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FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => Fire Safety => Topic started by: Ricardo on February 19, 2009, 10:14:28 AM
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An interesting short film about fire doors is now available at this link
http://www.bwf.org.uk/firedoors.
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Just received my free BWF Fire Resisting Door Gap Checker it came with a CD containing the same video and also a maintenance guide.
see the site for requesting the Gap Checker
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Its a brilliant demo of why I/os waste peoples money demanding upgrading of exisiting fire doors.
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Disagree with last comments, the video is of a furnace test which produces nice clean white smoke, bit different from a plastic TV or foam mattres burning.
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Disagree with last comments, the video is of a furnace test which produces nice clean white smoke, bit different from a plastic TV or foam mattres burning.
The colour of the smoke makes little difference to whether the door burns through or not which is the whole point of a fire resisting doorset.
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CIVVVVVVVYYYYYYYYY!!!!!!! Am I to understand you have a modicum of agreement with me??????????Can this be true or is it just a wild dream on my part? Either way you have to agree the smoke is very pretty. Ummmmmmmmm I dont know much about these things of course, cos, like you, I cant double-declutch lorries, but if there was one of these new fangled fire detector thingys in that furnace would it not kind of notice the whacking great post flashover conditions in the furnace.
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Just received my free BWF Fire Resisting Door Gap Checker it came with a CD containing the same video and also a maintenance guide.
see the site for requesting the Gap Checker
How do you get the free gap checker? I could not see any hint of it on their website!
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Drop them a line here
http://www.bwf.org.uk/no_cache/firedoors/about-the-scheme/understanding-the-label/?sword_list%5B%5D=tester
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CIVVVVVVVYYYYYYYYY!!!!!!! Am I to understand you have a modicum of agreement with me??????????Can this be true or is it just a wild dream on my part? Either way you have to agree the smoke is very pretty. Ummmmmmmmm I dont know much about these things of course, cos, like you, I cant double-declutch lorries, but if there was one of these new fangled fire detector thingys in that furnace would it not kind of notice the whacking great post flashover conditions in the furnace.
I think it just might, and in a non-sleeping risk this should be enough to ensure a reasonable level of safety. In a sleeping risk the situation is clearly different, caused generally by potential excessive pre-movement times, and the alarm system design. If you want to say that people are safer in their rooms, then you need to afford them that level of safety where the extra few minutes a proper doorset gives them could be the difference between getting out or not.
Something I mention time and time again is that when we ask for something it is usually because what is in place is very poor. When someone comes on here bleeting about the jack booted FSO asking them to upgrade their doors, what they will tend to miss out in their description of the story is the 10mm gaps at the top and sides of the door, the hole where the handle used to be, the general poor management etc etc etc....
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Thank you Civvy!!!
Stop I/O baiting Sir Todd!!
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We should make it an Olympic sport.
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Brian, Can I represent England?
Civvy, We dont expect people to remain in rooms in hotels, though I confess the princess and I did so in edinburgh recently, but that was cos we knew that Lothian and Borders finest would never let us die. Equally, I see great hope for you that you will know as much as we fire brigade chaps one day.
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Earl retty of sutton coldfield, would I ever do such a thing?
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Civvy, We dont expect people to remain in rooms in hotels, though I confess the princess and I did so in edinburgh recently, but that was cos we knew that Lothian and Borders finest would never let us die.
But you are still looking at pre-movement times of potentially over 15 minutes according to PD7974-2 even with good management, upgrading a door could make a significant difference to an outcome there, although everything should clearly be taken on its own merits.
I am guessing that they had HD and you refused to move based on the knowledge that statistics show that you are very unlikely to die? Or they had SD and you refused to move purely on principle? :)
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Civvy
During the pre-movement time, it is unlikely that conditions will have reached flashover. Once they do, there will still be at least 15 minutes before a titchy wee flame is sustained on the safe side of the door, even without intumescent strips. By the time the strip blows, the occupants of the hotel will have checked into another hotel, had a 3 course meal, gone to bed, engaged in unbridled passion and fallen asleep, by which time they will probably have lost interest in the situation at their previous hotel, which, if located in London will be floating down the Thames aided by the discharge of 35 lines of hose discharged by the Messys.
With regards to the princess and myself strange as it may seem,I haven't the faintest idea what type of detectors were in the bedrooms of the hotel in question as taking an interest in that was not on my priority list.
As always, hope this helps with your CPD.
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I am not saying you are wrong, just looking for a good answer... What are you basing the unlikeliness of flashover within 15 minutes on? If we use HD as you like to suggest, then we are not picking a fire up in it's infancy, we are looking at something reasonably well developed before the alarm goes off. Due to this, the standard medium growth t2 fire is surely a reasonable assumption?
(I am not arguing as such, I am giving you the opportunity to change my mind. And I am claiming 10 minutes CPD for this) :P
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Just a thought.... It's highly likely any windows in the room will be non fire rated such that they will fail well before the doors so allowing a large quantity of the smoke and heat to escape .
Bungle
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A window failing might also mean flashover happens sooner.
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Are you sure you can get flashover conditions in a well ventilated area?
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Yes I am. Unless it is so well ventilated that the room will not reach 600C.
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Civvy, even if there were a pre movement time of 15 minutes, which I would dispute in any case, that will still leave 15-20 minutes before the titchy we flame appears. Am I bovvered about that-not in the least. Where are the deaths over the last 50 years to justify this expense???? Chat to some of the old hands in your F&RS, particularly the operational ones. Ask them how often people have died because the door wasnt 30 minutes. While you are there (if you can be bothered talking to old fire officers, which I hereby give you absolution if you cant) ask them how often in their operational experience they have seen a blown intumescent strip and in what circs. First Minister Retty will confirm all this I suspect.
