Dealing with Prisoners in the event of fire

[Davo]

Ladies/Gents

I have been asked to review how we evacuate prisoners/deal with a fire in the cell area of our guest wings hem hem

I seem to remember one of our colleagues worked in the Prison Service and just wondered how they dealt with it?
I  have heard that if the fire is in a cell they just open the hatch and hose everything down but we don't have hoses due to water bylaws


davo

[jokar]

Back in the day, I attended a fire in a cell where the furniture fitted from door to wall and the inmate could lock himself in and then set the mattress alight.  The prison staff were very good as we were delayed attending through the double gate system.  By the time we had got in there the cell door had been forced open with a porta power kit and the wardens and the prisoner were in an adjacent cell enjoying themselves with the wardens teaching the inmate not to do it again.  No one else was evacuated although the whole wing was smokelogged, we were told quite strongly that the inmates were best left where they were.

[Phoenix]

You shouldn't have much to review.

In cells where the population is transient (at police stations, for example) a frequently used tactic is to have no combustibles in the cell area.  Therefore, no fires.  Or, at least, the biggest fire you could have would be the prisoner's clothes (and possibly the prisoner also).

Cells that have more permanent residents often contain reasonable fire loads.  The residents still need safe means of escape, but escape only from the fire. 

Any existing cells should already be built so that prisoners can be moved away from the fire into alternative areas that are no less secure than the cell area.  Cells should be constructed as compartments to contain any fire. 

As for dealing with the fire, the same as anywhere else, extinguisher if you can, otherwise shut the door and wait for the fire service.

Stu

[terry martin]

I have an involvement in these types of premises on a regular basis, and it is much more complex than most people realise. It is quite a Niche area, where normal MofE obviously don't apply.

The different kinds of detention premise each have specific risks and recognised appropriate control measures.These would be detailed in various published design guides for detention environments, and could help you.

In a court for example, the detainee is entitled to view his court papers whilst in his cell. This could be a significant amount of fire loading.

And even though they are searched and they are not allowed to smoke, it is common for detainees to smuggle in smoking materials (don't ask where!).

so although they try to create a sterile environment, they can't completely.

if you get a distraught or disruptive 'guest', and they have access to both the above, they could easily start a fire. the consequences of this poses serious problems that require specific control measures.

Sorry to be a little Vague. I am happy to offer you more guidance, but not within this forum. I cannot go into detail about inherent problems or proceedures within custody premises as this info is understandably privelaged information and could be misused. I have sent you an email should you wish to respond.

[wee brian]

If we are talking short stay accomodation such as police cells. Then the Home office (MOJ?)have been working up a guide for years.

Perhaps you could see if they got anywhere with it

[CivvyFSO]

I  have heard that if the fire is in a cell they just open the hatch and hose everything down but we don't have hoses due to water bylaws

Have you considered using petrol?

[kurnal]

As Terry points out it is an unusual setting and being the premises they are for many years they were exempt from the regulatory controls that affect the rest of us. Having looked round a few courts and police stations in various authorities it appears to me its high time many had a wake up call.

Clearly there are over riding security considerations to be taken into account, that the persons managing the areas are well trained and more responsible than the majority of citizens, and are present 24/7.

In many custody suites contents of cells are well controlled, there is ventilation, detection and doors of substantial construction which if not fire doors will have a reasonable performance in a fire. Job done? No thats only half of it.

So many of them have a control station at the centre which is typically an untidy office full of fire risk and vital to the safe supervision of the suite. Very often there is no separation between the control station and the cells, very often the keys to cells, cameras, UPS units, remote door access and egress controls and controls for external security are all at this all important hub. If theres a fire here- and there is often a lot of potential- then what happens? I have seen custody suites with long corridors, dead end conditions of the order of 45metres, corridors lined with archive files, escape doors that pass through compartment walls into court buildings that are locked on the court side.

I believe that a staged evacuation strategy using progressive horizontal evacuation should be designed into all custody suites similar to the approach in care homes, that this could be achieved in many cases by the simple addition of several fire doors held open on magnets and that all essential controls to access and egress  eg shutter doors to van docks be replicated at a safe location.

[Mike Buckley]

I remember doing a familiarisation inspection on a newly built secure mental health facility where the OiC of our station had advised on the Fire Precautions. We were shown all the security measures, interlocked doors so that there was no immediate escape to the outside. Our first question was "How do we get the hoses in to fight the fire?" Opps!

[afterburner]

Davo

It's me. I work for the Prison Service.

Get in touch with a PM and happy to discuss.

