Physical Security V Fire Safety

[Gary Howe]

I have been asked for advice on an industrial premises, with a history of break ins,  where the building ocupier has deemed the panic bar release mechanism on the fire door to be insufficient as the sole means of securing the door. He has requested that the door have an additional Chubb dead lock fitted, so that when the premises is closed the door is more secure. I have suggested the following:

Option 1: electro-magentic door locks (linked to the fire CIE) to the door + manual override.

Option 2: local audible warning unit to the doors.

Option 3: good on site fire safety management whereby the unlocking of the doors, is recorded in the log book as evidence of the door being unlocked, ready for

Could I have some advice please on balancing good fire safety provisions and reasonable security measures.

What is the best option?

[Guest]

There are lots of sites that will give details of security panic hardware. These devices with an alarm is the answer.
Out of hours any security device can be used such as a simple drop bar. There must however be a management procedure to remove it during working hours. I reccommend you keep the solution simple.
Try searching on security panic bars. there are lots of sites.
All the things you suggest could be OTT.

[Chris Houston]

We used to recommend the Abloy multi point fire exit door locking system, but I think these are no longer manufactured.

Try contacting ASSA and ask for a brochure on their "high security multipoint locking system" on 020 8688 5191, I think it might fit your needs.

[Guest]

As a local authority fire safety inspecting officer I would have no problem with a dead lock being fitted...indeed, fit three or four. What you MUST have is some robust system of making sure these deadlocks are unlocked at all times when the doors may be required. (We'll risk the dodgy burglar in the middle of the night being fried!). This system should be foolproof, ie cover times when people are working late, when the caretaker is on leave or sick, etc. If this is goling to be difficult to ensure then the drop down bar with good staff training will probably be the best solution.

[colin todd]

Be careful about mag locks with overrides on doors with panic bars. There would then be two means of securing the dorr, which is not usually acceptable.

[Gary Howe]

Thank you Guest, Chris, John and Colin  for your prompt responses, as with all things there seems to be a number of ways of achieving the objective.

Chris, Thanks for the info oin the multipoint locking mechanism, I will contact them and see if they will send me a glossy brochure.

Colin, You mentioned that two methods of securing the door, as usually being unacceptable, I presume you mean this is unacceptable to the local fire officer, and changes as you move around the country?

What do you mean by usually?, does this mean some fire brigades accept it and some do not.

[AnthonyB]

I'd be interested in whether acceptance/objection against mag locks to panic bolts is variable.

Recently had a long discussion with a client over such a situation. My arguement was if a panic device was indicated by the type & location of exit (which it was) then it must remain panic activated (i.e. by crush pressure) at material times and a mag-lock would render the door a non panic exit. The lock did not have an over-ride break glass and it was not clear if the lock was fail to safe although it did have fire alarm relay.

Not all emergency evacuations may involve fire alarm actuation and even if there was a break glass override, it is not panic capable.

More common I find Redlam bolts added to panic bolt doors, which again defeat the panic capable nature of the door (I find training & perception of Redlam bolts so poor they are marginally better than the dreaded key in box- most people see the padlock that prevents removal of the tube intact & think it's a locked door)

All these situations have involved additions over time to doors that when originally installed only had panic hardware & have had additions over the years for "security". In many cases it seems that fire authorities were either never consulted, were not bothered, or were never picked up due to lack of inspection (or inspection of a poor perfunctory kind)

[Guest]

GMCFS, (one that seems to avoid most of Colin's arrows) has recently defended an enforcement notice, (Under WP Regs) contested by a major supermarket operator. The notice required the removal of 'mag locks' from final exit doors, based primarily on no AFD and inadequate staff training. The case was argued by barristers before a stipendary magistrate and although it doesn't set case law, the written judgement  gives some interesting, non professional viewpoints. Contact on 0161 736 5866 and ask for fire safety dept. I'm sure they will email you the judgement. The only trouble is, as each RA is location and management  specific, it remains possible for any other dutyholder to argue the case back and forward. Indeed GMCFS has accepted these arrangements in other premises. Oh the joys of goal based fire safety assessments! Give it a few years and the CBI and Federation of Small Businesses will be pleading for prescriptive codes. Happy Xmas.