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If an fire risk assessor, wishing to achieve a listing on a register such as that for example operated by the IFE, expressed such arguments as:
We dont need to upgrade existing fire doors without seals in hotels because nobody has ever died as a result of the lack of a seal, or
upgrading heat detectors to smoke detection in hotel bedrooms is always a Bad Thing, or
An accoustic- triggered door hold open device on a fire door which protects the only staircase in a small hotel is fine because its most unlikely that both power supplies to the fire alarm will fail simultaneously, or
A mix of sounders is fine because persons will hear one signal and respond to it, it does not matter if the sound changes as they make their escape and are unlikely to turn back, or
It doesnt matter if the emergency escape lighting batteries are only rated at 30 minutes because all relevant persons should be out of the building long before then etc etc etc......
What is their chance of success do you think?
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Where are the deaths over the last 50 years to justify this expense???? Chat to some of the old hands in your F&RS, particularly the operational ones. Ask them how often people have died because the door wasn’t 30 minutes.
CT I cannot speak for the last fifty years but can for the last forty and I suspect the reason for the good record on fire deaths especially on the introduction of the FPA was because of the adequate passive fire protection in certain commercial buildings, hotels for instance. The doors were either very solidly built or they were fire doors with inch rebates but no intumescent strips. At that time, or maybe a little latter, you were writing in the FPA journal telling us how expensive the fire precautions were and absolutely not cost effective. Incidentally I have experience of jobs, in domestic property, were down stairs doors have failed and people have died up stairs.
p.s. You were Fire Prevention Officer Baiting in those days. ;)
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Where are the deaths over the last 50 years to justify this expense????
I wasn't aware we needed to have had deaths to justify safety measures. If nobody has died due to smoking in petrol stations, does that mean that they can save money by not buying 'no smoking' signs?
How many deaths can be attributed purely to having no risk assessment? If a premises has good procedures, good means of escape etc but no risk assessment, would you advise them that the risk assessment is actually a waste of money, or would you happily get them booked in for the assessment?
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Civvy, even if there were a pre movement time of 15 minutes, which I would dispute in any case
Dispute it all you want, it is straight out of a British Standard, with over 20mins suggested for a badly managed example.
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TW: I am confused by your posting which seems to be slightly contradictory, but if I get it right you are saying that old fire doors did a good job, without intumescent strips. In this case we are in agreement.
Kurnal, Your selection of suggestions is a mixed bag, but suffice it to say I did indeed interview some very experienced fire officers not long ago, and asked all of them about some of the things to which you refer. In some of the examples you give I can say categorically that the IFE would be likely to register the persons in question. In some they would not. I think it inappropriate to tell you which are which. But certainly, it is unlikely that the IFE would reject people who base their risk assessments on an assessment of risk. Equally, I know of one occasion where someone was rejected for being over prescriptive without any consideration of risk whatsoever, and since I did the interview in conjunction with one of the finest officers in the finest F&RS in a large metropolitan city, I feel sure the conclusion must have been correct. I hope that this answers your question.
Civvy, Thank you for the permission to dispute something in a somewhat esoteric and not always well founded BS, and the implied permission to take the circumstances into account, rather than following a text book as a result of lack of practical experience. In return, I give you the promised absolution for not talking to experienced fire officers, who I acknowledge can be a real pain to talk to, but sometimes have experience of fires (though with CFS less and less so, but best not tell the FBU or they will get all worried).
TW: you confuse baiting with a desire to make people think, which I know can bring on headaches and other side effects but sometimes prevents people from doing silly things. It is nice of you to acknowledge that I have been consistent in making my small contribution to this and I hope to continue to do so in the rapidly approaching twilight of my life. Buy shares in Nurofen now, as there will be a run on them soon
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With regards to the princess and myself strange as it may seem,I haven't the faintest idea what type of detectors were in the bedrooms of the hotel in question as taking an interest in that was not on my priority list.
when alone
mini bar priority then adult channel... then i may take a wee peek up at the detector to see who covered it with what before me..
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Sorry CT if I confused you, I know I confuse myself most of the time. What I was trying to say was that people didn’t die because, FPO’s at that time aimed to provide full half hour MOE routes and consequently the doors had to achieve a full half hour standard which meant the use of inch rebates. When intumescent strips were introduced it was considered that inch rebates were not required and in fact inhibited the effectiveness of the strips. So in my opinion you are unlikely to achieve a full half hour standard with out intumescent strips unless you are prepared to go back to the old standards. If you apply ASET principles and calculate times less than 30 minutes you still have to provide the minimum standard of 30minutes. If then you try to modify the door by not including intumescent strips then the fire resistance of the door becomes pure guesswork.
As for your last paragraph I believe you but thousands might not and I agree fully by challenging people you make people think very much deeper, which is good, because we all have too many pre conceived ideas which sometimes we are reluctant to modify.
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tw: you are making it all too comlicated. A 30 minute door is a 30 minute door, proven by test, It is simply a matter of practical fact that you dont get 30 mins without the strip. Going back to old standards would not give 30 minutes to the modern test. The test standard was changed in 1972-thats the reason for the strip, not any suggestion that old doors were deficient. New doors should be 30 minutes, and so have strips. Old doors are not as you suggest unchartered territory-they are 15-20 minutes IN THE BS TEST WHICH CRUDELY REPRESENTS POST FLASHOVER. Since detection in the room operates before flashover, you have 20 minutes plus for evacuation of the floor of origin. By that time who cares.
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All out by the time both veerses of the National Anthem have been played. Job done. ignition, growth, flashover, decay, backdraught. Who cares, all out let it burn. FRS then do defensive firefighting until another car park is formed.
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CT I have never been accused of being too complicated; I have been accused of being confused on many occasions. ::)
I accept most of what you say but if you saying a nominal 20 minutes fire protected route is acceptable then I would disagree. Because fire and the actions of persons in fire are so unpredictable I would require a minimal 30 minute standard. As Fire doors normally fail by distortion rather than burn-through and controlling or accommodating this distortion must be the primary objective. I would require intumescent strips to counteract this distortion and increase the fire resistance of the doors to provide a 30 minute nominal standard.
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I don't believe a word CT says any more. I started reading his book, got to page 2, found a blatant lie, and stopped reading in disgust. >:(
Seriously though, I think a valid point is that the 20 or 30 minutes is 20 or 30 minutes of the test, it is not 20 or 30 minutes of a fire.
