Hotel Room Bypass Doors

[leejr71]

Curious to know people's thoughts on hotel bypass doors. Would anyone still accept these in older hotels that maybe subject to preservation orders and options to upgrade fire precautions are limited

[kurnal]

Yes provided access is guaranteed and lighting provided. It should be demonstrated or explained to all guests on check in. Guests don't like them and worry about security and if you spot check you will sometimes find them obstructed. Electronic locks can be used and this can reassure guests  and with addressable fire alarms it is possible to provide intelligent signage indicating which route is available; you will often find those horrible break glass panels with a lever behind guaranteed to amputate guests fingers as they reach in amongst the broken glass and as they cannot be tested they are usually too stiff to operate. I never used to accept these during an FRA but many are in use. 

[Messy]

This reminds me of an audit I did of an over-height single staircase hotel in the finest capital city in the UK.

An alternative MOE was via a steel balcony at 4th floor level which took escapees to outside of next door's sash bathroom window (to a flat). The sash window was mounted in a hinged frame which swung horizontally out over the balcony & was secured closed with a maglock connected to the Hotels AFD. The sash window would slide vertically as normal during business as usual.

However, when the fire alarm activated in the Hotel, the window maglock released and simultaneously a buzzer would sound in the HMO bathroom to warn anyone in there to cover up!! With the maglock released, those escaping from the Hotel could open the entire sash window on its hinged frame and climb into the bathroom, through the HMO and out to the street. A green BGU door override was fitted outside the flat's window.

It remains the most bizarre MOE I have seen. I didn't want to allow it, but had no grounds not to. I even went back in the evening to discuss the matter with the tenant of the flat as I was sure they wouldn't know about this arrangement. After all, with the door override outside her window, any occupant from this seedy establishment could gain entry at any time. But no, she was happy to have 30 punters from a dodgy Hotel climbing thru her window wit 30 seconds notice!! As far as I know, it's still there!!

[AnthonyB]

Lots of older buildings have weird and wonderful alternatives put in place to satisfy the stringent escape requirements brought in by Means of Escape & fire certification where the usual additional external steel stair couldn't be installed.

Whilst many of the situations would never be allowed today, we have to remember they were accepted at the time of provision mainly as there was no alternative and it was better than sticking with the original single escape.

Short of being part of demolition & new build or a significant strip back to shell and refit it's not realistic (or physically possible) in many cases to change things, instead it needs to be managed as part of a risk based approach.

Often the escape fastenings need modernising from key in box or the seized fire escape deadlocks, lighting & signage can be improved, improved communication & cooperation with owners (where exit crosses properties), but there isn't always a viable alternative.

It's easy to just say 'not to latest standard' and walk away, but that's not fair to the RP nor is what risk assessment is meant to be.

[wee brian]

I had one where the alternative from a restaurant kitchen was via the dry store. by removing a shelf a hatch was revealed. the hatch lead into a protected stairway in the neighbouring building. Cant remember how but we got rid of it.

[Golden]

Pretty much any of the rooftop exits that I've seen from apartment blocks in London - investigating where one led recently and found myself wandering unannounced inside a High Consulate!!

I'd say 80% of the rooftop exits that I've looked at lead nowhere except the roof, often unguarded and unlit and far worse than bypass doors in hotels. This does raise a point regarding these little intricacies of escape routes such as the hotel bypass doors - also add staircase bypasses particularly in schools, balconies in scissor design blocks such as Lakanal, etc. - I suppose all of these are covered on 3 day fire risk assessor courses? Some are certainly not covered as I've also met so called 'fire engineers' who've written fire strategies that haven't even heard of them - come to think of it though many of them haven't got any idea about dead end travel including passing through the head of a staircase, different types of fire alarm systems, etc.

[Dinnertime Dave]

Interesting where some do lead. I went to a shop that had an alternative through the next door Jewellery shop.

[AnthonyB]

Pretty much any of the rooftop exits that I've seen from apartment blocks in London - investigating where one led recently and found myself wandering unannounced inside a High Consulate!!

I'd say 80% of the rooftop exits that I've looked at lead nowhere except the roof, often unguarded and unlit and far worse than bypass doors in hotels. This does raise a point regarding these little intricacies of escape routes such as the hotel bypass doors - also add staircase bypasses particularly in schools, balconies in scissor design blocks such as Lakanal, etc. - I suppose all of these are covered on 3 day fire risk assessor courses? Some are certainly not covered as I've also met so called 'fire engineers' who've written fire strategies that haven't even heard of them - come to think of it though many of them haven't got any idea about dead end travel including passing through the head of a staircase, different types of fire alarm systems, etc.

The problem with some of the shorter courses for newer people is they are based around brand new buildings that are code compliant and so assessors don't understand what they are seeing in older buildings and have no knowledge of the weird and wonderful ways compliance was achieved as modern fire regulations kicked in in the later half of the 20th Century, not just in layout of escape, means of escape, etc, but fire alarm design and operation, venting, fire door and frame construction, etc.

The easy option (but not for the RP) is to apply the highest & latest standard across the board, rather than have an understanding of how it worked, why it was done and to try and find a fair and realistic solution.

Some of these do have to go as they are wholly unsuitable (I remember an alternative route for upper floors from a Dublin bank and offices across an open flat roof rear extension to an unguarded edge two stories from ground with a very rusty chain link ladder in a box being the way to safety and a Notts building where the upper floor of a building had an alternative through a window onto a grid floor along a narrow lightwell and down an equally narrow fixed ladder into a confined space with a window into an adjoining building), but others, whilst not perfect, are tolerable with a few improvements until the premises are redeveloped.

[Mike Buckley]

I also remember tales from the old Fire Cert days where certifying officers would cross the street to avoid walking past one of the buildings they had certified, praying the place would never catch fire until after they had retired!

[Tom Sutton]

A load of crap Mike we worked from prescriptive guides without active fire precautions to supplement them and yes we had poor inspecting officers, like we have poor fire risk assessors to day.

[AnthonyB]

To be fair back in the early days of fire and means of escape certificates it was a difficult job - many existing buildings pre-dated the regulations and had limited scope for physical alteration; the UK had long before diverged from the US approach to sprinklers, leaving them as a property protection luxury; fire alarm technology was very rudimentary (especially detection); passive fire protection was very rudimentary and used asbestos; EL was limited; first aid fire fighting still involved mixing chemicals, pumping solvents and buckets.

Some terrible compromises existed, but bearing in mind the limitations of technology and knowledge back then how else could you have dealt with it? 

[Fishy]

It's often the case that if you maintain whatever fire protection is there in tip-top condition, improve what you practicably can and implement a robust and highly effective fire safety management regime using competent people then you can make a case for retaining much of what is existing, even if non-compliant.  You must then take the opportunity of improvement when and where it presents itself (e.g. during refurbishment or building works) and the extent of improvement is informed by the scope (and cost) of the changes being made.  What is regarded as 'ALARP' today might not be so tomorrow.

This blithe statement somewhat understates the necessity of applying sound judgement and justification to any departures from current guidance!  It's not just about knowing what the standards say - it needs an understanding of why they say what they say.  Knowledge of what would generally be regarded as 'good industry practice' in similar situations is key - and I must say that I regard the advice and guidance you get from FireNet contributors as a great source of such knowledge!