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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: Allen Higginson on January 22, 2009, 03:04:49 PM
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Just a quickie - all doors in an HMO must be fire doors,and doors on escape routes must not have key locks:happy enough with that.
But if you are in shared accomodation is it correct that you cannot have a lock on your own bedroom door as this forms part of the fire escape route?
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Just a quickie - all doors in an HMO must be fire doors,and doors on escape routes must not have key locks:happy enough with that.
But if you are in shared accomodation is it correct that you cannot have a lock on your own bedroom door as this forms part of the fire escape route?
What type of lock and to lock which way Buzz?
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Just a quickie - all doors in an HMO must be fire doors,and doors on escape routes must not have key locks:happy enough with that.
But if you are in shared accomodation is it correct that you cannot have a lock on your own bedroom door as this forms part of the fire escape route?
What type of lock and to lock which way Buzz?
A lock on your door to stop unsavouries getting in to nick your pot noodles (this is student accomodation after all).
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Just a quickie - all doors in an HMO must be fire doors,and doors on escape routes must not have key locks:happy enough with that.
But if you are in shared accomodation is it correct that you cannot have a lock on your own bedroom door as this forms part of the fire escape route?
What type of lock and to lock which way Buzz?
A lock on your door to stop unsavouries getting in to nick your pot noodles (this is student accomodation after all).
Provided your room is not an escape route for others it is OK to lock your door to keep your room secure. It is recommended that the door does not need the use of a removable key to get out. Something like a hotel room arrangement incorporating a thumb turn or lever is what is suggested.
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Just a quickie - all doors in an HMO must be fire doors,and doors on escape routes must not have key locks:happy enough with that.
But if you are in shared accomodation is it correct that you cannot have a lock on your own bedroom door as this forms part of the fire escape route?
What type of lock and to lock which way Buzz?
A lock on your door to stop unsavouries getting in to nick your pot noodles (this is student accomodation after all).
Provided your room is not an escape route for others it is OK to lock your door to keep your room secure. It is recommended that the door does not need the use of a removable key to get out. Something like a hotel room arrangement incorporating a thumb turn or lever is what is suggested.
If you don't mind me asking - where does your (acceptible by the way IMO!) solution come from?
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Just a quickie - all doors in an HMO must be fire doors,and doors on escape routes must not have key locks:happy enough with that.
But if you are in shared accomodation is it correct that you cannot have a lock on your own bedroom door as this forms part of the fire escape route?
Not necessarily so. Whether or not fire doors are required depends on a number of things. The number of storeys would have an impact, and the way the property is occupied would also have an effect. It is perfectly possible to have sound, close-fitting doors of conventional construction if the property is no more than three storeys in height and the property is occupied as a shared house. (See the LACORs guide. http://www.lacors.gov.uk/LACORS/upload/19175.pdf ) Locks on bedroom doors would tend to indicate that the property is not really occupied as a shared house and in that case the safety standards would generally be more onerous as shared houses are seen as the lowest risk category of HMOs.
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Just a quickie - all doors in an HMO must be fire doors,and doors on escape routes must not have key locks:happy enough with that.
But if you are in shared accomodation is it correct that you cannot have a lock on your own bedroom door as this forms part of the fire escape route?
What type of lock and to lock which way Buzz?
A lock on your door to stop unsavouries getting in to nick your pot noodles (this is student accomodation after all).
Provided your room is not an escape route for others it is OK to lock your door to keep your room secure. It is recommended that the door does not need the use of a removable key to get out. Something like a hotel room arrangement incorporating a thumb turn or lever is what is suggested.
If you don't mind me asking - where does your (acceptible by the way IMO!) solution come from?
Lacors & BS9999, being just two. You will normally find it in most if not all guidance.
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Just a quickie - all doors in an HMO must be fire doors,and doors on escape routes must not have key locks:happy enough with that.
But if you are in shared accomodation is it correct that you cannot have a lock on your own bedroom door as this forms part of the fire escape route?
