as I noted in my first ever post on this forum, I was being flippant and stretching statistics.
I was simply pointing out that the use of statistics was blatantly wrong. Call it tongue in cheek or stretching statistics or whatever, it gave a completely false representation of the point you were trying to make. I am not disagreeing with you that shared houses are a world away from 3-4 storey HMO's though.
The risk assessment may not be required in shared housing as the 'single private dwelling' may be applied from the fire safety order, however housing act still deems it a HMO but there is a guidance note somewhere (Prior to LACORS guidance) that recognises the lesser risk involved when a house is occupied in such a fashion.
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My overall point is that with regard to shared houses, whether two storey, three storey or even, dare I say it, more storeys, there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the occupants of shared houses are at any more risk than those in similar, single occupancy dwellings.
Correct but the government doesn't have control over single occupancy dwellings. And cannot improve the safety retrospectively in a normal dwelling. HMO's are covered by the government and they can (quite rightyly) demand them to be safer.
Just because you can doesnt mean you should.