FireNet Community
FIRE SERVICE AND GENERAL FIRE SAFETY TOPICS => General Interest => Topic started by: Thomas Brookes on July 04, 2009, 08:59:34 AM
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Investigations are under way into the cause of a tower block fire that left six people dead, including a three-week-old baby and two children.
Fire bosses believe it will take "weeks if not months" to establish how the blaze, in south-east London, happened.
About 30 people were rescued from the fire at the 12-storey Lakanal House on the Sceaux Gardens Estate, Camberwell.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/8134138.stm
I have recently been installing some safety signs in some London tower blocks, and when I made the comment about a fire detection system I was told by the Housing Association H & S bod that they had full approval from the F&R Service that they don't need one because fires in these building do not spread they are always contained in the flat where the fire starts.
They also do not have any fire fighting appliances for the residents to use and they were even moaning about us putting up photoluminescant signs on the internal staircases (which do not have any emergncy escape lighting) because again they have been advised they do not need it.
Surely this proves that these fire can spread even in purpose built blocks of flats, I would love to know if this block has a full detection system in the common area's fire doors etc etc, Anyone know where a report on this incedent will be availible from.
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The problem with building blocks of so called sealed units is that nobody seems to monitor the quality of workmanship to ensure that fire stopping is properly adhered to. It can be easy to see whats behind a suspended ceiling but not so a stud partition as I am finding out.
I would say that there are many many buildings certified as being in compliance with Building Regulations, which is very very different to actually being so.
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I have recently conducted a FRA at a London 19 storey block of self contained flats, with AFD in all means of escape routes, and naturally ventilated escape corridors and staircase.
Unless you tested it and know otherwise, it is likely that the AFD in the common parts of the block will not raise the alarm in the building. They are usually linked to the local AOV (i.e. in the same space) and their sole purpose is to open that AOV in the event of smoke leaking into the escape route.
Stu
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That's very unusual - and interesting...
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Can anyone explain how an L4 system will prevent people dying in a fire? Once the smoke is in the escape route it may well be impassable. The provision of detection in these types of blocks will not aid escape and dependent on the separation issues cause more difficulties in many people using the only escape route whilst firefighters are trying to tackle a fire.
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I thought an L2 system was required in the common parts - ie. a heat detector inside the front door of each flat connected to the common system as well as sounders within bedrooms etc?
How do you get away with L4??
The consultant/contractor and everyone else involved should be questioned....
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I thought an L2 system was required in the common parts - ie. a heat detector inside the front door of each flat connected to the common system as well as sounders within bedrooms etc?
How do you get away with L4??
The consultant/contractor and everyone else involved should be questioned....
Notwithstanding the recent fire in Camberwell, there is not normally any requirement for common areas in blocks of self contained flats. The one hour enclosures around each flat are justification for the 'defend in place' (sit tight, stay put, call it what you will) fire strategies that are applied. The only alarm requirements are normally for part 6 systems within flats - they are there to get people to their front doors - the assumption being that from that point on they are safe due to the compartmentation.
There are a range of premises where there may be a need for common area coverage, maybe halls of residence, sheltered flats, etc, but not normally 19 storey blocks of self contained flats.
Now, returning to Camberwell, there are bound to be widespread questions about the reliability of this compartmentation and about the effectiveness of the 'defend in place' policy but we can't speculate in that direction until more is revealed about the particular circumstances of that case.
I feel that it is unlikely that there will be any change to the pragmatic 'defend in place' policy. We're more likely to see significant issues raised regarding compartmentation.
On that issue, if fire did spread via external means then this is starting to become a recurrent problem and there may be a need to reconsider the traditional stance of assuming that compartmentation will not be breached by external means along a horizontal wall.
Stu
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Having looked at the video footage available at the start of this thread, I am surprised no-one has commented that there appears to three individual fires on the front elevation and one on the very end of the building.
The main area of fire is one flat above another, which does raise the question of compartmentation, as the flats appear to have a common external balcony access to their front doors. The other fires appear remote from the main one with no evidence of fire spread showing externally.
Comments??
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The news reports I have heard state that the fire is believed to have started in the stairwell. Without seeing the plans it is difficult to assess how it spread.
