Should a fire risk assessment identify design/build issues?

[Suttonfire]

Hi all,

some recent comments from a Fire Officer have prompted me to rethink the above, in relation to a relatively new building block of flats.

He has queried the fundamental building design and materials, and stated that the suitability of the design/build should have been either validated or called into question in the fire risk assessment report.

Would it be you view that if inspecting a new build and finding uniform building materials and ventilation arrangements etc, that there is a degree to which the assessor is entitled to presume that it has been built to an approved standard? Otherwise, the assessor could find themselves in a position where they have to redesign/engineer a building which has already been constructed.

My interpretation of the 'Common misconceptions about fire risk assessments' section of the purpose built flats guidance is that a fire risk assessment is not an exercise to identify design/fire engineered issues which should have gone through the building control process.

I would appreciate views on this.   

[Mike Buckley]

Initially it sounds to me rather like a Fire Brigade get out clause, where everything is blamed on the Fire Risk Assessment, ?I don?t like the colour they?ve painted it, should be addressed in the Fire Risk Assessment?.

IMO these issues should be addressed in the Fire Strategy Document as required by Building Regulations.

As far as the FRA goes you should be looking for the obvious usual, can people get out? are the guidelines of ADB etc. being followed? Etc.

Otherwise you should be looking for the obvious issues for example is the fire stopping appropriate no holes above corridor fire doors etc.

The design and materials issue should be addressed in the planning permission process by Approved Inspectors, Building Control etc. and at this stage the Fire Brigade has the opportunity to comment on the plans.
To put the other side of the argument I have been involved in discussion with Approved Inspectors where the general answer was ?I don?t care about the Fire Risk Assessment, you do this or I won?t sign the building off!?

In short the fire officer missed the opportunity at planning stage and shouldn?t be blaming it on the FRA.

[Tom Sutton]

A FRA should consider the General Fire Precautions and the first clause (a) measures to reduce the risk of fire on the premises and the risk of the spread of fire on the premises. If the fundamental building design and materials is likely to cause a spread of fire then you should consider it. What yo do about it is another matter maybe it's to walk away?

[Fishy]

A FRA should consider the General Fire Precautions and the first clause (a) measures to reduce the risk of fire on the premises and the risk of the spread of fire on the premises. If the fundamental building design and materials is likely to cause a spread of fire then you should consider it. What yo do about it is another matter maybe it's to walk away?

Absolutely agree - with the exception of access & facilities for fire-fighters the FRA can't necessarily assume that what's been built is OK.  This is the type of issue that mandatory consultation during the building control process is meant to address (e.g. BCO approved building gets occupied & then the Fire Authority slap an enforcement notice on it 'cos they consider it doesn't meet the FSO...).  Can happen in theory.

[colin todd]

I still recall that , some years ago, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service demanded that the managing agent of a building that was not even built should carry out an FRA, before it was built and managed by them as they in the not so humble opinion of the GMFRS geezer would not be able to manage it safely.  They had lost this battle with the building control body , so wanted to use the managing agent as a lever to get what they wanted.

Always willing to be nice to these FRS chappies, I did ask what they wanted and we would see if the managing agents could put it to the developer for them, but the response was that the FRS did not tell people that, and it was for us to determine by an FRA.  Still feeling the love for the FRS, I pondered as to whether they would like this or like that, and if they just said we would see what we can do, as there was still time before the building was completed.  Some of the officers expressed an interest in the suggestions but were cut off by the geezer in charge who told his colleagues that the FRS don't tell people what they want.  He still insisted that we would need to do an FRA, at which time my love for the FRS and the geezer in question diminished to negative values and I advised the managing agent that we should now take our leave from the meeting and go home and leave the FRS to their agenda with building control the fire engineers and whoever else they wished to fight with, which is what we did.

One of the nice chaps from GMFRS showed us out of the building and expressed his heartfelt apologies for the behaviour of his senior officer.  It was very honest of him and we became friends, such that we would have a drink of an evening when I visited Manchester. I always liked to meet him in the building in question, once it was constructed, always advising him to inform control to augment the attendance to secure our safety.  Sadly, my chum passed away and I did not know about his passing in time to go to his funeral.

Its a funny old World.

[Phoenix]

The Building Regulations and the FSO are meant to mesh together to avoid duplication of jurisdiction and to provide a continuous enforcement regime that covers a building from design to demolition.

Consultation between the building control body and the fire service is required during the design and construction phases.  The lead authority is the building control body.  The consultation process is often not carried out correctly.  Especially, some might say, if the design is pushing the bounds of what is acceptable in terms of fire safety.  Some might think that this is deliberate.  Others might judge it negligent.

Even if the consultation is carried out correctly the building control body are at liberty to ignore every word that the fire service have uttered.

So it is not surprising that some buildings are built, completed and occupied with controversial fire safety characteristics. 

Building control wash their hands of it and take their money on occupation and a fire risk assessment is required.  The fire risk assessment has to consider life safety and it can consider other fire safety objectives.  For matters under the fire safety order the gloves are off. 

