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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: Messy on July 23, 2016, 05:09:10 PM
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I have come across a building with about 60/70 green break glass units throughout. These locked doors do not open on the actuation of the fire alarm, but do fail open in a power cut.
The RP has no PPM system in place to check the operation of the units, indeed he doesn't even know how many units there are or their exact locations
I have had a word with my old mate Mr Google, but there is precious little information in relation to the frequency or nature of the routine testing
So can anyone please tip me off where I should be looking or even what the test frequency should be?
Many thanks
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IMHO it's a bit of a judgement call on this one Messy. Strictly speaking 7273-4 does not apply as I see it because the locks are not connected to the fire alarm. Whether this is appropriate or not will be determined by the risk assessment but there was some guidance on this in Graham Shiels guide, now obsolete but never fully replaced. The fact is that if 7273-4 did apply the recommendation would be for a weekly test on the door release mechanisms throughout but the box would be treated as an alarm call point, once per year for all devices unless it was necessary to operate some more often due to the set up of alarm zones.
But in this case there will be no weekly test of the release mechanism as there is no link to the fire alarm. To me this, depending on the control set up, represents a higher risk of individual failure but may pose less risk of general failure. If there is centralised control then you may consider treating it as a fire alarm and testing all zones weekly. If it is individual devices operating independently the risk of failure is higher but the consequences may be lower. But this is my greatest concern- is it appropriate to the risk? Who uses it, what will they expect to happen, will they know they have to sound the alarm as well as operating the green BGU? Do the Public use the doors or trained staff? If you cannot test all door releases centrally then more frequent tests of each break unit may be justified but I don't think you will find any specific guidance on frequency.
Just my opinion, probably will be corrected by others, but there appears to be no specific guidance on this.
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"Graham Shiels guide"???
I don't think I am familiar with this document, do you have a copy that I could take a look at?
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IMHO it's a bit of a judgement call on this one Messy. Strictly speaking 7273-4 does not apply as I see it because the locks are not connected to the fire alarm. Whether this is appropriate or not will be determined by the risk assessment but there was some guidance on this in Graham Shiels guide, now obsolete but never fully replaced. The fact is that if 7273-4 did apply the recommendation would be for a weekly test on the door release mechanisms throughout but the box would be treated as an alarm call point, once per year for all devices unless it was necessary to operate some more often due to the set up of alarm zones.
But in this case there will be no weekly test of the release mechanism as there is no link to the fire alarm. To me this, depending on the control set up, represents a higher risk of individual failure but may pose less risk of general failure. If there is centralised control then you may consider treating it as a fire alarm and testing all zones weekly. If it is individual devices operating independently the risk of failure is higher but the consequences may be lower. But this is my greatest concern- is it appropriate to the risk? Who uses it, what will they expect to happen, will they know they have to sound the alarm as well as operating the green BGU? Do the Public use the doors or trained staff? If you cannot test all door releases centrally then more frequent tests of each break unit may be justified but I don't think you will find any specific guidance on frequency.
Just my opinion, probably will be corrected by others, but there appears to be no specific guidance on this.
Thanks for your commenst so far
Kurnal - There are around 60 individual break glass override units (nobody knows the true figure yet) within this building. Just a few are at final exits, however the majority are distributed throughout the premises.
The resp person involved is a low fire risk scientific & medical research establishment. There are high value (monetary and commercial sensitivity) goods, so the premises have various security layers throughout the premises, some staff having restricted access to parts.
There is no central control as these are stand alone units - I have been having a bit of a headache about this, but due to the nature of the business, and the fact that there are absolutely no public & visitors will be accompanied - I believe there is a justification not to link the units to the AFD
It would be very difficult and perhaps disproportionate to test all 60(ish) every week, as assuming a 2 minute test per device (including completing paperwork) and a 3 minute walk between units - that's 5 hours a week - and more if the results need entering on a database! So I am considering three options
A) Testing say 5 per week (at the same time as the fire alarm) which means they all get tested quarterly.
