FireNet Community
FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: Fishy on June 14, 2017, 07:30:23 AM
-
Woke up to the terrible news about the tower block fire in West London. Pretty shocked to see the pictures of so many floors all alight at the same time. Websites seem to suggest that it was very recently refurbished using an Aluminium Composite Panelling (ACP) rain screen cladding... http://www.harleyfacades.co.uk/page/grenfell-tower
If so, it does echo some of the incidents we've seen in the Middle and Far East where combustible cladding systems have caused rapid vertical fire spread?
Whatever the cause, here's hoping that everyone was evacuated safely, & that all the fire-fighters are safe and well.
-
"A number of fatalities" has been confirmed.
The local Grenfell Action Group had claimed, before and during the refurbishment, the block constituted a fire risk and residents had warned that access to the site for emergency vehicles was "severely restricted". and link to
https://grenfellactiongroup.wordpress.com/2016/11/20/kctmo-playing-with-fire/
Three hours after the fire started, police said people were continuing to be evacuated from the tower.
Eyewitnesses said they saw lights - thought to be mobile phones or torches - flashing at the top of the block of flats, and trapped residents coming to their windows.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-40269625
-
Yes, Dany Cotton has confirmed there are an as yet unknown number of fatalities. My thoughts go out to their families and loved ones...
-
Thoughts and prayers to those affected by this dreadful incident. One can only look at the news and think about the plight of those trapped in the building and the courage and bravado of the firefighters and other residents doing what they can to rescue who they can.
There will be many stories of heroism from this tragedy.
-
http://www.harleyfacades.co.uk/page/grenfell-tower
Web page has been removed.
-
"Fire Risks From External Cladding Panels - A Perspective From The UK" is about sandwich panels, which I would think Aluminium Composite Panelling falls within that description.
Check out http://www.probyn-miers.com/perspective/2016/02/fire-risks-from-external-cladding-panels-perspective-from-the-uk/
-
http://www.harleyfacades.co.uk/page/grenfell-tower
Web page has been removed.
Nothing is ever removed from the internet!
https://web.archive.org/web/20170614035707/http://wittukgroup.co.uk/grenfell-tower-london-w11-1tq-regeneration-project/
-
Thoughts and prayers to everybody affected. Sad, sad, day.
-
Likewise, thoughts are with all of those effected. Just so hard to believe in 2017, some of us are old enough to remember showing the training video 'Fire and Smoke give yourself a chance' the scenes today are reminiscent of the San Paulo fire on that old video. 40 years later? beggars belief! so sad
-
In January, "552 firefighter jobs and 14 engines are also being cut from the capital's brigade after seven London boroughs failed last year to legally challenge the closures."
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/firefighters-cry-as-10-london-stations-including-clerkenwell-close-due-to-cuts-9050079.html
Also there have been concerns over (imported Chinese?) cladding failing tests
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/property/fears-grow-as-apartment-cladding-debacle-ignites/news-story/22bf66af43cd0c52c91063d8b4b34535
Cheaply imported aluminium cladding from Melbourne?s fire-damaged Lacrosse tower was so flammable CSIRO scientists had to abandon combustibility tests after only 93 seconds to avoid damaging their equipment.
A CSIRO report obtained by The Australian reveals that the sub-standard Alucobest cladding ? suspected of also having been used in thousands of buildings nationwide and linked with fires in large buildings around the world ? sustained extensive ?flaming? after 55 seconds and had to be extinguished after 93 seconds because of ?excessive flaming and smoking?.
An MFB incident report into the November Lacrosse fire also reveals there have been seven high-rise apartment fires around the world directly attributed to the unsafe cladding with plastic cores, with more than seven deaths. Four high-rise towers in Dubai including The Torch ? all with aluminium cladding with the plastic core ? have suffered extensive damage from fires spreading up the facade of the buildings.
In France, seven people died in an 18-storey apartment complex in Roubaix, clad in similar aluminium facade as that used at the Lacrosse Tower.
In South Korea, a rapidly spreading fire in a 42-storey fire high-rise apartment complex was directly attributed again to the same sort of cladding used at Lacrosse as was a fire in a 41-storey building in Atlanta City in the US.
Of those international fires, the MFB reports say: ?What is evident is the rapid and extensive vertical fire spread up and down the buildings in direct correlation with the fire (at the Lacrosse tower). Whilst the brand and make of the panels are not identified in the report, they would all appear to be of very similar material and construction to the material installed in the facade at the (Lacrosse building).?
