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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: Fraudley on January 12, 2017, 07:28:46 PM
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hello ladies n gentlemen,
May i ask for your opinion regarding a situation i was made aware of today please?
It concerns the loft of a leasehold property. The loft is above 2 separate flats. Whilst both flats have loft hatches they are not permitted to access the loft for any reason or use it for storage. The separation between the flats and the loft is not something I have seen in housing as it comprises of boarding and 2 inches of silver sand. The Warden call system was installed in the loft. A risk assessor has asked for the loft to be properly divided above the flats partition. I understand he is thinking about fire spread but I cannot see why the RP would go along with this suggestion. I would have thought once it's confirmed the separation is in no way compromised, possibly installing additional detection or relocate the warden call system, there's no rational need to even consider the RA's suggested action. I'm still waiting for the assessor to explain their reasoning behind their request. Am i missing something glaringly obvious here?
Thanks in advance.
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You maybe missing something if the walls to the flats do not extend to the underside of the roof (I assume you are on the top floor). Do you know the fire resistance level of the flat ceilings and does the loft void extend over both flats and/or the access corridor?
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Benchmark standards would provide for full compartmentation to the roof. However many buildings converted to flats fall short in this regard. It might have been that the silver sand and boarding were accepted as an alternate, horizontal form of compartmentation between flats but you are unlikely to find any evidence of approval. During the housing boom of the early 80s foamed perlite cement was widely used in this way but personally I have never encountered solutions involving sand.
The assessor is pointing out the shortcoming, the solution may not be straightforward. Compromise may have to be made, for example providing a barrier with less than the requisite fire resistance. I would base my recommendation on the risk assessment taking into account : how high; how many flats; other variations from best practice ; building construction, protection to MOE etc.
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The sand might be there for sound insulation (its called pugging , I think).
There was a fatal fire in a sheltered block where the lofts were undivided (in the last couple of years). I understand the arguments against separating the lofts, but I would do it.
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Are you sure the sand isn't vermiculite for heat insulation ??
Sand would be very heavy to support on a layer of plasterboard .........
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Thanks all,
William as far as I know the whole loft is open, so above the flats and the landing between them.
Brian, was that related to the poor compartmentation?
David/Brian No idea about the actual sand. I've only know what I've been told. I agree I'm not comfortable with the concept and I'm surprised it is there to act as a fire barrier.
My initial thoughts were to ensure the integrity of the ceiling which will probably mean removing the current barrier and replacing it. Whatever it takes to ensure there is 60min protection. Other thoughts are to ensure that there is a full evac policy in place. AFD in loft linked to escape route. Investigate if an AOV is feasible.
The cost of the proposed sub division is going to run close to 8k. I suppose I'm trying to see if it can be sensibly risk assessed/managed out without compromising safety.
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yes the death was linked to fire spread through a loft.
Google "sand pugging" listen to uncle Brian - he's a reformed builder.
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Before spending too much in the loft it would be wise to check the construction of the walls below, I have come across many a conversion with lath and plaster walls where you would expect masonry. There are also fire curtains available with full integrity and insulation, these can be much cheaper / easier to install than a stud wall.
There are so many substandard buildings and it is often not practicable to bring them up to current standards, if you want your hair to stand on end go and have a look at some of the tenement blocks in Scotland where 6 storeys are commonplace and not a fire door in sight. Yes there's the occasional fire death but numbers are socially acceptable.
Consider the level of risk, should we be spending a relative fortune on small premises when for example we have tower blocks in which the compartmentation has been ripped apart - remember the recent BBC coverage of a fire in a tumble drier in London that clearly spread vertically and horizontally and led to a full evacuation of the upper levels....but London fire brigade only commented on the risk caused by the tumble dryer.
The other alternative approach if nothing else will work may be full evacuation and alarm system. Don't just hug the code - risk assessment should be the order of the day. Does the housing officer have a view on this?
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Thanks all,
William as far as I know the whole loft is open, so above the flats and the landing between them.
Brian, was that related to the poor compartmentation?
David/Brian No idea about the actual sand. I've only know what I've been told. I agree I'm not comfortable with the concept and I'm surprised it is there to act as a fire barrier.