[afterburner]

Picking up Kurnal's point about exemption from legislative compliance I can clarify the position in Scotland.

The Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 and the Fire Safety (Scotland) Regulations 2006 apply. Prisoners are 'relevant persons' and measures to ensure their fire safety must be provided. This must happen in harmony with security and locking policies and controls. 

All Prisons and Court cells falling within the definition of the Prisons (Scotland) Act are 'Crown Premises'. As such the legislation is enforced by H.M. Chief Inspector of Fire & Rescue Authorities (Scotland).

Police cells also fall within the legislation but are not deemed 'Crown Premises' and therefore fall under the enforcement umbrella of local authority Fire & Rescue Services.

The Fire Risk Assessment process derives from the legisation. 

[Davo]

Thanks Guys

I will contact those who offered words of advice after Monday when my brain is fully recharged and the Blues are once again top of the league


davo

[kurnal]

Thanks Guys

I will contact those who offered words of advice after Monday when my brain is fully recharged and the Blues are once again top of the league

davo

Anyone care to quote odds on either or  both those goals being achieved?

[Midland Retty]

I've hit on this discussion rather late, but  for what it is worth I dealt with a similar scenario the other day

Kurnal has already pointed out some of the common problems with custody suites.

Here are just a few other things then to throw into the mix  - things that I encountered. over!

Aggrivating Factors

1) Custody suite was getting evacuated on every alarm activation - causing huge disruption for custodystaff - remedy - designated fire marshalls check panel, investigate if alarm is genuine, custody suite is not evacuated unless absolutely necessary (phased evac plan to be implemented)

2) Insufficient custody staff to evacuate 18 prisoners (this is according the police themselves due to risk of prisoners taking advantage of evacuation scenario and trying to escape ) - Remedy: All available police officers which have otherwise reported to fire assembly point will be on standby to assist custody sergeant and his / her team if required. Prisoners will be handcuffed marched out in a line to assembly point awaiting transport to another police station

3) Detainees can't always be given full body search prior to entering cells due to several reasons (strip searches can only be undertaken if officers have reasonable grounds to suspect the detainee is hiding something about their person) Therefore slim chance detainees could smuggle in lighter / matches small amounts of fuel or other substances which may not get picked up during routine clothing checks .  

4) Police Officers are told not to fight fires within the station - also there are no fire extinguishers in custody suite - potential that any small fires could grow into bigger ones - force looking at training certain officers and providing PFFE

5) Large dead end (approx 48 m in one wing of the custody suite) - Impractiacble to add alternative means to reduce travel distances.

6) Corridors leading to cells covered by Heat Detection (possibly back from the days when detainees could smoke in their cells) - Fiorce will change to smoke detection when suite is due for next major refurb.

Mitigating Factors

1) Police Officers are used / trained to deal with extraneous / emergency situations

2) Custody suite, certain cells, adjacent corridors monitored by CCTV - any problems should be picked up very quickly

3) Three ways out of the building from most parts of the custody suite except for cells despite in dead end corridor.

4) Escape routes / corridors kept sterile

5) Custody Sergeant's desk / counter was not cluttered with unecessary paperwork or equipment.

6) AFD to L2 standard.

7) High risk or dangerous detainees are monitored via CCTV in their cell and checked every 15 minutes.

Cell doors will offer nominal protection, holding back smoke and flame.

9) Cells generally sterile with little fire loading contained within them

[afterburner]

MR your reply is absolutely spot on under the  heading of 'aggrivating factors'. However, within the Prison Service (as opposed to Police cells) compliance standards are considerably different.

Arising from the Fire Risk Assessment the fire safety provisons and staff procedures have to recognise the life risk arising from cutody & control, sleeping risk and demonstrate compliance with legisaltion and comparable benchmark standards.

All cells are provided with automatic fire detection, as are surrounding access corridors and 'association' spaces. (achieving M/L1 equivalent coverage standards)

Fire response procedures (which may include fire suppression (manual or automatic) techniques) are immediate and have no 'investigation time'

Fire response and evacuation procedures must be deliverable with the available staff (worst case staffing scenario applies)

Travel distances must comply with legisaltion (Building standards and fire laws)

Adequate fire suppression equipment is provided.

Evacuation drills are regulalry practiced, including single cell and area evacuations.

These outcomes have been the result of considerable guidance, pressure and indeed occasional enforcement procedures by our Enforcing Authority over a long period

[afterburner]

Davo

the Blues are indeed top the League  .... the Hoops are immediately behind.