Unfortunately, we don't have a British Standard fire, and the times that it goes awfully wrong it is often a string of unlikely occurrences all bolted together. I am sure that for many circumstances the good old door would suffice, but somewhere at some time that extra 10 minutes could make a considerable difference.
I would also suspect that the manufacturers submitting their doors for the test will ensure that everything is done with the best quality gear, by their best joiner, and the door that sits on the test rig is the best one that they can possibly make. All others that end up in-situ will be at least a little inferior, and possibly fitted by young Johnny the trainee.
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Civvy, are you allowed to say that? Surely you have been subjected FRS equalities policies!
Doors are doors are doors. You are correct that no one will know whether any particular door will operate in any way shape of form in a fire situatuation. The furnace puts 800 degrees on the face but who knows what temperature will be in the room or compartment and for how long.
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I don't believe a word CT says any more. I started reading his book, got to page 2, found a blatant lie, and stopped reading in disgust. >:(
Seriously though, I think a valid point is that the 20 or 30 minutes is 20 or 30 minutes of the test, it is not 20 or 30 minutes of a fire.
Unfortunately, we don't have a British Standard fire, and the times that it goes awfully wrong it is often a string of unlikely occurrences all bolted together. I am sure that for many circumstances the good old door would suffice, but somewhere at some time that extra 10 minutes could make a considerable difference.
I would also suspect that the manufacturers submitting their doors for the test will ensure that everything is done with the best quality gear, by their best joiner, and the door that sits on the test rig is the best one that they can possibly make. All others that end up in-situ will be at least a little inferior, and possibly fitted by young Johnny the trainee.
"but somewhere at some time that extra 10 minutes could make a considerable difference."
Difference to what Civvy?
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Civvy I accept all you say except that scandalous statement in the first sentence. :-X
I am not talking about certified fire door sets I am talking about nominal fire doors which in the opinion of the assessor the doors should hold back a fire for a certain time. I am aware that a substantial standard door should hold a fire for 20mins, although I didn’t know it had been subjected to BS tests and in my opinion by adding the intumescent strips, will increase the FR to 30 mins. What I cannot accept is the notion that fire protected routes can be less than 30 mins.
Jokar I think Auntie Lin may have something to say on you statement “Doors are doors are doors”?
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Tw what is magic about 30 minutes POST FLASHOVER for avoidance ofdoubt I will say it again POST FLASHOVER. Given that people will have gone before flashover in most of the ciucmstances in which the issue is debated, who cares whether it is 20 or 30 or 300. Over engineering is bad engineering, thats why there arent 3 engines on a 737. Why do you not have intumescent strips on the doors in TW towers, given that statistically you are about 10 times more likely to die there than in an old hotel with 25mm stops on the doors and no strips.
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Difference to what Civvy?
The difference between someone who makes it out of a building and someone who doesn't.
Why do you not have intumescent strips on the doors in TW towers, given that statistically you are about 10 times more likely to die there than in an old hotel
Where are those statistics from? I am not totally disputing them, just asking the question...
In 2006 there were approx 25,000,000 homes in the uk, and there were 55,000 fires. That is a 1 in 454 chance of having a fire in any one home over the course of the year. A total of 342 deaths means that on average 1 in 73000 houses suffered a fatality. We have 1 death recorded in a hotel in 2006. If there are 73,000 hotels in the UK then it is a nice even balance of probability of the building having a fatality due to a fire. The chances of any particular person being involved is clearly dependent on the number of persons in the hotel, and the same can be said for houses. There is not just the chance of death to consider, but the chance of injury also. If we want to update the figures for 2008 and look at the three killed in the Cornwall hotel, among with any more that occured during the year, then the figures will look quite different.
I have found it hard to find that actual number of hotels in the UK, so if anyone could enlighten me I would be grateful. I think guest houses etc can be lumped in with hotels because the statistics do not seem to separate them.
Also, there is over engineering and there is building in a suitable factor of safety for when it all goes wrong.
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"The difference between someone who makes it out of a building and someone who doesn't"
Not getting at you personally Civvy but do we not aim for an evacuation to be completed in a few minutes? Even up to 10 mins would be very generous when you consider the level of detection installed in building nowadays. Twenty minutes might be useful if you were tied up on a bed or trapped in a time locked safe.
Why 30 mins?
Why not 25 or 35?
Is it necessary to link 30 min fire door protection and evacuation times?
What is the rational behind 30 min fire door protection for escape purposes?
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So based on statistics Colin Todd are you advocating that shouldnt put strips and seals on fire doors, or that we should just consider substantial doors full stops or do you think that because those things are in place that is why we have low statistics in the first place?
Plus a 747 has 4 engines not 2 Colin so no over engineering to give it three engines would be likely
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What Colin is getting at, I think, is that the fact that a fire door doesnt have intumescent strips has a very small impact (if any) on the effectiveness of a fire door in protecting escape routes from real fires. Given the small risk and the small impact of the strips it is hard to justify making somebody install strips in exisitng doors.
If you are replacing doors then, of course, you would use the latest spec.
Just out of interest, how many of you strip huggers check the spacing of fixings in the plasterbaord partitions around the doors?
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What Colin is getting at, I think, is that the fact that a fire door doesn’t have intumescent strips has a very small impact (if any) on the effectiveness of a fire door in protecting escape routes from real fires.
The following is a extract from a guidance document on upgrading doors.
Behaviour of the stiles and rails framework
Fire doors normally fail by distortion rather than burn through and controlling or accommodating this distortion must be the primary objective (even purpose made fire doors can fail as early as 12 minutes due to distortion). It is also considered important that the doors prevent the spread of smoke just as much as the door remaining stable helps the spread of fire and this significantly. The fundamental performance of a door leaf will be a function of the factors listed earlier but the main objective must be to restrain the distortions that will cause a loss of integrity at the leaf frame interface.
