Fatal Newquay Hotel Fire

[Mike Buckley]

As far as the complexity of a FRA is concerned there is the view that a FRA does not need to be that complex this is being pushed from the government, this is fine until something goes wrong then the lawyers get involved, at that time the FRA needs to have everything covered i's dotted t's crossed etc.

In a way the Newquay fire may show this up. Let us assume that the hotel did have a FRA and it was done by one of our colleagues. Was the FRA adequate? Three people died, a fire escape couldn't be used because flame were spreading over it and the fire spread through the building very rapidly. Even if the Fire Authority etc. do not pursue a criminal prosecution what will happen if the families sue?

If we look at the Health and Safety side the HSE is saying that the Risk Assessments do not need to be that complex or detailed, however if an employee gets hurt and sues the lawyers are looking for any loophole to get money.

So my view is a simple FRA is fine until something goes wrong then it becomes a lead life belt.

I think the RR(FSO)O is flawed but the major flaw is in the assumptions made as to how it could work. It was modeled on the H&S legislation but to a great extent H&S can split down into smaller units. A machine can be risk assessed, a process can be risk assessed and the two combined to give an overall view of the job. However with fire it is necessary to take a more holistic view. An accident involving a machine is likely to be localised and once it has happened it is over. Fire on the other hand starts small and then accelerates, creating other failures and exposing flaws that would not be apparant on a smaller scale.

As far as the RRO goes. Create a relevant person who is responsible for fire in a company, yes great. Give guidance as to the arrangements that need to be put in place to allow everyone to escape in case of a fire, it's roughly the same as the old Fire Safety Act and Building Regs. Expect anybody without a background in fire or fire engineering to combine the two, major problem. Its rather like taking a person off the street giving them a copy of the building regs and asking if that building is ok.

I feel that the RRO was a reaction not to a failure in the Fire Safety Act but in the failure to invest in enough resources to make that Act work.

In short the RRO is rather like the early days of the lazer: a good solution looking for a problem.

[Tom Sutton]

Mike the RRO followed on from the Workplace Regs which was forced on us by Europe. It had nothing to do with the effectiveness of the FP Act which I believe played a major part in reducing non domestic fire fatalities down from 500+ in the seventies to less than a hundred by the end on the century. How is debateable.

[Goodsparks]

Would be intresting to know how many additional premises are now subject to FS legislation that were previously never covered under the FPA? Places of worship, Community centres (those which weren`t covered by a PEL / Alc. Licence), Scout huts, temporary structures etc How many serious fires have occured on these premises and how many serious injuries / lives lost.

Whilst many buisneses may be claiming to be unaware / unsure / unqualified / unenthusiastic about the RRO, I am aware of many community groups which are now taking their responsibilities very seriously. They may not have the full competence required to complete their own adequate RA unassisted, but they know they now need to be doing far more than they ever have.

In my own experience, brigade inspecting officers themselves are uncomfortable (or indeed incompetent ?) with the idea of sensible fire risk assessment and until october, were trying to ridgidly impose the same type of fire safety stuff they were in 1971. The grade 2 listed building I work in is littered with 3 decades of "very important" fire precautions enforced through the issue of a fire cert. Metres upon metres of GWPP glass chopped into ancient oak doors, FA call points stuck in the most inappropriate locations - just because the regs said so, ply-faced fire door sets put into corridors, metres from existing hardwood door sets just because the compartment length exceeded that in the text book.

Whilst i`m sure their are exceptions to the rule, the bulk of IOs I encounter are not kept abreast of the technologies available, this confirmed again a couple of weeks ago when it was sugested that a monnex extinguisher be provided to cover frying  / fat risks in one of our commercial kitchens.

Apologies if the post wanders a little from the thread title. It does frustrate me that some people seem intent on turning a tragic incident like the Newquay fire into an attempt to discredit what could be one of the most productive pieces of fire safety legislation ever brought into force, when the liklihood is, that if the fire had occured on 30th September last year, the result would have been the same.

Paul

[The Lawman]

Hi Goodsparks, but the fire didn't happen on the thirtieth of September last year and three people have tragically lost their lives. We have every right to question the adequacy of the new FRA regime and be fearful that further incidents will cost lives.

[wee brian]

Yes - I expect whe the FPA was repealed these people all ran about removing all the fire protection that was "required" by their fire cert.