B) Assess the location of each unit and provide it with a high or low risk rating based on the numbers of staff expected to use that route, and the expected fire growth rate of the area they would be evacuating from. The higher risk units would attract a more frequent test than the lower risk units.
C) Test 15 or so per week (on the same day - so 1.5hrs work a week which still sounds a long time to me), so all units are tested monthly
Any comments???
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Are these magnetic units or electromechanical? If electromechanical do they require power to lock or power to unlock? There's more potential points of failure with electromechanical locks which might indicate more frequent testing than simple, pinless magnetic locks.
I guess FRA guidance would lead you towards a connection between the security system and the alarm, whilst recognising that there may be circumstances where this is inappropriate, for example high value, high societal risk and secure premises.
All in all I don't think you will go wrong with any decision you make messy, you are obviously obviously giving it a great deal of thought and in the absence of any specific guidance your risk assessment will be as valid as anybody else's judgement.
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Idlefire it was an early document published by IFE and CACFOA if I recall, it is now long obsolete but in common with so many older standards and guidance includes useful snippets of information omitted from current guidance. I will try and make time to scan it this week unless someone else already has a scanned copy?
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Idlefire it was an early document published by IFE and CACFOA if I recall, it is now long obsolete but in common with so many older standards and guidance includes useful snippets of information omitted from current guidance. I will try and make time to scan it this week unless someone else already has a scanned copy?
Thanks Kurnal, much appreciated.
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I guess FRA guidance would lead you towards a connection between the security system and the alarm, whilst recognising that there may be circumstances where this is inappropriate, for example high value, high societal risk and secure premises.
I agree Kurnal, both Article 40 guidance and Approved Document B prescribe linking electro-magnetic locking devices on the means of escape to release upon actuation of the fire alarm system, in which case testing would be to BS7273; although I am not sure without checking, if BS7273 actually includes a physical test of the green "break-glass box" override itself or merely the relay from the fire alarm system. If however a competent fire risk assessor is comfortable to operate outside the benchmark standards it is academic either way because, as you said in an earlier post, BS7273 relates to devices connected to the fire alarm system.
So, if there is no appropriate standard we are effectively left with device that is connected directly to the mains electrical supply which, if fitted correctly, interrupts the electrical supply to the locking device. Such devices do not appear to fall within the definition of a portable electrical device so, by default, must be part of the fixed electrical installation and therefore, would it not be included in the Fixed Installation Test?
Please do not accept this as a definitive answer, it is merely a train of thought that I would be exploring in a similar situation.
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Another way of looking at the units is what they are securing. If the door is along an escape corridor then a regular test would be required and probably these should be linked to the fire alarm system. However they are securing a door into a laboratory or room and it could possibly be left to the people using that particular room.
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"Graham Shiels guide"???
I don't think I am familiar with this document, do you have a copy that I could take a look at?
Hi idlefire you have / should have email on your registered email address s------6@aol.com
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Hi idlefire you have / should have email on your registered email address s------6@aol.com
Thanks Kurnal, much appreciated.
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Big Al why on earth do you think that a green BGU is not within the scope of BS 7273-4.
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I said why in my first response Colin. And my comments were specific to Messys scenario.
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Nope Big Al, still dont get it. Am I missing something.
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It's an old exit control system that was installed when bs7273-4 was still a figment of your imagination. There is no interface between the exit control system and the fire alarm system.
It appears that the fire risk assessment concludes that such an interface is not a requirement for the protection of relevant persons. This is catered for in the RRO guidance.
I can find no guidance in 7273-4 on the frequency of testing for green BGUs that are NOT part of an system connected to a fire alarm system.
Benchmark guidance is that ideally it should be connected but it would be an unusual BS that rendered entire systems obsolete and requiring replacement on publication, in an enforcement regime founded in risk assessment. As an example My ford Anglia still passes its MOT without seat belts.