Controlling distortion
The control that various items of hardware can provide should be used in combination with each other to ensure that the proposed upgrading measures work in unison. Similarly, the correct specification of the intumescent door seal is vital to ensure that they can contribute to the control distortion of the door if the analysis identifies this as a requirement. And also provide a gap-filling function between door leaf and frame.
Note: Intumescent seals come in various types, some providing high-pressure expansion, others offering low pressure, also the direction and nature of expansion varies. Use of the wrong type of intumescent material could potentially worsen the situation and also be a complete waste of money.
The balance between hardware and intumescent is particularly important when considering historical/joinery type doors. Correctly specified intumescent seals can greatly improve the performance of the doorset, even if no other measures are carried out.
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Not getting at you personally Civvy
I never take it personally. It is all discussion, advice and opinions. :)
but do we not aim for an evacuation to be completed in a few minutes? Even up to 10 mins would be very generous when you consider the level of detection installed in building nowadays.
We need to consider the time between the alarm being raised and the time that persons will leave their room. In hotels and other sleeping risks this can be quite a long time. There have been some human behaviour studies done and an alarm siren/bell is not a particularly effective method of letting people know what is happening. Pre-movement times (time between hearing an alarm and actually moving) are quoted in PD7974-6 as >20 mins for a poorly managed hotel occupancy, (i.e. probably 'less competent' or no staff on site, no prior fire instructions, expecting you to evacuate yourself) and IIRC similar times are quoted in D.Canters book "Fires and Human Behaviour". Granted, not all hotels are badly managed, but being an FSO I always go for the worse case scenario for an example. >:(
(And also bear in mind that we may lose a few minutes before the activation of the alarm due to Toddy's heat detectors being in the affected room.)
Something to consider is that if I ended up in coroners court over a decision I made then I need to be able to justify that decision. "Colin Todd says it should be ok" is not a good defense, unless you actually are Colin Todd with your list of letters after your name and a head full of statistics and years of experience. (And good reasoned arguments of course.)
Just to append to this:
TW, I think the point Colin is making that the 20 or 30 minutes comes purely from the test, which pretty much starts at flashover conditions. There can be a considerable incubation/smouldering period before the fire reaches anything like flashover conditions. (A good excuse for SD if there ever was one, but thats a matter for 50 other threads entirely... ;)) so from the point of ignition there may potentially be 5-15 minutes before anything like good flames are produced and the fire starts to really get hold, and even then a delay until flashover which may even require a window to break. The old test either wasn't as severe, or had lighter requirements, and the old doors could survive THAT test for 30 minutes. They changed the test, and the strips became necessary for the doorset to survive the test for the allotted time. So where we have the tendency to think of a 30 minute corridor, it is not really a 30 minute corridor, it is a corridor made up of materials that survive various specific tests for 30 minutes, the actual time it survives in a specific fire will vary depending on many potential different situations. It could be less, it could be more.
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Wee B That was precisely the point I as making and Civvy appears to have taken on board the point about the difference between real fires and test fires, something we teach all new inspecting officers, so that they do not end up as dinosaurs closely hugging the security blanket of a prescritpive code of practice with arbitrary numbers.
Re statistics as there is around one death per day in dwellings and 60 million people live in dwellings, the chances of dying from fire by spending a day at home is 1 in 60 million. For comparison, adults spend around 100 million nights a year in uk hotels. Hope this helps civvy.
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Civvy I think I do understand what CT is saying but your explanation is much clearer. I must reread the thread again because I must be missing the point somewhere.
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Re statistics as there is around one death per day in dwellings and 60 million people live in dwellings, the chances of dying from fire by spending a day at home is 1 in 60 million. For comparison, adults spend around 100 million nights a year in uk hotels. Hope this helps civvy.
It does help, thank you.
So adults spend 60 million x 365 = 21,900,000,000 nights a year in domestic dwellings. Out of those nights 342 resulted in deaths in 2006. So any one adult has a 1 in 64 million chance of dying in their home in any one night. Ignoring any factors such as people living in deprived areas and vulnerable groups.
Last year 3 people died in one hotel. There may be more to add once 2008's figures are released but lets just use those 3 for the sake of argument. So, from the 100 million nights people spend in hotels, that gives a 1 in 33.3 million chance of dying in a hotel.
Now that doesn't seem to point towards hotels being 10 times safer, it seems to point to them being twice as bad.
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I notice the oh so holy didnt respond back to your argument Civvy, Perhaps the truth hurts.
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I was wondering...
The funny thing is that even if you take the 3 deaths as an extreme example, and 0 deaths as extreme in the other case, average them out to get 1.5 deaths per year it is still a 66 million to 1 chance. STILL way off being 10 times as safe.
The problem with that is that fire safety should not be based around what happens on average, we are attempting to protect people when the particularly unusual or extremely unlikely happens.
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The problem with that is that fire safety should not be based around what happens on average, we are attempting to protect people when the particularly unusual or extremely unlikely happens.
Think I have to disagree with you there Civvy. Can we really provide fire safety measures for the unusual and extremely unlikely? I think we can only provide measures for the protection of persons from likely scenarios based on past incidents and a logical analysis of situations. The mind would go into melt down if you had to take in to consideration very unlikely and unusual situations.
Do you give consideration to the building being hit by an 747? It would be unusual and extremely unlikely and as such an acceptable risk.
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I did read the thread again and when I read reply #2 “It’s a brilliant demo of why I/us waste peoples money demanding upgrading of existing fire doors” I realised how off course I was with my responses and why CT was so confused with my postings. In future any threads I am interested in I will occasionally check out from the start to make sure I fully understand the question. As was drummed into us many years ago don’t try to answer the question until you have read it at leased twice.
Despite this much of the thread is certainly food for thought.
p.s. I remember a promotion exam some time ago when a question was asked on Heath fires and at least 50% of the candidates submitted pages on Hearth fires.
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Think I have to disagree with you there Civvy. Can we really provide fire safety measures for the unusual and extremely unlikely? I think we can only provide measures for the protection of persons from likely scenarios based on past incidents and a logical analysis of situations.