My initial thoughts were to ensure the integrity of the ceiling which will probably mean removing the current barrier and replacing it. Whatever it takes to ensure there is 60min protection. Other thoughts are to ensure that there is a full evac policy in place. AFD in loft linked to escape route. Investigate if an AOV is feasible.
The cost of the proposed sub division is going to run close to 8k. I suppose I'm trying to see if it can be sensibly risk assessed/managed out without compromising safety.
I don't think what you are proposing would be adequate then in this case, if you see diagram 33 para 9.2 of ADB, the walls of the flats should extend to roof height, if so then the ceilings in the flats do not have to have any fire resistance, so your investigations into the FR level would not be required. By extending the flat walls to roof height you would prevent fire spreading from one flat to another within the void. This method also protects the roof space from a fire originating in the roof void or from a fire externally or from a flat window where a fire has vented and gone into the roof space.
So your suggestion to upgrade the flat ceilings to 60mins FR would not be enough and would not be the same standard as detailed in ADB, although building control and Approved Inspectors are passing the provision of cavity barriers and 60min ceilings as an equivalent standard and arguing would meet the functional requirements of ADB.
Also the DRAFT Speslized Housing Guide spesifically refers to this point, I stress this is a draft and it maybe removed from the final version but I doubt it will. See below.
76.4 The lines of compartmentation between flats located on the top floor of a building should, where there is a common roof void above, extend through the roof void in a continuous vertical plane to the underside of the roof. This will ensure that the fire-resisting ?box? principle, extends into the common roof voids, to prevent fire spread between flats, and fire spread from a flat into other areas of the building, via the common roof void. It is not appropriate to complete the line of compartmentation within roof voids by installing cavity barriers above the compartment walls that separate flats, nor to treat the roof void simply as a concealed space within which cavity barriers are installed at regular intervals.
76.5 The provision of fire-resisting ceilings within top floor flats would not normally provide an alternative means of achieving an equivalent standard of safety, as it would fail, for example, to address the possibility of a fire that starts within the roof void or that enters the roof void externally.
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William this is an existing building so why are we seeking to apply ADB? From the information given I believe this to be flats so the LGA flats guide would apply (not that it would make much difference to the guidance)
The OP has not given us enough information to argue this further in specific terms, we don't know the height, size, number of flats, age of the building, design standards used etc.
All I know is the UK economy could not stand the cost of bringing all buildings up to current standards, let alone trying to make existing buildings fit the current Building Regulations even though no material alterations are being carried out. Housing associations and landlords would be bankrupted. And how many lives would be saved each year? Maybe one or two? That's why the legislation was based on risk assessment. it's a great tool, why are we afraid to use it?
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William this is an existing building so why are we seeking to apply ADB? From the information given I believe this to be flats so the LGA flats guide would apply (not that it would make much difference to the guidance)
The OP has not given us enough information to argue this further in specific terms, we don't know the height, size, number of flats, age of the building, design standards used etc.
All I know is the UK economy could not stand the cost of bringing all buildings up to current standards, let alone trying to make existing buildings fit the current Building Regulations even though no material alterations are being carried out. Housing associations and landlords would be bankrupted. That's why the legislation was based on risk assessment. it's a great tool, why are we afraid to use it?
It's about bench marking Kurnal not making it comply with ADB. I have seen buildings built only last year with the same "latent defect" as AI's and building control are passing them. I would argue that the current situation as detailed by the OP is so far removed from today's standards that action would be justified. (granted we don't know the full details)
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Big Al, the guy talks about warden call so it does not sound like general needs flats. Wullie is right, as is Wee B. And on a point of accuracy few if any fire curtains have insulation to BS 476-22. ?8k is peanuts compared to the risk of unlimited fire spread over sheltered housing flats.
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Colin again we don't have enough information from the OP to know the basic details of the building, the role of the warden call system or the fire strategy for the building.
Curtains are available with up to 2 hours insulation. I have commissioned their installation in the past.
My point is general, how far risk assessment has a role and how much prescription holds sway - prescription seems to be the dominant approach. I remain interested in the reason for this. I have a number of suggestions but am interested in the views of others.
William I agree we need benchmarks but IMO they should be taken into account in the risk assessment to arrive at a solution that is safe, practicable, reasonable and proportionate.
