Green break glass door release boxes

[Rocha]

I have been to three sites recently in Leeds, all of which have benn constructed within the last 18 months and therefore subject to current building regs and fire service approval.

I have noted a lack of green break glass door release boxes adjacent to exits (locked by electromagnetic locks) from basment car park levels back into the escape stairs of the building.  However all doors have been linked to the fire alarm system and fail safe upon power fialure.
I presume this is for security reasons to prevent unauthorised persons from gaining access to the building, although in conflict with current building regs (ADB).

I would welcome any comments.

Thanks

[Pip]

if you enter 'green boxes' into the search option,you will find half a dozen or so interesting threads on this subject.
If these stairs are required as M.O.E. from the carpark,what happens if there is a fault in the alarm panel,and it doesn't send the signal to the electronic locks?This is my understanding on why the 'green boxes' are required,because they are directly linked to the locks and thus open them on operation.The security issue should be addressed another way,not by potentially putting lives at risk.

[Tall Paul]

I have raised a similar comment with my colleagues.  The non-provision of the green box means that the door is reliant on a combination of two systems operating correctly, or even failing correctly, rather than just one.

[saddlers]

if you enter 'green boxes' into the search option,you will find half a dozen or so interesting threads on this subject.
If these stairs are required as M.O.E. from the carpark,what happens if there is a fault in the alarm panel,and it doesn't send the signal to the electronic locks?This is my understanding on why the 'green boxes' are required,because they are directly linked to the locks and thus open them on operation.The security issue should be addressed another way,not by potentially putting lives at risk.

I think a lot also depends on the extent of the fire alarm system. If you are waiting at that door for someone else to activate the fire alarm via a call point or waiting for a detector to activate, it could be a very nervous wait, and I would suggest that many people would immediately move away trying to find an alternative.

I have seen call points positioned by the door instead of a green break glass, and whilst this does not directly advertise the fact that the security can be overridden, it does ensure that the door will be available to the first person approaching if the alarm has not already been activated.

I think it is not so much the fact that the route could be affected by a fault from a panel, because virtually every piece of fire safety equipment could fail but assessing the likelihood of it occurring (I have a limited knowledge on the internal workings of fire alarm systems, and would be interested to hear what others think is the likelihood of this failure occuring, because it would certainly change the way I view the situation).

If there is a substantial chance that the failure could occur, well I would question whether the panel should really be in operation anyway? A panic bar or self closer could fail at the moment they are required, but the risk is surely minimal.

[Pip]

I have no electrical knowledge on how these things work,but I was under the impression that a 'red' box would simply send back a message to the alarm panel,which in turn would send a message back to the electronic lock to open it.Fine until there is a fault in the system required to carry out that functionThe green box,being directly linked to the electronic lock,cuts the power supply and releases the lock.It is included in the reccommendations of the Graham Shiel/IFE document on 'Guidance on the acceptance of Electronic locks to doors required for M.O.E.'.This is the benchmark standard used in my area.I agree that statistically chances of a failure on a decent maintained system may be low,but possibly not low enough-but throw in the fact that there are many systems not so well maintained(look at the number of false alarms-ok it is a different 'fault' but shows lack of management control).
A  green box 'fail safe' method seems to be the 'standard required'  by brigades(at least in my area),so unless there is a better argument that they will buy,I will continue to reccommend them.

[Wiz]

The only reason that the automatic locks have been installed on the doors is obviously to stop the 'scum' members of our society pi**ing, shi**ing, fornicating or hiding in wait on the staircases to mug or rape others.
If green call points were to be installed then the 'scum' would use these to overide the automatic system to carry out their deeds in the escape staircases.
If the automatic door lock system is tested and maintained regularly and properly then the chances that it doesn't work at the same time as the exceptional circumstances that I would need to use the escape door, is really slim.
I would rather do without the small additional margin of safety provided by the green BGU's than run the risk, during normal times, of being attacked by 'scum' hiding in the staircases or to have to use them in an emergency only to slip over and crack my head after treading into a pile of human excrement!
There is a time and place for Green BGU's and this is not it!!!!!