IMO Fire safety is based on the unusual and unlikely.
A fire isn't a likely scenario in the first place in most premises. If there is a fire, then that is one unlikely occurrence straight away. The average fire in the average shop will lead to an alarm being raised and everyone safely walking out eventually. Now for it to happen in the back store room, just on the day that the big mothers day delivery of cards has come in is even more unlikely by a factor of 365. Then for this to happen on the only day in the last 3 months that you have a disabled person on the first floor, and have wedged the door open between the store room and the retail area for ease of stock movement is going even further. But these sort of things can and do happen, but the good procedures and attention to persons at risk etc that you will raise awareness of during a risk assessment (or that we will enforce or advise about) will counteract this without looking at all the particular different possiblities.
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Forgive my delay in responding, but incompetent enforcement of fire safety legislation, plus a very serious crime in respect of which I am appointed as an expert for the police has precluded me from time to deal with the playground banter of some of the Firenetters. Civvy you will understand the point people are making about the lack of need to avoid the extremely unlikely if, like so many operational firefighters, you did some study of HSE policy on this subject. A Scottish O grade in statistics would also have stood you in good stead, and you would have realised that a one off single incident in one year is next best to irrelevant statistically. You need to take a number of years, which is what I did for you. And I am not aware of the roll of intumescent strips or otherwise in the Penhallows fire, in which at least one death was from jumping out of a window as I recall. If you would enlighten us as to the fire resistance of the doors in the premises and the effect of intumescent strips and smoke seals I am sure we would all be pleased to learn. We can all recount incidents of unusual disasters but as I have already said we did not fit 3 engines to 737s just because people were killed when British Midland proved beyond all doubt that planes dont fly when you shut down both engines. Happily wearing another hat I am greatly encouraged to find the number of experienced fire officers who are happy to accept existing fire doors without strips or seals. Possibly their operational experience of REAL fires proves of value in this respect.
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The debate over the retro fitting of fire and smoke seals to older type fire doors that originally did not have them is an interesting one. We seem to be on the one hand looking to reduce the level of risk as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP), but always with one eye on the legal definition of ALARP and the other eye on the National Guidance documents which give us some sort of benchmark - describing standards and typical solutions that may be used to inform the fire risk assessment.
Then we have some fire authorities or inspectors who then set out their own over arching prescriptive policies - such as poster DavidRH experienced- requiring all fire doors to be retro fitted with fire and smoke seals- clearly an unreasonable stance but another benchmark applicable in their area.
I will not re-iterate the arguments and history here of BS476 and neutral planes and time to flashover. All good points made by others.
I just wanted to make the following points.
1 - Most of my clients want me to find them a cost effective fire safety solution both to satisfy the duty of ALARP but equally to ensure that they satisfy the requirements of the Enforcing Authority. Where I know that an Authority has a policy on this then I go along with it and recommend their standards. Most of my clients dont want hassle with a fire authority inspector. They want that warm glow of satisfaction from a positive audit. This is invariably a bigger factor than saving a few quid on some seals. I will advise them of what they need to provide first to satisfy ALARP and second to achieve no hassle from the inspector.
2- Dead end conditions in sleeping accommodation, doors protecting single staircases and maybe bedroom corridors in old hotels with heat detectors in bedrooms - these are examples of places where my gut feeling is to recommend seals be retrofitted if not already provided. Elsewhere I will be a little more subjective.
3- The right type of heat and smoke seal may be used to correct defects in other situations- where damage or shrinkage has occurred.
4- Whilst ever we base our fire risk assessments on qualitative judgement we will continue to have these arguments. But I dont think there ever be sufficient data or modelling programs available to enable accurate quantitative risk assessment to be undertaken at this macro level.- enabling the judgement to be taken beyond the opinion of expert witnessess.
5- The bottom line is this- if we are looking at achieving ALARP, is an older type fire door in perfect condition going to perform better in a fire if retro fitted with seals. I would suggest that that any door fitted with seals will perform better than the same door without seals. Seals are cheap, easily fitted,- I could say as a risk control measure - Reasonably Practicable in almost every case.
Now the question is that risk control measure required in the first place. Back to square one.
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The debate over the retro fitting of fire and smoke seals to older type fire doors that originally did not have them is an interesting one. We seem to be on the one hand looking to reduce the level of risk as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP), but always with one eye on the legal definition of ALARP and the other eye on the National Guidance documents which give us some sort of benchmark - describing standards and typical solutions that may be used to inform the fire risk assessment.
Then we have some fire authorities or inspectors who then set out their own over arching prescriptive policies - such as poster DavidRH experienced- requiring all fire doors to be retro fitted with fire and smoke seals- clearly an unreasonable stance but another benchmark applicable in their area.
I will not re-iterate the arguments and history here of BS476 and neutral planes and time to flashover. All good points made by others.
I just wanted to make the following points.
1 - Most of my clients want me to find them a cost effective fire safety solution both to satisfy the duty of ALARP but equally to ensure that they satisfy the requirements of the Enforcing Authority. Where I know that an Authority has a policy on this then I go along with it and recommend their standards. Most of my clients dont want hassle with a fire authority inspector. They want that warm glow of satisfaction from a positive audit. This is invariably a bigger factor than saving a few quid on some seals. I will advise them of what they need to provide first to satisfy ALARP and second to achieve no hassle from the inspector.
2- Dead end conditions in sleeping accommodation, doors protecting single staircases and maybe bedroom corridors in old hotels with heat detectors in bedrooms - these are examples of places where my gut feeling is to recommend seals be retrofitted if not already provided. Elsewhere I will be a little more subjective.
3- The right type of heat and smoke seal may be used to correct defects in other situations- where damage or shrinkage has occurred.
4- Whilst ever we base our fire risk assessments on qualitative judgement we will continue to have these arguments. But I dont think there ever be sufficient data or modelling programs available to enable accurate quantitative risk assessment to be undertaken at this macro level.- enabling the judgement to be taken beyond the opinion of expert witnessess.