However I was also struck by the positions of the flats involved in the fire. It was speculated that one of the reasons for the fire spread was that people had their windows open due to the hot weather but I would have expected a vertical spread of the fire not the offset result shown in the video footage. Difficult to comment too much as there is no information on the amount of internal damage.
If it did start in the stairwell this must raise concerns about the management of these areas as it would seem to attack the assumptions we usually make about the common areas.
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Lets us not go down the line of a defend in place strategy. Many high rise builidngs were built prior to the Building Regulations and therefore the structure will not support that type of evacuation strategy. Also, RS's when undertaking their roles in blocks should assess the level of compartmentation both primary and secondary and not guess at what it is or could be. This set of circumstances could happen anywhere and some of these blocks are not flats or apartments but maisonettes.
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Lets us not go down the line of a defend in place strategy.
Why not? (Ohhhh, I can hear the arguments already..... yeah, ok, point taken.......No more....)
Many high rise builidngs were built prior to the Building Regulations and therefore the structure will not support that type of evacuation strategy.
Let me just get this straight... If someone who lives on the 14th floor in a 15 storey block of flats, built in, say, the early 70s burns the toast and opens their front door to ventilate the few whiffs of smoke that result, then the smoke will reach a detector that will evacuate the entire building. I can't see it.
Also, RS's when undertaking their roles in blocks should assess the level of compartmentation both primary and secondary and not guess at what it is or could be.
That's fine. But just how exactly will they do that? Without guessing...? This isn't meant to be rhetorical irony, I'd really like to know.
This set of circumstances could happen anywhere
You ain't wrong there.
some of these blocks are not flats or apartments but maisonettes.
Note that the word "maisonette" has led to confusion in the past and so the phrase has been abandoned for the more unambiguous "multi-storey flats." But the point you raise is significant. The recent deaths in London may have been because of inadequate means of escape to the front door of the flat - I don't know, but it's a possibility. Multi-storey flats demand a safer means of escape to the front door than single storey flats.
Stu
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I thought an L2 system was required in the common parts - ie. a heat detector inside the front door of each flat connected to the common system as well as sounders within bedrooms etc?
How do you get away with L4??
The consultant/contractor and everyone else involved should be questioned....
Notwithstanding the recent fire in Camberwell, there is not normally any requirement for common areas in blocks of self contained flats.
True...sorry not clear but but I was referring to S Hoods post of the building he surveyed with an L4 sytem... which seems to have disappeared....!!
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So how many babies and kids should be killed to introduce flats to BS5839 part 1, which is more tighter than part 6 ????
What's the difference between people living 24/7 in block towers and those working 8 hours in commercial buildings, some thing must be wrong in this philosophy.
http://www.blinkx.com/video/camberwell-flat-fire-victims-named/ipaEWdM-ysdCOgujEjxrYg
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To be cynical, the money for upgrading the fire system in comercial premises comes from the profits of the organisation. The money for upgrading the fire system in council tower blocks comes from our pockets via the rates.
People are happy for the rich directors to lose abit of money but putting the taxes up is bad news for politicians especially round election time.
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Without wishing to annoy anyone, the mere thought of a communal fire alarm system annoys me. Totally unmanageable and totally pointless.
Evac strategy in a high rise block of flats would NEVER EVER work.
Defend in place is a strategy employed since the creation of the first high rise there is no legal requirement for a communal fire alarm system and without one an evac strategy cannot occur.
It annoys me that people say that stay put can only be employed in a block built after 1991. Ridiculous. How did they evacuate building built prior to that then? Magic and dreams? CP3 never equired a communal alarm system so how could evac take place?
I refuse to get emotional about the fire. We must be pragmatic and logical in our approach. Hundreds of fires occur in blocks of flats every year. Over literally decades. This is the first fire of this significance in a block of flats.
We do not know the results of the investogation yet. So we cannot speculate on cause or how we intend to improve things.
We had a fire in a communal area 2 weeks ago. Arson, matress, communal area. Smoke vents operated, no communal fire alarm system, no injuries, no deaths,no fire spread between floors despite the arsonist wedging a staircase door open.
FD30 doors, Class O wall coverings, no communal combustibles and smoke control is our strategy in this building twinned with a stay put policy.
Poor risk assessment or fowl play? Both I'll warrant.
