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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: Hightower on July 03, 2009, 05:39:00 AM
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Hi
I've just been reading BS5839-6 (yes I know its just gone 5 in the morning - I couldn't help myself) and I wondered what people made of the following:
In 'section 1 - Scope' it clearly states: "It does not (thats BS5839-6) apply to hostels, caravans......................., or to the communal parts of purpose - built sheltered housing and blocks of flats or maisonettes.
Yet when I look at the 'Department for communities and local government publication - Sleeping accommodation' page 55, table 1 states that 'Flats and conversions (including holiday flats) that have not been constructed to building regulation standards' are to consider a Grade A, category LD2 system in the common areas. Therefore should the guide not state that in these parts of such buildings it should be a category L sytstem. If I understand the BS correctly the LD provision is for escape routes within the dwelling itself, not once having stepped outside of the front door. I ask because I have seen such a lot of discussion on the provision of AFD in common areas and am still as confused as I was when I began.
Maybe I'm just being picky - but maybe you could just entertain the question for me? ???
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Hello Hightower
What page 55 is referring to is the issue of converted buildings used for sleeping accomodation purposes.
A high rise block of flats is a purpose built construction - that is to say it was designed & built as a block of flats.
A large victorian house converted into student lets is not purpose built (i.e it was originally a house for a single family house hold)
Where conversions have taken place and havent gone through building regulation approval it can be difficult (and in some cases impossible) to guarantee the level of fire seperation in the building. Therefore we require AFD in the common areas and within the flats themselves. The reason being that if a fire does break through into the common areas from one of the flats, for whatever reason, it will be picked up by the detection in the common areas.
In purpose built accomodation such as a high rise block which has gone through BR approval we can guarantee the fire seperation and levels of fire resistance within the building and thus do not require AFD in the common areas /escape routes . The theory being that a fire should be contained in each individual flat because they have been constucted to a certain fire resisting standard (60 minutes for flats in high rise blocks)
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Sorry that's wishful thinking Retty
Each flat in a block of flats should be essentially be a sealed fire resisting box. But they seldom are. Alterations occur, services dont get fire stopped, contractors come along and dont seal their work properly and before you know it a fire in one flat can affect several areas through unstopped ducts and risers.
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In purpose built accomodation such as a high rise block which has gone through BR approval we can guarantee the fire seperation and levels of fire resistance within the building and thus do not require AFD in the common areas /escape routes .
What was that in the news yesterday about a fire in a block in London?
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Now that the horse has bolted - reference fatal fire in London yesterday - I guess we might now get some more guidance come out.
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Dont shoot the messenger - I was just explaining the principles.
Unfortunately as last weeks events in London have shown the difference between principles and theories can often be worlds apart from what occurs in reality.
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Re the Camberwell Fire - anyone any idea where I would find or buy "preliminary results" from any investigation currently under-way?
I've tried googling - but obviously all that's coming up thus far is very tragic human interest stories.
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Dont shoot the messenger - I was just explaining the principles.
Point taken.
Unfortunately as last weeks events in London have shown the difference between principles and theories can often be worlds apart from what occurs in reality.
This difference between theory and practice is woeful; but it is human nature, it is widespread and it is actually what gives a lot of us a job. If the world was as perfect as the theory then a lot of us would be twiddling our thumbs a lot more.
Stu
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Indeed it just goes to show what can happen ! The events in London were tragic, we will all be debating the cause but until the official report is concluded no one can be 100% sure how it occurred.
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Anyone else hear the debate on radio 4? Cut and paste link - http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8135000/8135619.stm
know its far to early to draw conclusions - but I can't see the chap's (architect's) solution about everybody in a domestic block of flats being trained to leave being achievable - surely defend in place is still the best option? And of course build and maintain properly in the first place.
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My council has a couple of 17 storey flat blocks. We have detection in each of our tenanted flats but didn't use to have detection in common areas. Fire detection has now been installed in common areas of one tower. (I don't know why yet.)
All the usual problems with leaseholders who may change front doors and may not have proper fire doors. (Building Control Issue?) I know there was previous thread which I won't duplicate.
Our RA says we didn't need detection in common areas. Now we have got it what do we do about evacuation? Notice to residents saying if you hear alarm stay put!? Advise tenants to evacuate? What do other LAs social landlords do?
Interesting to hear in fullness of time if AFD in common areas would have saved lives at Camberwell.
And surprise, surprise our local FRS wish to talk to talk to us about our high rises.
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I applied to a local FRS to remove the fire detection and alarm from the communal areas of a high rise a few months ago based on false alarms and the fact stay put is the recommended strategy for High rise.
It was accepted without a hint of disagreement
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problem with an alarm in common areas - is that some of the people will respond - some won't - if its a single escape way - that will cause problems for the fire brigade going up and if by a miracle there is a fire in a common area (they should be sterile - they are potentially walking into smoke. And if the building is built and maintained properly, they are (or should be) perfectly safe in their flats.
My understanding is that detection and a fire door in individual flats is standard if new build - a strong recommendation if privately owned - and the landlords responsibility to supply fit and check if rented.
