BWF fire door short video

[Clevelandfire 3]

I notice the oh so holy didnt respond back to your argument Civvy, Perhaps the truth hurts.

[CivvyFSO]

I was wondering...

The funny thing is that even if you take the 3 deaths as an extreme example, and 0 deaths as extreme in the other case, average them out to get 1.5 deaths per year it is still a 66 million to 1 chance. STILL way off being 10 times as safe.

The problem with that is that fire safety should not be based around what happens on average, we are attempting to protect people when the particularly unusual or extremely unlikely happens.

[nearlythere]

The problem with that is that fire safety should not be based around what happens on average, we are attempting to protect people when the particularly unusual or extremely unlikely happens.

Think I have to disagree with you there Civvy. Can we really provide fire safety measures for the unusual and extremely unlikely? I think we can only provide measures for the protection of persons from likely scenarios based on past incidents and a logical analysis of situations. The mind would go into melt down if you had to take in to consideration very unlikely and unusual situations.
Do you give consideration to the building being hit by an 747? It would be unusual and extremely unlikely and as such an acceptable risk.

[Tom Sutton]

I did read the thread again and when I read reply #2 “It’s a brilliant demo of why I/us waste peoples money demanding upgrading of existing fire doors” I realised how off course I was with my responses and why CT was so confused with my postings. In future any threads I am interested in I will occasionally check out from the start to make sure I fully understand the question. As was drummed into us many years ago don’t try to answer the question until you have read it at leased twice.

Despite this much of the thread is certainly food for thought.

p.s. I remember a promotion exam some time ago when a question was asked on Heath fires and at least 50% of the candidates submitted pages on Hearth fires.

[CivvyFSO]

Think I have to disagree with you there Civvy. Can we really provide fire safety measures for the unusual and extremely unlikely? I think we can only provide measures for the protection of persons from likely scenarios based on past incidents and a logical analysis of situations.

IMO Fire safety is based on the unusual and unlikely.

A fire isn't a likely scenario in the first place in most premises. If there is a fire, then that is one unlikely occurrence straight away. The average fire in the average shop will lead to an alarm being raised and everyone safely walking out eventually. Now for it to happen in the back store room, just on the day that the big mothers day delivery of cards has come in is even more unlikely by a factor of 365. Then for this to happen on the only day in the last 3 months that you have a disabled person on the first floor, and have wedged the door open between the store room and the retail area for ease of stock movement is going even further. But these sort of things can and do happen, but the good procedures and attention to persons at risk etc that you will raise awareness of during a risk assessment (or that we will enforce or advise about) will counteract this without looking at all the particular different possiblities.

[colin todd]

Forgive my delay in responding, but incompetent enforcement of fire safety legislation, plus a very serious crime in respect of which I am appointed as an expert for the police has precluded me from time to deal with the playground banter of some of the Firenetters. Civvy you will understand the point people are making about the lack of need to avoid the extremely unlikely if, like so many operational firefighters, you did some study of HSE policy on this subject. A Scottish O grade in statistics would also have stood you in good stead, and you would have realised that a one off single incident in one year is next best to irrelevant statistically. You need to take a number of years, which is what I did for you. And I am not aware of the roll of intumescent strips or otherwise in the Penhallows fire, in which at least one death was from jumping out of a window as I recall. If you would enlighten us as to the fire resistance of the doors in the premises and the effect of intumescent strips and smoke seals I am sure we would all be pleased to learn. We can all recount incidents of unusual disasters but as I have already said we did not fit 3 engines to 737s just because people were killed when British Midland proved beyond all doubt that planes dont fly when you shut down both engines. Happily wearing another hat I am greatly encouraged to find the number of experienced fire officers who are happy to accept existing fire doors without strips or seals. Possibly their operational experience of REAL fires proves of value in this respect.

[kurnal]

The debate over the retro fitting of fire and smoke seals to older type fire doors that originally did not have them is an interesting one. We seem to be on the one hand looking to reduce the level of risk as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP), but always with one eye on the legal definition of ALARP and the other eye on the National Guidance documents which give us some sort of benchmark - describing standards and typical solutions that may be used to inform the fire risk assessment.

