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THE REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005 => Q & A => Topic started by: A J on November 04, 2008, 11:07:13 AM
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Hi,
Your thoughts on the following would be appreciated..
A scheme of 8 blocks consisting of ground and first floor, constructed of solid walls and floors. two flats on ground and two flats on the first floor. door entry system at the front door and a bin store (secured with slated doors and locked). Corridor has fire doors on both floors and also the bin store area. There is AFD in the flats and in the escape route.
There are not any smoke detectors in the common areas, the escape route is sterile and with fire doors in the building and also the stay put policy the scheme operates I wonder if they are required.
However looking at table 1 -part 2 of the sleeping accommodation guide it states that sheltered accommodation requires an L2 system in the common areas
If a fire was to start in the bin area no one in the flats would be aware, The only ignition source would be arson, so if the bins are kept secure and the fire doors kept shut then would it be suitable under the RRO not to install smoke detectors in the common areas.
Am I correct or am I missing something?
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I think you are right, especally as it is a two storey block and window exits can be assumed. Above two storeys the bin store may become more of an issue.
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Thanks Kurnal for putting my mind at rest...again!
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The recommendations in 5588 pt 1 31.1 / 31.2 would suggest otherwise.
In addition to the smoke detectors in the flats there should be a system to warn of a fire in the communal areas. especially with the specific risk you have identified.
In sheltered accomodation L1 or L2 is required.
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Fire does not really know or care if people behind front doors are ancient (like Kurnal) or young and fit (like me). BS 5588-1 was never logical on this issue. But one should not rush into giving advice without knowing all the information. Sheltered housing is tricky-some at one extreme it is simply a speical case of a block of flats. At the other, it looks like res care (though it is not actually res care of course).
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If this is a new build then ADB or BS 5588 part 1 would apply. If it is existing it has been built to an accepted standard and therefore the CLG guidance where necessary can be applied. If the evacuation strategy is defend in place then a part 6 system is acceptable in the dwellings, it is after all a horizontal blck of flats.
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The blocks were built in 1976, a defend in place strategy is adopted within the scheme, if a fire was to start in the bin area, it would be contained within the compartment if of course the fire door was not wedged open! With the scheme manager addressing this problem is the detection still relevant?
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Still sounds ok to me dopps. Yes there is a benchmark for new builds that says something else but we cant and should not apply new build standards to existing.
Reasonably practicable is what its all about. After all there are tens of thousands of buildings exactly like the one you are describing that dont have fire doors or detection in the dwellings or fire doors to the refuse sore. For those substandard buildings we would probably aspire to the standards you have described.
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Theres always lots of things that we could do to make places safer. Sheltered housing should be exactly that. And a key element of sheltered housing should be support and supervision, all too often totally lacking in these schemes. The most retrograde step was the removal of the wardens from these schemes. Wardens played such a key role not only in terms of fire safety but also in terms of social support and welfare.
Its such a contrast to the way other countries do things- take Paris for example where they still have full time attendants in every public toilet. But we cant provide care and supervision to our vulnerable and eldery parents.
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I have always thought that the requirement was a bit off when you consider that the only difference was that the people behind the front door were a bit older. Mind you you should remeber that sheltered accomodation doesn't always mean old.
I thought the theory of an alarm in sheltered was to ensure that fire brigade response was punctual so that safe evacuation could be carried out if required by alerting a call centre or the scheme manger (some palces do still have wardens Kurnal, your home just isnt a very good one!)
I agree that modern buildings would be built to that standard but are the requirements as per the 1991 5588 pt 1 all that different? to those that preceded it?
When we consider that we should be assessing and then upgrading where necessary where do we draw the line? If we change the use of a building from general needs to sheltered we would normal put an alarm system in. Is this wrong?
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I have always thought that the requirement was a bit off when you consider that the only difference was that the people behind the front door were a bit older. Mind you you should remeber that sheltered accomodation doesn't always mean old.
I thought the theory of an alarm in sheltered was to ensure that fire brigade response was punctual so that safe evacuation could be carried out if required by alerting a call centre or the scheme manger (some palces do still have wardens Kurnal, your home just isnt a very good one!)