[Rocha]

Thanks for your posts.

It seems to be the case that fire authorities are happy with electromagentic locks on fire exit doors in such cases, as long as two of the three (fail safe on power failure, fire alarm or green box BGU's) are provided.

This tends to be the approach I work off, although of course this does not work for some situations.

[bolt]

Thats how i view it too. A red box ie fire callpoint is red becuase it indicates that when activated it will raise the fire alarm. A green box means emergency access through doors which are normally security locked. In the interest of very high security a green KAC callpoint is not exactly secure means someone only needs a KAC test key to pass through secure areas. I know becuase this how i often used to move about these buildings testing the alarms.    

This maybe electronic or key inside to overide the door lock. However, as i explained on another thread about using sounder and aux relays these outputs are not just designated to running sounders but they control a dozen other fire safety systems and i know many places where the doors are controlled by the FAP. The reason is quite straight forward. In older buildings the use of door control systems are added at later dates on a purely locallised basis usually the simple swipe card system and a method must be in place for over riding that system in event of alarm thus the green box. However the new building you described the security doors are centrally controlled and monitored throughout the building in which case they only have to be centrally released in alarm condition and must release on power failure if it can be demonstrated it works as expected. Of course it could fail but then so can the FAP, detectors and a host of other things. Interested parties must have agreed to this.

[Tom Sutton]

Could the green boxes be configured so if they are actuated then this trips the burglar or some other alarm so the management is aware of the situation?

[bolt]

Yes it could class 6 security use EOL's too so activating a green KAC could be set to indicate a zone fault on the door security but is it 24 hour monitored by security staff? Might not be much use in unmonitored locations. Have to be careful though that the fire alarm remain just that and is no way compromised. I wont say where but i know one very well known place that actually drop the tamper EOL to  callpoint next to a fire door when the fire door is opened becuase the public would leave this door open creating a major security problem. But the FAP is in a 24 hour monitored control room so they despatch a security bloke to go and check the fire doors if the FAP starts beeping. So long as the door is shut the tamper EOL fault is cleared. They are treading on thin ground here as this is a security issue but it works.

[val]

With respect to Rocha, who simply asks for advice... how many more times are we going to disappear up our own backsides with arguments involving slivers of technical detail?
ADB, the government RRO guides, the CFOA/IFE/Graham Sheil paper and the most recent BSI written by Colin Todd Associates all recomend green boxes in most situations. Because some daft FRA has been persuaded, (or more probably not looked at them), by an approved inspector looking to cut costs, that green boxes are an unnecessary luxury doesn't make their omission right.
Employ an eastern european security guard (can one be racist against such a diverse ethnic grouping?) to watch the CCTV rather than compromising fire escape.
Wiz, Remember the trade said these devices were 'absolutely fail safe' for several years before they were forced to admit that well. actually, they weren't! Fills one with confidence.
With the increasing use of these exit control, and more worryingly, entry control devices from multiply occupied premises, I believe we are looking at a large number of fatalities in the future. These devices are being used for the conveinience of managers rather than addressing any real and pressing security issues.

[Wiz]

With respect to Rocha, who simply asks for advice... how many more times are we going to disappear up our own backsides with arguments involving slivers of technical detail?
ADB, the government RRO guides, the CFOA/IFE/Graham Sheil paper and the most recent BSI written by Colin Todd Associates all recomend green boxes in most situations. Because some daft FRA has been persuaded, (or more probably not looked at them), by an approved inspector looking to cut costs, that green boxes are an unnecessary luxury doesn't make their omission right.
Employ an eastern european security guard (can one be racist against such a diverse ethnic grouping?) to watch the CCTV rather than compromising fire escape.
Wiz, Remember the trade said these devices were 'absolutely fail safe' for several years before they were forced to admit that well. actually, they weren't! Fills one with confidence.
With the increasing use of these exit control, and more worryingly, entry control devices from multiply occupied premises, I believe we are looking at a large number of fatalities in the future. These devices are being used for the conveinience of managers rather than addressing any real and pressing security issues.