If compartmentation is problematic - then I'd guess an alarm in common areas as well - but surely if people are supposed to respond - it needs to be 65 at the bedhead? And there needs to be some instruction to tenants!
Which brings us back to fairy-land as its never going to happen and would be impossible to maintain, people would get so many false alarms - they'd ignore it or some may deliberately silence the system rendering it useless for when it may be useful.
If anyone's cracked it within flats - I'd love to know!
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I'm having a chat with a chappy from a local Domestic Sprinkler PLC about the possibility of installing throughout a block of flats with serious compartmentation issues. I am waiting to cost up and way that up against minimising other compartmentation upgrading issues, the sprinklers will be connected to a hydraulically operated alarm (which of course only a very few will respond to) but even if they don't then at least the fire will be being dealt with.
In the common corridors I'm thinking of a Grade C, LD4 system - so as to avoid having to have all of the non rated fire doors replaced. All of this has to be presented to the FRS in the next month who are now pursuing the case with interest.
I have lots more of investigation to go yet - but my enquiries were inspired by the Fire Risk Management Journal just released this month. Very interesting articles on sprinklers and infact my contact with the above company tells me his company has now been asked to talk to the council of the fatal Camberwell fire.
I will keep you posted on how things develop.
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Im not against sprinklers I do see the benefit of a well designed system. But remember that a sprinkler system doesn't stop smoke, atleast not to begin with .
It almost certainly doesn't fully extinguish a fire unless the fire is in very close proximity to a sprinkler head or heads. So you need to know a fire has occurred and the Sprinkies are trying to deal with it.
Then again sprinkies do prevent fire growth and that is a good thing, im just saying that you need to balance everything it up. Also what will be the cost of a sprinkler system in this respect?
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I think sprinklers IS the answer. Although retro fitting would be to costly. New domestics buildings with a storey height more than 18m above ground will be sprinklered..... AFD in the bedrooms, living room and kitchen, good quality Long duration fire door is the minimum standard for existing. Properly maintained and a home fire safety check for the occupiers.
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Hi Marty,
In England it's 30m, not 18m. Is Scotland different?
Stu
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Sure is Stu
2.15 of the tech handbook states a high rise domestic requires auto life safety fire suppresion. Definition of high rise domestic is a building with a storey height more that 18m. Then annex 2A gives more info on system etc.
Give me an email at work re reunion etc.
cheers
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Has anyone got experience from fitting sprinklers - what trade off in terms of not having to upgrade other aspects of compartmentation they have been able to negotiate with their respective FRS's?
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The trade-off for sprinklers is usually in terms of levels of fire resistance. For blocks of flats there's not a lot to be had - the requirement for compartmentation does not diminish when sprinklers are installed. Maybe you feel it should but then you'd have to be very sure about the reliability of the sprinklers throughout the entire lifetime of the building. Reliability not just in terms of operating but in terms of controlling the fire also - two different things - and two things that have not proven 100% reliable so far.
Now we may have good evidence at our fingertips that compartmentation has questionable reliability and that may strengthen the argument to offer compensation for sprinkler installation.
Stu
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Re the Camberwell Fire - anyone any idea where I would find or buy "preliminary results" from any investigation currently under-way?
I've tried googling - but obviously all that's coming up thus far is very tragic human interest stories.
I have some information on the preliminary causes, the stairs were of wood construction and the supporting structure penetrated the walls of the stair well into voids and cavities that were not fire stopped. House keeping and maintenance was poor and vandals had stolen some hinges from fire doors. The main problem for the lateral flame spread appears to be the building design. The internal stairs for each flat penetrated the lateral corridors inside the false ceiling without any form of fire resisting casing. Windows were open and plastic bird spikes on the window ledges are also thought to be contributing factors. All councils across the UK are checking their housing stock apparently the design faults would not have been obvious during a walk around risk assessment. ‘Official sources claim’
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Re the Camberwell Fire - anyone any idea where I would find or buy "preliminary results" from any investigation currently under-way?
I've tried googling - but obviously all that's coming up thus far is very tragic human interest stories.
I have some information on the preliminary causes, the stairs were of wood construction and the supporting structure penetrated the walls of the stair well into voids and cavities that were not fire stopped. House keeping and maintenance was poor and vandals had stolen some hinges from fire doors. The main problem for the lateral flame spread appears to be the building design. The internal stairs for each flat penetrated the lateral corridors inside the false ceiling without any form of fire resisting casing. Windows were open and plastic bird spikes on the window ledges are also thought to be contributing factors. All councils across the UK are checking their housing stock apparently the design faults would not have been obvious during a walk around risk assessment. ‘Official sources claim’
The bit about the internal flat stairs is the official CLG release the rest is just press stuff sorry I mixed the two together following a conversation about the fire. I have seen the official release now and it does only mention the wooden internal flat stairs breaching the communal horizontal corridors.
Sorry I wasn't strictly accurate.
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Cheers Bobbins - very useful info - either way round!