I agree that modern buildings would be built to that standard but are the requirements as per the 1991 5588 pt 1 all that different? to those that preceded it?
When we consider that we should be assessing and then upgrading where necessary where do we draw the line? If we change the use of a building from general needs to sheltered we would normal put an alarm system in. Is this wrong?
Lots of food for thought Big T
In some areas the former sheltered housing provided for older people is now used for anyone with a housing need and the mix of people with substance dependancies and displaced persons has led to a serious decline in the quality of life for those older people for whom the housing was originally conceived and a reduction in the community facilities available- especially voluntary groups, luncheon clubs, social meetings etc that were the original strenths of these schemes.
I only have experience of carrying out risk assessments in local authority directly controlled housing, with very little experience of work in the private sector or arms length housing providers. We may have to assess the councils entire housing stock and its always against a very limited budget for improvements. Whilst we try and remain objective and focus on benchmark standards it is very difficult not to compare todays building against last weeks rather than against the benchmark standards document.
In the main resident wardens are rare, roving wardens used in some areas mobilised from a control centre. The better authorities link the domestic fire alarm system to the control room- where this is the case there is a major benefit in putting detection in the common areas too.
So many of the buildings we visit date from the 60s and 70s with inappropriate doors, travel distances, glazing, wall linings etc.
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In these cases where a detection and alarm system have been utilised for the communal areas and in the case of older blocks to 5839 1988 or earlier versions, where do the residents go when the alarm goes off? Back to their homes, out on the street, who lets them back in, who controls the evacuation? The FRS with their eyes on false alarms will not want to attend UwFS for ever and some FRS are now sending the letters for non attendance at some premises. How soon can a roving warden attend, what about at night. If the communal alarm goes off at night whta do the residents do, tip out, stay in their homes, not hear the alarm as it is staff only alert? Are we not in danger of making everything really complicated and disproportionate to the risk.
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very interesting point jokar, With these buildings being part of a complex where the only assembly point would be at the community centre staffed 9-4 would it cause more harm for Fred & Flo to assemble in the cold and wet rather than to wait to be assisted to evacuate if required by the FRS or scheme manager.
I agree Kurnal, if the schemes were monitored by live in wardens it would make everyones life a whole lot easier however, with the risk being minimal and with the construction and compartmentation of the premises being sound I feel that the introduction of additional detection in the common areas may cause more harm than good.
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I have done a lot of work with the private sector and the one thing that comes up time and time again is the age of residents. The life expectancy of a resident has now far exceeded what was envisaged for a 'sheltered' scheme. Some schemes have almost become residential care homes but without the care. There appears to be different categories of schemes as well i. e sheltered, sheltered extra care, sheltered extra care for the elderly. a lot of residents of normal sheltered schemes are now in their 80's even 90's and sizeable proportion end their days in the scheme. It seems that the level of manning is not keeping up with the age increase, so perhaps the level of protection needs to be higher?
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Such as?
More AFD will just frighten them. They still cant get out.
You could increase the fire resisitance but 1 hour really is plenty.
Sprinklers would be nice but what problem are you trying to resolve? The compartmentation will do the trick for people in the other flats and its touch and go as to whether they would help a 90 year old much anyway.
Treat em like flats and get the CFS guys to take away their chip pans - QED
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There are any number of problems in sheltered housing with regard to fire alarms, and wardens/managers/housing support whatever they are called. Firstly the days of staff being on the premises day and night are gone due to financial reasons. There is no one to keep order in the event of an alarm so that residents tend to wander around and any kind of procedure is ignored. Basically its the sound of the alarm that creates the chaos with individuals unable to stand in a common area under a sounder but reluctant to venture out in the cold and rain, result confusion. Frankly you dont have to be old,senile,less able to suffer the pain of a fire alarm blasting the eardrums. False signals lead to some residents just knowing which toaster is the culprit and off they go perhaps walking toward the seat of the fire blithley unaware. Sheltered housing can be a recipe for disaster.