He said there was a growing problem of builders substituting quality products at the last moment for cheaper, dangerous, imported products to increase profits.
He also warned about companies in China selling building products such as cladding with questionable quality control and compliance certificates.
... only an invasive test can determine the difference between non-compliant cladding with a plastic core and the compliant cladding with a fibre core. Otherwise they look, feel and smell exactly the same.
-
I do wish the shed load of experts being paraded on the TV would reflect on what they are pontificating and just keep their opinions on this incident to themselves. The confusion being created with everyone seeming to have a different view on what residents should do in the event of a fire and the level of fire safety measures that should have been in the building.
They will have an opportunity at a later date to air such views at the Public Inquiry.
-
Agree.
I listened to Radio 5 yesterday, they were requesting firefighters and retired firefighters to ring in and give their expert opinion.
Whilst people on here will have their theories, we should wait for the facts to be established. Speculation doesn't help the families of those missing, injured or dead.
-
Absolutely agree with both the above - therefore as the original poster can I suggest that (as a mark of respect to the bereaved) we voluntarily close down this thread & don't use it to speculate any more on what will eventually emerge as the facts of this awful incident?
-
Although I agree that uninformed speculation may be unhelpful, there have already been some supplier/contractor websites closed down or amended which has been remarked upon in some fora and then picked up by the media. Public scrutiny from the outset may help the right questions be asked and prevent a cover-up so that the facts do emerge.
-
I agree with Owain.
Discussion and speculation can reduce the likelihood of a potential cover-up
-
Why in heavens name would you want to close this thread down! If you want to show respect get answers rather than hiding under your eiderdown! Speculation is a natural part of a tragedy like this. What must people think when they see the outside of a building on fire, spreading rapidly to engulf the whole building and hear fire safety professionals hedge their bets on cause. If it wasn't the material in the composite panels used in the rain screen then the whole building was doused in petrol!
-
the facts will be available albeit drip fed ,and after all this is a forum? so I agree this should be open for discussion/speculation after this terrible disaster .Answers need to be given ASAP, after all there are people living in similar clad buildings up and down the country, and worldwide.
-
The response from the fire service and council is not to speculate.
The housing association I work for has been inandated with private sector housing officers making appointments to inspect our 3-5 storey properties. The first question asked is do they have cladding.
-
Reports of another block of flats with "solar panels and cladding" on fire
http://www.croydonadvertiser.co.uk/block-of-flats-damaged-in-fire-in-thornton-heath/story-30392245-detail/story.html
Fire under control in 10 mins and no casualties, but concerns again about alarms
http://www.croydonadvertiser.co.uk/thornton-heath-flats-owner-says-it-is-too-soon-to-answer-reports-residents-didn-t-hear-fire-alarm/story-30392866-detail/story.html
-
A lot of talk about retrofitting of sprinkler systems following the tragic happenings at Grenfell. Grenfell aside, what's the general feeling about the practicality and proportionality of retrofitting sprinkler systems in existing tower blocks?
-
It appears, at Grenfell Tower, it was an external fire spread, then breaking into each floor in turn, if it was, the a sprinkler system would soon be render useless. I am not aware of any situations where there has been a major loss of life, where the fire spread was internal, where sprinklers would be effective. However if the origin of fire was confined to one occupancy it would be effective saving individual lives.
-
Tom -
I am not aware of any situations where there has been a major loss of life, where the fire spread was internal, where sprinklers would be effective.
Did you mean "external?"
-
Yes Tadees silly mistake, but what I did not consider was if the fire in an occupancy is extinguished before it can start an external fire, then it could be argued that the sprinklers did prevent an external fire. ???
-
If it's caught the external cladding the spread of fire will continue to other dwellings. I assume sprinkler systems have limited water supply (not my field so I wouldn't know)
-
If the cause of the fire was indeed a faulty electrical appliance answers will be needed in regard to product recalls and responsibilities of tenants.
Also will stay put policies for such tower blocks need to be re-assessed?
Will regulations have to change to ensure that entrance doors to private accommodation are changed to fire rated doors (to protect the means of escape).
In non residential buildings the RRO (Fire Safety) requires much to ensure the safety of the occupants - this does not apply to private residential (other than common areas). There are no means to ensure all residents have heard the alarm (by what ever means that may be - including voice), no way to access private flats to ensure they have evacuated. How can that elderly or ill person on a high floor escape by them selves un -aided with no fire lift?
My prayers to all of those affected by this disaster.
-
Even the archive page has now been removed
funny smell somewhere?
davo
-
funny smell somewhere?
