Bedrooms as inner rooms in post war CP3 flats

[Argyle]

Your thoughts would be appreciated - we have a considerable number of flats where egress from a bedroom is via the lounge in order to reach the front door - with no alterantive available. We are just about to start talking to our Housing Authority on this issue and we are looking at either making structural alteration to create by pass routes through the kitchen ( where possible) , upgrading the smoke detection to LD1 , 5 year fixed wire testing. the other problem is doing all of this work without over alarming the residents. 

[Midland Retty]

Hi Argyle

I think the best and most practical solution is to create an alternative into the kitchen as you have already mentioned. I take it that there is an inner hall off the lounge leading to the bedrooms, or are the bedrooms directly off the lounge ?

Furthermore what additional rooms will be protected by detection if you upgrade to LD1?

Just out of interest had there used to be alternative exits provided (ie balcony escape) ?

[Argyle]

Thanks -

Yes there is a lobby between the bedrooms and the lounge. No, there is no linking balcony or pass door to alternative. At the moment for various reasons the flats have been fitted with hardwired detection to varying standards some have one , majority have 2 and a small number of flats have three. - I should point out there are two lobbies in each flat . From the bedroom you come into a lobby from this you then go into the lounge . from the lounge you then enter another very small lobby which has the flat entrance door and the door to the kitchen. So if we were to increase the detection it would be to the lounge , bedrooms and a heat in the kitchen. We have nearly a 1000 of these properties so what ever we do it is going to be a major project and it will not happen over night.

[kurnal]

How high / how many storeys Argyle?  When were they built?

They dont sound like CP3 flats to me with that layout. Not without an alternative escape route of some sort. The original CP3 chapter 4 part 1 (if I recall) applied to buildings over 80 ft and was amended circa 1963 (relying on memory) to apply to buildings of 3 storeys and above. Later amendments took place in 1971.  I think I have most of these old guidance documents. Are you looking at a single development or are they scattered over a wide area?

[kurnal]

Another thought- they sometimes created these lobbies between lounge and bedrooms when only one of the bedrooms could achieve a window or balcony exit.

[Clevelandfire 3]

the layout fits figure 3 in cp3 except these flats dont have balcony alternative. did it have balcony escape before?Door into kitchen will be the only route to provide adequate m/o/e. Don't see what additional protection an LD1 system will give you if an LD2 is applied properly.

[Argyle]

To reply to a few questions - they were built in around 1955/56 . In total they cover about a 100 seperate blocks . And they do resembbel the layout in fig 3 of CP3 1971 . All of the blocks are four storey. How and why they were built without a linking balcony or alternative i do not know !

[colin todd]

I hate to say it but the answer might be suppression though an alternative route is the ideal solution..

[Clevelandfire 3]

Disagree Col. suppression will stop fire from growing but wont stop means of escape becoming untenable.will still get smoke filled lounge. that means they stay put awaiting rescue in bedroom. me no likey.

[Argyle]

Thanks everyone -"talking to myself" - 
From what I can determine the approach that has been taken across the country ( talking to a number of RSL's) has been to upgrade the smoke detection. Although I accept this as an improvment in the level of safety I am not convinced it is the best way forward. It is impractical to retro fit in alternative escape routes. Possibly the best way forward is to protect the risk rooms- lounge & kitchen by means of a suppresion system.  The next problem would be -how do we fit in suppression systems to 1000 properties with out someone saying to the tenants - oh by the way were doing this becasue your home is a potential death trap?
So in many ways I come back to the improvmernt to the levels of smoke detection ( we can sell this without raising tenant concerns ) secondly to ensure that we do a fixed wiring check more regularly than 10 years say every 5 , and ensure all flats have RCD fuse boards. Ensure all rooms have "doors". Offer all relevant tenats a home safety check with the local fire service (we have a paid partnership arrangment with them). And then convince the RSL to put in a regeneration programme to replace these buildings

[nearlythere]

Do I not remember a Determination where fire suppression in the access room to a bedroom was rejected as being an inadequate control measure?

[Midland Retty]

Although it would be impractical in this instance, I wouldn't dismiss completely the supression idea in similar properties.

Even if you live in a flat with a conventional layout you could argue that there is a potential that tenants become trapped in their bedroom in the event of fire. Tenants prop or remove doors, and do other things to put themselves at risk of fire and fire spread!

In most flats tenants would not be alerted of a fire occurring until the stand alone detector in their hallway is sounding.

By the time those residents wake up, realise whats going on, throw some clothes on, the hallway may be smoke logged! 

In this scenario tenants are advised to await rescue in their bedrooms (by fire brigades) ie; close door, put bedding underneath the door, open window, call the fire service, and await rescue.

So with that in mind is the provision of a supression system going to be any different? Even if the lounge is untenable the fire will be controlled and won't get bigger, the tenants should be able to remain in their bedrooms safely if the lounge is impassable (there is an inner hall between them afterall)

But I accept that the cost and perception of tenants means the provision of suppression systems isn this scenario is probably a non starter.

[jokar]

Do I not remember a Determination where fire suppression in the access room to a bedroom was rejected as being an inadequate control measure?

Scotland, the land of the missionaries!

[kurnal]

BS 9991 (the document that replaced BS 5588-1) allows for bedrooms to be inner rooms provided a suppression system is fitted.

Rights and wrongs apart it is a recently published standard.

I would like to ask Cleveland 3 in dismissing sprinklers what would you suggest to make things safer? I dont agree with BS 9991 but I believe the flats would be safer with sprinklers than without.

[Clevelandfire 3]

i would put in the bypass door to the kitchen. early warning in lounge so that if theres a fire the residents goes through the kitchen instead. the reason i dont like the suppression option is based on the fact that your average joe wont want to stop in a flat if he knows its on fire. they wont grasp the concept of what the system does. simples.