Then we have some fire authorities or inspectors who then set out their own over arching prescriptive policies - such as poster DavidRH experienced- requiring all fire doors to be retro fitted with fire and smoke seals- clearly an unreasonable stance but another benchmark applicable in their area.
I will not re-iterate the arguments and history here of BS476 and neutral planes and time to flashover. All good points made by others.
I just wanted to make the following points.

1 - Most of my clients want me to find them a cost effective fire safety solution both to satisfy the duty of ALARP but equally to ensure that they satisfy the requirements of the Enforcing Authority. Where I know that an Authority has a policy on this then I go along with it and recommend their standards. Most of my clients dont want hassle with a fire authority inspector. They want that warm glow of satisfaction from a positive audit. This is invariably a bigger factor than saving a few quid on some seals. I will advise them of what they need to provide first to satisfy ALARP and second to achieve no hassle from the inspector.

2- Dead end conditions in sleeping accommodation,  doors protecting single staircases and maybe bedroom corridors in  old hotels with heat detectors in bedrooms -  these are examples of places where my gut feeling is to recommend seals be retrofitted if not already provided. Elsewhere I will be a little more subjective.

3- The right type of heat and smoke seal may be used to correct defects in other situations- where damage or shrinkage has occurred.

4- Whilst ever we base our fire risk assessments on qualitative judgement we will continue to have these arguments. But I dont think  there ever be sufficient data or modelling programs available to enable accurate quantitative risk assessment to be undertaken at this macro level.- enabling the judgement to be taken beyond the opinion of expert witnessess.   

5- The bottom line is this- if we are looking at achieving ALARP, is an older type fire door in perfect condition going to perform better in a fire if retro fitted with seals. I would suggest that that any door fitted with seals will perform better than the same door without seals. Seals are cheap, easily fitted,- I could say as a risk control measure - Reasonably Practicable in almost every case.

Now the question is that risk control measure required in the first place. Back to square one. 

[nearlythere]

The debate over the retro fitting of fire and smoke seals to older type fire doors that originally did not have them is an interesting one. We seem to be on the one hand looking to reduce the level of risk as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP), but always with one eye on the legal definition of ALARP and the other eye on the National Guidance documents which give us some sort of benchmark - describing standards and typical solutions that may be used to inform the fire risk assessment.

Then we have some fire authorities or inspectors who then set out their own over arching prescriptive policies - such as poster DavidRH experienced- requiring all fire doors to be retro fitted with fire and smoke seals- clearly an unreasonable stance but another benchmark applicable in their area.
I will not re-iterate the arguments and history here of BS476 and neutral planes and time to flashover. All good points made by others.
I just wanted to make the following points.

1 - Most of my clients want me to find them a cost effective fire safety solution both to satisfy the duty of ALARP but equally to ensure that they satisfy the requirements of the Enforcing Authority. Where I know that an Authority has a policy on this then I go along with it and recommend their standards. Most of my clients dont want hassle with a fire authority inspector. They want that warm glow of satisfaction from a positive audit. This is invariably a bigger factor than saving a few quid on some seals. I will advise them of what they need to provide first to satisfy ALARP and second to achieve no hassle from the inspector.

2- Dead end conditions in sleeping accommodation,  doors protecting single staircases and maybe bedroom corridors in  old hotels with heat detectors in bedrooms -  these are examples of places where my gut feeling is to recommend seals be retrofitted if not already provided. Elsewhere I will be a little more subjective.

3- The right type of heat and smoke seal may be used to correct defects in other situations- where damage or shrinkage has occurred.

4- Whilst ever we base our fire risk assessments on qualitative judgement we will continue to have these arguments. But I dont think  there ever be sufficient data or modelling programs available to enable accurate quantitative risk assessment to be undertaken at this macro level.- enabling the judgement to be taken beyond the opinion of expert witnessess.   

5- The bottom line is this- if we are looking at achieving ALARP, is an older type fire door in perfect condition going to perform better in a fire if retro fitted with seals. I would suggest that that any door fitted with seals will perform better than the same door without seals. Seals are cheap, easily fitted,- I could say as a risk control measure - Reasonably Practicable in almost every case.

Now the question is that risk control measure required in the first place. Back to square one. 

Totally agree K. The way I look at it if an I/O comes along, asks the boss for the FRA, looks around for 1/2 hr, hands the FRA back and says "have a nice day sir" on his way out, then the I/O is happy, the boss is happy and I'm happy. Job done.
 

