I looked at the Israeli system some years ago. It was one of a number of design proposals for some of the premises that were being designed to replace those damaged in NY on 9/11.
It ticked most of the box’s, and was significantly better than some of the parachute arrangements (Honestly, parachutes)and single use systems that were being pushed by opportunistic companies in the states. The issues that were highlighted by the appraisal team about the system were addressed by the designers who explained that Israeli building codes include considerably more safety features than most national building codes because the risks of attack are that much greater. (With regards to midlands point about people being reluctant to use the system, evidently when faced with the option of dieing people tend to be a little more enthusistic)
However, in the end, and once we had sorted through the understandable emotional drivers that surrounded high rise evacuation in the wake of the twin towers attack, the Port Authority and just about everyone else involved, accepted that interior escape routes were perfectly good means of escape for everything but the most catastrophic incidents which are almost impossible to guard against.
That said there were a number of enhancements to existing high rise evacuation practices that were assessed and included in new buildings. Some were even implemented retrospectively which is a rare occurrence in the states. Some were good, others not so good. Apologies if I’ve gone off track a bit here Kurnal