Fatal flats blaze inquiry starts

[Thomas Brookes]

Investigations are under way into the cause of a tower block fire that left six people dead, including a three-week-old baby and two children.

Fire bosses believe it will take "weeks if not months" to establish how the blaze, in south-east London, happened.

About 30 people were rescued from the fire at the 12-storey Lakanal House on the Sceaux Gardens Estate, Camberwell.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/8134138.stm

I have recently been installing some safety signs in some London tower blocks, and when I made the comment about a fire detection system I was told by the Housing Association H & S bod that they had full approval from the F&R Service that they don't need one because fires in these building do not spread they are always contained in the flat where the fire starts.
They also do not have any fire fighting appliances for the residents to use and they were even moaning about us putting up photoluminescant signs on the internal staircases (which do not have any emergncy escape lighting) because again they have been advised they do not need it.

Surely this proves that these fire can spread even in purpose built blocks of flats, I would love to know if this block has a full detection system in the common area's fire doors etc etc, Anyone know where a report on this incedent will be availible from.

[nearlythere]

The problem with building blocks of so called sealed units is that nobody seems to monitor the quality of workmanship to ensure that fire stopping is properly adhered to. It can be easy to see whats behind a suspended ceiling but not so a stud partition as I am finding out.
I would say that there are many many buildings certified as being in compliance with Building Regulations, which is very very different to actually being so.

[Phoenix]

I have recently conducted a FRA at a London 19 storey block of self contained flats, with AFD in all means of escape routes, and naturally ventilated escape corridors and staircase.  

Unless you tested it and know otherwise, it is likely that the AFD in the common parts of the block will not raise the alarm in the building.  They are usually linked to the local AOV (i.e. in the same space) and their sole purpose is to open that AOV in the event of smoke leaking into the escape route.

Stu

[Phoenix]

That's very unusual - and interesting...

[jokar]

Can anyone explain how an L4 system will prevent people dying in a fire?  Once the smoke is in the escape route it may well be impassable.  The provision of detection in these types of blocks will not aid escape and dependent on the separation issues cause more difficulties in many people using the only escape route whilst firefighters are trying to tackle a fire.

[David Rooney]

I thought an L2 system was required in the common parts - ie. a heat detector inside the front door of each flat connected to the common system as well as sounders within bedrooms etc?

How do you get away with L4??

The consultant/contractor and everyone else involved should be questioned....

[Phoenix]

I thought an L2 system was required in the common parts - ie. a heat detector inside the front door of each flat connected to the common system as well as sounders within bedrooms etc?

How do you get away with L4??

The consultant/contractor and everyone else involved should be questioned....

Notwithstanding the recent fire in Camberwell, there is not normally any requirement for common areas in blocks of self contained flats.  The one hour enclosures around each flat are justification for the 'defend in place' (sit tight, stay put, call it what you will) fire strategies that are applied.  The only alarm requirements are normally for part 6 systems within flats - they are there to get people to their front doors - the assumption being that from that point on they are safe due to the compartmentation.

There are a range of premises where there may be a need for common area coverage, maybe halls of residence, sheltered flats, etc, but not normally 19 storey blocks of self contained flats.

Now, returning to Camberwell, there are bound to be widespread questions about the reliability of this compartmentation and about the effectiveness of the 'defend in place' policy but we can't speculate in that direction until more is revealed about the particular circumstances of that case.

I feel that it is unlikely that there will be any change to the pragmatic 'defend in place' policy.  We're more likely to see significant issues raised regarding compartmentation. 

On that issue, if fire did spread via external means then this is starting to become a recurrent problem and there may be a need to reconsider the traditional stance of assuming that compartmentation will not be breached by external means along a horizontal wall.

Stu

[FireDave]

Having looked at the video footage available at the start of this thread, I am surprised no-one has commented that there appears to three individual fires on the front elevation and one on the very end of the building.

The main area of fire is one flat above another, which does raise the question of compartmentation, as the flats appear to have a common external balcony access to their front doors.  The other fires appear remote from the main one with no evidence of fire spread showing externally.

Comments??

[Mike Buckley]

The news reports I have heard state that the fire is believed to have started in the stairwell. Without seeing the plans it is difficult to assess how it spread.

However I was also struck by the positions of the flats involved in the fire. It was speculated that one of the reasons for the fire spread was that people had their windows open due to the hot weather but I would have expected a vertical spread of the fire not the offset result shown in the video footage. Difficult to comment too much as there is no information on the amount of internal damage.