But don't bring me a revised 5588 pt 1 requireing communal alarms, because I guarantee the fire service false alarm reduction manager will be begging for them to be removed in under a year.
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I'm with you there Big T.
Also, regarding your fire 2 weeks ago - imagine the mess it would have been and the potential for injuries if everyone in the building had tried to evacuate, through the smoke, past the fire, over the fire-fighters' hoses, impeding the fire-fighters, with their pet dogs and carrying their pet budgies and fish tanks (I've been to a fire where the fish died!).....the thought of it is laughable.
Stu
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Agreed
Im not sure what Jokar is harping on about defend in place in blocks of flats have been the norm for decades
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To be cynical, the money for upgrading the fire system in comercial premises comes from the profits of the organisation. The money for upgrading the fire system in council tower blocks comes from our pockets via the rates.
People are happy for the rich directors to lose abit of money but putting the taxes up is bad news for politicians especially round election time.
So it's a matter of money then?
Do you mean BSI has to see where the money is, before setting some cost effective standards?
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Communal fire alarm systems in blocks of flats are not only unnecessary but sometimes positively dangerous. They are either installed to operate AOVs ro by well meaning people who understand fire alarms but do not understand fire safety design. This is old hat that pre dates current building regs by decades-its not new. read CP3 Chapter 1V Part 1.
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Spot on Big T all those asking for communal alarms etc please explain what sort of evacuation strategy you intend to run in the event of an alarm actuation?
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Relating to Benz post above, the reason is not about money in the social environment it is about manageability of the residents. In an office environment you have control over the occupants as they are employees, you can insist on training, drills, consequesnces of non compliance etc.
In a residential setting you do not have that control.
If I was required to I would spend money on communal alarms. But I am not required to. As a consequesnce I spend money on passive protection improvements. The corner stone of defend in place strategy.
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No the BSI produce standards which are advisory unless they are actually put into legislation. For example there is no law that says I must install a fire alarm to BS and I could take on the Fire Authority in court and argue that the alarm system I have fitted was adequate even if it didn't comply with the standard.
The problem will come if the law states that all tower blocks must have communal fire alarms to BS that is when the politicians start to scream.
The other side is that although this is a headline grabbing tragedy as said above, fires have occured in tower blocks without this loss of life. I would say most ex firefighters on this list have dealt with fires in tower blocks. This one has grabbed the headlines because it was in London, young children died and there was good video footage of it.
Yes we need to find out what happen and why, then we can learn from it.
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AHH Cleveland you are so so right. However, to have Defend in Place you need to be assured that the compartmentation will support that theoretical practice which is why most atypical HMO's have a different evacuation strategy. If you leave people in a premises and the fire can jump from flat to flat then you have a whole host of other problems to deal with.
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Asbolutely Jokar, however I thought (and I suspect Cleveland did too) that you were saying blocks of flats shouldn't have defend in place strategies.
Any defend in place strategy whether it be for blocks of flats or otherwise relies on top notch compartmentation - no argument there - hence as you correctly point out we don't allow defend in place within HMOs.
On a different note I agree with all of you who have stated that installing AFD in the communal areas is a very BAD idea.
Priority as Big T states is compartmentation, and standalone AFD in the flats.
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Whilst this is total specualtion. The london lite newspaper (Freeby) went in to the block opposite Lakanal house to look at the building (Marie Curie house)
The paper still harps on about no external staircase and a single staircase (which I am not convinced is a design flaw) But has identified significant quantities of combustibles in the common areas. Blocked fire exits and doors with no closers and damaged hinges.
They describe this as "typical" in buildings containing social housing, but with good management this can be overcome.
I appreciate this is early days still but the spread looks increasingly management rather than poor design
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http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23716422-details/The+twin+block+that+gives+clue+to+what+might+have+happened+in+blaze+tragedy/article.do (http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23716422-details/The+twin+block+that+gives+clue+to+what+might+have+happened+in+blaze+tragedy/article.do)
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Interesting that the residents are using the FRA as a scapegoat!
Maybe they should start looking at the building management and the damage created by vandals if it is found to be similar conditions to the block featured in the article.
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Does anyone know what the FRA strategy is a Southwark and whether they have even carried them out?
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Priority as Big T states is compartmentation,.......
