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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: AnthonyB on August 13, 2014, 04:18:10 PM
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Opinions please!
1989 purpose built housing complex. around a quadrangle. It has self contained town houses along one row, the rest is ground floor 1 bed flats and first floor 2 bed maisonettes with a second floor (this 2nd level only internally accessed from each flat).
Front doors are to an enclosed corridor, part open at both ground & first floor levels with a high level roof at second floor height. The corridor is very long (up to 60m) undivided except by what looks like a glazed smoke curtain half way. Roof vents with actuators throughout. Stairs at each end enclosed with roof and ground vents (actuators removed or never final fixed to ground).
Internal layout of flats is similar to that in CP3. Ground floor flats have a 30 minute protected lobby, although the door to the combined kitchen/living room is nearer the front door than the beds and there is alternative escape via the living room to the outside. Maisonettes have the same ground floor layout with a bathroom and second bedroom to their upper floor (protected lobby & stair) their living room exit is onto a narrow open air escape balcony along the row of flats with a spiral stair to ground.
Structural plans from the build suggest 30 minutes between flats and flats and internal corridor.
The vents have a zoned control panel to the basement. There is a fire alarm system which unfortunately has been upgraded and doesn't appear to reflect the original install and is corridor only with apparently no interface to the vents anymore. The original install did include a smoke and sounder to the flat internal lobbies, the sounder located to try and give the best sound levels to the bedrooms, although it's not clear if these still work.
Questions:
-I believe that the fire safety precautions in the 1985 Building Regulations would have applied and as a result CP3:IV Part 1:1971 applicable - would you agree?
- The client is adamant that stay put didn't exist until very recently and not at the time of build - my opinion is that whilst the term did not exist the principle has done since the 60's - would you agree?
- They don't want to fix the smoke vents (which they say aren't smoke vents but cannot explain what they are there for) due to cost and want full evacuate - I feel this should be OK as long as the communal alarm does work in the flats as originally and the policy is clearly communicated, reasonable?
It's a funny build as it combines elements of both strategies, as well as a corridor design and ventilation more akin to covered shopping malls so is quite a pain to decipher!
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Part extract from CP3:IV Part 1:1971 advice to owners and occupiers.
(http://i1257.photobucket.com/albums/ii506/twsutton1196/STAYPUTCP31971style.jpg) (http://s1257.photobucket.com/user/twsutton1196/media/STAYPUTCP31971style.jpg.html)
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Hi Anthony
Several comments, I remember the late 80s housing boom and although you are right to quote CP3 and the 1985 regs don't overlook the Mandatory Rules for Means of Escape (the 85 ADB did not cover B1).
The Mandatory Rules were intended to cover flats with a floor height of over 4.5 metres- ie second floor and above, because where there was a floor height of less than 4.5m window escapes were considered ok ........ but it was not unknown in some cases for designers to incorporate a protected staircase internal to a 2nd floor flat, this discharged at first floor level into communal areas and from there persons could fling themselves out of a window (I know!).
I can assure you that Stay Put was the standard strategy for code compliant flats in those days- the birth of the stay put strategy came in the 1971 CP3 - prior to that (the 1963 edition) it was assumed that the floor or the fire or at least the adjacent flats would be evacuated (though no alarms were installed). See clause 2.1 on page 8 of the 1971 edition, or indeed the excellent summary written by Colin Todd in the LGA guidance, with reference to pages 140- 150.
One would expect 1 hour floors and walls in a CP3 compliant building though.
As for ventilation the roof vents sound unconventional for its day - rather like two smoke control zones with the central barrier to bring in make up air from the adjoining zone.
CP3 1971 offered two approaches, smoke containment or smoke dispersal which later fell into complete disrepute. Permanently open vents were commonplace to staircase lobbies and corridors in the 1960s but by the 80s POVs had largely been replaced by AOVs, with the improvements and availability of detector technology.
Smoke dispersal was still an optional approach in CP3 1971 and this often used windows or wall vents which could be permanently open or automatic opening with a maximum corridor length of 60m. Staircases could have manually opened vents. Your version sounds akin to this though whether the smoke in the corridor would be sufficiently buoyant to make it work as such is another matter. (the dispersal concept was later dropped). Para 2.4.2 page 14 of CP3 describes the approaches.
