Inconsistant use of intumescent strips on ward fire doors.

[LFCDA]

Just wondered what the general consensus might be concerning the use of intumescent strips and cold smoke seals on fire doors in hospital ward corridors.

I recently visited a new PFI hospital building where you would imagine all doors installed as fire doors (installed post BS 476 pt 20 1987) would have the strips – but not so. In fact, intumescent strips were missing from doors to linen, clinical waste, and other store rooms and were installed to doors containing low risk rooms such as sluice and wc’s. very haphazard.

The PFI drawings did not help but simply stated that all sub-compartmentation zones should have a minimum of 30 minutes FR.

Surely, all fire doors containing a room of medium to high risk including sleeping patients should be a minimum of FD30(S) ?? without exception.

Or do we just accept that in the process of PHE in evacuation terms we can ignore the concept of sub-compartments and just rely on the broader 60 minute compartment lines.

[kurnal]

Was there any chance that they may have been proprietary door sets e.g. with metal frames/leaves? The standard of fire doors and door sets in hospitals can be found in appendix B table B1 of HTM 0501 and specifies FD 30S/FD60S in most locations other than within the cavity barriers.

[Colin Newman]

The guidance in Firecode would require that all doors to hazard rooms are provided as a minimum of FD30(S), that would include linnen stores, general store rooms etc. 

Doors to bedrooms would only be fire rated if the bedrooms are provided for patients considered to constitute a particular risk i.e. the elderly, those with mental health issues or learning difficulties, or they form part of a single direction escape route.  In either case door closers should noty be provided to patient bedrooms.

The appropriate protection of fire hazard rooms is fundamental to the fire safety of healthcare buildings since it is the hazard room enclosure that prevents a fire within the hazard room affecting the means of escape.

The concept of sub-compartments provides an initial limitation to fire spread and the number of patients that are considered to be at immediate risk from the fire.  Whilst sub-compartments afford some protection to patients and allow the evacuation within the compartment to be staged, PHE requires that the compartment is evacuated. 

There is a discrepancy between the guidance in respect of fire detection and alarm systems (HTM 05-03 Part B) and the guidance in respect of sub-compartmentation/PHE in HTM 05-02.  HTM05-03 Part B describes the fire alarm zoning on a sub-compartment basis indicating that PHE takes place at a sub-compartment level. However, the guidance in HTM05-02 specifies thermally activated dampers to ductwork penetrating sub-compartment walls.  This implies that PHE must be on a compartment basis since the definition of PHE refers to the movement of patients horizontally to a place free from the affects of fire and smoke which may not be provided if cooler smoke permeates across the sub-compartment boundary via any penetrating ductwork.

[LFCDA]

Thanks Kurnal, I've read the HTM 05 01 which is why I 'm so surprised with the inconsistency. This is a new PFI hospital I'm referring to so you would expect that within sub-compartments you would see FD30(S) doors on all rooms with the exception of WC's, Sluice rooms etc.

Colin, from your comments I can see that you agree with me that although its good to be able to contain a fire in a sub-compartment especially at an early stage to allow PHE procedures to successfully kick in, the critical factor is that the main compartment enclosures are intact.

So do we really care (within reason) in terms of MOE what the sub-compartment elements are made of or what their FR ratings are?

I wonder how many other healthcare officers responsible fire risk assessments in ward corridors have had the same issue.

[Midland Retty]

Hi LFCDA

It is of absolute importance that sub compartment doors are FD30S.

To  put it simply, without FD30S protection normal hospital evacuation procedures would not work.

[LFCDA]

I'm sure MF that the Healthcare buildings you're working with are 100% up to scratch but if you honestly believe that the provision of 30 mins FR sub compartments is of 'absolute importance' to the effectiveness of normal hospital evacuation (I assume you mean progressive horizontal evacuation) then I would say that we are all in serious trouble because in my experience - it rarely exists.

In the last 2 years I have inspected about ten major NHS sites with particular attention to the integrity of fire compartments. working with a structural engineer our intrusive surveys have revealed some (mostly) shocking results.

The inconsistency of intumescent strips on fire doors that you can see should act as a clue to the lack of any any real sub-compartments on hospital ward corridors.

If you think your membrane ceiling tiles are 30 mins FR to BS 476 part 21 then I suggest you take a closer look, you may find the only BS rating on the ceiling is for 'insulation' and not for fire resistance. and if you do find that your ceiling is not up to correct standard then I suggest you take a look above the ceiling line or don't if you are of a nervous disposition.

Personally, I disagree in a purely practical sense with MF I do not think that these sub-compartments are critical to the success of an effective evacuation plan for a hospital - look after your main 60 min and 90 min FR compartment lines to ensure your PHE provides adequate protection. the structural integrity of sub- compartments sadly, cannot be relied on. 

Evacuation plans, training, instructions to staff should be based on realistic guidelines i.e. what you actually have and not what you think you have.





 

[Midland Retty]

I'd be careful there LFCDA

Most hospitals employ PHE based around the premise that if one ward (sub compartment) has a fire staff can evacuate patients to an adjacent ward (sub compartment)

The time taken to evacuate any given sub compartment depends on staff numbers, numbers and mobility of patients, and the size of the ward.