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The BGUs do not appear to be there for fire purposes but for security - a power cut does not in itsself change this, so have to agree with Mr K
davo
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Big Al: where did you get the date of installation from. Cant see it in the posts. Why is it not an installation to which BS 7273-4 applies with a variation that there is no interface with the FAS. It is quite simple-if the BGUs are there as a safeguard for means of escape (which in the absence of an FAS interface would seem quite critical to me) why would you test them at any frequency different from BGUs that serve the same purpose (but are LESS critical) when there IS a link to the FAS.
Anyhow, this thread is going round in circles so treat the above question as rhetorical and no need to reply. Davey I am sure will sort it all himself without our help.
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Colin I agree with your view on frequency of testing and the proposal is clearly to test them more often than if the system was linked to the alarm - but the question is how much more often if they are all stand alone local systems each controlling a single door? Weekly ? Monthly? Quarterly? What would 7273-4 suggest if this was treated as a variation? I can't find anything to help with this scenario hence the reliance on a risk assessment.
I exchanged a pm with messy as I was interested in his query. I wrote a paper on this in 2006 when the RRO guidance was published as the advice within is contradictory and I had a similar problem in a warehouse in which thousands of pounds worth of stock was walking out of the building via the fire exits every week and there were well over 100 doors to consider. Came to a satisfactory solution there eventually involving technical upgrade and management in tandem.
Contrary to going round in circles your advice would be valued.
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Big Al, you are all making this unnecessarily complicated. They should be tested every week; this is not rocket science. I am sure that Davey has worked this out by now.
Stop message ends. Returning home station. Free for further banal imponderables.
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Please see my post above..........
Nowhere in the original post is there any mention that the BGUs are there as a Means of Escape.
However, have to agree with CT [uIF][/u] they are there as MoE
davo
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Are these break glasses essential for a final fire exit doors (fitted with a securing mag lock that fails safe to open under power loss) - I am working with a surveyor that states not but I am not convinced this this is so. If you need the break glass do you also need a standard push button door release?
Cheers,
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Colin thanks for your advice. Personally I would opt for a risk assessment approach rather than just adopting a weekly check for all units which may be onerous. As an example BS5839 -1 for a conventional zoned system does not require a call point on each zone to be tested. Anyway enough of this - thanks for your opinion.
Fire Monkey - all doors that are used as fire exits that are secured with an electronic lock require the green emergency door release but the standard push button door release is only needed on doors through which general access / egress is required.
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Thanks for the replies and comments
Firstly, the green box overrides are indeed to secure a means of escape where the primary door opening mechanism (push button or swipe card) has failed. None of the units are linked to the AFD.
The concern is that the actual door release mechanism is not being opened weekly as it would if remotely operated during a fire alarm test. But weekly testing of all doors would be onerous
I agree with Kurnal and am proposing that those in high traffic areas such as final exits (about 38 units in total) are tested weekly. The others would attract a monthly or even quarterly test, depending how critical they are or if an alternative MOE is possible. For example, where two doors are in easy line of sight (in some cases, directly adjacent), its unlikely both will become defective simultaneously so the frequency can be relaxed.
I am surprised that there isn't any guidance, but accept that the special application which has led to this set of circumstances is unusual
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So out of interest what (if any) would be an acceptable "engineered" solution to monitoring these mechanisms that would perhaps negate the physical testing or at least reduce it to the level of a 100% annual test?
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Please help me to understand 21.3.a of BS 7273-4 2015 requires manual release control(greenbox) to be tested annually and elsewhere the relay that controls the mag lock to be tested weekly so why is it being said the green box has to be tested weekly?
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Because ... (I think) .... in this case there is no link to the Fire Alarm System so a weekly test of a red MCP isn't going to release the doors via the relay.
So because the doors are "standalone" the only way to check them is to test each associated Green BGU ..... although technically there probably isn't a relay involved .... most likely the power to the release mechanism is switched through the Green BGU.