I used to work for housing associations and councils, we did hundreds of risk assessments and if I had gone in and applied ADB without risk assessment and proportionality we could have cost them more than their total budget several times over.
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Big Al, the guy talks about warden call so it does not sound like general needs flats. Wullie is right, as is Wee B. And on a point of accuracy few if any fire curtains have insulation to BS 476-22. ?8k is peanuts compared to the risk of unlimited fire spread over sheltered housing flats.
Claims to be certified to BS 476-22
http://static.rockwool.com/globalassets/rockwool-uk/downloads/datasheets/fire-protection/rockwool---fire-barrier-systems-ds-v2.pdf (http://static.rockwool.com/globalassets/rockwool-uk/downloads/datasheets/fire-protection/rockwool---fire-barrier-systems-ds-v2.pdf)
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the guy talks about warden call so it does not sound like general needs flats.
If only there was a some kind of recognised guidance document which explicitly covered specialized housing that could be used as a benchmark standard to answer this question. ;)
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Thanks again chaps.
It's a leasehold property. 3 floors I believe. Kurnal I agree. I grew up in a street where I could go in my loft and come down in a neighbours 20 houses away. Tell local authorities to comply with todays regs... its simply not feasible. I wont get on my soapbox about guides and codes just yet but i'm in the business of looking at a building and asking IF a fire will happen, what will happen. Too many people look at a building and imagine WHEN the fire happens. I believe if the roof is 1 hour, the walls are as should be, no resident in the block is vulnerable, escape routes are protected and there is AFD in the flats, I would be comfortable with a fire curtain. I haven't seen the equipment involved but possibly also relocating the warden call. If a fire should break out in one flat, by the time it could affect others we would expect them to be out of the building and the fire brigade to already be on scene wouldn't we?
on another matter..
"76.4 The lines of compartmentation between flats located on the top floor of a building should, where there is a common roof void above, extend through the roof void in a continuous vertical plane to the underside of the roof. This will ensure that the fire-resisting ?box? principle, extends into the common roof voids, to prevent fire spread between flats, and fire spread from a flat into other areas of the building, via the common roof void. It is not appropriate to complete the line of compartmentation within roof voids by installing cavity barriers above the compartment walls that separate flats"
Why not?
Is this guide stating that cavity barriers are ineffective? Is that a proven fact now? Or is this guidance for planned builds. My point being as with all guides out there it doesn't say... "But if this is already in place... do X,Y and Z to compensate." Or am I being too practical here?
Idlefire - Not until a document is written by people who actually manage specialised housing will there be one that can be completely relied upon. Landlord contributing to guides is not enough because the right questions and existing scenarios, that landlords have to battle against are not included or properly discussed. OK slooowly sliding my soapbox back under the bed.... :)
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Idlefire - Not until a document is written by people who actually manage specialised housing will there be one that can be completely relied upon. Landlord contributing to guides is not enough because the right questions and existing scenarios, that landlords have to battle against are not included or properly discussed. OK slooowly sliding my soapbox back under the bed.... :)
I attended the roadshow in Manchester, my personal opinion as an ex-inspecting officer and now managing the fire risks in a large housing association is that the the process was open and transparent.
There did seem a genuine interest in seeking the views of stakeholders. A lot was discussed and a number of time the quote of "We haven't considered that and will look to add something" was made.
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It's a leasehold property. 3 floors I believe. Kurnal I agree. I grew up in a street where I could go in my loft and come down in a neighbours 20 houses away. I assume you are talking about a terraced street? Not the same.
Tell local authorities to comply with todays regs... its simply not feasible. I wont get on my soapbox about guides and codes just yet but i'm in the business of looking at a building and asking IF a fire will happen, what will happen. Too many people look at a building and imagine WHEN the fire happens. I believe if the roof is 1 hour, the walls are as should be, no resident in the block is vulnerable, escape routes are protected and there is AFD in the flats, I would be comfortable with a fire curtain. I haven't seen the equipment involved but possibly also relocating the warden call. If a fire should break out in one flat, by the time it could affect others we would expect them to be out of the building and the fire brigade to already be on scene wouldn't we? What if the fire starts in an empty flat and breaks through the limited FR ceiling?
on another matter..