Aye, an it's no meltin plastic. That's shyte hittin the fan, as my dear auld grannie wud have said if she'd bin fae Coocaddens.
-
Freedom of information requests and enquiries from a major international news organisation have started rolling into my inbox. Any one else getting these? Why me - I just not at the same level as many on this site and I really don't want to giving out unsuitable comments or advise to reporters.
If any one is at FireEx tomorrow I will be the one in the monkey suit.
-
.
If any one is at FireEx tomorrow I will be the one in the monkey suit.
Went today, good luck if it's 32 degrees.
-
OK I know I've retired, But there is one question that puzzles me. It the external cladding was on fire, how come the lobbies and the escape staircase in the center of the building were smoke logged and impassible? Surely the stairs should have been a place of relative safety?
-
Sprinklers in new builds should be mandatory irrespective of cost. Retro fitting sprinklers in existing flats would be a nightmare from an installation point of view.
But is there any reason why retro fitting sprinklers into ALL stairwells and landings couldn't be done? I don't think cost should come in to it. Would this assist with the smoke problem that Mike refers to above?? If so, it would then ensure that egress is possible.
John
-
OK I know I've retired, But there is one question that puzzles me. It the external cladding was on fire, how come the lobbies and the escape staircase in the center of the building were smoke logged and impassible? Surely the stairs should have been a place of relative safety?
Check out http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/14/grenfell-tower-floorplan-shows-120-flats-packed-highrise/ if the plans are correct then it is esily to see how the route to the staircase would be impassable in a short time.(30 min) Also the liftshafts would be a concern as they have no fire resistance. I would accept it is suitable for stay put policy but this was not the case at Grenfell tower fire.
-
OK I know I've retired, But there is one question that puzzles me. It the external cladding was on fire, how come the lobbies and the escape staircase in the center of the building were smoke logged and impassible? Surely the stairs should have been a place of relative safety?
Check out http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/14/grenfell-tower-floorplan-shows-120-flats-packed-highrise/ if the plans are correct then it is esily to see how the route to the staircase would be impassable in a short time.(30 min) Also the liftshafts would be a concern as they have no fire resistance. I would accept it is suitable for stay put policy but this was not the case at Grenfell tower fire.
Hi Tom, are you saying that because the lift opens in to the lobby serving the flats?
-
Yes because the lift shaft is not a protected shaft, consequently you have limited compartmentation between floors, and the only FD30s door is the front door of each flat, however it does meet ADB.
-
You are assuming that the door to each flat is a FD30s I have inspected many blocks of flats and the flat doors were not always fitted with smoke seals. There has been much discussion on this site as to the merits of upgrading with intumescent strips, cold smoke seals and self closers. My preference was always to advise that they are fitted. Also the door from the lift lobby to the staircase should be a FD30s door.
It does not appear that there is any windows into the staircase therefore if the structural protection was sound the two sets of compliant FR doors should reduce the amount of smoke getting into a staircase. However once people started to evacuate smoke would get into the staircase.
I do not wish to make any assumptions at this time as the exact details are not known yet, I did see at one time a photograph of the building showing a gas main that was installeed in the staircase as part of the refurbishment ? I wait to see if this is confirmed.
-
This does not just affect apartment blocks. From the BBC:
Premier Inn has told BBC Newsnight that cladding on its hotels in Maidenhead, Brentford and Tottenham did not appear to comply with government guidance for tall buildings - although it did appear to be a less flammable type than that used at Grenfell Tower. The hotel chain said an independent expert has assured them that the hotels were safe to stay open given their "robust" safety measures including fire detectors and smoke alarms in every room. The hotels do not operate a "stay put" policy and have multiple means of escape.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40366646
It's also not stated whether those three Premier Inn hotels have been used, but:
the council itself has offered some Grenfell residents temporary accommodation ? in a building that they describe as a ?carbon copy? of Grenfell Tower. Some survivors have been offered rooms at a local Premier Inn, which in itself sounds unobjectionable. But anyone with a little local knowledge knows that the high-rise hotel bears a strong resemblance to the building that burned down last week with huge loss of life.
https://skwawkbox.org/2017/06/18/grenfell-residents-offered-rooms-in-carbon-copy-hotel-with-cladding/
-
Sorry Tom,
ADB vol2 5.42 states:
Lift wells should be either:
a. contained within the enclosures of a protected staircase; or
b. enclosed throughout their height with fire - resisting construction if they are sited so as to prejudice the means of escape.