Not necessarily so. Whether or not fire doors are required depends on a number of things. The number of storeys would have an impact, and the way the property is occupied would also have an effect. It is perfectly possible to have sound, close-fitting doors of conventional construction if the property is no more than three storeys in height and the property is occupied as a shared house. (See the LACORs guide. http://www.lacors.gov.uk/LACORS/upload/19175.pdf ) Locks on bedroom doors would tend to indicate that the property is not really occupied as a shared house and in that case the safety standards would generally be more onerous as shared houses are seen as the lowest risk category of HMOs.
If three storeys in height fire doors are required in a shared house.
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If three storeys in height fire doors are required in a shared house.
Sorry Rex, I beg to differ. Please refer to the LACORs guide and in particular case study D5 (Page 42). Note 8 says about three storey shared houses:
However, in existing three-storey shared houses of low risk it may be possible to accept existing walls and partitions if 20-minutes fire resistance can be achieved. This is likely to be met if walls and partitions are of sound, conventional construction. Sound lath and plaster construction should meet this requirement. Doors onto the escape route may be acceptable if they are of sound, solid construction, are close fitting and self-closing.
I read that to say that three storey shared houses do not require fire doors. It's all based on risk.
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Johnny 99
I believe the LACORS Guide was formerly launched London on the 23rd July 2008, prior to that guide being issued the bench mark standard for a three storey HMO’s by virtually all LHA was the requirement for 30minute fire resistance to all doors walls, and ceilings, with a higher standard of 60 mins for basement situations.
I have never seen an LHA Guide other than LACORS that would accept 20mins fire resistance to doors walls and ceilings in a HMO of three storeys.
However, in the light of this further guidance I sincerely hope that local Councils will not change their bench mark standards to accept 20 mins fire resistance in a three storey HMO.
In a survey carried out by ENTEC plc on behalf of the Government and looking at national fire stats it is an accepted fact in the UK that if you live in an HMO you are 6 times more likely to die from fire than adults in an ordinary house. Thus the requirement to license HMO’s of three storeys with 5 or more occupants.
Page 42, Note 8 of the LACORS Guide also states that “the ideal situation is for escape routes to be enclosed in 30 minutes fire resisting construction and FD 30 fire doors.” I would rather accept the “ideal situation” than 20 minutes fire resistance.
Due to the credit crunch and people losing their homes, sadly more people could be housed in an HMO. I could go on about the nature of the vulnerable occupants, but will stop here; I hope this posting makes some sense.
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I think you are right in most respects Rex but the language was probably worded deliberately as many existing HMOs do have lath and plaster partitions. Would it be reasonable to expect them to be removed in an existing building in current use?
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Ive got my answers so if anyone wants to lock the topic feel free.
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Johnny 99
I believe the LACORS Guide was formerly launched London on the 23rd July 2008, prior to that guide being issued the bench mark standard for a three storey HMO’s by virtually all LHA was the requirement for 30minute fire resistance to all doors walls, and ceilings, with a higher standard of 60 mins for basement situations.
I have never seen an LHA Guide other than LACORS that would accept 20mins fire resistance to doors walls and ceilings in a HMO of three storeys.
However, in the light of this further guidance I sincerely hope that local Councils will not change their bench mark standards to accept 20 mins fire resistance in a three storey HMO.
In a survey carried out by ENTEC plc on behalf of the Government and looking at national fire stats it is an accepted fact in the UK that if you live in an HMO you are 6 times more likely to die from fire than adults in an ordinary house. Thus the requirement to license HMO’s of three storeys with 5 or more occupants.
Page 42, Note 8 of the LACORS Guide also states that “the ideal situation is for escape routes to be enclosed in 30 minutes fire resisting construction and FD 30 fire doors.” I would rather accept the “ideal situation” than 20 minutes fire resistance.
Due to the credit crunch and people losing their homes, sadly more people could be housed in an HMO. I could go on about the nature of the vulnerable occupants, but will stop here; I hope this posting makes some sense.
Rex,
I hear what you're saying, but again, I beg to differ. If you read the Entec report in detail, it actually identifies that the risk in shared houses is in no way comparable with the level of risk in other types of HMO, particularly bedsits, unless there are a large number of occupants or the occupants are particularly vulnerable.