5- The bottom line is this- if we are looking at achieving ALARP, is an older type fire door in perfect condition going to perform better in a fire if retro fitted with seals. I would suggest that that any door fitted with seals will perform better than the same door without seals. Seals are cheap, easily fitted,- I could say as a risk control measure - Reasonably Practicable in almost every case.
Now the question is that risk control measure required in the first place. Back to square one.
Totally agree K. The way I look at it if an I/O comes along, asks the boss for the FRA, looks around for 1/2 hr, hands the FRA back and says "have a nice day sir" on his way out, then the I/O is happy, the boss is happy and I'm happy. Job done.
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Generally agree Kurnal, although I wouldn't want anyone to be discouraged from challenging local fire authorities and their inspectors!
It is a two way street and there are mechanismans where determination can be sought from the Secretary of State. I think the use of determinations would help to establish clearer boundaries and guidelines.
Can I ask has anyone yet from the forum used the determination route?
Conversely are there any of you who have little confidence in,or have been discouraged from, using this process?
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Only one has been published so far. It's early days yet
http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/firesafety/firesafetylaw/fsodeterminations/
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And I am not aware of the roll of intumescent strips or otherwise in the Penhallows fire, in which at least one death was from jumping out of a window as I recall.
The reason the person jumped was because the spread of fire was not controlled adequately which is relevant to the MOE. I am not suggesting the fire resistance of doors was to blame, more likely fire doors wedged open, and he will have died as the result injuries due to the fall however the reason was unsatisfactory fire precautions, assuming arson has been ruled out. I think both Penhallows and the Blackpool are good examples of what can happen if you get the fire precautions wrong either physical or managerial.
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Only one has been published so far. It's early days yet
http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/firesafety/firesafetylaw/fsodeterminations/
Any determinations I have read so far in relation to smoke seals and intumescent strips have been in favour of F&RS.
I would asume that other rooms opening onto bedroom corridors should have doors fitted with belt and braces also?
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TW. I thnk you will find that arson was far from ruled out!
Grand Master Retty, yes to the first part of your question. Lips are sealed on 2nd and third parts.
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Forgive my delay in replying. But incompetent placing of a red blanket by Iggle Piggle, followed by a runaway ball scenario meant that I had to sit through two episodes of "In the night garden" back to back.
Civvy you will understand the point people are making about the lack of need to avoid the extremely unlikely if, like so many operational firefighters, you did some study of HSE policy on this subject.
If the life safety aspect of fire safety is not based on the unlikely then why do we insist on 2 of everything? Surely the risk of a fan failing at the same time as a fire occurring is particularly small, yet we always want the backup duty fan. I do appreciate however that this only extends a certain degree, and eventually the risks are classed as not worth protecting against.
A Scottish O grade in statistics would also have stood you in good stead, and you would have realised that a one off single incident in one year is next best to irrelevant statistically.
Maybe an O Level in Maths at the school I went to would have helped you see that it is less irrelevant than your claim that you are 10 times more likely to die in your own home. Your main comment attempting to justify it fell short of the mark as you completely failed to take into account the actual number of nights people spend in their homes. If you want to question my maths feel free, but I am quite sure that it is your maths that is suspect on this occasion.
Also, when hotel fire deaths are in the range of 0 to 5 deaths a year, a year with at least 3 deaths is not irrelevant at all. It is twisting it a bit using that year on it's own, but even if the average number of deaths is 1.5 per year, that equates to approximately a similar risk as in dwellings.
You need to take a number of years, which is what I did for you.
The only information you supplied to me was that we spend 100 million nights a year in hotels. If you would like to go back 10 years and give the average number of deaths on hotel fires per year, then unless the average number of deaths per year in hotels is less than 0.156 per year then your "10 times as likely" statement is still wrong.
And I am not aware of the roll of intumescent strips or otherwise in the Penhallows fire
Nor am I. That was not the point I was making. My point was purely based on comparing the likelihood of dying due to a night in a hotel or a night at home. And we should remember that it is not just deaths that we are protecting against:-
From UK Fire Statistics:
In 2006, the highest non-fatal casualty rates in fires in other buildings
occurred in public administration buildings – includes police stations and
prisons – (146 non-fatal casualties per 1,000 fires). High injury rates were also
recorded in chemical industrial premises (124 non-fatal casualties per 1,000
fires) and hotels (109 non-fatal casualties per 1,000 fires).
Good old 'safe' hotels?
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The maths is correct. And I come back to the principle that you can ignore risks of less than 1 in a million per annum in general. As for the standard of fire precautions needed for hotel fire safety, it reached the point of greatly diminishing returns years ago. If you want to save the world, go knock on the doors in deprived areas of Middlesbrough (but not when its dark) and give them a smoke alarm.
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The maths is correct.
"Lies, damned lies, and statistics" ;D
So you stand by your comment that you are 10 times more likely to die in your own home? With the figures you supplied this seems to be not the case. My maths is there to be seen, feel free to point out where I have gone wrong.
My argument was never for more fire safety being required for the hotel trade, and Kurnals explanation of when strips and seals might be recommended is almost spot on in my eyes.
The 1 in a million tolerable risk thing doesn't seem to me to be quite as simple as you make out. HSE guidance seems to point towards that being relevant to any particular accident. i.e. A well maintained fire alarm somehow failing completely on the night it is required to perform is particularly unlikely, and if this happened, and people died due to this, it can be seen as an unfortunate accident providing that the 1 in a million criteria is met, and the HSE or FRS should identify it as an accident and act accordingly.
It surely does not mean for instance that if I own a shopping centre that expects 20 million people through its doors in a year, that 20 of those people can die without any repercussions to myself. If someone dies due to my poor fire safety, then regardless of the risk I should be prosecuted. Which is where my comment comes from about fire safety being there to cater for the extremely unlikely. It isn't aimed at protecting from any particular unlikely event, it is over and above the average requirement because many of these unlikely events will happen given time, and fire safety caters for this "as far is is reasonably practicable".