A lift well connecting different compartments should form a protected shaft (see Section 8)
See also the Lifts Directive 95/16/EC.
I did come across this problem and a requirement to provide fire compartmentation round the entrance to a passenger lift and was told that the lift doors are normally 1/2 hour FR separating the shaft from the floor.
My original concern still stands.
-
That's fine Mike I stand corrected, but my concern still stands regarding smoke control as I believe fireman's lift doors are FD30 not FD30s so what the chances for standard lifts.
Check out http://highrisefirefighting.co.uk/lift.html
-
This link still works
http://web.archive.org/web/20161114232416/http://www.harleyfacades.co.uk:80/page/grenfell-tower
-
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4657984/Grenfell-safety-consultant-urged-council-hide-failings.html
Don't tell anyone about the fire risks: Safety consultant hired to inspect Grenfell Tower urged council to hide failings - and he's an ex-firefighter
Carl Stokes was paid ?250,000 to inspect Grenfell Tower for any risks of fire
But former Oxfordshire Fire Service worker plotted with council to hide failings
Fire safety expert Arnold Tarling said attitude of Stokes 'absolutely stinks'
?250k for one block?!
-
?250k for one block?!
Fire consultant Carl Stokes was paid ?244,318 over seven years as fire risk assessor for Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), according to documents seen by Inside Housing.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/grenfell-tower-fire-risk-assessor-carl-stokes-buried-fire-risk-report-kensington-and-chelsea-tenant-a7819386.html
-
?250k for one block?!
(a) "consultant"
(b) local authority client
(c) London prices
-
Confused.
Mr Stokes website implies that he is registered/connected in some way with the IFE.
He states 'IFE Assessor/Auditor (Fire Safety Order)'
What does this mean?
-
His telephone number would indicate he is located in the Witney area near Oxford, I can only find one who is located in that area on the IFE fire risk assessors register.
http://www.ife.org.uk/Fire-Risk-Assessors-Register
-
OK I know I've retired, But there is one question that puzzles me. It the external cladding was on fire, how come the lobbies and the escape staircase in the center of the building were smoke logged and impassible? Surely the stairs should have been a place of relative safety?
Puzzles me too Mike but I have a thought on why this would happen. We'll all have to wait until the official enquiry provides the answers.
-
Confused.
Mr Stokes website implies that he is registered/connected in some way with the IFE.
He states 'IFE Assessor/Auditor (Fire Safety Order)'
What does this mean?
Not saying it happened here but I know someone who went on a risk assessment course and then anointed himself as a qualified fire risk assessor.
-
There are plenty of "Fire risk assessment" courses which are IFE Recognised. They may be useful courses in themselves but possibly are intended for someone doing in-house assessments which may be of a more limited scope than an external independent assessor would encounter across a range of businesses and premises.
-
Owain
You are absolutely correct, that was the original intention of such courses.
The loophole, wide enough to drive a bus through, was who was going to stop the individual with other ideas in mind.
Why after over 10 years of the RRO are we only now SERIOUSLY questioning the abilities of those who carry out assessments?
Who from the fire service advised the Government prior to its introduction because the shortfalls we are talking about now were clearly known then.
-
OK I know I've retired, But there is one question that puzzles me. It the external cladding was on fire, how come the lobbies and the escape staircase in the center of the building were smoke logged and impassible? Surely the stairs should have been a place of relative safety?
Puzzles me too Mike but I have a thought on why this would happen. We'll all have to wait until the official enquiry provides the answers.
With a fire that large, smoke may have been drawn in via the make-up air path for the staircase ventilation / pressurisation.
-
Who from the fire service advised the Government prior to its introduction
People who were expecting to leave the fire service and looked forward to a lucrative career in the private sector?
-
If I remember right the Regulatory Reform Order was born from the Workplace regulations which were a European requirement.
At the time of the consultations with the fire services regarding the proposed Workplace Regulations I remember distinctly the concerns and fears of allowing responsible persons to undertake their own fire risk assessments as the knowledge and experience was not available.
At that time the workplace regulations did not apply to certified (by the fire authority) premises. The introduction of the RRO was intended to de-regulate fire safety and place a duty on the responsible person. This self-regulation unfortunately in many cases became financially driven and was used to provide cheaper methods/solutions not always with the best results.
When consultants provided guidance or advice to responsible persons that were considered to be expensive responsible persons could simply find another assessor who would be willing to provide a cheaper alternative, even though the protection may not be as effective.