In short I think the roof vents would have been AOVs and should be reinstated as such. You could also consider a conversion to containment but those half hour walls may be an issue.
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Yes, I was using CP3 due to the Mandatory rules referencing it.
The half hour is from the spec for the walls between the flats and common corridor which includes solid glass blocks that were specified only for a minimum of 30 minutes. Whilst most current FR glass blocks are 60 minute and even some of the normal ones 60 minute integrity, but poor insulation I have no way of confirming that the ones put in in '89 are anything more than the 30 minute specification for the build
The party walls between flats are 100mm blockwork with plasterboard lining and skim.
The problem is one of the management company directors is an architect and is adamant that it's meant to be full evacuate due to the extra exits from each flat and the fact stay put 'didn't exist then' and that the AOV aren't smoke vents and have never worked (not unusual, have dealt with a mid 2000 build that the smoke shafts were too small and the vents never worked from day 1 either - the disruptive works and 6 figure sum to reverse this means that full evacuate and a common alarm upgrade is in the offing).
The odd thing is the original fire alarm layout does reflect full evac - whilst it predates LACORS it is the 1989 equipment equivalent of the Grade A LD2 common system recommended for full evac in non ADB compliant conversions (or effectively a build that isn't to ADB).
It also covered the townhouses as well which is very odd (self contained, exit to open air).
The cheap & easy option is to go to full evac and drop the stayput making sure that the flat sounders and detectors are back on the loops, certainly the residents preferred option!
It's an odd one for sure!
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It sounds as though full evac is the way to go then. In supporting this approach do the managing agents think it can work? A hydrid alarm or mixed system may be the best approach rather than tipping everyone out every time someone burns the toast?
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Yes, I would recommend the lobby smokes be changed to heats with separate grade D systems for life safety if the flat is the site of fire origin to mitigate false alarms, or failing that a suitable C&E based on the device location activated.
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who supervises the evacuation? who silences the alarm? whats the strategy for disabled people?
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These are the problems and why I (& the guides) don't like full evacuation. Sorting out the smoke control and the glazing (which should have the required integrity but may fall down on the thermal insulation) and remaining stay put (which has been the official policy for years and there is even the old CP3 stay put fire action notice up in a few areas) is best as well as upping the self-contained AFD to the maisonettes.
But the RMC want to be simultaneous evacuate and have a fire detection system put in place originally that supports this. The limited as built info doesn't add much useful background beyond the fact that it's mostly solid construction that would support stay put.
No lifts, so whilst there could be some people with mildly limited mobility or other impairments (deaf/blind) there aren't real issues plus the demographics of the block aren't including these sorts of resident.
The fact that there is no concierge or caretaker doesn't help and resetting would have to be either via call out to the Managing Agent or let the residents have the codes to use the active repeaters to silence & reset!
The layout is such that even with an evac policy only 25% would need to be emptied at any one time anyway.
It would be a lot easier it was built like most contemporary buildings but it seems to be a cross between a CP3 compliant flat block, a covered shopping mall, and a BS5588-1 sheltered housing complex in it's various features!
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agreed, good luck with it.
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AB stated when discussing stay put evacuation procedure "my opinion is that whilst the term did not exist the principle has done since the 60's" and I believe my submission confirms that.
In my opinion not giving the procedure a term was wise because it can be easily misunderstood a better description would be "stay put if it is safe to do so" because in an incident there will be a small number of tenants who should evacuate, for their own safety but some people believe they should stay put at all costs or until the FRS tells them to evacuate.
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Just to add to Toms post above the 1971 edition of CP3 signalled a step change in approach. The previous 1962 edition of the same document stated " The assumption should no longer be made that buildings must be evacuated if a fire occurs and high residential buildings should, therefore, be designed that the occupants of floors above a fire may, if they choose, remain safely on their floor. It may be necessary to evacuate the floor on which the fire occurs, and in some instances those floors which are in the immediate vicinity of the fire, but the occupants of these floors should be free to reach safety in any other part of the building via the staircase".