Val,
Nothing can be made totally failure-proof! Just show me any proposal that purports to be and I will 'pick holes' in it with a dozen 'what ifs'. I understand that the latest requirements are that green BGU's must be double pole operation because on one site the cables shorted on a metal door frame and the green BGU failed to operate. Wiring double pole surely doesn't defintely prevent this happening again - I agree it reduces the liklihood (probably by half) - but does it make it failure proof? No! It is obvious that the mangement of this building are not cutting costs or just doing something that is convenient for them. They have had to pay out for fitting automatic releasing locks on these doors when they shouldn't have to and the cost of a few green BGU's adds a minimal cost to the project. They have had to do it because people are using the staircases who shouldn't be. Adding the green BGU's negates the purpose of fitting the locks in the first place and their omission, in my opinion, only increases the liklihood of the system failing to operate as it is meant to do by a small degree.
In real terms it would probably be best that these doors did not have any locking system on them at all, and with just some sort of alarm system if the doors are opened. But if no-one can 'police' any of the alarms then they would be useless.
I suggest that before we suffer any fatalities due to the failure of not including green BGU's on this project, thousands will die in road accidents. We could avoid all of these road deaths by banning cars, but we don't because it is not practical to do so. Fitting Green BGUs in some circumstances is equally not practical.

[val]

Wiz,
Thank you for your polite reply, my post was late and after a couple of large whiskeys!

The problem that the average FSO has is that they are not electrical engineers and therefore had to rely on what the trade was telling them about 'fail-safe.' Having finally applied sufficient grey matter, I now realise that this was not the case because the relays required to unlock the devices are generally maintained in an unenergised state. Loss of power does not always cause the devices to fail-safe. I personally was told on scores of occasions. "What's your problem? If all else breaks, they will 'fail-safe". At least allow me a degree of doubt. Should I now retrospectively revisit all those schemes and get them altered?

This confirms, the admittedly conservative approach, that belt and braces often is the safest way forward.

My real concern is that the 'sexy engineered and managed' approach is OK on paper but fails to take account of human nature a few years down the line or build in a degree of redundancy. The approach all too often seems to be, "we'll build it, maximising efficency and financial return, (single stair 40 storey buildings?) and then throw some clever stuff at it to make it appear safe."
The green box argument is just one example of how the design is not really fit for the purpose, (i.e. there are big security problems), but we can make it work if we chuck some gizmos at it and then cut a few corners.

Your reference to 'scum' members of society is the same argument that the government is using to systematically remove our rights as citizens. Attach a 'terrorist' label and we can get away with anything!

Regarding your road death analogy, see what happens to the law when a dozen people get locked into a single staircase (because of the entry control devices which are not fail safe), which is then compromised by smoke. We accept risk from cars and say, alcohol consumption because of the substantial benefits. Stopping someone peeing in the straircase, something that is entirely foreseeable at design stage, by compromising fire safety...isn't.

[Tall Paul]

Wiz, I may be missing the point, but for the most part in multi-occupied buildings the green boxes are on the occupier's side of the door to allow them to access the stairway in the event of an emergency.  Where they are sited alongside final exit doors they are again on the occupier's side.  How does this allow your "scum" to use them to over-ride the system?

[Wiz]

Val,

Some good points and well made.

However, I would confirm, that in my opinion you can't make anything failure-proof. No matter how many of the stages you make 'maintained' so they should fail-safe. There will always have to be something that needs to 'turn on' to tell the rest to 'turn off'. All we can do is to make sure all stages are reliable as possible. However, at the end of the day, there has to be a point where we accept the risk is acceptable against the cost and aggravation of reducing it a small notch lower.

I've now decided this forum is not the right place for me to argue the reasons for there being so many ills in society but I maintain that we wouldn't even be having this discussion if the emergency staircases were only used for the purpose they were provided!