The birth of the so called consultants and assessors with a few days training has in my opinion considerably reduced the level of fire safety in the UK and this not only applies to the private sector but the fire authorities who gave similar short training to personnel then sent them out to audit fire risk assessments. The regulations require that persons not only have relevant knowledge but also experience. Experience cannot be given in a classroom but must be obtained by supervised and monitored practical application of the standards over a considerable time.
My view may be considered cynical by some but it is born from experience and practice of 30 odd years in fire safety seeing many shortcomings, errors and bad practice.
-
If I remember right the Regulatory Reform Order was born from the Workplace regulations which were a European requirement.
At the time of the consultations with the fire services regarding the proposed Workplace Regulations I remember distinctly the concerns and fears of allowing responsible persons to undertake their own fire risk assessments as the knowledge and experience was not available.
At that time the workplace regulations did not apply to certified (by the fire authority) premises. The introduction of the RRO was intended to de-regulate fire safety and place a duty on the responsible person. This self-regulation unfortunately in many cases became financially driven and was used to provide cheaper methods/solutions not always with the best results.
When consultants provided guidance or advice to responsible persons that were considered to be expensive responsible persons could simply find another assessor who would be willing to provide a cheaper alternative, even though the protection may not be as effective.
The birth of the so called consultants and assessors with a few days training has in my opinion considerably reduced the level of fire safety in the UK and this not only applies to the private sector but the fire authorities who gave similar short training to personnel then sent them out to audit fire risk assessments. The regulations require that persons not only have relevant knowledge but also experience. Experience cannot be given in a classroom but must be obtained by supervised and monitored practical application of the standards over a considerable time.
My view may be considered cynical by some but it is born from experience and practice of 30 odd years in fire safety seeing many shortcomings, errors and bad practice.
In my part of the world JJ the FRA approach was sold on the basis that it would be very cost neutral in that, through the rose tinted glasses of politicos, all businesses had to do was manage their fire safety as the infrastructure was already in place because of the good work of building control and by self policing under previous legislation.
Light years from the real world self regulation was not enforced by proactive auditing by enforcement authorities and BC seemed to make up FS on the hoof.
The standard of building construction in NI is pathetic and a plasterboard ceiling hides a multitude of sins going on the basis that if fire risk assessors cared to have a good old poke around above suspended ceilings or in service shafts they would see the real world construction methodology.
I have not doubt that, despite the fire safety input from other authorities, for what it was worth, the cock ups have been concealed and a lowly fire risk assessor will be expected to see through plasterboard or crawl through a nail hole in search of the defects or omissions of fire safety standards when those ultimately responsible, but not legally, move on to their next car crash.
There is to be an enquiry and maybe a criminal investigation but be very very sure that those ultimately responsible will not be.
-
My experience of construction in NI, which straddles more than forty years, is that it is of a good standard, supported by good designers, professional tradesmen and a solid inspection regime. Having said that, there are occasions when " pathetic" would be a good descriptor of some aspects of the work produced. All fire safety professionals should be on the look out for such works and where observed, reported to the relevant persons.
If out of politeness, you tell the chef that the meal was very nice when it was, in fact, pathetic, how will he ever know to put things right?
-
Why in ADB vol 2 a firefighting lobby is required for a firefighting shaft in all building requiring a firefighting shaft except flats (17.14)?
-
Why after over 10 years of the RRO are we only now SERIOUSLY questioning the abilities of those who carry out assessments?
If you delve back into the older posts on this forum, the abilities of those carrying out assessments has been questioned. Third party assessment schemes are in place but there is no requirement for an assessor to belong to one of these. In general the reported experience is that membership of these schemes did not appear to provide any significant benefits to the assessor.
The attitude of the government appeared to be that if legislation required set qualifications this would lead to a monopoly of trained consultants with a corresponding effect on the price.
The end result is that anyone can call themselves a fire risk assessor and there is a wide spectrum of people doing it. The people who are doing it range from experienced fire engineers who may or may not have a fire service background to Health and Safety consultants who want to add another aspect to their business, not to forget the fire extinguisher salesmen.
The saying 'as you sow, so shall you reap' comes to mind.
-
Dear Members
This thread has been locked
This is due to a criminal investigation which is now in progress and a public enquiry to be started in the very near future on all aspects of the Greville Tower incident
This action has not been taken lightly as it has always been a sounding board for the Fire Safety industry to share and learn from
However some statements on this tread are airing assumptions as fact and this cannot be left open ended.
I have only had to take this action once before again with a criminal prosecution pending
I am sure that you will understand my action as the owner of this forum
Colin S
FireNet