So I think its slighty incorrect to suggest sub compartmentation isn't required. Because without it one fire  could potentially take out multiple wards quickly, making the prospect and success of PHE behind a 60 minute compartment line impossible.

I resent your comments about my perception of standards in hospitals. Of course I know they are far from perfect. But that doesn't mean to say we give up and throw everything out of the window. Also you said this was a NEW hospital.

Also if you are going to talk about ceiling tiles how about we also mention ventilation systems which only need to be smoke stopped at the compartment line.

Thus smoke can be transmitted from sub compartment to sub compartment quite easily. Yet another potential issue to compromise safe evacuation.

So yes I do poke my head above ceiling tiles, because I wouldn't be doing my job very well if I didn't.

[LFCDA]

Steady on MF - think I might have ruffled a few feathers there.

Reckon you defeated your own argument when you mentioned the fire dampers. so we are agreed then - in hospital ward corridors it's best not to rely on sub-compartmentation as part of an evacuation strategy, progressive or otherwise.

 


 

[Midland Retty]

LFCDA I think you are confused about what I'm saying, and by the tone of your original reply I rather thought I'd ruffled your feathers.

You do have to rely on sub compartmentation in hospitals- it needs to be there.

Yes you are quite correct that in the real world the sub compartmentation is often poor, non existant or compromised in some way. But that's not just a problem we face in hospitals - its a common problem everywhere.

But it's no good saying "dont rely on sub compartmentation" and then just leave it at that.

Either you re-instate adequate seperation or you look at alternative solutions to mitigate the problem of poor or non existant fire seperation. But what alternatives are there?

To be perfectly frank in existing hospitals particularly I can think of no real practicable alternatives to mitigate poor sub compartmentation.

The seperation HAS to be in place to allow for the evacuation procedures utilised in hospitals. Without it those procedures would fall flat.

The hospital you are dealing with is apparently new. So there is absolutely no excuse for there to be poor compartmentation. No excuse at all, and if you are involved at the stage while the hospital is being snagged / hand over stage, then surely someone should be flagging up the compartmentation whether it be you or the building control officer / approved inspector and having it put right prior to it being opened.

[SandDancer]

Hi All,
As a NHS Fire Officer, I feel that i can reasonably qualified to add my views on this topic.
LFCDA you raised an issue of which I have also had problems with, namely architects of new builds who either have limited knowledge of the HTM suite of documents or misinterpret them to their own needs. To remedy this I have managed to cajole the Facilities Department into allowing me access at a design stage of a project and work closely with the Architect/Construction team. As a consequence of this (depending on the Architect/Construction team-it is still a work in progress!) I regularly get sent information on all plans, materials (inc fire doors, f ire dampers alarms, etc) before installation.
If you are in the NHS too, I would recommend that you go down this route too!

On fire doors in the NHS, I have found (and this is limited to my own NHS Trust experience) that on the whole fire doors of the correct standard have been fitted to Hazard rooms. The problems I found was that staff in some areas had decided that the storeroom would make a better office and have done the old switcheroo or because of limited space an office has been converted into storage without prior consultation. The only way to eradicate this is, as you said, Information, Instruction ,Training and Monitoring.

The big issue in my Trust was damage and maintenance, when I started the Trust had no maintenance schedule in place (which it has now) and fire doors on corridors were continually in a poor state of repair (this was down to Portering staff continually ramming doors with trolleys if they found them closed/not held back on détentes !- and before you ask we have tried to educate them but it is like using a peashooter against a tank:( ).
I can also agree with yourself and MF and say that with growing despair I often "poke my head above the tiles" to be met with a colander of a fire wall. Unfortunately, all my efforts to instigate regulations with contractors has met with failure

In regards to your views on sub-compartmenting Hazard rooms I must disagree, these rooms need to be compartmented as stated by Colin and MF as they lead on to escape routes/bedded patient areas and in these area we need to "buy time" to evacuate multiple bedded patients as part of the phased evacuation.

(I have also noted the discrepancy between the HTM's Colin, but use my judgement and experience to ensure the plan fits the build or vice versa)

By the way LFCDA if this is a new build what has the submitted Fire Strategy said about the doors?   

[LFCDA]

SandDancer,
Thanks very much for your detailed contribution, you are more than welcome - we Newbies need to stick together I don't see why the established members should have all the limelight.

I have been involved in Fire Safety in one form or another for over 30 years and only came across this forum a few weeks ago, I've read a lot of brilliant posts but a lot of hot air as well, the more people contribute the better.

MF its not just the new PFI I have recently been working on thats the problem but as mentioned in a previous post I have looked at about 10 other hospitals over the last few years - what I discoverered is 'shocking' its endemic. Your comment that its an issue everywhere is not helpful - other premises do not practise PHE

So , may I say that I did not intend to give the impression that I think sub-compartmentation is wrong or a waste of time but simply from my experience it is not to be relied on and from the personal replies and posts I have received its clear this is a major problem not only in newly built PFI's but also in older buildings used as hospitals and medical support premises throughout the NHS.