Is this guide stating that cavity barriers are ineffective? Is that a proven fact now? Yes evidenced in some recent fires, once in place, difficult to check and keep maintained in the original state as intended, power cables, sky installations, contractor work, etc over the years
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Big Al. It was confusion in terminology. I thought you were talking about drop curtains, which, on reflection, you were not. I agree that, obviously, products like mineral wool fire barrier can give insulation with enough layers, but it is open to the abuse cited by Wullie.
But a cavity barrier is not a compartment wall. And I do not believe that a 60 minute ceiling and slinging cavity barriers at some undefined spacing would satisfy the Building Regs. In existing buildings, where this arrangement exists, some form of fire resisting barrier needs to be installed in line with the walls of each flat. The fact that it does not already exist in some properties does not make it acceptable. Flames emanating from windows and entering the roof void, or a fire that starts in the roof void, are not addressed by a 60 minute ceiling in the flats. As Wullie points out, this is not just hypothetical.
It is a little arrogant to suggest that only landlords are competent to write guidance on fire safety in their properties. If landlords managed fire safety properly, there would no need for guidance. Maybe we should only allow Marks and Spencer to write fire safety guidance for shops. You should see the totally conflicting views we are receiving on some issues from the property sector
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William. Not sure why you say terraced street is not the same, I'd be interested to know why (not saying you are wrong, merely curious).
When you say what if re the limited ceiling, if it's reconstructed for 60min FR then cant we all go down a list of what ifs forever and a day? If we are talking about saving life here i'm not sure what point you are making. Again, treading carefully I'm just interested... call it learning if you will.
Lastly, your point about barriers you are saying difficult to manage. If a property if risk assessed every 3 years, contractor works are checked when complete, aren't you again stating a potential, not a fact?
And I also agree regarding the potential for fir to enter the flat from an external point. But the property will have AFD and it can be upgraded.
Dave, that's good to hear. Will the document be something housing managers can pick up and make decisions with? That is the test.
Colin I totally agree it does not make it acceptable if the standard is not to what we would all expect, my point being, no one is telling anyone that they must identify shortcomings in all existing buildings and put it right.
and believe me when I say I am well aware of your work Colin and have the utmost respect for you. I wasn't referring to landlords writing guidance. I was referring to fire safety professionals that are responsible for, and who work in housing day to day. Customer facing. Working alongside housing and estate managers. How often is clear corridor debated in this forum. We know it makes sense. Fire authorities know it makes sense. But when you are faced with residents who are genuinely distressed by a clear corridor policy, that wasn't in place when they moved in whenever that may be, no guidance provides solutions to this. I'll give you an example to make my point. You cannot have a chair mid point on a stairwell for all obvious reasons. I'm the only person I know that has suggested to one client to install effectively a drop down shower chair. People that cant manage a flight of stairs in one go, people living in flats with no room to swing a cat let alone store a mobility walking frame so they put them in the corridor. I know one housing provider that has a clear corridor policy, yet a particular FA has allowed their residents in one location to store their scooters in side at the bottom of a stairwell, with no alternative MOE for the residents in the upper flats.
What I'm saying, is housing providers need to find solutions to these issues, and they have. But what will be agreeable with one fire authority wont necessarily be OK with another. And that's where guidance can help.
Slightly off point regarding my original post though. As is typical with fire safety, we will not all agree. I'm merely trying to see if the issue could be resolved without thinking the very worst is definitely going to happen regardless.
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William. Not sure why you say terraced street is not the same, I'd be interested to know why (not saying you are wrong, merely curious).
When you say what if re the limited ceiling, if it's reconstructed for 60min FR then cant we all go down a list of what ifs forever and a day? If we are talking about saving life here i'm not sure what point you are making. Again, treading carefully I'm just interested... call it learning if you will.
Lastly, your point about barriers you are saying difficult to manage. If a property if risk assessed every 3 years, contractor works are checked when complete, aren't you again stating a potential, not a fact?
And I also agree regarding the potential for fir to enter the flat from an external point. But the property will have AFD and it can be upgraded.
Firstly, this is nothing new and has been part of building regs for a while now, also note BS 9991:2015 Section 19.1.1 "It is important to continue any compartment wall up through a ceiling or roof cavity to maintain the standard of fire resistance, therefore compartment walls should be carried up full storey height to a compartment floor or to the roof as appropriate. It is therefore not appropriate to complete a line of
compartmentation by fitting cavity barriers above the compartment wall"
Diagram 24 following 19.1.1 indicates where cavity barriers may be used in tandem with compartment walls within a roof void.