[Midland Retty]

Generally agree Kurnal, although I wouldn't want anyone to be discouraged from challenging local fire authorities and their inspectors!

It is a two way street and there are mechanismans where determination can be sought from the Secretary of State. I think the use of determinations would help to establish clearer boundaries and guidelines.

Can I ask has anyone yet from the forum used the determination route?

Conversely are there any of you who have little confidence in,or have been discouraged from, using this process?

[wee brian]

Only one has been published so far. It's early days yet

http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/firesafety/firesafetylaw/fsodeterminations/

[Tom Sutton]

And I am not aware of the roll of intumescent strips or otherwise in the Penhallows fire, in which at least one death was from jumping out of a window as I recall.

The reason the person jumped was because the spread of fire was not controlled adequately which is relevant to the MOE. I am not suggesting the fire resistance of  doors was to blame, more likely fire doors wedged open, and he will have died as the result injuries due to the fall however the reason was unsatisfactory fire precautions, assuming arson has been ruled out. I think both Penhallows and the Blackpool are good examples of what can happen if you get the fire precautions wrong either physical or managerial.

[nearlythere]

Only one has been published so far. It's early days yet

http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/firesafety/firesafetylaw/fsodeterminations/

Any determinations I have read so far in relation to smoke seals and intumescent strips have been in favour of F&RS.
I would asume that other rooms opening onto bedroom corridors should have doors fitted with belt and braces also?

[colin todd]

TW. I thnk you will find that arson was far from ruled out!
Grand Master Retty, yes to the first part of your question. Lips are sealed on 2nd and third parts.

[CivvyFSO]

Forgive my delay in replying. But incompetent placing of a red blanket by Iggle Piggle, followed by a runaway ball scenario meant that I had to sit through two episodes of "In the night garden" back to back.

Civvy you will understand the point people are making about the lack of need to avoid the extremely unlikely if, like so many operational firefighters, you did some study of HSE policy on this subject.

If the life safety aspect of fire safety is not based on the unlikely then why do we insist on 2 of everything? Surely the risk of a fan failing at the same time as a fire occurring is particularly small, yet we always want the backup duty fan. I do appreciate however that this only extends a certain degree, and eventually the risks are classed as not worth protecting against.

A Scottish O grade in statistics would also have stood you in good stead, and you would have realised that a one off single incident in one year is next best to irrelevant statistically.

Maybe an O Level in Maths at the school I went to would have helped you see that it is less irrelevant than your claim that you are 10 times more likely to die in your own home. Your main comment attempting to justify it fell short of the mark as you completely failed to take into account the actual number of nights people spend in their homes. If you want to question my maths feel free, but I am quite sure that it is your maths that is suspect on this occasion.

Also, when hotel fire deaths are in the range of 0 to 5 deaths a year, a year with at least 3 deaths is not irrelevant at all. It is twisting it a bit using that year on it's own, but even if the average number of deaths is 1.5 per year, that equates to approximately a similar risk as in dwellings.

You need to take a number of years, which is what I did for you.

The only information you supplied to me was that we spend 100 million nights a year in hotels. If you would like to go back 10 years and give the average number of deaths on hotel fires per year, then unless the average number of deaths per year in hotels is less than 0.156 per year then your "10 times as likely" statement is still wrong.

And I am not aware of the roll of intumescent strips or otherwise in the Penhallows fire

Nor am I. That was not the point I was making. My point was purely based on comparing the likelihood of dying due to a night in a hotel or a night at home. And we should remember that it is not just deaths that we are protecting against:-

From UK Fire Statistics:

In 2006, the highest non-fatal casualty rates in fires in other buildings
occurred in public administration buildings – includes police stations and
prisons – (146 non-fatal casualties per 1,000 fires). High injury rates were also
recorded in chemical industrial premises (124 non-fatal casualties per 1,000
fires) and hotels (109 non-fatal casualties per 1,000 fires).

Good old 'safe' hotels?

[colin todd]

The maths is correct. And I come back to the principle that you can ignore risks of less than 1 in a million per annum in general.  As for the standard of fire precautions needed for hotel fire safety, it reached the point of greatly diminishing returns years ago. If you want to save the world, go knock on the doors in deprived areas of Middlesbrough (but not when its dark) and give them a smoke alarm.