I very much doubt there is such a thing MR unless you were there from foundation to habitation to ensure it was carried out. Big strong concrete walls are great until the sparky or plumber comes along with the masonary bit, at best, or a kango to provide the standard 300mm opening for the 15 - 100mm pipework or bunch of flat twin and earth. Once the building is up and "finished" there is no way of knowing if compartmentation as defined in B Regs has been maintained if provided in the first place.
I'm dealing with a young block of private flats at present and is it compartmented properly? Not a snowballs chance in hell. Problem is that to check if it has been done thoroughly would require a very intrusive investigation.
So that I and the occupants can sleep easy at night I am minded to go for a common AFD and properly compartment where I can see it ain't.
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Similarly we maintain a private "elite" block of flats in camden that has a "smoke ventillation system" on each floor (5 floors) ie. mains powered detector with relay base in the lift lobby on each floor, controlling louvres in the lobby that open to air.
Each detector is completely standalone and isolated from the other detectors.
The "residents" have requested a FD&A system in the common parts - sounders in flats + heat detector - etc
Comments ??
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Similarly we maintain a private "elite" block of flats in camden that has a "smoke ventillation system" on each floor (5 floors) ie. mains powered detector with relay base in the lift lobby on each floor, controlling louvres in the lobby that open to air.
Each detector is completely standalone and isolated from the other detectors.
The "residents" have requested a FD&A system in the common parts - sounders in flats + heat detector - etc
Comments ??
And why not if it makes them happier.
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David, do they really want to evacuate every time an alarm goes of? and if they do and it is a real fire are the staircases large enough to take the capacity of the whole population of the building and to allow firefighters access from the access level and from thwir bridgehead position.
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David, do they really want to evacuate every time an alarm goes of? and if they do and it is a real fire are the staircases large enough to take the capacity of the whole population of the building and to allow firefighters access from the access level and from thwir bridgehead position.
I really think jokar that it would be difficult to persuade the residents to remain in their flats where the F&RS say they are safe more especially now after the London incident.
The alarm is their choice so let them have it.
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Oh dear oh dear oh dear!
Havent we got ourselves into a tizzy. We dont even know what happened in London yet and here we all are spurting off in all directions declaring that compartmentation is useless, that no one ever does their jobs properly to check the integrity of fire resistance and the whole thing goes to rat poo poo.
Of course compartmentation gets breached in some cases, Im a realist Nearlythere I know what goes on. But because Im a realist I also know a full evacuation policy will never work either
And NT go ahead put in a common fire alarm system I truly understand your logic IF the compartmentation is crap I really really do, but alas Im afraid the system will get vandalised, Im afraid the alarm will be going off every five minutes causing complaceny amongst residents who will be sick and tired of the alarm activating and wont move when there is actually a genuine emergency.
Can we all just slow down a bit take a chill pill and await the findings of the fire investigators before we start whining on about this that and the other. Midland Retty pointed out we won't know what's happened til the investigation is complete and looking at the footage of this horrible blaze I have my own opinions on what may have occurred. But I wasn't there, you weren't there. The experts will determine the cause, lets await their findings before going off on one and declaring the world has fallen of its axis and that tower blocks are the most unsafe things in the world.
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Defend in place is an established and accepted principal with regards to residents. However, what about the persons who work within common areas. For example, one premises that I am aware of has a team of cleaners working in the staircase and corridors on a daily basis. All of us who have been operational would have attended a fire in a common area of this type of premises at sometime in our career (normally rubbish or a piece of furniture dragged in from outside). The persons working within common areas do not normally have access to flats so Defend in Place is NOT an option for them. How are they warned of a fire in a common area? How about visitors who could be present in a common area? How have you all addressed this within your risk assessments?
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One of the best breakdowns of the timeline of the incident so far:
http://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/news/daily-news/lakanal-house-new-evidence-reveals-how-fatal-fire-spread/5204724.article
There are also links on the article showing the layout of the flats.
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And NT go ahead put in a common fire alarm system I truly understand your logic IF the compartmentation is crap I really really do, but alas Im afraid the system will get vandalised.
CF3. Flats get vandalised. Apartments do not. ::)
I'm afraid that the outcome of the enquiry will have little effect on how the residents see the issue. Fact is, regardless of how it happened, 6 persons perished in a fire and that, to flat/apartment occupiers, is all that matters.