[AnthonyB]

With no fire certificate and most risk assessments I see (& I see lots) being check boxes filled in without resort to any guidance, not even the entry level leaflet fire precautions are likley to fall & multi occupancies rise in risk as there is little coordination - just this week gone it was only the coincidence of my inspection/coordinating visit that one occupier was stopped from blocking up an adjoining exit from another office (despite their Y/N FRA) that was essential to allow access to the secondary stair that they required to have access to.

We are stuck with the RRO & have to work with it to try & get it to evolve & be effective, but thatdoesn't mean we shouldn't stick our heads in the sand as to it's potentially hazardous flaws

[jokar]

Please let us live in the real world.  Whether a fire certificate exsisted or a FRA or nothing at all.  People will still behave as they will as they have little or no idea about fire.  The legislation does not matter, it is the advice that is given that counts.  For all risk assessors and FSO's it is about life safety, the difficulty lies when all sorts want to talk property protection as an aside to the life safety issue.  having sat on both sides of the fence some of the certificates I did were rubbish and my early FRA's probably the same.  It is about experience and knowledge but also about understanding a differing view.  The legislation is with us and now let us all use it to the right purpose, to ensure that people do not lose their lives in fire as in this tragic case.  It is immaterial now what the cert or the FRA said, the fact are that people died perhaps unecessarily but the inquest will find that out.

[The Lawman]

Please let us live in the real world.  Whether a fire certificate exsisted or a FRA or nothing at all.  People will still behave as they will as they have little or no idea about fire.  The legislation does not matter, it is the advice that is given that counts.  For all risk assessors and FSO's it is about life safety, the difficulty lies when all sorts want to talk property protection as an aside to the life safety issue.  having sat on both sides of the fence some of the certificates I did were rubbish and my early FRA's probably the same.  It is about experience and knowledge but also about understanding a differing view.  The legislation is with us and now let us all use it to the right purpose, to ensure that people do not lose their lives in fire as in this tragic case.  It is immaterial now what the cert or the FRA said, the fact are that people died perhaps unecessarily but the inquest will find that out.

Hi Jokar, forgive my ignorance but how long will the inquest take?

[jokar]

I for one have no idea, but for sure an offence under Article 32 may have been committed.  "a failure that results in death or serious injury" paraphrased of course.  many people will be called to account for he actions taken includining both sides of the FRS, ops and fire safety.

[The Lawman]

Cheers, I sincerely hope it's sooner rather than later and is dealt with appropriately.

[nearlythere]

One area of concern with risk assessments is that there could be a tendancy to stray, considerably by some, from accepted and authoritive codes of practice. Currently, in my fire fighting role and with fire safety experience, if in a fire situation, I enter a stairway enclosure or dead end corridor I will make a reasoned judgement that I am likely to in a protected route and reasonably safe from a fire in other parts of the building.
The introduction of risk assessments removes this, particularily where a culture of cost cutting has started to creep into the equation.

[Big T]

One area of concern with risk assessments is that there could be a tendancy to stray, considerably by some, from accepted and authoritive codes of practice. Currently, in my fire fighting role and with fire safety experience, if in a fire situation, I enter a stairway enclosure or dead end corridor I will make a reasoned judgement that I am likely to in a protected route and reasonably safe from a fire in other parts of the building.
The introduction of risk assessments removes this, particularily where a culture of cost cutting has started to creep into the equation.

I agree, but with that in mind doesn't your Dynamic Operation Risk Assessment therefore change?

[nearlythere]

It is more difficult to assess the elements of contruction of a corridor in poor visibility and whether partitions are 1/2 hr to structure ceilings.
There exists a greater risk in that one cannot use professional knowledge as one used to be able, particular in building where Brigades would have been involved in the design or ungrading as one would have been aware of the standards usually applied.

Yes Big T you are quite correct but this is just my 2 penny bit.

Reminds me a little of how we are now to treat sandwich panel buildings on fire. If there is no life risk do not enter.

[jokar]

Nearlythere, from experience, until I went into FS I had no idea what a protected route was and learnt to fight fire using the protection around me.  We will never get it all right as fires of the past such as Kings Cross and the Avon fire where colleagues lost their lives have demonstrated.

[nearlythere]

Nearlythere, from experience, until I went into FS I had no idea what a protected route was and learnt to fight fire using the protection around me.  We will never get it all right as fires of the past such as Kings Cross and the Avon fire where colleagues lost their lives have demonstrated.

My point completely Jokar. All the time you did not know it but you probably were within protected routes. Thats the protection your Fire Safety colleagues made sure was provided for the occupants and you.