E.G. It states in paragraph E19:
However, the findings of this study indicate that additional and/or alternative precautions are needed to reduce the relatively very high risk in bedsits, higher risk shared houses and higher risk households with lodgers, and those hostels and purpose built HMOs which lack self-contained accommodation. Particular attention should be awarded all 3 storey bedsits and those 3 storey shared houses with either larger numbers of occupants or with vulnerable occupants.
It also states in paragraph E 25:
Inversely, where a HMO has a low risk occupancy and few occupants, additional fire precautions may not be required, including lower risk 3 storey shared houses. Thus, the standards for 3 storey shared houses should be linked to the number and type of occupants and existence of any other special risk factors, in the same way that the qualifying criteria for registration should be linked to the number of storeys and the number and type of occupants.
Paragraph 2.1.4 indicates that shared houses have the lowest fatality rates by type of HMO.
Paragraph 2.1.5 indicates that shared houses have the lowest fatality rates per building.
Paragraph 2.1.10 indicates that the fatality rates in shared houses and households with lodgers are very close to those in
single occupancy houses.
I will concede that it states that the fatality rates in shared houses of three storeys are 50% higher than those in shared houses of one or two storeys, but could that simply be because those properties have 50% more floors and maybe 50% more occupiers in each property?
The Entec report contains some good stuff, but you do need to read the detail, not just the headlines. If you want another LHA guide that supports the provision of sound traditional construction in three storey shared houses, have a look at the DASH guide. (Decent and Safe Homes East Midlands). I believe that that covers about 40 local authority areas.
In addition, the LACORs guide is not just another LHA guide, it is co-published by LACORs, the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, the Chief Fire Officers Association and is forwarded by two ministers from the Department for Communities and Local Government. The list of contributors and consultees is long indeed.
Regards
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Does nobody have any more opinions on this?
Please tell me I'm right or why I'm wrong?
However, having looked at this post http://forum.fire.org.uk/index.php?topic=3971.0 I'm beginning to wonder if I'm the love child of a certain Mr. Todd!!!
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Johnny 99
I believe the LACORS Guide was formerly launched London on the 23rd July 2008, prior to that guide being issued the bench mark standard for a three storey HMO’s by virtually all LHA was the requirement for 30minute fire resistance to all doors walls, and ceilings, with a higher standard of 60 mins for basement situations.
I have never seen an LHA Guide other than LACORS that would accept 20mins fire resistance to doors walls and ceilings in a HMO of three storeys.
However, in the light of this further guidance I sincerely hope that local Councils will not change their bench mark standards to accept 20 mins fire resistance in a three storey HMO.
In a survey carried out by ENTEC plc on behalf of the Government and looking at national fire stats it is an accepted fact in the UK that if you live in an HMO you are 6 times more likely to die from fire than adults in an ordinary house. Thus the requirement to license HMO’s of three storeys with 5 or more occupants.
Page 42, Note 8 of the LACORS Guide also states that “the ideal situation is for escape routes to be enclosed in 30 minutes fire resisting construction and FD 30 fire doors.” I would rather accept the “ideal situation” than 20 minutes fire resistance.
Due to the credit crunch and people losing their homes, sadly more people could be housed in an HMO. I could go on about the nature of the vulnerable occupants, but will stop here; I hope this posting makes some sense.
Rex,
I hear what you're saying, but again, I beg to differ. If you read the Entec report in detail, it actually identifies that the risk in shared houses is in no way comparable with the level of risk in other types of HMO, particularly bedsits, unless there are a large number of occupants or the occupants are particularly vulnerable.
E.G. It states in paragraph E19:
However, the findings of this study indicate that additional and/or alternative precautions are needed to reduce the relatively very high risk in bedsits, higher risk shared houses and higher risk households with lodgers, and those hostels and purpose built HMOs which lack self-contained accommodation. Particular attention should be awarded all 3 storey bedsits and those 3 storey shared houses with either larger numbers of occupants or with vulnerable occupants.
It also states in paragraph E 25:
Inversely, where a HMO has a low risk occupancy and few occupants, additional fire precautions may not be required, including lower risk 3 storey shared houses. Thus, the standards for 3 storey shared houses should be linked to the number and type of occupants and existence of any other special risk factors, in the same way that the qualifying criteria for registration should be linked to the number of storeys and the number and type of occupants.