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That may be true, but no-one died in a communal area. They died in their flats. Due to a fire in that flat! Part 6 system please!
Smoke vents operated by SD is the only type of communal system that should be installed.
The mere thought of you poor sods having to manage a communal fire alarm system in a block of flats or apartments is laughable.
In fact, install one with my blessing and I await your post in 10 weeks time asking for ways in which to minimise fire alarm activations.
What do you do when it goes off?
Auto dialler to brigade? Auto Dialler to call center? Either way they are same thing because the call centre will call the fire service straight away.
Whos going to respond once it goes off? Concierge? Doubt you have one. Resident? Doubt it. Fire alarm contractor? 2 hour call out. Fire service? After 3 activations you will be looking at reduction programmes.
What do you want the communal system to do? get everyone out? They WONT LEAVE. I guarantee it! Defend in place? Why have an alarm? The reason you have a communal system in a sheltered housing block is to get the brigade there early. You don't need to do that in normal blocks.
You have an alarm you need to then do fire drills! You need to do a weekly fire alarm test! Whos going to do that? Concierge? you dont have one!
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I totally agree Big T
YOu should protect the flat with AFD rather than look at a communal system.
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Big T.
The adequacy of the compartmentation is questionable and impossible to confirm. You don't believe there should be a common AFD system. What I don't want in 10 weeks is to see a post reporting deaths in a block of flats without AFD and having dodgy compartmentation.
You said "they died in their flats" (plural). Why would that be if the block was built with compartmentation?
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Its not as simple as that Nearlythere though is it.
If AFD was installed communally nothing would have changed, the outcome would be identicle. Apart from the fact that potentially MORE people would have evacuated their flats who in this instance stayed where they were in a compartment that was unnafected by the fire.
Regardless of compartmentation, communal AFD is not the solution. Improving Compartmentation or smoke ventilation / extraction is.
Fire spread through corridoors in this instance has not been cause by a sparky knocking a brick out of an electrical riser. Its been caused by inadequately maintained fire doors, external fire spread or communal waste / wall covering that has encouraged fire and smoke spread. But this is still specualtion and flimflam.
A Fire risk assessment will identify obvious breaches of compartmentation and will ensure that it is rectified by installing intumescent foam or mastic or fire rated board in areas where there are compartment breaches.
The RRO covers the communal areas. So the assessor would look in electrical cupboards, corridoors, bin chute areas etc. Of course they aren't going to start knocking walls down or smashing ceilings out to see whats beyond it and in addition aren't going to gain access to individual flats.
What you are advocating is mitigating poor compartmentation by installing AFD. We know from experience that it was inherantly useless in situations like this and virtually impossible to manage.
The correct mitigation is to improve compartmentation ensure a part 6 system in each flat to provide early warning of smoke in a dwelling (not present in Lakanal), not install communal AFD.
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Sorry nearlythere but you are way off on this one. A communal fire alarm system is not whats required.
Tell me whay you cant proove the fire resistance and compartmentation. I accept getting access to all flats, some of which will house very unhelpful residents isn't easy, but alas thats exactly what needs to be done. What areas are you aware of in the flats may be compromised?
How many fire deaths in flats that you know of have there been? I can tell you how many I know of.... 8 - six of which occurred last weekend.
I ask again that we all calm down until we get the report from the disaster in London
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Information I received yesterday. The letter I received was from the
Lakanal House was built in 1959 and contains 98 two storey flats over 14 floors. They are arranged in a “scissor block” style, served, at alternate levels, by a longitudinal common corridor that leads to a central stairwell. The flats are accessed on either side of the common corridor and at entrance level contain bedrooms and bathroom accommodation. An internal timber stair adjacent to the corridor gives access to the living room and kitchen on the flat’s upper floor, which spans from side to side of the building passing over the common corridor on the lower level.
Where the internal staircase passes over the corridor it cuts through the enclosure to the common corridor presenting a potential breach in the fire resisting construction above the ceiling. This could allow a fire in one of the flats to burn through the timber stair and spread into the ceiling void.
The letter then goes on to tell us that as a responsible person under the RRO it is up to us to decide what action "if any" needs to be taken.