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Absolutely, Hence the recommendation in 5588 pt 1 to have an alarm notify the central control / warden / fire service of a fire and to warn the flat of origin of a fire.
People seem to have lost a lot of faith in compartmentation and appear to be very scepticle of allowing a stay put / shelter in place evac strategy in sheltered housing for instance Hants fire and rescue advise against it. Which is absolutely ludicrous.
I have risk assessed 150 Sheltered schemes managed by my company and out of those have only advised one scheme to scrap the stay put policy in favour of an evac strategy until destructive surveys can be carried out to ensure this pre 21st century wing of the scheme is adequately fire rated to allow a stay put strategy.
Many of the schemes previously haven't carried out annual drills as they say that if they are stay put then they don't need to drill.
In my opinion they absolutely should and upon hearing the alarm residents are asked to stay in their flat and prepare to leave. The scheme manager will then walk around the scheme to ascertain if it was the real thing, if an evacuation was required by the fire service would the residents be ready to go or not. This is carried out 6 monthly.
The beauty of this is that if they hear the alarm sounding they are actually doing something rather than just sitting there or worst case scenario going to investigate themselves. The residents know that the alarm may sound for a while and are informed that the system will have notified the scheme manager/ out of hours centre/fire service and if they need to get out the fire service will tell them to if the fire is out of control. They are also told that if they are affected by heat/smoke etc in their flat they are to ring the fire service and evacuate.
This is why there is a recommendation for fire doors etc as it is there to prevent fire spread.
If sheltered block were evac strategy then you could ditch the whole compartmentation thing and just tell everyone to evac on hearing the alalrm.
Deidre and Flo would be impressed at 3am December 25th
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Out of 2000 + sheltered schemes I have assessed only a handful have had fire doors with cold smoke seals, letter box's with smoke and intumescent seals, doors that close fully etc, not to mention the holes left above false ceilings in fire barriers above fire doors. I can understand why the fire services are against stay put policies when the fire compartmentation is not adequate. stay put is fine if everything works as it should including the fire action plan.
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Big T it's encouraging to hear that your organisation has well managed schemes where the compartmentation is all as it should be.
In my experience FR / compartmentation in many sheltered schemes / blocks is substandard or incomplete meaning that a stay put policy can not be considered.
BIG T mentions something above which I feel is often forgotten or overlooked. It is the issue of tennants making sure they are ready to be evacuated if required when the fire alarm sounds.
The other issue here is the current trend and indeed regulatory loophole where some organisations are alllowed to operate what are essentially residential care or nursing homes as sheltered schemes or "very sheltered schemes".
This is where one organisation provides the bricks and mortar of the scheme (the premises) and another company provides the care to the residents on an individual contract basis or similar. Often the company that provides the building also has a sister company that provides care workers. And because the staff arent directly employed the scheme is not called a residential care home.
I spoke to CSCI about this. They told me it was an issue of concern to them and that it was a grey area they wanted to address.
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Out of 2000 + sheltered schemes I have assessed only a handful have had fire doors with cold smoke seals, letter box's with smoke and intumescent seals, doors that close fully etc, not to mention the holes left above false ceilings in fire barriers above fire doors. I can understand why the fire services are against stay put policies when the fire compartmentation is not adequate. stay put is fine if everything works as it should including the fire action plan.
Stay put is fine if people know that they can stay if they want to that is. Recent fire I know of in purpose built flats had multiple rescues because people did not know of stay put but most probably would not want to remain in a block anyway when one of the flats was on fire.
Stay put doesn't seem to take into account people behaviour.
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I just wanted to ask about the requirement for the intumescent letter boxes. If they are located correctly in the door then there should b no requirement for an intumescent letter box. The fire service love asking for them to be upgraded. The BS covering non metallic door leaves suggests if it is within a certain height this is not required. I am sure Smokescreen can elaborate...
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I just wanted to ask about the requirement for the intumescent letter boxes. If they are located correctly in the door then there should b no requirement for an intumescent letter box. The fire service love asking for them to be upgraded. The BS covering non metallic door leaves suggests if it is within a certain height this is not required. I am sure Smokescreen can elaborate...