There are no precedents.  Nothing in the history of the property has any bearing on the provisions that are required in order to meet the legislative objectives (with some minor exceptions).  It's all about getting it right for the future.  Therefore, yes, I agree with Tom and Fishy.  If it ain't right, it ain't right and the fire risk assessment should address the issue.

On the other hand, the building has been built and someone in a position of authority must have considered it safe at some stage.  This does tend to indicate, as a kind of default position, that the building should be satisfactory as it is, irrespective of the concerns of the fire service or the fire risk assessor.  As Tom says, what do you do about it if you're the fire risk assessor?

It gets worse because the fire safety order does not make any direct provisions in terms of compartmentation or fire resisting structure or boundary distances or external finishes.  And it has very little to say about access and facilities for firefighters.  So, if these matters are not adequately addressed at the Building Regulations stage they might never get addressed.  The fire risk assessor has no simple grounds for making any requirements for these matters, except possibly requiring maintenance of facilities for firefighters.

So the fire safety order is a pretty toothless wonder for some aspects of fire safety whilst for means of escape it appears to be all powerful.

This would all be fine if the system worked.

But the world is complicated and we all have different perceptions of what is acceptable and what is not.  Some times we have to take a step back and take a fresh look at a problem from a different angle.  If we are making judgements about the world we have to have a set of standards to which we aspire.  As everyone's set of standards is different to everyone else's it is inevitable that there will be disagreements about how a suitable level of safety can be achieved. 

You won't arrive at a right answer.  There cannot be any 'right answers'.  But you might find one of the more pragmatic solutions.

As for Colin's tale, that has more than a ring of familiarity about it.  (Not the poignant bit, the bit before that.)  It's a picture that is not universal but it is one that is far from dying out.

[AnthonyB]

Who cares who passed it if when you assess it it fails to meet the basic requirements of the FSO by not providing features where necessary, or providing features that are inadequate, be it traditional or engineered construction.

I've assessed buildings that don't follow the normal rules, but because there is a detailed fire strategy that demonstrates that the level of safety is not less than that provided by traditional means I've not had any concerns with the design & build beyond the usual snagging you need to look for.

However I've been to others where there is a gaping hole in the rationale in the strategy or simply no attempt to mitigate deviations at all and in those cases have flagged it for further scrutiny.

It would be wrong to assume that what went before is automatically correct and rubber stamp it further in an FRA - mistakes are made, corners are cut (look at the AI for the fatal North Yorks flat fire) and you wouldn't want to be found to have put your name to something obviously wrong when there is an inquest (taking the example to the extreme)

[colin todd]

They cant look at the AI in the fatal N Yorks fire, Tony, because the period of their severe reprimand has now expired.

And if the FSO cant address compartmentation, Ashes, what is the meaning of general fire precautions?

[Phoenix]

I know what you're saying, Colin, and I might be a little ignorant in this respect. 

Have there been cases where RPs have been taken to task for having insufficient compartmentation under the FSO?  And, if so, what standard has been used to determine whether or not compartmenbtation was adequate?  ADB?

[colin todd]

Ignorance does not make you a bad person, Ashes.  Indeed, in some English FRS, it would actually be a qualification as an inspecting officer.  Yes, they can be taken to task; this is well accepted and does occur.  General fire precautions include measures to reduce the risk of spread of fire.  What is that if it is not inter alia compartmentation.  You can use whatever standard you like.  Is that not the beauty of the FSO, that people can make it up as they go along so long as the measures are reasonable and applied where necessary.

[kurnal]

I often reflect on the old days. Buildings were much more tightly controlled during construction, there was a role, long since gone called the clerk of works who would make the various trades men's lives a misery and make sure the building was erected to a good standard on behalf of the owner. The building control was invariably through the local authority and people looked on it as a long term career. Regular weekly meetings took place with the fire service to review applications and people knew each other and had long term working relationships and a teamwork , partnership approach . Then if the building required a fire certificate the FPO would go through it with a fine tooth comb because if we got it wrong there was the statutory bar. FPOs had better training in such aspects as compartmentaion because it was detailed on the fire certificate.  

Now all of that is gone. No clerk of works and no coordination on the construction site it's each trade to his own and all falling over each other to throw it up as fast as possible. But they get away with it because there's next to no supervision on site by the Building Control and all are on such tight margins and deadlines rushing all over the country there's no time for meetings or working relationships.

The fire service inspection teams are decimated and training a shadow of its former self. The training for most is based on the cfoa audit form and this pays little regard for the verification of fire compartmentation. Indeed some give it to the rp  to fill in because they only have 30 minutes allocated to the job. Most write down what they are told without looking for themselves because that's the approach favoured by the legislation. Only if there is a serious fire will a thorough building evaluation be made.