In the words of my old boss. "Bring me solutions, not problems"
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A previous posting provided a link to the Architects Journal which includes a study of Sceaux Gardens, Camberwell which is identical to Lakanal House and includes plans which does make the layout very clear. Just click on the image and you get a pfd. file which you can enlarge.
http://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/sceaux-gardens-camberwell-the-original-1960-aj-building-study/5204667.article
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For info:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/jul/12/tower-block-fire-construction-flaw
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Tell me whay you cant proove the fire resistance and compartmentation.
Because if I can actually see failings in compartmentation where cabling, pipework and trunking penetrates compartment walls and ceilings goodness only knows what is, or what is not, behind plasterboard.
This is an interesting comment from Bobbins from another thread.
"I have some information on the preliminary causes, the stairs were of wood construction and the supporting structure penetrated the walls of the stair well into voids and cavities that were not fire stopped. House keeping and maintenance was poor and vandals had stolen some hinges from fire doors. The main problem for the lateral flame spread appears to be the building design. The internal stairs for each flat penetrated the lateral corridors inside the false ceiling without any form of fire resisting casing. Windows were open and plastic bird spikes on the window ledges are also thought to be contributing factors. All councils across the UK are checking their housing stock apparently the design faults would not have been obvious during a walk around risk assessment. ‘Official sources claim’ "
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I dont disagree that prooving compartmentation is difficult. But it is not impossible. Is it unreasonable to carry out a destructive survey to ascertain compartmentation beyond plasterboard.
If it is unreasonable then it can't be assessed. Most FRA bods will not carry out a destructive survey to ascertain fire stopping beyond existing plasterboard.
I have carried out 1 destructive survey in a wing of an older block where a stay put policy had been in place.
If we take the design issue where the staircase penetrates the compartment as described in mine and Nearlytheres post if the issue was not obvious, and the builders, architect and council surveyors did not notice the issue when it was being built, how would an FRA have picked it up. Consider particularly that the government said originally that a layman could do an FRA with the sleeping guide of a property of this type.
There will obviously be other factors, but are we all really understanding the scissor design? I can email accross a Powerpoint presentation if anyone is unsure that I put together for a meeting the other day.
I think to get back on point and has been described to oblivion before. Would active fire protection have helped?
Sprinklers? Yes
Smoke extraction? Maybe
Communal alarm? No
Part 6 throughout? Maybe
Better management? Maybe
A destructive survey of the building during an FRA? Yes
Which would have been reasonable to install?
Sprinklers? No
Smoke extract? Yes
Communal alarm? NO
PArt 6 throughout? MAybe
Better management? Yes
Destructive survey during FRA? Only if the assessment questioned the compartmentation
I would bet my mortgage that there was not a FRA for the building at the time of the fire.
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I have been gathering information on these flats and the previous links are good at providing an insite into the design.
I would appreciate a copy of Big Ts power point as I was considering doing some thing similar.
It is becoming clear that fire separation is the issue and it is important that this is looked into carefully as the majority of tower blocks operate a "Stay Put" policy.
A summary of the areas I have been considering are listed below and I appreciate they may not be fact but are worth considering.
Building Design
Design and building commenced in 1957
Photographs & plans do not show any doors across access corridor or at main staircase.
The external facia of the main staircase appears to have changed from the original design. As there is no indication of any smoke ventilation from the main staircase via windows or other openings did the original design incorporate smoke ventilation or had it been removed?
Main staircase width 3’6”
Original heating design was warm air supplied from ground floor oil fired boiler room fed to a unit in each maisonette entrance lobby which circulated air around the maisonette.
Gas was provided to each maisonette.
Maisonette design and means of escape.
Maisonette access from central corridor leads to bedroom/bathroom area then timber stairs to upper living kitchen area.
Escape balcony provided at each side accessed from upper Living room/Kitchen level assumed to lead to main staircase.
Exit route available from bedrooms which bypasses entrance lobby and leads back into main entrance corridor.
Bedroom and lobby doors are stated as fire resisting (asbestos sheeting to one side only) but clear glass fan lights above.
The internal bathrooms were mechanically ventilated but how, is not explained.
Internal doors flush facing with asbestos cement facing to one side.
Comments relating to design and fire.
Fire involving the Living room/Kitchen area can affect both escape balconies at that level.
