Mike
The investigation view is that it was a flashover and that the roof panels were the initial fuel for the fire. The fire developed very quickly according to local media. This is some local reporting:
Source:
www.blikop112.nl Published: 12-5-2008
Chronological summary of the fire in De Punt
De Punt / Tynaarlo - A chronological summary of the recent events on Friday 9 May during which three firefighters from the Eelde fire brigade died in a fire at a shipyard on the Groningerstraat in De Punt.
The fire alarm centre for Groningen received the first report of an indoor fire on the Groningerstraat in De Punt. Geographically, De Punt is quite close to the area covered by the province of Groningen, which is probably why the report was first received in Groningen. The fire alarm centre for Groningen immediately sent the report on to the fire alarm centre for the province of Drenthe in Assen.
2:10 p.m. The fire brigade stationed in Eelde receives a report of an indoor fire on the Groningerstraat in De Punt.
2:17 p.m. The first fire engine from the Eelde fire station arrives on the scene. A great deal of smoke is visible, and the fire is immediately upgraded to a ‘medium-sized fire’. There are not yet any flames visible from the outside.
The officer in charge orders two teams (4 firefighters) to carry out an initial investigation of the building’s interior. Four firefighters equipped with gas masks enter the building with a high pressure water jet and an infrared camera. At a certain point in time, one of the four has to leave the building, as the fire hose taken inside becomes stuck somewhere. Immediately after he leaves the building, an intense fire suddenly fills the entire building accompanied by a very large amount of smoke.
2:21 p.m. It becomes clear that firefighters are missing. The officer in charge has already deployed all his men (TS Eelde) and can therefore not initiate a rescue operation to search for his colleagues. The crew of the fire engine dispatched in response to a ‘medium-sized fire’ alarm is immediately deployed to search for the missing firefighters.
2:23 p.m. The Officer on Duty, who is on his way to the fire, has been informed of the missing firefighters and upgrades the situation to ‘very large fire.’
2:25 p.m. The incident is classified as a GRIP 1 situation. As a result, a command post is set up on site to coordinate the deployment of a multidisciplinary team.
2:28 p.m. An order is given by the command post to deploy teams to measure the concentration of harmful substances in the smoke in the surroundings.
2:30 p.m. The incident is classified as a GRIP 2 situation. As a result, a regional operational team is established and takes over control from the on-site command post.
3:15 p.m. The incident is upgraded to GRIP 3. As a result, a municipal action team is also established. The reason for this is that it has become absolutely clear that three firefighters are missing.
7:18 p.m. The ‘fire under control’ signal is given.
9 p.m. Seats of the fire under control (i.e. extinguished).
Source: Cobouw -
http://www.cobouw.nl/cobouw/nieuws/toonnieuwsartikel.jsp?di=424842 Published on 25-6-2008
Sandwich panels surprise firefighters
TYNAARLO - Due to the risk of gases escaping from sandwich panels, fires in industrial buildings should be fought only from the outside, according to the committee which investigated the fire in De Punt in which three firefighters died in the beginning of May.
The fire started in the meter cupboard in the back of a large industrial building used for maintenance activities on yachts and cars. A few minutes after the alarm was sounded, the fire brigade arrived on the scene and yellow-brown smoke was seen escaping from the back of the building, which collected and remain visible at a low level. This was why the fire brigade originally decided not to enter the building to fight the fire.
However, the picture looked different ones they arrived in front of the building. The wind was blowing hard into the main interior of the building, giving the firefighters a good view of the rear wall. They therefore decided to nevertheless enter the main section of the interior, armed with a high pressure water hose.
Looking back on the events, the investigative committee led by professor of crisis management Ira Helsloot concluded that the entrance door to the building, which had been swivelled upwards, must have blocked the view of the roof. That is where an enormous cloud of yellow-brown smoke would have been hanging in the air. Immediately after the firefighters entered, the fire suddenly expanded, turning the entire main section of the interior into a sea of fire. The heat, the enormous shock wave, and the lack of oxygen proved fatal.
Flash-over
The roof of the 75 m long structure consisted of steel sandwich panels with a 9 cm thick core of polyurethane foam. According to the investigators, as is also the case for polystyrene, this type of material releases gases upon being heated. The gases released contain ammonia, hydrocyanic acid, and nitrous compounds. The latter have a characteristic yellow-brown colour. If the concentration exceeds a certain level, these gases can be ignited by a spark and cause a flash-over. If the polyurethane foam itself starts burning, it produces a cloud of greasy black smoke.
Insufficient knowledge
The release of gases by the insulation materials used in sandwich panels is a well-known phenomenon among materials researchers, but there is a lack of knowledge in this regard among firefighters, acccording to the Helsloot Committee. This aspect is also not covered in the training for firefighters. According to Helsloot, forbidding the use of sandwich panels is not a useful option. Fire brigades should therefore make a habit, in principle, of fighting fires in industrial buildings only from the outside.
In comparison to Netherlands we have more 'sheds' with sandwich panels with combustible plastic foam cores. Shouldn't DCLG, CFOA, FBU looking at what can be learnt?