Paragraph 2.1.4 indicates that shared houses have the lowest fatality rates by type of HMO.
Paragraph 2.1.5 indicates that shared houses have the lowest fatality rates per building.
Paragraph 2.1.10 indicates that the fatality rates in shared houses and households with lodgers are very close to those in
single occupancy houses.
I will concede that it states that the fatality rates in shared houses of three storeys are 50% higher than those in shared houses of one or two storeys, but could that simply be because those properties have 50% more floors and maybe 50% more occupiers in each property?
The Entec report contains some good stuff, but you do need to read the detail, not just the headlines. If you want another LHA guide that supports the provision of sound traditional construction in three storey shared houses, have a look at the DASH guide. (Decent and Safe Homes East Midlands). I believe that that covers about 40 local authority areas.
In addition, the LACORs guide is not just another LHA guide, it is co-published by LACORs, the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, the Chief Fire Officers Association and is forwarded by two ministers from the Department for Communities and Local Government. The list of contributors and consultees is long indeed.
Regards
Where does one get the Entec report?
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nearlythere
I've only got it in hard copy. I've never been able to find it on the internet.
Regards
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Where is the risk assessment in a solution like "FD30S All round"
LAcors gives some accepted Mitigation methodology.
For example in a 2 story HMO with evacuation windows from the bedrooms it is acceptable to accept solid doors as supposed to FD30S
We have to be realistic in the type of things we are asking for in our FRA Action plan. I recently looked at 30 HMO's in a coastal town, 30% of the HMO's has a protected route with FD30S doors, 40% had solid doors with no intu strips and seals and the other 30% had rubbish eggbbox type doors on the bedrooms or single glazed door on the kitchen or living room doors leading to the escape route.
In my opinion the 30% of protected route are low risk, the 40% of solid doors are medium risk and the 30% of eggbox and glazed doors are high risk.
The action plan in each should reflect its risk rating and this should be considered by the budget holders as to which is rectified first. Do the high risk first, medium next etc
Many of the companies who run HMO's provide some sort of support in them, and generally these comopanies publish an excess of 30-40k per year. "Upgrade all your doors that are not FD30S accross your entire business in the next 12 weeks" Is not fire risk assessment. And is damaging. that kind of comment on an FRA would literally close business' down
High risk should be dealt with as quickly as possible (This financial year) and based on a risk assessed approach the medium risk could be dealt with over the next 2 - 5 financial years, Low risk requireing no change at all.
As assessors and fire managers we should be attempting to mitigate the HIGH risk stuff as soon as is physically possible with the proggressive upgrade of passive protection over an agreed period.
We forget that these buildings operate an evacuation strategy. Perhaps an increase in the fire alarm provision would mitigate some of the risks presented in buildings with traditional solid doors.
I personally am against retrofitting strips and seals as these have not been tested to BS476. Why not wait a little longer, get the right budget and upgrade doors and frames that have been tested.
I know the money issue is always discussed as being an unnacceptable reason to not upgrade something but this is business.
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Where is the risk assessment in a solution like "FD30S All round"
LAcors gives some accepted Mitigation methodology.
For example in a 2 story HMO with evacuation windows from the bedrooms it is acceptable to accept solid doors as supposed to FD30S
We have to be realistic in the type of things we are asking for in our FRA Action plan. I recently looked at 30 HMO's in a coastal town, 30% of the HMO's has a protected route with FD30S doors, 40% had solid doors with no intu strips and seals and the other 30% had rubbish eggbbox type doors on the bedrooms or single glazed door on the kitchen or living room doors leading to the escape route.
In my opinion the 30% of protected route are low risk, the 40% of solid doors are medium risk and the 30% of eggbox and glazed doors are high risk.
The action plan in each should reflect its risk rating and this should be considered by the budget holders as to which is rectified first. Do the high risk first, medium next etc
Many of the companies who run HMO's provide some sort of support in them, and generally these comopanies publish an excess of 30-40k per year. "Upgrade all your doors that are not FD30S accross your entire business in the next 12 weeks" Is not fire risk assessment. And is damaging. that kind of comment on an FRA would literally close business' down
High risk should be dealt with as quickly as possible (This financial year) and based on a risk assessed approach the medium risk could be dealt with over the next 2 - 5 financial years, Low risk requireing no change at all.