You are clearly a clever man, you have more letters after your name than I have in my name, but you sometimes seem to throw random numbers, comments and claims in which I think deserve qualification. I have many years left in the 'trade' and I will learn much more by dragging the facts out of you than just blindly believing everything you say. :)
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Colin. The brigade are putting in smoke detectors in & around Middlesboro and have been doing so for years, ever since HFRAs and HFSCs were conceived infact. Again you are talking about domestic premises where people have the right to tell the fire brigade that they do not want them to come into their house to put smoke detectors in. We are talking domestic premises where people are free to do as they choose and are masters of their own destiny. Fire safety legislation doesn't apply there. So whilst you are right in that more people die at home than in a hotel you can see immediately why that is. Im not asking for over the top precautions in hotels, but a certain standard must be maintained for obvious reasons. That however emcompasses other issues rather than the finer detailing of intumescent strips whose benefit may be minimal in the greater scheme of things.
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That however emcompasses other issues rather than the finer detailing of intumescent strips whose benefit may be minimal in the greater scheme of things.
Aha, I knew you would see sense.
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Civvy, Suggest you set out the maths again clearly, so that it can be subject to scrutiny
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I suggest you go back and read it.
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Civvy, we in the modern fire and rescue service educate and inform, not give instructions and orders.
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That however emcompasses other issues rather than the finer detailing of intumescent strips whose benefit may be minimal in the greater scheme of things.
Aha, I knew you would see sense.
Colin this is exactly why I get annoyed. I have never advocated that intumescent strips be fitted to existing fire doors on this thread. Come on lets play fair here please. One of my gripes with you Colin is that you keep referring to domestic premises and saying more people die from fire at home. Of course they do. I dont deny that. The reason is we dont enforce standards in domestic premises.And also thats why fire services are running around doing HFSCs. Thats why new houses have more stringent standards. So leave that aside. WLets talk about commercial premises. Educate and communicate. Civvy's mathematics seem perfectly sensible to me. Please read them again. If you can counter it with sensible argument Im always genuinely prepared to listen.
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Clevey, I thought you didnt get annoyed any more. Anyhow, i note you retired from the brigade a year ago, and hence I assume you are old enough to remember the 1960s and 1970s. You may remember research that was intended to help government with fire safety policy. It quite specifically compared the chance of dying from fire in different occupancies and compared the risk to the chance of dying at home in a dwelling. One very major study looked at schools, hospitals, hotels and of course dwellings. Statistically the risk of dying in a school was negligible. Hospitals are also very safe.
In the case of hotels, the risk was over 10 times that of a dwelling. Morally that was considered
to be wrong. The principle was this. You and mrs clevey could spend a night at home with your cocoa and a good book tucked up safely in bed. Or you could take mrs clevey to the middlesbrough hilton (were there such a thing). It was considered that by buying Paris H a new dress you should not be put at greater risk than if you hadnt bothered. Equally, you could set fire to your bed at home, and need not be protected against the consequences to you in a hotel so long as you dont kill anyone else.
Along came the rose and crown and the consequent FP Act. Further research specifically aimed at helping govt with policy showed that the job was virtually done in keeping people as safe as they are at home, by adopting standards that we would laugh at now. Old style fire doors and no afd whatsoever.
Now you are many times safer in a hilton than at clevey towers. How much safer. Well you cant take 5 years and then one year and divide by two alas for civvy. But there are around 60 million people in the uk, and one dies per day in a dwelling fire. So your chance of dying from fire during a 24 hour period at clevey towers is around 1 in 60 million. Accordingly I would bet a years salary that you will be alive tomorrow to read this, having not died in a fire. In 512 million adult nights in uk hotels (ignoring kids) 1 person died from a fire in their own bedroom in a hotel. So as far as risk to people currently from fire in their bedroom the maths is clear.
Stop for puerile arguements. Point extinguished. Returning home station.
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Now you are many times safer in a hilton than at clevey towers. How much safer. Well you cant take 5 years and then one year and divide by two alas for civvy.
What on earth are you on about?
In 512 million adult nights in uk hotels (ignoring kids) 1 person died from a fire in their own bedroom in a hotel.
First of all, you initially mentioned that we spend 100 million nights a year in hotels. Where does the 512 million now come from? In those 512 million nights how many people died from a fire, whether in their room, in a corridor, outside on the pavement or later in a hospital bed?
You are looking at a total number of deaths in dwellings attributed to fire, and then looking at a specific scenario for hotels. You are simply trying to twist statistics to say what you want. Your point would be semi-relevant if I was facing you arguing for an upgrade of an existing fire door, but I am questioning your comment on the chance of dying in a hotel fire (by whatever means) as opposed to dying in a fire in your own home.
Stop for puerile arguements. Point extinguished. Returning home station.
Re-ignition occurred 12:50pm. Visible flames.
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it is 100 million, but to try to find a death for you i took 5 years and still only found one in the room of fire origin.
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The number of deaths in the room of origin has no relevance to the point being made. All you are doing is recycling an old argument for warranting HD in bedrooms.
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NO argument about HD in bedrooms, the BS recommends them. You either follow the BS or follow something else. It is not a cut and paste job.
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It is in the BS because it is warranted. It is warranted due to the very argument that Mr Todd puts forward, I do not dispute that. But thanks for missing the point.
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See Civvy a wee comma makes all the difference to meaning sometimes. I was not in the least interested in the hd/sd arguement. Always willing to assist those who have not enjoyed the delights of the old crash gear box on a Dennis, I took the trouble nto search specially for you 5 years data on any death that had occurred anywhere within the confines of a hotel or boarding house as a result of a bedroom fire, so that I might find for you any relevant information on intumescent strips and smoke seals. Happily or regrettably according to how you view it I could only find one death, which happened to be in the room of origin. No one at all died beyond the bedroom.
A cooma would have made this clearer, so I reproduce the text again, with the offending comma in place.it is 100 million, but to try to find a death for you i took 5 years and still only found one , in the room of fire origin.
