Dynamic Risk Assessment

[Old legend]

Well,  just thought I'd leave it a couple of days to see which way the wind blows.  I can see the debate clearly has two camps and I will, respond with my views but to further fuel debate one of the influences behind my hypothesis is taken from the unprecedented publication of the detail in the Hertfordshire report of the investigation into the Harrow Court fire where two colleagues tragically lost their lives.

At the time they entered the compartment in which they lost their lives, they were without supervison, the decison to enter, the method of entry and the fact the entry was without the protection of water was 'their' decison.  DRA starts with a safe person, asks that a split second decision on risk and benefit is taken.  Is this DRA at work?  I don't know anymore.  After 36 years I thought I did, after being the author of a number of 'safe systems', I though I did.  My fear, tinged with a little sadness for the potential conseuences is that just like stamping the tactical mode on a job in the early stages of deployment, DRA is simply a 'get out of jail free' card.

[Tom Sutton]

Point of interest does anybody know how many firefighters lost their lives in the last 10 yrs since DRA has made the job so much safer and the 10 yrs before that when we just let things happen?

[Nearlybaldandgrey]

The incident at Stevanage was tragic, but highlighted a number of issues and failings, not just the DRA.

I do not see the process as a "get out of jail free card". To declare a tactical mode, a risk assessment must have been carried out. It is not cast in stone and as the incident progresses continual asessment of hazard and risk will confirm that tactics are correct or require changing.

I refer to my previous post which says "Unfortunately loss and injury occurs because, despite every effort to reduce, eliminate and control risk, the environment is changing and there are occurances which cannot be predicted or contolled."

I stand by this statement having been at an incident where a colleague lost his life.

[Old legend]

twsutton,  
I have most of the data that answers your question but unfortunatley due to copywright and confidentiality am unable to reproduce it here.  I can say that the relationship of pre/post DRA has other dynamics that must be taken into account such as systems of work, frequency of response, quality of PPE, likelihod of entry pre 'defensive' tactics, appliances, equipment etc etc.

baldyman,
the issue for me is not the concept, its possessing the craft skill and knowledge that enables application of the concept, the mantra contained in the manual is the same found in the Home Office guide issued in 1997/8.  We seemed to know and understand then. For the LFf/ SubO of the day they had been well tested in their craft knowledge having had to study a broad syllabus to answer a handful of questions as confirnation of that knowledge.  Subsequently they had to demonstrate skill in safely deploying their crews.  Then and only then would they 'qualify' to make such decisions.

Is the ITOP, are PQA's providing a stable of crew and watch managers/commanders with the same underpinning skill and knowledge? There is an 'expertise' element to the DRA equation whether we like it or not.

I wonder if the view that it's not a Performance Indicator, so train when you can also has some substance?

I am merely fuelling debate.

[Old legend]

fireftrm
I have to disagree with the statement that the "modern CM is more likely to". DRA was adopted at a time when we became all too acutley aware of the need to open doors and use water differently (or some of us anyway).  Hot fire training became the new way. FRS invested many thousands on simulators that complied with the 'realistic training' requirement of the National Industries Group.  Constraints on their use in recent years means a drastically reduced availability even though their use was a training watershed, when does the modern CM in the mission to gain competence evidence across the entire role map get the time to maintain such craft skills and knowledge?

[Tom Sutton]

Old legend
I agree with you there are other factors to take into account but the principle factors are the numbers of injuries and fatalities. All the other factors you indicated post DRA should be improving the safety situation. I also do not understand why giving two numbers pre/post infringes copywrite and confidentiality we would not require a list of references.

[Old legend]

twsutton

Numbers I have look like 17 before and 9 after.  With closer scrutiny from the HSE there were 7 Improvement Notices before and 19 after.

[Tom Sutton]

twsutton

Numbers I have look like 17 before and 9 after.  With closer scrutiny from the HSE there were 7 Improvement Notices before and 19 after.

Seventeen firefighters lost their lives operationally in the ten years prior to DRS (1997) I am extremely surprised at those figures I was operational then and I can only recall a couple of fatalities.

[Mike Buckley]

Be careful about the broad figures the total number of fireifghters killed include those who were killed in RTAs on the way to incidents etc. DRAs will have no effect on these incidents.

The other side is to compare the death rate with other industries compared to agriculture, construction etc. the death rate in the fire service is very good.

[fireftrm]

The increase in the number of improvement notices reflects the increase in activity by the HSE and our 'coming under the spotlight' far more than in the past. In addition H&S regulations have been extended over that period giving rise to more areas for HSE concern. Looking at some historical incidents I am fairly sure that improvement notices would have been a weekly affair, had the regulations, or enforcement body existed then.

[kurnal]

It would be interesting to see some statistics, I have often wondered whether firefighters were at greater risk when working outside their traditional core skills, ie whether there is a greater risk of accidents or death when involved in special services- on the roads, cliff, confined space  or water rescues,  compared to firefighting.

[Tom Sutton]

It would be interesting to see some statistics, I have often wondered whether firefighters were at greater risk when working outside their traditional core skills, ie whether there is a greater risk of accidents or death when involved in special services- on the roads, cliff, confined space  or water rescues,  compared to firefighting.

You will be lucky Kurnal I have tried to get historical data on firefighters fatalities because I cannot accept that 17 firefighters died between 1987 and 1997. I was able to get limited data from 2000 to 2006 but before that a closed door. In America you have no problems you can go back to 1988 and get detailed information even there names.

[Mike Buckley]

I had a look at the In Memorium part of Firenet (www.fire.org.uk/deaths.php) which gives the following numbers:
2007: 1
2006: 2
2005: 2
2004: 2
2003: 2
2002: 1
1996: 2
1989: 1
1987: 2
1977: 2
1958: 2

These refer to firefighters killed at incidents and I suspect that there are names missing from the list. From this there have been 10 killed after 1998 and 3 killed between 1988 and 1998.

Could I suggest that members of this forum check the list against the knowledge they have from their own brigade and add any additional details. Then perhaps we may get a better picture.

Also our fallen comrades should be remembered.

[nearlythere]

As an Incident Commander I was always glad when one of the experienced firefighters sidled up to me and said "Guv would you like me to do..... or wouldn't it be a good idea if you....." and most of the time I took the advice. If I didn't I had a good reason not to.

Mike
When your experienced firefighter was using his/her initiative and suggesting ideas, you were risk assessing the suggestion before you made your decision. We make dynamic risk asessments every minute of the day. When we come to a road junction we stop and consider our options on how to proceed safety taking into consideration the other traffic using the road. It is a normal everyday function except someone has now given it a label.

[Tom Sutton]

Thanks Mike those figures appear more in keeping to what I remembered. Although this calculation is very crude, it appears the number of firefighters killed on duty has doubled since 1997.