The "gripes" I've heard relate to some misconceptions about the document.
So perhaps if we are dead set on providing an official response from Firenet to the review committee we should decide amongst ourselves what are genuine gripes, and those which are born out of myth or misconception.
What myths or misconceptions do you have in mind, MM?
I think this could be done fairly easily if we start a fresh new thread on it.
I think we have a perfectly good thread going here, so here are some anomalies that I have stumbled across in the document (other than the ones kurnal has already mentioned above):
1. 8.3.7 - The opportunity has been missed here to specify communications between various management levels in the building on a day to day basis. The paragraph concentrates on communications during incidents which is not the most relevant aspect of communications within the context of building management. The most relevant aspect is day to day communications of fire safety problems and solutions.
2. Table 3 - Some of the examples for fire growth rates are poor. I think the examples for 1 and 4 are ok but better examples for 2 would be, perhaps, 'library, cinema, restaurant seating area, etc.' and for 3 'commercial kitchens, shops, woodworkers'.
3. Table 4 - This says risk profiles A4, B4 and C4 are 'not acceptable'. This is nonsense. Of course, they are, but they do require their own strict controls. The document seems to indicate that all boiler rooms, for example, should be sprinklered. It is very rare that a whole building or premises would have a fire growth rate of 4 and that would be difficult to visualise as acceptable unless the building was particularly small. In many cases buildings have various risk profiles in the different areas and it is perfectly acceptable for a office block, say, to have a boiler room that is A4 attached to it.
4. Table 5 - There are two lines for 'Shop sales areas'. Both give B3. They could be on one line (even though there are two notes for them).
5. 6.5 - There is no mention here or elsewhere of the life safety enhancements to the sprinkler installations. BS EN 12845 does not state when the life safety enhancements should be installed, it merely states what they are. This omission from BS9999 has led to much speculation, mischief and vexation. It may have been deliberate in an effort to see which way the wind blows but now is the time to come down on one side of the fence or the other.
6. 14.3 - The prescriptive guidance that escalators should stop could be toned down slightly as there are occasions when it is advantageous for them to keep going. For example, when they are moving away from the fire and smoke. Moving escalators are much easier for people to negotiate than stationary ones.
7. 16.5.3 - The figure can reduce to something less than 60 if the door happens to be at the base of a staircase.
8. 16.5.6.e - The equation is a lot more manageable when it is expressed as follows: Provided that D is at least 2m and N is at least 60, the width of the final exit (W) should be 5mm for each person coming through the door plus three quarters of the width of the stairs. That is 5N + 0.75S (mm). S and W must be expressed in mm, which is much more in keeping with every other measurement in the document.
9. Table 10 - Everyone uses 4sq m/person for secondary trading floors in large shops so the document should reflect this. What about fridge shops and other shops that sell bulky items? Is 2 sq m/person the right figure for them? Probably not.
10. 17.3.4 - Inner rooms that are protected by smoke detection in the access room are very common. The following potential problem should be pointed out, as it is a common fault in existing buildings. Where there is a two stage fire alarm (with an investigation period) not all buildings give an intermittent signal upon detection of fire and it is possible that there is a considerable delay before the people in the inner room receive their warning of a fire in the access room. Even where there is an intermittent signal broadcast through the whole building during the investigation stage, often the users of the inner room do not appreciate that this, for them, should be taken as a signal that they should leave the inner room.
11. 17.3.8 - Nothing wrong with this. I'm glad to see they corrected the error in ADB.
12. Table 12 - The 25% reduction in travel distances for premises where alcohol is served is almost invariably irrelevant. These premises usually have a number of exits and do not come anywhere near the two direction limits. Even if they are at the limits of travel distance, it makes little difference as the last people to get to the exit will very probably have to queue there anyway. Instead of this 25% reduction in travel distance, consideration should be given to increasing exit width requirements by 25% where alcohol is served. In these sorts of premises the time that it takes to evacuate a space is governed much more by the widths of the exits than by the travel distances so this would be a much more relevant measure. Bearing in mind the anomalies in safe occupancy numbers that kurnal has included in his initial post above I feel that this increase in width would be well justified. On the other hand, I do appreciate that it would generate a lot of problems in existing premises so maybe it should be tempered a little. What would we prefer, some disgruntled bar owners or a major loss of life in a bar?
13. 17.6.1 - Anomalies in exit widths as described in kurnal's post.
14. 17.6.1 again - Why are the notes 'note 3' and 'note 4'? Where are notes 1 and 2? Note 4 is very poorly expressed. The first sentence is at odds with the example. The comment, '
[not the 579 persons who could be accommodated through a single exit 2 550 mm (i.e. 3 × 850 mm) wide].' is rubbish and should be deleted. It is a hangover from the paragraph it was copied from in ADB but has no relevance in BS9999 as the latter document applies a unit width of exit per person right down to an 800mm door whereas ADB uses a step function in its Table 4.
15. 19.4.4 - A simple typo. Tables 14 and 15, not 15 and 16.
16. Tables 25, 26 and 27 - The use of these tables could be better explained to make the section more accessible for all. I have to go to some lengths to explain the use of this section to students.
17. Table 27 - the term,
h, should be better explained, perhaps with a diagram.
h is the height of the opening and some, incorrectly but understandably, think this means how high it is above the floor.
H is given as the height of the compartment but in an office building, for example, there may not be any compartmentation and the figure to use is the height of the space that contains the fire. This should be better explained.
18. Fig D4 - Transverse and radial gangways are still the wrong way round (they were in BS5588 part 6). The diagram is not clear anyway but you can still tell that they're labelled incorrectly.
19 E3.1.3 - The equation for calculating mall exit widths is still based on 5mm per person whereas every other recommendation for exit widths is based on Tables 13, 16 and 18. The 5mm per person was relevant when we based all exits on this figure but now that we are varying the figure should we not also vary the equation for mall exits so that it is consistent with the rest of the document.
20. E4.4 - Sprinklers are often omitted from public mall areas so this should be included as an acceptable exception.
21. Annex S - The example notices are much to wordy for practical use. They might be ok as handouts for training but notices as long as these will never be read by anyone. Not even me if I was inspecting the place. I would get bored long before the end and I certainly wouldn't have time to read it all if the building was on fire.
I haven't been through the document with a fine tooth comb, these are just some issues that come immediately to mind. I took the time to look up the references to help others review my comments.
Stu