The 1971 edition stated "It is no longer assumed that when a fire occurs in a block it is necessary to evacuate the whole block, whole floors or even dwellings adjacent to the fire"
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I fully accept all of that Kurnal, I can see a situation where nobody has to evacuate (refuse bin fire) or only the family in the flat on fire or whole floors (Lakanal House) but I believe all tenants should be made aware that stay put procedure doesn't mean stay put at all costs, only if it is safe to do so, and they do not feel threatened. I just feel the term "Stay Put Policy" can be easily misinterpreted.
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I would agree that 'stay put policy' is probably not the best term however it is in constant use and referred to in the Guidance on purpose built blocks of flats so we are stuck with it.
The way forward has to be the enforcing authorities and the assessors must ensure people can still evacuate the building.
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The greta thing about the stay put approach to flats is that the residents don't really need to know about it.
If you are in your flat and you are not aware of any fires - then carry on with your life.
If you notice that one of your neighbours flats is on fire you can either leave or stay where you are.
If you are directly affected by a fire most people will try to move away from it without the need for any training.
This worked as well as any fire strategy could until the Fire Safety Order came along and people started looking at blocks of flats. lots of people who had never dealt with them before got all excited and made life complicated they started by giving it a name!
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Wee Brian - and started coming up with all number of complicated methods to fix a system that wasn't broke in the first place such as installing fire detection and alarm systems where they're not required (the possible exceptions being in the circumstances described in the OP). My only addition to your statement would be that people in blocks need to be given some information on the fire safety procedures when they move in and that the information should be in as simple terms as possible. Having been at many high rise fires it became apparent that the world is changing and many people don't have the 'relationship' with fire that us 'old uns' have developed over many years. I was brought up with open fires, bonfires in the back garden, matches, and many other activities where sometimes I learnt by getting literally getting my my fingers burnt. Many people today don't have any understanding of fire or smoke and only see it on the TV where it inevitably ends in conflagration and disaster; so the more information that we give can lead to a better understanding.
A second point that I would make is that many residents of flats in many areas are people from places where CP3 was not the building standard and may have different experiences from our own and would possibly expect their block to burn down therefore will evacuate as this is what would be the 'norm' where they come from. A few years ago I stood on the roof of a building in Africa where I was carrying out a fire audit and could see within a few hundred metres at least four multi-storey buildings that had been completely gutted by fire!
People within flats will obviously do what they feel is right at the time and will make their decision based on their own learning experiences and their decision can be influenced by us 'professionals' having a clear idea of the 'stay put' principles and recommending to RPs that they inform their residents of the appropriate procedures.
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The reason for my concern, check the bottom half of page 3 of the inquest of Catherine Hickman. http://www.lambeth.gov.uk/sites/default/files/ec-inquisition-and-narrative-verdict-catherine-hickman.pdf
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Can you elaborate your concern Tom? Many issues from Lakanal are well known and many of us have learnt from the experiences of both fire risk assessments, or lack of, at the property and from the issues with fire advice to occupiers. I'm not saying a similar incident will never happen again but it is extremely unlikely and in my opinion departing from stay put is foolish in the extreme - what are you actually suggesting?
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My concerns is what I have been saying in the previous posts the term "Stay Put" can easily be misunderstood and if you read the paragraphs I indicated, I believe that is what happen there.
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Yes there were issues with the stay put policy at Lakanal as well as a myriad of issues with poor building design, lack of knowledge of alternate fire escape routes, blocked escape routes, fire spread through badly repaired building works, alterations by residents affecting fire resistance, fire fighting, fire doors being left open, extreme weather conditions, etc. all of which contributed to the unfortunate deaths on the day - it would be grossly unfair to blame the 'stay put' policy alone as most people were safe in their flats up to the hour after the fire started. What would you suggest as an alternative?
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The question that comes up from Lakanal house is whether this unfortunate woman would have stayed in her flat if she hadn't have been told too. As I understand it her escape route was available even when flames were begining to penetrate through her windows.
Its an extreme case and the expereinces of all the blocks we've built since the 1960s suggest that the overarching strategy works.
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Golden see nothing wrong with the concept of "Stay put if it is safe to do so" we have had it for more than fifty years and it has work fine. However in 2006 we had to label it and in my opinion emergency evacuation plan would have been better, but the terminology "Stay Put" was used and in my opinion can easily be misunderstood. This is why I used the inquest report to highlight that point, nothing to do with the rest of the problems at Lakanal House.