On almost every job I do I find the same problems, buildings not in accordance with the as built plans, compartment walls of plasterboard with exposed studding on the hidden side, came across a one hour compartment wall last week of 12.5mm plasterboard one side only of a lightweight studded wall and the other side exposed studding lined only with a 1mm glass fibre Curtain fabric intended for use as a cavity barrier. As built plans showed 2x 12.5 mm plasterboard both sides. And no documentation whatsoever to cover the change. My client is now pricing up replacing a wall 10m high and 80m long in an operational building as this is a key compartment wall separating sprinklered and unsprinklered compartments.

Crisis? What crisis?

On the other hand fires and fire deaths are at an all time low. It's hard to square the circle sometimes.

[Golden]

May have mentioned this before but I'm currently awaiting a building to be completed for a client of mine where the fire brigade have told me they will issue an enforcement (possibly prohibition) notice as soon as its occupied; I fully agree with them and have been telling the developer for two years that it is not fit for purpose. The AI and the(ir) fire engineers have concocted a fire strategy and are fully prepared to sign the building off despite its non-compliance; among other issues I fail to see how 32m dead ends on 8 floors coupled with insufficient staircase widths for the occupancy can be dealt with so blatantly but I'm awaiting the fire brigade report with interest.

The outcome of the consultation was that the brigade were "satisfied with the proposals" which the AI took as a green light to progress however later in the consultation document among other issues the brigade commented on the MoE to "strongly recommend that this item is reviewed to ultimately ensure that adequate means of escape routes are now provided". The consultation clearly highlighted that the brigade were only interested when the FSO came into play and really weren't prepared to make a stand at the consultation stage.

I have made strong representations to my clients but no changes have been made - I will be asked to carry out a FRA before occupation when I will be using red for only the second time in five years and indicating substantial or intolerable risk for certain areas of the building and may possibly lose a decent contract if/when I dig my heels in - or should I just accept the AIs decision that the building is safe?

[Phoenix]

the brigade commented on the MoE to "strongly recommend that this item is reviewed to ultimately ensure that adequate means of escape routes are now provided". The consultation clearly highlighted that the brigade were only interested when the FSO came into play and really weren't prepared to make a stand at the consultation stage.

In fairness to the FRS, at the consulation stage with building control the objective of the consultation is to cover matters that do not fall within the requirements of the Building Regulations.  Procedural guidance states that the FRS may comment on matters under B1 to B5 if they so desire.  The aim is to avoid duplication of work by building control and FRS.  This means that in theory the FRS should be concentrating on matters that will have a bearing on how the premises will meet the requirements of the FSO when it is occupied.  In terms of enforcement, it is the sole responsibility of building control to ensure that the building satisfies B1 to B5.  I'm not saying that this is what happens, I'm saying that this is what is meant to happen.

This case sounds very interesting Golden.  I think there's a lot of people who would be interested to hear how this one concludes.

The easy option is to accept the AI's decision and put some caveat to that effect in your FRA.  I don't think anyone could criticise you for doing that.  But it's not the AI's or the fire engineer's or the developer's lives that are being put at risk in years to come.  They'll have their money and be off building more of the same.  You have to be honest to yourself, don't you - if you feel that there is a real risk of injury or death because of the design then you have to say so.  It would be worth getting other people's opinions before deciding.

On the other hand fires and fire deaths are at an all time low. It's hard to square the circle sometimes.

Yes, but fire deaths are decreasing because of progress in community fire safety, smoke alarms, oven chips, gradual improvement in the housing stock, etc - all things within people's homes.  The problems we're looking at here are commercial buildings where there have always been relatively low numbers of fire deaths.  The degradation of standards you refer to kurnal is, without a doubt, real but it's difficult to judge how it may affect fire statistics in the future.  I think one thing is obvious - it's not going to help!

I think I shall post an extract from a newspaper article I came across a few years ago, hang on....

[Phoenix]

Some will know this article published after a bridge collapsed in Minneapolis in 2007 killing many people:

The Washington Post

Fallen bridge was from more confident era

The 40 year old bridge that collapsed in Minneapolis last week was built during an era when designers were confident that they knew enough about bridge strength and weight loads that they could build bridges lighter and cheaper.

But a number of bridge collapses have taught engineers painful lessonsabout the frailty of bridges and the punishment they take from heavy trucks, strong tides and even the errant barge that slams into bridge supports, according to engineers, bridge builders and academics.

The challenge, they say, is that many of the nation's 594,709 bridges were built during the 1950s and 1960s, an era when designers didn't fully understand the effects of metal fatigue or other challenges. Now many of those bridges are facing increased scrutiny.

"Maybe we out-thought ourselves for a little while," said Mal Kerley, chief engineer of Virginia, referring to post war bridge building when the interstate highway system was created.  "What has happened over time is that we learned things."

Sound familiar?

[Owain]

The problems we're looking at here are commercial buildings where there have always been relatively low numbers of fire deaths. 

Possibly because fire has an immediate impact on production and hence profits. Even in Victorian times they built 'fire-proof' mills, and it wasn't out of concern for the workers.

However, fire in a commercial building has the potential to affect a large number of people very quickly. Even with compartmentation there may be ~100 people or more in a compartment compared to ~5 in one dwelling in a high-rise.