BS 8214:1990 has no requirements for intumescent letter boxes. It does say that the height of the letter box in the door has an influence, along with the size and stating that they should have well fitted internal and external sprung or gravity flaps manufactured from steel, stainless steel and some brasses.
On another note
Why would the invention of the intumescent strip and smoke seal now require us to change policies from stay put to an evac in sheltered blocks (or any others)? The 'stay put' policy has worked fine in the years up to this point so why the need to change it now?
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Stay put doesn't seem to take into account people behaviour.
At a fire recently where someone had set a mattress alight in a corridor several gallant but misguided elderly gentlemen put themselves and several elderly ladies, who they tried to 'rescue', in serious danger from smoke inhalation.
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On another note
Why would the invention of the intumescent strip and smoke seal now require us to change policies from stay put to an evac in sheltered blocks (or any others)? The 'stay put' policy has worked fine in the years up to this point so why the need to change it now?
Its an urban myth that the fire service is trying to change stay put policies
As you correctly point out stay put policies were in existence before intumescent strips and cold smoke seals became available. What Inspecting Officers, Risk Assessors, RPs should be looking for is good unbreached compartmentation.
Without the correct level of FR / compartmentation a stay put policy can not be entertained. This encompasses several aspects of passive and active fire precautions, not just strips and seals on doors, but the integrity and condition of compartment walls / true lines of Fire Resistance for example.
So I dont think its fire service losing faith in stay put policies, instead I think its more a case that they are looking more closer at it.
Another consideration is the management or marshalling of fire evacuations. We are seeing many schemes now without any staff on site. That has to be factored in for several reasons too.
We could all drive cars without seatbelts some years ago, then it was enforced that we should wear them.Why? because they give occupants enhanced protection.
Its the same with strips and seals; they are an additional safety measure which gives enhanced protection.
So if a door hasnt got them but needs them an inspecting officer will ask for them to be fitted.
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On another note
Why would the invention of the intumescent strip and smoke seal now require us to change policies from stay put to an evac in sheltered blocks (or any others)? The 'stay put' policy has worked fine in the years up to this point so why the need to change it now?
Its an urban myth that the fire service is trying to change stay put policies
As you correctly point out stay put policies were in existence before intumescent strips and cold smoke seals became available. What Inspecting Officers, Risk Assessors, RPs should be looking for is good unbreached compartmentation.
Without the correct level of FR / compartmentation a stay put policy can not be entertained. This encompasses several aspects of passive and active fire precautions, not just strips and seals on doors, but the integrity and condition of compartment walls / true lines of Fire Resistance for example.
So I dont think its fire service losing faith in stay put policies, instead I think its more a case that they are looking more closer at it.
Another consideration is the management or marshalling of fire evacuations. We are seeing many schemes now without any staff on site. That has to be factored in for several reasons too.
We could all drive cars without seatbelts some years ago, then it was enforced that we should wear them.Why? because they give occupants enhanced protection.
Its the same with strips and seals; they are an additional safety measure which gives enhanced protection.
So if a door hasnt got them but needs them an inspecting officer will ask for them to be fitted.
Thts well and good but if a car wasn't fitted with them then they dont need upgrading. middle rear seatbelt for example.
I agree whole heartedly that buildings without strips and seals can still operate stay out policy but some brigades will not even entertain allowing the strategy. Not all brigades of course, just a few we deal with.
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Yes unfortunately there are regional differences. I can see the argument from both sides. And of course it depends on the doors in question - if they a poorly fitted doors then strips and seals are a must.
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Absolutely.
Accepting that the majority of sheltered shemes are of older design no strips and seals are likely to be present. but generally the doors and door stops are sound.
Is when people find issues and do nothing I get annoyed
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Same argument then, where does it state that S&S can be retrofitted or are we talking about a new door set in these instances.
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In our case we change the door set competely as there is no evidence that retro fitting improves the doors capability in the event of fire.