So if you followed the letter of 21.3a if there is no relay then there is no need for a weekly test .... you are required to test the mechanics of the locking device every six months under 21.2.7 ....... so ....... should there be a 100% test six monthly ???
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David - that is exactly the scenario
Thank you for your view in relation to relays and 6 monthly testing.
This makes my proposal for quarterly testing more onerous than required but not too onerous to be achievable by the business
Thanks
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Dave I am not going to respond further on this thread as the level of discussion has descended into insults and I don't want to get further embroiled but am happy to discuss the issues as I see them with you or other parties through personal messages or by phone. With regard to banal imponderables it's easy for those engaged mainly in the theory of fire risk assessment and writing standards to assume there's a perfect world out there where every problem has a code compliant solution and if you don't adopt it I will see you in court. To those practitioners out in the field every day finding issues and having to both identify suitable, sufficient pragmatic and cost effective solutions and negotiate these with often hostile management companies and budget holders it's far from banal. It does not help when the management company says "let's ask the fire service for their opinion" and some IO with minimal training and probably never heard of 7273-4 comes along, does not recognise what she / he sees and glibly says that's ok completely undermining your risk assessment.
In my view it's better to leave a place safer than you found it justified by your best evaluation of what is in place rather than simply recommend a code compliant solution only for no action to be taken.
Universities and their accommodation blocks are some of the worst in this regard as many security systems have been fitted retrospectively as the focus has moved to safeguarding issues.
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Absolutely K.
Doing "something" is always better than nothing !!
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Thanks David so the manufacturers recommend a six monthly test so this is where risk assessment is order of the day.
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Mickey is correct that the need for weekly testing comes from the fact that the weekly fire alarm test does not do the job. Let me have one last try.
See a green break glass is normally there in case the fire alarm interface fails. Probability very low (call it x where x is a very small fraction, like 1 in 100,000), consequences kind of pretty bad, especially if there are people who are not familiar with the normal means of egress control. If the fire alarm system fails you rely on the normal mushroom head push button (if present). It goes through an access control system commonly which is not designed as a life safety system (and I have personally known them to fail and had to deal with fall out), but probability y (y low but nothing like as low as x). So we have the green break glass. Probability of failure very low (a bit like x, but call it z).
In a fire alarm system, because z is low and the consequences of failure (someone has to use another call point to raise the alarm) may not be too awful, we live with annual testing.
In a conventional arrangement, for people to be trapped in a burning building, the probability is xyz, which is so low you can forget about it, particularly as the weekly fire alarm test means that the down time of the very low probability event is short.
Now look at Davey's wee building. If there is no fire alarm interface, probability of people being trapped is much greater, namely yz if you have the mushroom heads or just z if not. So for example, say x were 1 in 100,000, Davey's trapped people are more likely to die by a factor of 100,000 than people in conventional arrangement. If a door is even semi critical, why would you, as well as massively increasing the likelihood of failure, increase the down time for which it is allowed to exist. Microswitches do stick (though how I know this since all I do is sit at a desk and write standards I am not sure).
Cant see it myself but not sure I really care.
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One for Dave Rooney perhaps- do many call points use micro switches? I have taken a couple apart and they used large brass exposed contacts?
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Have to say all the ones I'm familiar with have a micro switch pushing against the plastic/glass element ........
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Thanks Dave that's an oops from me then- had a training kit for those clients who wanted alarm glass replacement training, used to match what they had as far as possible but in my box only the latest Gent resettable had a micro switch. Kit must have been way out of date!
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Ah Big Al , three wire circuits with call points switching 230V (which at the time we called 240V) onto mains sounders, and drop flag indicator CIE, were those not the days! It all went downhill with decimalisation, after which I could not longer buy broken biscuits from the local grocer for a penny.
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It's never been the same since Roy Orbison died ................ ;D
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He's dead?
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I'm crying, its over...
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Is there no more left in the bottle, Brian?
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you got it, Colin