Newgrange Care Home

[Tom W]

A "fierce fire" at a care home has left two people dead - with a further 33 having to be rescued from the collapsing building.

The blaze gutted Newgrange Care Home in Cadmore Lane, Cheshunt, after it broke out at about 06:00 BST.

Despite firefighters launching a "challenging" rescue operation, they were unable to save everyone inside.

Three more residents needed hospital treatment for minor burns and smoke inhalation, the fire service said.

Richard Hammond, an executive director at Princess Alexandra Hospital, said two of the three patients were still being treated but their condition was not known.

Chief fire officer for Hertfordshire, Darryl Keen, said the fire "had spread inside the roof all the way along the entire property".

"We had a number of people that were unable to get themselves out, you know, physically would not have been able to move even under normal circumstances," he said.

[Owain]

Tragic and very worrying.

It appears to have been a modern purpose-built building and the latest inspection found it 'safe'

Plans and guidance had been drawn up to help staff deal with unforeseen events and emergencies. The environment and equipment used were regularly checked and well maintained to keep people safe.

[SeaBass]

That's a CQC report finding. CQC reports do not focus on fire safety, and in practice rarely even mention it. The key report here will be the fire risk assessment, and possibly, depending on the age of the building or the date of any conversion/change of use, followed by a review of any building control approvals to see whether or not the use of the premises as a care home and the dependency levels of the residents were considered as part of that approval process.       

[Bruce89]

If the reports about the fire service having to carry out the number of rescues are true, the FRA in relation to  article 15 (1)(b) will be interesting.

[AnthonyB]

The description of the fire spread screams 'compartmentation!' but of course we will need to wait for the official report and inquest and if there are any charges resulting under various legislation.

With it being relatively modern and purpose built the number of rescues and casualties suggest something went very wrong.

[jayjay]

Looks like the fire was spreading in the roof void to me.  Had a similar incident a few years ago (prior to RRO  fire regs) separation had been provided but was not sealed effectively at underside of roof and access doors through the separation indicated Fire Door but were not.

Fortunately no one hurt bot 95% of roof lost.

How many assessors would have inspected the roof void ? I always made a point of checking them after the fire I atteded.

[Dinnertime Dave]

O

.

How many assessors would have inspected the roof void ? I always made a point of checking them after the fire I atteded.

How many assessors!

How many inspecting officers go in the roof? Haven't seen one yet.

[lyledunn]

I can understand why assessors and inspectors don't access the roof space, many drive cars with no room for any kind of step ladders and like to go to work dressed as if they were off to the opera. In any event there may well be justified and invented health and safety reasons. So they are unlikely to access voids above suspended ceilings where compartmentation issues often abound.
When carrying out inspections on the electrical engineering services in a building I go to the job in a van, have appropriate industrial-grade access equipment, lighting and method statements prepared. I look in roof spaces and in voids, I have overalls on and I am prepared to get dirty.
Perhaps time that the FRA guys and gals had a look in their wardrobes for some different attire?

[William 29]

The issue of large non-compartmented voids in roof spaces and the associated risks is well documented. However, we are still coming across this on new builds, that have been "passed" by building control or Approved Inspector. They would argue that a 60min ceiling in the top floor flats provides an equivocal standard to that provided in ADB, but it does not. Neither does cavity barriers.

All FRAs should be mentioning access to roof voids and spaces and if no access gained this should be clearly stated in the Limitations section of the FRA.

[David Rooney]

Forgive my ignorance as I only design FDA systems ... but what is the argument behind the "60 min ceiling" versus properly compartmented voids?

Is it simply that once a fire has found its way to the void the expectation is that the roof will "quickly" collapse through the ceiling?

Therefore the less compartmentation there is the quicker the spread the more roof is liable to collapse?

[Dinnertime Dave]

Forgive my ignorance as I only design FDA systems ... but what is the argument behind the "60 min ceiling" versus properly compartmented voids?

Is it simply that once a fire has found its way to the void the expectation is that the roof will "quickly" collapse through the ceiling?

Therefore the less compartmentation there is the quicker the spread the more roof is liable to collapse?

From my experience fires spread into the roof void via windows and through the soffit.

A 60 minute ceiling won't stop the fire from spreading once it gets in the roof void. Compartmentation will keep the fire to a manageable size allowing staff or firefighters time to evacuate or carry out rescues.

The chance of this happening is low, but the consequences are ........

[William 29]

Forgive my ignorance as I only design FDA systems ... but what is the argument behind the "60 min ceiling" versus properly compartmented voids?

Is it simply that once a fire has found its way to the void the expectation is that the roof will "quickly" collapse through the ceiling?

Therefore the less compartmentation there is the quicker the spread the more roof is liable to collapse?

The 60 min ceiling option has a major weakness. It will not provide the same protection from a fire originating in the roof void, or from a flat fire breaking through a window and attacking the roof externally. Also fire resistance is not measured in a downwards direction so the 60 min ceiling will only provide 60mins FR from the flat side, not from the void.

These type of fires are becoming more frequent I am afraid.

[Fishy]

Forgive my ignorance as I only design FDA systems ... but what is the argument behind the "60 min ceiling" versus properly compartmented voids?

Is it simply that once a fire has found its way to the void the expectation is that the roof will "quickly" collapse through the ceiling?

Therefore the less compartmentation there is the quicker the spread the more roof is liable to collapse?

The 60 min ceiling option has a major weakness. It will not provide the same protection from a fire originating in the roof void, or from a flat fire breaking through a window and attacking the roof externally. Also fire resistance is not measured in a downwards direction so the 60 min ceiling will only provide 60mins FR from the flat side, not from the void.

A bit geeky, but under the BS EN testing (BS EN 1364-2) you can actually fire resistance test a ceiling membrane from above , which you couldn't really do under BS 476-22.  This then allows you to specify fire-resisting ceilings that are classified as providing protection either with a fire from above, or below, or both (under BS EN 13501-2), using a cryptic combination of numbers, 'E's, 'I's 'a's, 'b's and arrows!  So, you could specify a ceiling construction that was fire resisting from both directions.  Whether anyone has actually bothered to do the tests and you could actually buy one is a rather different matter of course...

[William 29]

Forgive my ignorance as I only design FDA systems ... but what is the argument behind the "60 min ceiling" versus properly compartmented voids?

Is it simply that once a fire has found its way to the void the expectation is that the roof will "quickly" collapse through the ceiling?

Therefore the less compartmentation there is the quicker the spread the more roof is liable to collapse?

The 60 min ceiling option has a major weakness. It will not provide the same protection from a fire originating in the roof void, or from a flat fire breaking through a window and attacking the roof externally. Also fire resistance is not measured in a downwards direction so the 60 min ceiling will only provide 60mins FR from the flat side, not from the void.

A bit geeky, but under the BS EN testing (BS EN 1364-2) you can actually fire resistance test a ceiling membrane from above , which you couldn't really do under BS 476-22.  This then allows you to specify fire-resisting ceilings that are classified as providing protection either with a fire from above, or below, or both (under BS EN 13501-2), using a cryptic combination of numbers, 'E's, 'I's 'a's, 'b's and arrows!  So, you could specify a ceiling construction that was fire resisting from both directions.  Whether anyone has actually bothered to do the tests and you could actually buy one is a rather different matter of course...

Good info! But as you say I doubt anyone has done this as an option or even knows about it? It still wouldn't stop uncontrolled fire spread over the roof void though.

[wee brian]

I'd forgotten about this test procedure. Its a German thing apparently. I doubt its been used in the UK and I suspect there aren't many systems that'll give you an hour.