If it did start in the stairwell this must raise concerns about the management of these areas as it would seem to attack the assumptions we usually make about the common areas.

[jokar]

Lets us not go down the line of a defend in place strategy.  Many high rise builidngs were built prior to the Building Regulations and therefore the structure will not support that type of evacuation strategy.  Also, RS's when undertaking their roles in blocks should assess the level of compartmentation both primary and secondary and not guess at what it is or could be.  This set of circumstances could happen anywhere and some of these blocks are not flats or apartments but maisonettes.

[Phoenix]

Lets us not go down the line of a defend in place strategy.

Why not?   (Ohhhh, I can hear the arguments already..... yeah, ok, point taken.......No more....)

Many high rise builidngs were built prior to the Building Regulations and therefore the structure will not support that type of evacuation strategy.

Let me just get this straight... If someone who lives on the 14th floor in a 15 storey block of flats, built in, say, the early 70s burns the toast and opens their front door to ventilate the few whiffs of smoke that result, then the smoke will reach a detector that will evacuate the entire building.  I can't see it.

Also, RS's when undertaking their roles in blocks should assess the level of compartmentation both primary and secondary and not guess at what it is or could be.

That's fine.  But just how exactly will they do that?  Without guessing...?  This isn't meant to be rhetorical irony, I'd really like to know.

This set of circumstances could happen anywhere

You ain't wrong there.

some of these blocks are not flats or apartments but maisonettes.

Note that the word "maisonette" has led to confusion in the past and so the phrase has been abandoned for the more unambiguous "multi-storey flats."  But the point you raise is significant.  The recent deaths in London may have been because of inadequate means of escape to the front door of the flat - I don't know, but it's a possibility.  Multi-storey flats demand a safer means of escape to the front door than single storey flats.

Stu

[David Rooney]

I thought an L2 system was required in the common parts - ie. a heat detector inside the front door of each flat connected to the common system as well as sounders within bedrooms etc?

How do you get away with L4??

The consultant/contractor and everyone else involved should be questioned....

Notwithstanding the recent fire in Camberwell, there is not normally any requirement for common areas in blocks of self contained flats.  

True...sorry not clear but but I was referring to S Hoods post of the building he surveyed with an L4 sytem... which seems to have disappeared....!!

[Benzerari]

So how many babies and kids should be killed to introduce flats to BS5839 part 1, which is more tighter than part 6  ?

What's the difference between people living 24/7 in block towers and those working 8 hours in commercial buildings, some thing must be wrong in this philosophy.

http://www.blinkx.com/video/camberwell-flat-fire-victims-named/ipaEWdM-ysdCOgujEjxrYg

[Mike Buckley]

To be cynical, the money for upgrading the fire system in comercial premises comes from the profits of the organisation. The money for upgrading the fire system in council tower blocks comes from our pockets via the rates.

People are happy for the rich directors to lose abit of money but putting the taxes up is bad news for politicians especially round election time.

[Big T]

Without wishing to annoy anyone, the mere thought of a communal fire alarm system annoys me. Totally unmanageable and totally pointless.

Evac strategy in a high rise block of flats would NEVER EVER work.

Defend in place is a strategy employed since the creation of the first high rise there is no legal requirement for a communal fire alarm system and without one an evac strategy cannot occur.

It annoys me that people say that stay put can only be employed in a block built after 1991. Ridiculous. How did they evacuate building built prior to that then? Magic and dreams? CP3 never equired a communal alarm system so how could evac take place?

I refuse to get emotional about the fire. We must be pragmatic and logical in our approach. Hundreds of fires occur in blocks of flats every year. Over literally decades. This is the first fire of this significance in a block of flats.

We do not know the results of the investogation yet. So we cannot speculate on cause or how we intend to improve things.

We had a fire in a communal area 2 weeks ago. Arson, matress, communal area. Smoke vents operated, no communal fire alarm system, no injuries, no deaths,no fire spread between floors despite the arsonist wedging a staircase door open.

FD30 doors, Class O wall coverings, no communal combustibles and smoke control is our strategy in this building twinned with a stay put policy.

Poor risk assessment or fowl play? Both I'll warrant.

But don't bring me a revised 5588 pt 1 requireing communal alarms, because I guarantee the fire service false alarm reduction manager will be begging for them to be removed in under a year.