[Guest]

Do any one know that the concept of evacuation at height provided additional escape routes for high security buildings where the goals associated with allowing authorized people in and keeping the wrong people out is primarily to limit entrances into the building at the ground level,  without having to add on fire escape stairs from the design, which would otherwise have been needed, a significant space was saved and increased in security?

This evacuation approach vs fire safety is similar to provide more lifeboats on the ship to increase the level of the passengers’ ability to escape from an extreme event.

This security approach must be weighed against the potential impact of hindering the compliment of building occupants who may need to quickly evacuate the premises. Locking of stairwell doors to prevent re-entry, installation of turnstiles at building entrance points and installation of screening equipment can restrict, or outright fire egress through previously available routes. The ability to evacuate occupants at height levels provided more than one means of exiting the building at various strategic heights that would have a huge impact on the security and evacuation planning.

Example: escape chute can be provided as a secondary means of egress for air traffic control tower and communication tower, prison cells, security/money printing facility where it has limited access for emergency egress because of their secure facilities not open to the public.

[Guest]

God...boring again. Escape chute agents please note...only in exceptional circs will these ever be allowed in this country. Make something else for goodness sake.

[Guest]

Although not normally directly applicable to existing premises, I've found Sections 6.11 and 6.12 of the Approved Document 'B' to the E & W Building Regulations as useful 'ammunition' when discussing the issue of multiple fastenings on doors used on means of escape.  I quote:

"in general, doors on escape routes (whether or not the doors are fire doors), should either not be fitted with lock, latch or bolt fastenings, or they
should only be fitted with simple fastenings that can be readily operated from the side approached by people making an escape. The operation of
these fastenings should be readily apparent and without the use of a key and without having to manipulate more than one mechanism."

James Whittaker

[colin todd]

Carol, I have been interested in this case since I first heard of it. Any chance you can get me a copy of judgement. By the way, no arrows for GMCFB, because, in keeping with the local people, they are just so damn nice even when they are wrong. We offered them powered sliding doors in a bar, with movement detector to open them, opening on power failure, opening on operation of fire alarm, a green break glass to open them and if necessary a microswitch on the panic bar of adjacent fire exit door so that if it was opened the whacking great sliding doors opened too. Oh and for good measure, a wee man sitting by the door any time that special events (which is only time that numbers would have needed use of the sliding doors) were on. On site the IO and the BCO seemed impressed with that lot, but later reverted having spoken to the ADO to say, nope they dont accept sliding doors in licensed premises in GMC----what happened to risk assessment.? Now if that had been in L@@@@@, we would have gone to court. But the GMC IO had been so friendly and helpful that we had a bit of wall knocked out and an existing exit widened
(quite unnecessarily and giving less satisfactory escape than the sliding dorrs would have). To Gary, having 2 means of securing is not a good idea at all, especially if public could be involved. Even in other circs, I dont think it is right if numbers are significant. And I disagree with the idea that AFD is compensation.

[Ken Taylor]

With regard to additional locks fitted to final exit doors with panic bolts for security purposes when premises are not occupied, what is the current thinking, requirement and general practice on requiring adjacent signage stating that they are to be removed/unlocked when the building is occupied?

[AnthonyB]

Procedures & training plus the standard "remove all fastenings when....." sign in white text on blue circle is what we normally look for.
We prefer for more than one person to be designated to check the doors in case one forgets.

Unfortunately it is not foolproof & we often find the small shop unit that has omitted to remove the night bar from the rear doors........

[Ken Taylor]

Anthony, I just wondered to what extent this signage is still being required and enforced as I have suspicion that it is not so much in evidence these days.