As assessors and fire managers we should be attempting to mitigate the HIGH risk stuff as soon as is physically possible with the proggressive upgrade of passive protection over an agreed period.
We forget that these buildings operate an evacuation strategy. Perhaps an increase in the fire alarm provision would mitigate some of the risks presented in buildings with traditional solid doors.
I personally am against retrofitting strips and seals as these have not been tested to BS476. Why not wait a little longer, get the right budget and upgrade doors and frames that have been tested.
I know the money issue is always discussed as being an unnacceptable reason to not upgrade something but this is business.
Hi Big T.
I have a problem getting my head around the prioritisation approach of high, med and low risks. To my mind there is either an unacceptable risk or there is not. If medium risks, as some call them, can be dealt with over a 2 - 5 year time frame then they must be tolerable with no action required. It only suggests to me that dealing with these risks over that length of time is only to ensure that at some time the premises will be code compliant which is not how FRAs should be. Risk have only 2 levels. Acceptable or not.
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I disagree, Risk has many levels and whilst may be as simple as acceptable or not many large campanies cannot commit to dealing with all risks in one financial year. So risk prioritisation is essential to dealing with issues a sensible fashion.
Fire services are quite blatently attempting to enforce buildings to comply with modern code.
As an organisation we need to have a schedule of works to rectify the most significant risk first. If you ask many people what they would deam as acceptable the perfect protected route is always the preferred option.
Can Medium risk hazards (Such as those described above) be rectified over a period of years due to budgetting and financial constraints? In my opinion yes they can.
Should Higher risk Hazards be dealt with as a priority and as quickly as possible regardless of financial constraints? Absolutely
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Hi Big T.
I have a problem getting my head around the prioritisation approach of high, med and low risks. To my mind there is either an unacceptable risk or there is not. If medium risks, as some call them, can be dealt with over a 2 - 5 year time frame then they must be tolerable with no action required. It only suggests to me that dealing with these risks over that length of time is only to ensure that at some time the premises will be code compliant which is not how FRAs should be. Risk have only 2 levels. Acceptable or not.
I may be wrong but i think Big T means that the 'medium risk' are still items that do require attention, but, in the case of large companies like the one he mentioned, they sometimes can't afford to carry out all the necessary work at once so they therefore have no choice but to categorise their workload further and over longer timescales than others (low, medium or high).
If this is all properly documented in the FRA and the company can prove that it has been spending money on improvements then surely this is how the process should work.
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I may be wrong but i think Big T means that the 'medium risk' are still items that do require attention, but, in the case of large companies like the one he mentioned, they sometimes can't afford to carry out all the necessary work at once so they therefore have no choice but to categorise their workload further and over longer timescales than others (low, medium or high).
If this is all properly documented in the FRA and the company can prove that it has been spending money on improvements then surely this is how the process should work.
I understand that entirely but are we adopting the ostrich approach for up to 5 years hoping that nothing happens during that period.
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I dont think that it is fair to say companies are burying their heads in the sand. Our organisation has taken a risk assessed approcah in dealing with issues as all companies should
How would you suggest a large company such as a registered social landlord deal with the issues arising from 3500 fire risk assessments.
I would suggest a risk assessed approach. Starting with the high risk and ending with the low. If it takes 5 years it takes 5 years. But I would rather minimise the risk accross the entire organisation by removing the high risk issues from all buildings, than reduce the risk accross some of the stock by dealing with all issues in only 20% of the buildings.
There is no endless pot of money for fire safety in any organisation.
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I agree with Big T. All doors will have and give some degree of protection from fire and smoke. Therefore, there is a quite different approach to be used in prioritisation between these sets of doors. This is and can easily be identified and justified and whatever anyone thinks Cost Benefit Analysis is part of an FRA. It has to be, the RR(FS)O is not and never was envisaged as a piece of retrospecvtive legislation.
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No its not retrospective in the sense you speak of but if a FRA or Fire Authority see the premises they should in my opinion be asking for upgrades within realistic time scales.Its all well and good syaing that fire authorities want it all in one go but i think this is a bit of a falacy and an exageration in most (not all ) cases.