Re your other points without sounding arrogant and trying to genuinely help with your question, I think it comes down to practical experience and application of the subject. Common roof voids in terraced housing is quite common and I have fought fires in such circumstances where the fire has spread across most of the roof, usually people evacuate safety in these circumstances.
You seem to be describing sheltered or general needs flats where usually a "stay put" policy would be accepted. I wouldn't be comfortable with a 60min ceiling in the top floor flats and an unseparated roof void above that relies on cavity barriers and a 60min FR ceiling. As detailed above this simply does not meet building regs standards.
Additional AFD would not solve it (as I assume you mean in the loft), as if this detection operates what will be the cause and effect? i.e. how do residents know when to evacuate or stay put? The only AFD normally installed would be a Part 6 system in the flats (if general needs) and a Part 1 system in the common areas if sheltered.
Re the cavity barriers I have had practical experience of a fire in a tower block, starting on an external balcony, spreading to the roof void where cavity barriers were originally fitted instead of extending the flat walls to the underside of the roof. The fire destroyed 2 flats and a large section of the roof and lift motor room. On inspection after the fire it was evident that cavity barriers were in place but had never been checked, which was only part of the problem. Once the fire gets into the void the flats to the ceilings would have NO fire resistance as this is not tested in a downwards direction. By that I mean the 60min ceiling will only give you 60 mins if the fire originates from within the flat.
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Wullie, how very well said. You are definitely getting the hang on this fire safety stuff, despite having been a fire officer.
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Cavity barriers aren't typically as robust as compartment walls; they are usually hung from the roof construction and if (when) the roof collapses on the fire side you're pretty much guaranteed that they'll be brought down with it.
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Wullie, how very well said. You are definitely getting the hang on this fire safety stuff, despite having been a fire officer.
::) ;D
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That's true Fishy but at that stage, even in flats with a stay put policy, is it a life safety or property protection issue?
I understand this to be a 3 storey flats conversion with 2 flats per floor. Please correct me if I am wrong.
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I am not a doctor, though I did study vet medicine for a while, but it would seem to me that having a roof bounce off your head would tend to be detrimental to health, not to mention the difficulty for fire-fighters to search a flat that is full of roof.
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Thanks everyone for your input on this matter I am very grateful. Totally agree with all the points made and want to thank you for your contributions.
:)
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Pardon my Ignorance but if the roof void is only accessible for maintenance purposes then is it a common area? and if it's not a common area then what has it got to do with the fire risk assessment ? Please remember the only stupid question is one you don't ask ::)
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It might be a common area. It all turns on the meaning of the phrase "used in common".
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It might be a common area. It all turns on the meaning of the phrase "used in common".
Does it really matter if it is a "common" area by any definition or not?
Surely the fact that it is a "place" to which the Order does not apply by virtue of Article 6 is the relevant point.
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Is this guide stating that cavity barriers are ineffective? Is that a proven fact now?
Cavity barriers are fine... at being cavity barriers, but not as being compartment boundaries. They don't typically provide the same fire resistance as you would have for the compartment wall (they only require E 30 / EI 15). They are usually less robust than walls, and are very often hung from the roof construction (rather than being self-supporting) and may be prone to being brought down if there is any collapse of structure on the 'fire' side.
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Funny old world isn't it. Here we are on this thread wringing our hands over roof compartmentation between two top floor flats in a 3 storey block of six flats whilst elsewhere in another thread we are encouraging stay put in a much larger block in which all flats are open to the stairs?
For the record in my earlier posting I was careful to state that I was referring to mineral wool barriers that can give the necessary insulation though I accept have the weaknesses you describe.
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Why is the void not a place to which the Order refers.
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Funny old world isn't it. Here we are on this thread wringing our hands over roof compartmentation between two top floor flats in a 3 storey block of six flats whilst elsewhere in another thread we are encouraging stay put in a much larger block in which all flats are open to the stairs?
I don't think that is a fair comparison in terms of the risk Mr K?
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Just my opinion William based on the number of persons potentially at risk and the likelihood of them coming to serious harm in such a small building.