Fatal flats blaze inquiry starts

[Phoenix]

I'm with you there Big T.

Also, regarding your fire 2 weeks ago - imagine the mess it would have been and the potential for injuries if everyone in the building had tried to evacuate, through the smoke, past the fire, over the fire-fighters' hoses, impeding the fire-fighters, with their pet dogs and carrying their pet budgies and fish tanks (I've been to a fire where the fish died!).....the thought of it is laughable.

Stu

[Clevelandfire 3]

Agreed

Im not sure what Jokar is harping on about defend in place in blocks of flats have been the norm for decades

[Benzerari]

To be cynical, the money for upgrading the fire system in comercial premises comes from the profits of the organisation. The money for upgrading the fire system in council tower blocks comes from our pockets via the rates.

People are happy for the rich directors to lose abit of money but putting the taxes up is bad news for politicians especially round election time.

So it's a matter of money then?

Do you mean BSI has to see where the money is, before setting some cost effective standards?

[colin todd]

Communal fire alarm systems in blocks of flats are not only unnecessary but sometimes positively dangerous. They are either installed to operate AOVs ro by well meaning people who understand fire alarms but do not understand fire safety design. This is old hat that pre dates current building regs by decades-its not new. read CP3 Chapter 1V Part 1.

[Steven N]

Spot on Big T all those asking for communal alarms etc please explain what sort of evacuation strategy you intend to run in the event of an alarm actuation?

[Big T]

Relating to Benz post above, the reason is not about money in the social environment it is about manageability of the residents. In an office environment you have control over the occupants as they are employees, you can insist on training, drills, consequesnces of non compliance etc.

In a residential setting you do not have that control.

If I was required to I would spend money on communal alarms. But I am not required to. As a consequesnce I spend money on passive protection improvements. The corner stone of defend in place strategy.

[Mike Buckley]

No the BSI produce standards which are advisory unless they are actually put into legislation. For example there is no law that says I must install a fire alarm to BS and I could take on the Fire Authority in court and argue that the alarm system I have fitted was adequate even if it didn't comply with the standard.

The problem will come if the law states that all tower blocks must have communal fire alarms to BS that is when the politicians start to scream.

The other side is that although this is a headline grabbing tragedy as said above, fires have occured in tower blocks without this loss of life. I would say most ex firefighters on this list have dealt with fires in tower blocks. This one has grabbed the headlines because it was in London, young children died and there was good video footage of it.

Yes we need to find out what happen and why, then we can learn from it.

[jokar]

AHH Cleveland you are so so right.  However, to have Defend in Place you need to be assured that the compartmentation will support that theoretical practice which is why most atypical HMO's have a different evacuation strategy.  If you leave people in a premises and the fire can jump from flat to flat then you have a whole host of other problems to deal with.

[Midland Retty]

Asbolutely Jokar, however I thought (and I suspect Cleveland did too) that you were saying blocks of flats shouldn't have defend in place strategies.

Any defend in place strategy whether it be for blocks of flats or otherwise relies on top notch compartmentation - no argument there - hence as you correctly point out we don't allow defend in place within HMOs.

On a different note I agree with all of you who have stated that installing AFD in the communal areas is a very  BAD idea.

Priority as Big T states is compartmentation, and standalone AFD in the flats.

 

[Big T]

Whilst this is total specualtion. The london lite newspaper (Freeby) went in to the block opposite Lakanal house to look at the building (Marie Curie house)

The paper still harps on about no external staircase and a single staircase (which I am not convinced is a design flaw) But has identified significant quantities of combustibles in the common areas. Blocked fire exits and doors with no closers and damaged hinges.

They describe this as "typical" in buildings containing social housing, but with good management this can be overcome.

I appreciate this is early days still but the spread looks increasingly management rather than poor design

[JC100]

http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23716422-details/The+twin+block+that+gives+clue+to+what+might+have+happened+in+blaze+tragedy/article.do

[FSO]

Interesting that the residents are using the FRA as a scapegoat!

Maybe they should start looking at the building management and the damage created by vandals if it is found to be similar conditions to the block featured in the article.

[Big T]

Does anyone know what the FRA strategy is a Southwark and whether they have even carried them out?

[nearlythere]

Priority as Big T states is compartmentation,.......

I very much doubt there is such a thing MR unless you were there from foundation to habitation to ensure it was carried out. Big strong concrete walls are great until the sparky or plumber  comes along with the masonary bit, at best, or a kango to provide the standard 300mm opening for the 15 - 100mm pipework or bunch of flat twin and earth. Once the building is up and "finished" there is no way of knowing if compartmentation as defined in B Regs has been maintained if provided in the first place.

I'm dealing with a young block of private flats at present and is it compartmented properly? Not a snowballs chance in hell. Problem is that to check if it has been done thoroughly would require a very intrusive investigation. 

So that I and the occupants can sleep easy at night I am minded to go for a common AFD and properly compartment where I can see it ain't.

[David Rooney]

Similarly we maintain a private "elite" block of flats in camden that has a "smoke ventillation system" on each floor (5 floors) ie. mains powered detector with relay base in the lift lobby on each floor, controlling louvres in the lobby that open to air.

Each detector is completely standalone and isolated from the other detectors.

The "residents" have requested a FD&A system in the common parts - sounders in flats + heat detector - etc

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