You have hit the nail on the head SandDancer, the root cause of these issues is the lack of fire professionals in the design, installation and sign off for these contracts. also MF you mentioned this.

Sir Ken Knight in his report following the fatal fire in Camberwell last year alluded to the lack of advice from suitably qualified and experienced fire professionals at both the design stage and successive refurbishments of the tower block that may have prevented the design failures in fire separation on that tragic day. Also, compartmentation issues were raised in all the recent London Hospital fires often discussed on this forum.

In answer to your question – yes, I do work in the NHS but not confined to one hospital or trust, I’m encouraged to hear that your premises are as they should be but that’s probably down to your professional attitude and getting involved in the contract work.

I would like to hear from other hospital fire officers to maybe get an idea of how widespread this problem is.

[Clevelandfire 3]

LFCDA sorry but I disagree. Other premises do practice PHE.  Care homes and blocks of flats practice it. What Midland has said is 100% true, this is NOT a problem associated just with hospitals, it is an every day problem for most fire safety professionals dealing with these type of properties, so lets not pretend its just a problem for hospitals and lets not label his advice as "unhelpful" because actually it is not.

The fact that sub compartmentation "is not to be relied on" is a rather reckless comment to make. It has to be relied on.Surely you understand that as a hospital fire officer. Please please tell me you do. I think what you meant to say is that the compartmentation in the hospitals you have seen is poor. That is totally different from saying "do not rely on compartmentation"

Fire safety bods who have any experience of working with hospitals know that they are not up to current standards or code compliant but once again, as always, Midland is absolutely spot on in saying that sub compartmentation needs to be there. If it isnt something needs to be done about it, because otherwise the whole thing falls flat. If you cant rely on compartmentation what do you rely on? The answer is nothing because there is nothing. Not even sprinklers will help here because they would probably cost more than making good the fire resisting structure and if the fire starts in the ward sprinklers wont stop smoke spread. So rather than dismissing others LFCDA why dont you tell us what you would have us do to combat poor fire separation? Sorry to be so blunt, but I think you have dismissed some rather good advice so far.

[LFCDA]

Thanks Clevelandfire

OK, two separate issues here let’s get the PHE out of the way before we deal with Compartmentation.

The term ‘Progressive Horizontal Evacuation’ was first coined in early HTM’s in relation to hospital procedures to accommodate patients who may be unable to mobilise for themselves and consequently require some degree of assistance.
The assistance may vary from directing patients along a corridor into an adjacent ward or to evacuate in a bed or on a wheeled trolley to a place of safety. Patients may be unconscious or attached to vital life support equipment. Patients may be undergoing intrusive operations at the time of the emergency. Patients may even have to continue their medical procedures, maternity, for instance as the evacuation is taking place.
PHE may be used as a ‘catchall’ to describe evacuation procedures in other purpose groups but in essence its definition is unique in relation to its original concept.   

Cleveland, please please do not misquote me, I did not say that compartmentation cannot be relied on. However, I did say that in my experience sub-compartmentation should not be relied on.

Please indulge me for a few paragraphs while I attempt to explain myself. If you were in your home and you were awoken in the small hours of the night by a fire in an adjacent bedroom, it’s unlikely that you would take refuge in another room on the same floor level, chances are that although the walls between the bedrooms are reasonably sound, if the fire were to develop the smoke and heat from the fire is likely to spread into the loft or into the hall lobby and eventually, probably, compromise your safety.
If, however you were to get out of the house and take refuge in your neighbour’s house you may only be a few metres from the fire but you would feel a whole lot safer mainly because of the dirty great 13 inch brick wall between the properties. 

Compartmentation in hospitals is absolutely vital – sub-compartments however should not be relied on.
In an emergency, patients should be evacuated across main compartment lines or to use my analogy - next door.

[Clevelandfire 3]

I get what you are saying but unfortunately what your saying is unworkable and unpractical in hopsitals. You cant always easliy just evacuate quickly behind a 60 minute wall or on the other side of the corridor.

First stage evac is to get behind a 30 minute fire line in hospitals, otherwise all your sub compartments would be have to be 60 minute boxes. So you do need to rely on sub compartmentation.

[LFCDA]

I think we are going to have to agree to disagree on this one.

My only concern is that patients may be placed at risk if the sub-compartmentation fails to live up to expectations.

Hospital managers should carry out sample intrusive inspections to see if this is a problem, standard fire risk assessments will not necessarily identify these structural shortfalls. A decision to carry out full surveys can be made based on the results of the sample inspections.

Our surveys as mentioned previously are joint inspections using both fire professionals and structural engineers. Our reports often lead to hospitals rethinking their evacuation procedures.

It's clear from the tone of the posts here and all across the Firenet forum that we all take our responsibilities seriously, we are not just 9 to 5 people, the passion comes through loud and clear.
Evacuation procedures in hospitals should'nt just be something written on a sheet or pinned on a wall to be followed just because someone 5 or 10 years ago decided thats how it should be.

The safest and most effective evacuation procedures will be decided on the basis of the lastest intrusive assessments.