Westie, ever since the days of the F P Act, fire officers, due to a lack of knowledge of basic engineering principles, thought that door hold open devices and electronic locks failed safe. They really did not understand the concept of fail safe. The did not think beyond the fact that, if you drop power to a device that needs power to keep it held, of course it releases. What never occurred to most of them (and this is not a rant about fire officers, so if you think that read on) was, in the event of fire, what caused the power to drop.
So, when the poor dears (ok I will not patronise them any more in this thread, I promise) became head hauncho fire officers, writing Home Office guides as long ago as the early 1990s, they wrote in all the guides that held open fire doors and electronic locks would release if there was a fault on the fire alarm system. YELL OF FRUSTRATION COMING: IT WAS IN EVERYSINGLE BLOODY GUIDE!!!!!!!!!!!
The only problem is that the geezers in the fire alarm world had no need to read guides on certification of premises under the fire precautions act, so they NEVER EVER EVER EVER arranged the systems that way.
So, there was this huge communication failure, such that fire officers thought the damn interfaces worked in one way, and the fire alarm industry did not even know that anyone wanted them to work in that way. I gave up telling both sides that each misunderstood the position of the other.
We knew all of this in 1990, and, when BS 7273-1 was published it contained a promise that, one day, a further part would deal with doors.
What happened to bring about the realisation of the original promise? I confess Westie to being the cause of all your woes. I brought it to the attention of the relevant BS committee that:
1. An old lady called Maude died in a care home in the NE of England, because someone operated a master door release control and the closing fire door knocked her to the ground, resulting in her death after an operation the next day for her broken hip. The local authority were fined heavily under HAWA and piad undisclosed damages to Maude's family.
2. A security guard died in a fire in Edinburgh (of a heart attack as it happens), when caught in a situtation in which electronic locks failed to release, so no one could get to him. The Sherrif concluded that the failure was because the cable from the access control central equipment to the outstation was damaged by fire, something we had warned people about for years (and tried to prevent in BS 7807, which no one ever read either). (Word on the streets was that there was a totally different cause of the failure, but for reasons of libel law, I cannot set them out here.)
3. We had info about various near misses, in which people were trapped because electronic locks failed to release on operation of the fire alarm system, some due to installation wiring errors.
It was agreed that there should be a BS 7273-4 to deal with these things. (As it happens, we were awarded the contract after competitive tender to draft it for the committee).
At one of the first meetings of the committee, CFOA were represented by a fire officer who was a chum of mine. Realising, in his profession, there was no proper understanding of the engineering issues involved, I asked leave of the committee chairman if I could explain the issues to him, drawing on a flip chart. As, in my explanation, I was addressing only him, eventually he asked (I was never sure if he was being sarcastic) if he was the only one on the committee who did not understand the issues. Regretably, everyone had to gently tell him that they all fully understood.
At first, my pal from CFOA would not even believe me that what I was saying was true. He could not countenance that, for all these years, fire officers had been requiring door hold open devices to "fail safe" in the manner described in Home Office guides, and that the requirement was universally ignored. I had to ask another chum who was representing BFPSA to tell him if his company had ever in its history arranged for fire doors to release when a fault occurred on the fire alarm system or the CIE processor crashed. Of course they had not.
This left us with a dilemma. Should the new BS 7273-4 actually recommend what the fire service wanted and thought they had all these years, or should it reflect custom and practice. Ultimately, it was agreed that, if that was what the enforcing authorities wanted, that is what we would give them, bearing in mind that what they wanted could prove very safety critical in some circumstances. But first, the committee had a chat with a very large manufacturer and a very small manufacturer. The large manufacturer advised us not to concern ourselves with what the trade did, but only with how we wanted systems to work. The small manufacturer concurred that, if that was what we wanted, the manufacturers could provide it.
But to ensure that devices that could not properly fail safe might be used in less critical situations, we invented the categlories of reliability, with some suggestions as to where each should be used. It was informally agreed that, if we invented the categories, other codes, including BS 9999, could specify where they wanted the highest category. That never occurred, because no one bothers to read BS 7273-4. People even ask questions about it on firenet, openly admitting they dont even have a copy. Yet it is referenced normatively in BS 5839-1.
So, the bottom line is that, far from the BS setting very onerous recommendations for the first time, all it did was reflect the requirements of regulators, as expressed in guidance for 15-20 years!!! And we even relaxed the recommendations for less critical situations.
FOOTNOTE: DONT BLAME THE BS COMMITTEE OR ME FOR THE FACT THAT HALF OF OUR PROFESSION CANT READ AND HALF OF THE OTHER HALF CANT BE BOTHERED TO BUY BRITISH STANDARDS.