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In my part of this island the fire services would prefer a full evacuation scenario but are sensible enough to see that this may not be possible. They take the view that providing the compartmentation is sound then stay put is acceptable, but again, this is where the problem sits. Big T, you must have fantastic fire doors and flat entrance doors on your schemes for there not to be issues. Even new schemes I have assessed have had some door issues, these range from missing screws in hinges to poorly aligned doors and doors that contact the frame by as little as 2mm! I look at the letter box issue like this, if there was a fire within a flat, smoke could escape in to the corridor. The people within the scheme do not stay put but wander about (common complaint of scheme managers). So they could become overcome by smoke. The doors do not close properly so the smoke spreads into other corridors, and, due to more wanderings, more potential victims, etc., etc. Without a doubt, the age of residents in sheltered schemes is rising and their mobility and health are declining. With no staff on site this is going to become an issue at some stage. the comment about the stay put policy being around for a long time is ok but we have advanced technically since some of these schemes were built and I am sure that when they were built they would have had 24 hour warden control and lower age residents in mind.
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So what is the answer? If you decide that the compartmentation is not good enough for a defend in place strategy you end up with simultaneous or PHE. Who then, with no warden controls the evacuation? Where do they go on evacuation? Can the residents actually evacuate within a specified time frame at night? Do they saty in their rooms and await the FRS arrival within whatever minutes IRMP comes up with?
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I agree Joker with your points. The problem is that housing associations and others are cutting back on thier manning levels due to cost and it is all to easy to impliment a stay put policy.
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So what is the answer? If you decide that the compartmentation is not good enough for a defend in place strategy you end up with simultaneous or PHE. Who then, with no warden controls the evacuation? Where do they go on evacuation? Can the residents actually evacuate within a specified time frame at night? Do they saty in their rooms and await the FRS arrival within whatever minutes IRMP comes up with?
But you would agree that if the compartmentation is not adequate for a stay put then it should be a Sim or PHE evac.
Who would marshall it? ... who knows? themselves? should it not be down to the residents (if abled bodied and able to self evacuate) to leave the building?
What about bed ridden residents though? WHat about those who cant self evacuate?
Defend in place then? Yes - but you will need 60 mins FR - and you will need to be able to guarantee that its not breached anywhere to ensure maximum protection to individual residents and thus truly forfil the purpose of a defend in place strategy
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So what is the answer? If you decide that the compartmentation is not good enough for a defend in place strategy you end up with simultaneous or PHE. Who then, with no warden controls the evacuation? Where do they go on evacuation? Can the residents actually evacuate within a specified time frame at night? Do they saty in their rooms and await the FRS arrival within whatever minutes IRMP comes up with?
But you would agree that if the compartmentation is not adequate for a stay put then it should be a Sim or PHE evac.
Who would marshall it? ... who knows? themselves? should it not be down to the residents (if abled bodied and able to self evacuate) to leave the building?
What about bed ridden residents though? WHat about those who cant self evacuate?
Defend in place then? Yes - but you will need 60 mins FR - and you will need to be able to guarantee that its not breached anywhere to ensure maximum protection to individual residents and thus truly forfil the purpose of a defend in place strategy
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It may interest you that CFOA is in the process of setting up a representative stakeholder group to try and address all the issues that are being discussed. It is true that schemes are providing more and more personal care, (one way or another), the residents often are completely unable to self rescue and managers are a dying breed. Are we really saying that the best we can come up with is to tell ederly people, or, in some cases, very confused younger people, to stay in a burning building and hope the management has thoroughly checked the compartmentation.
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Yes I think we are, valerie. A lot of sheltered housing is simply a special case of a blaock of flats and that is what we do there. If it isnt like a block of flats you need to tailor make a solution. We have done lots and it just needs careful thought.
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It may interest you that CFOA is in the process of setting up a representative stakeholder group to try and address all the issues that are being discussed. It is true that schemes are providing more and more personal care, (one way or another), the residents often are completely unable to self rescue and managers are a dying breed. Are we really saying that the best we can come up with is to tell ederly people, or, in some cases, very confused younger people, to stay in a burning building and hope the management has thoroughly checked the compartmentation.
It would also be a good idea to compare the differences in fire safety legislation North and South of the Scottish border and whether this has led to any percievable differences in fire deaths, losses or injuries.