Break-glass door locks

[Ken Taylor]

At a recent visit to one of our schools, a fire engineer has said that the security type door locks (whereby one has to break a small glass pane with an attached hammer before operating a small lever) do not meet current standards and that they should be replaced by padlocked sprung bolts with break-glass tubes. In support of this, they were informed that both Surrey and Hampshire Fire Authorities are now requiring removal of this type of security lock. Whilst I can appreciate that two actions are required with the existing locks as opposed to one with the bolts, I have also seen a number of accidentally broken glass bolts with immediate loss of security - whereas the present type seem to remain intact. Could anyone give me their opinion on the necessity or desirability of this change? These are not final exit doors but are on alternative escape routes in lesser-frequented areas (eg locker rooms).

[AnthonyB]

What current standards? It's an existing door in existing premises with no changes.

Is he on commision for Redlam or Ashworth (whose bolts you describe)?

There is little between the type of fastening, in fact, even in premises where the public are not present I have seen the Redlam/Ashworth bolts cause problems as the anti-tamper padlock that secures the tube is often seen first by people who instantly think it's locked and either turn back against the exit flow or bunch up in a crush/panic scenerio.

Upgrading either lock (internal or Redlam) to a panic device if indicated by assessment fair enough, but changing one for the other, no. Plus Redlam devices are as you say often broken and the door unfastened, or an unsuitable replacement subsituted for the tube as no-one seems to keep spare ceramtubes on the premises.

How can the FA require a change in buildings where no changes to the premises are being carried out & the risk isn't changed.

If they were key in glass fronted boxes then absolutely, but they are not, they are a fastening tht is easily and simply usable without resort to a key.

Leave the fastenings as they are, sign them well, train staff. If the FA really want them changed they'll issue a notice (not a goodwill letter).

Choose your fastenings on actual risks present, don't waste money that can be used elsewhere to improve safety

[Firewolf]

yes this is something a fire engineer tried to tell us as well.

Ignore it as the previous poster said. Its rubbish.

It would be good to know who these so called fire engineers are - we should have a list of rogue fire engineers I think - the tyoe that are either imcopetent or rip off merchants!!

Sorry I shall calm down a little now!

[Chris Houston]

Would it not all depend on the fire safety risk assessment recommendations/conclusions?

[AnthonyB]

Yes, but it's hardly an improvement, just a sideways move. As I said internal latch to panic device if indicated fine.

But there is hardly any logic to this and besides he refers to standards rather than an assessment of risk (& starts to sound like certain companies extinguisher sales reps...)

[Ken Taylor]

You are all echoing my instinctive thoughts and it's notable that the manual operation of the doors on London Underground trains also rely upon this '2 stage' 'break the glass and operate the lever' arrangement. It was just the assertion that two fire authorities were getting people to replace them that made me think that I had better run this past you people. Does anyone know whether Hampshire and Surrey are really taking this line?

[AnthonyB]

The official internal policy on fastenings for Hampshire FSO's is here:

http://www.hantsfire.gov.uk/manage/serviceorders/6-49.html

They are not banned, but like any fastening subject to an assessment of the situation

[Ken Taylor]

Thanks for the Hampshire link Anthony.

So, unsurprisingly, the Fire Engineer's reference to their position on the school's devices is not supported by their documentation.

It's interesting that, whilst the 'single action' principle is applied to levers and pads, the other devices described (and said to require consideration on their own merits) include some requiring two actions - and sound just like those at the school.

[messy]

I notice on the Hampshire document, that Redlam bolts are not permitted for exits in food preparation areas.

Is this a hygiene, rather than fire safety matter or am I missing something here??

[AnthonyB]

I would certainly say that hygiene could be an issue, as a broken Ceramtube or the cleaper plain glass tube would lead to a risk of contamination from ceramic or glass shards.

But I would have thought there were more important things to worry about than the remote chance of ceramtube contamination of food if the building is on fire!

[Ken Taylor]

Food contamination was always given as the reason for not allowing break-glass tubes in food preparation areas. This also seemed strange to me as, irrespective of the argument that the last thing you worry about when escaping from a fire is the condition of the food when subsequently eaten, if glass contamination due to accidental breakage in non-fire circumstances is a valid reason, it would be a good case for banning all other glass products from the area. It does, however, tend to confirm an expectation that accidental breakages to the tubes will occur. and my belief that levers behind glass panes are more reliable for security (as well as keeping glass out of your diet).

[Chris Houston]

I may be wrong (obviously) but I think that call points in food prep areas don't have glass in them, I don't mean they have bits missing, but they avoid having glass in these areas and use something else.

While we are all fanatical about fire safety, the food safety people obviously have their risks to manage.

[AnthonyB]

It's only in recent years that alternatives to glass in break glasses have become a mainstream product.

BGU's in food areas are still glass & usually aren't if a new system is present with the new type breakable element.

It's not a problem to use glass if you have the KAC brand BGU as no shards are produced due to the film on the front.

But older systems with call points like the traditional Gent designs that are supposed to have a hammer (that always vanishes) would present a problem

[Guest]

I know from experience that Herts F&R and the LFEPA actively discourage the use of the frangible tube/element type devices on exit doors. When questioned, representatives of both authorities independently stated that they had come across numerous instances where the tubes had been replaced with unbreakable elements, and that the risk was just to great. As an experienced fire safety officer, I have also come across numerous "rigged" and incorrectly installed devices, so it's difficult to argue the tosswith any conviction.

[AnthonyB]

Thats a very good point, and I have come across all sorts of things in place of the frangible element. A common excuse is not having spare Ceramtubes on site & not being able to get hold of them (I must admit they aren't the easiest things to find if you are the typical premises occupant, unlike signs, extinguishers, etc that are easily found even in office stationery catalogues that seem to be increasingly used as a source of items these days)

On getting background for a drill, the site supervisor asked which exits were to be used, as staff normally only use the main stair to maintain premises security as the exits have redlam bolts & there are no spare tubes!! I will be taking a box of ceramtubes & having the main stair out of action for this one - I suspect most occupants will see the anti-tamper padlocks on the redlam bolts & stop thinking the exit is locked - wouln't be the 1st time I've had to go & break the tube for them to prevent congestion & confusion related problems in this situation...