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It seems clear to me that you are cherry picking the best years to suit your argument. (Just as I did originally, which you quite rightly corrected me on. :))
it is funny that you should stop at the 5 year mark. I am guessing you are working from UK Fire Statistics, and if so, going just 1 year past that 5 year mark there are another 3 deaths to add. Also, if you take the entire 11 year stretch from UK statistics there is a total of 8 deaths, and those deaths are only the ones attributed to deliberate fires. That is also ignoring the 3 deaths (minimum) last year, and anything to come from 2007.
If we assume (for arguments sake) that 2007 had no deaths, and that 2008 had just the 3 deaths, then we can look over the course of 13 years, and we have 11 deaths. Again, only the ones attributed to deliberate fires. (I do not know why stats for accidental fires are not included but I shall work with the information available)
Let me repeat the maths for you:
11 deaths over 13 years gives 0.84 deaths per year. (in deliberate fires only).
100,000,000 nights spent in hotels per year gives: 100,000,000/0.84 = 1 in 120,000,000 chance of dying (due to a deliberate fire) in a hotel room in any one night spent in a hotel.
Maybe you are approximately twice as likely to die in your own home, which is quite a considerable difference to your claim that you are 10 times as likely to die in your own home.
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Hmmm, (Thoughtful sound)
The Times once reported that there was a 1 in 909,000 chance of asteroid '2003 QQ47' striking the Earth with catastrophic consequences in 2014. Should I be more worried about that happening than I am?
1 in 120,000,000 in a hotel or somewhere between 1 in 60,000,000 and 1 in 12,000,000 in my home .................. I think I'd be happy to take my chances in either of those two places tonight.
Although I'm not sure if I would want to take the risk of crossing the road to get to the hotel. Who knows, I may get struck by lightning (at odds of 10,000,000 to 1)
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Thanks for the reality check. ;)
If you like to play with odds... If you have £1 a week on the lottery, you are more likely to die in a fire that week than to win the jackpot. Yet we are all happy to put the occasional quid on. (Scottish excluded)
The thing with probabilites is that they are particularly easy to misrepresent, and for you as an individual you can pretty much ignore the risk of dying in your own home. But as an enforcing authority, or as the government, or as someone sitting on the committee of some british standard making a decision as to what is reasonable, those 340-350 deaths are quite significant.
Also those odds for dying in a fire are per night. So by the time you are 80 it is down to a 1 in 2200 chance that you will have died in a fire.
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The thing with probabilites is that they are particularly easy to misrepresent, and for you as an individual you can pretty much ignore the risk of dying in your own home. .....................................Also those odds for dying in a fire are per night. So by the time you are 80 it is down to a 1 in 2200 chance that you will have died in a fire.
Now then Civvy you are starting to sound like a politician.
Hard sums are not my forte but if I have reached the age of 80 then it is an absolute cert that I have NOT died in a fire
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"For insurance purposes I have died in three consecutive pub fires" Al Murray Pub Landlord 2007 ;D
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Kurnal. I always assumed that you had reached the age of 80. Civvy, I took five years as that is a reasonable period and reflects current standards. I also made sure it covered all deaths, not just those deliberately started. And you may feel that for certain deliberately started fires will not be ifluenced by the last few minutes duration of a door.
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My argument was not about upgrading to current standards, merely pointing out some inaccuracies and misrepresentation of facts and figures.
Anyway, I think we have done this one to death.
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Civvy
If the odds of dying overnight in a fire are X, then the odds of dying in a fire the night after (assuming you made it!) are still X.
Nothing has changed ;D
If you worked out the risk of dying in a car accident for those exceeding 25K miles per year based on your methods, none of the drivers would live to see 60!!!
davo
ps why does anybody do the lottery? the odds of winning are
49 x 48 x 47 x 46 x 45 x 44 to 1 ie 10,297,000,000 to one
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If the odds of dying in one night are 1 in 64,000,000, then the odds of dying in 2 nights are 2 in 64,000,000. I can see where you are coming from though, surviving one night does not increase your chance of dying the night after. It is the total chance of dying in the 2 nights we should be concerned with.
Your lottery odds are flawed too. It is approx 1 in 14,000,000. If you put 2 sets of numbers on (Akin to staying 2 nights in your home) that is a 2 in 14,000,000 chance.
For your benefit:-
The chance of getting the first number drawn is a 6 in 49 chance
if you get that then your second number has a 5 in 48 chance
if you get that then your third number has a 4 in 47 chance
and so on....
:-D
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Anyway, I think we have done this one to death.
Is that in one night? :-\ ???
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If the odds of dying in one night are 1 in 64,000,000, then the odds of dying in 2 nights are 2 in 64,000,000.
Sounds a bit like the old James Bond theme "you only live twice".
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Apologies Kurnal, and with the greatest of respect may I interject as that's a little off thread.
I think you were possibly referring to 'Die Another Day' or that other well known Broccoli classic 'Dr No Intumescent Strips'.
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Very true Johnny99.
I was trying to point out that if you die on the the first nght then there aint much point in worrying about the second night.
But its time to stop digging I reckon and start writing my memoirs of double declutching on a reverse gate Dennis F8. I am banking on Toddy eagerly snapping up the the whole print run of the first edition. He has already re-written the Home Office drill book on manouvering appliances to add a mandatory commentary on ADB5 and the need to eat more carrots.
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With all of these odds being discussed about the chances of death from a fire in a "hotel"
It would be interesting to see what happens to those odds when you look at the odds when you are staying in a 1*,2*,3* and so on.
What does it do to the odds when you look purely at small B&Bs guest houses? (i don't mean to entice the B&B angry man back so i hope he doesn't see this!)
Also what happens to the odds when you look at the stats for "hotels" up norf and daaaan saaaaf?
Just thought i would throw that in ;)
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I am sure it would alter the actual risk by quite a large amount, just at it would if you looked at the specific demographics of deaths in the home.
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Why all this has been going on, has there been a fire in a Hotel, Guest house, hostel B&B.? If there has has anyone died or been injured?
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No, just me taking offence at Mr Todds claims.