First maisonette involved in fire is adjacent to the main staircase; flames or smoke exiting from the window could, depending on the fire resistance of the door enter the staircase also flames could prevent passage along balcony.
Fire has entered the main access corridor and spread to the end of the block as flame and smoke is seen coming from the end windows on news videos.
The position of thes end windows or openings is not clear as they do not apper to be inline with the access corridor?
Apparent defect in fire resistance where internal timber maisonette staircase crosses main access corridor this may have allowed fire/smoke to enter the main access corridor. This can be seen in news video looking into a maisonette bedroom level, where daylight is clearly visible through to the opposite maisonette in the area of the internal staircase.
Vertical ducts run adjacent to internal staircase and also a vertical duct runs adjacent to the exit cupboard within each maisonette which is also on the the separating wall to the adjacent maisonette.
Fire spread within the block is downwards and horizontally, the lower maisonettes involved are adjacent to the duct from the upper maisonettes on fire.
Reports indicate open windows assisted fire spread this is not apparent from the news videos and fire development does not appear to be adjacent to the windows
Deliberate ignition is alleged
137 ft High
Access corridor 93ft from flat door to main staircase.
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Faulty TV being reported as the initial cause.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/22/camberwell-fire-investigation
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I have just carried out a FRA on a similar block of flats.
Although there are many issues , it is apparent that there are no self closing devices to flat entrance doors (I know I am doing an FRA of the landlord areas only, but I was able to get into a couple). This is a route of fire spread. Occupants escapes their flat, and doesn't close the door behind them.
I have CP3 Part 1 1971, this indicates that self closing devices to flat doors are recommended. But I am interested to know whether the 1948 version of CP3 asked for them??
With regards to compartmentation, CP3 1971 does not specify periods of fire resistance, it refers you to the Building Regs 1965. If only I had a copy of the 1948 version, then I could see where this guidance refers you to.
Camberwell designed to 1948 CP3 possibily?? Maybe reference is made in CP3 to local acts, which would be London Building Acts 1939. Obviously due to height, London Building Acts 1939 would be applicable.
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Regardless of whether they were required or not I would suggest that an FRA of a block of flats would see a non self closing flat entrance door as an intolerable risk and note is as High priority
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I agree
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I read a report that changes to the original structure may have been the reason why it spread in such a way,due to the fire stopping being compromised.
This theory was based on other work done in similar flats within the same borough.
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For info
I have been told that all West Yorkshire I/Os are dropping their normal inspections and concentrating on high rise flats to go over them with a fine tooth comb.
Expected to take over a year to complete
davo
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No knee jerk reactions there then.
Wonder how many times they have shown the slightest interest in them since 1947?
Never had the legislative powers to do so will be the cry. You would have done if you had campaigned for it is the reply.
Lets not be fooled into thinking there is a fundamental problem with the design philosophy of blocks of flats.There isnt if they are maintained and managed effectively. Statistics prove that.
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No knee jerk reactions there then.
Wonder how many times they have shown the slightest interest in them since 1947?
Never had the legislative powers to do so will be the cry. You would have done if you had campaigned for it is the reply.
Lets not be fooled into thinking there is a fundamental problem with the design philosophy of blocks of flats.There isnt if they are maintained and managed effectively. Statistics prove that.
Thats the issue K. It's not the buildings that are the "fire risk", as residents are usually inclined to describe, after the event. It's the people in them, who have no knowledge of fire safety until a tragedy when all of a sudden they become fire safety experts.
Is it unrealistic to expect people to take some responsibility and accountability for their own and the safety of others.
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I can see it now, the Government will release funds to build new staircases on all these blocks all over the UK. Each separate premises will have residential sprinklers installed, they will even consider the drainage problem that will ensue for this initiative. Every staircase and corridor will have automatic smoke ventilation, a common fiire alarm system and extinguishers to fight the fire when it occurs.
Of course the residents will always keep the staircases and corridors free from all refuse, junk and other detrius. No fire doors will ever be exchanged for UPVC and they will never be damaged. The outlets for the rising mains will never be damaged or removed and all will be well with the world. There will be no more wars, thanks Mr Blair, peace will be a part of our time, no one will die an accidental death and all will embarce and love one another. Women will not fight for more and more power, prestige and the right to be treated as men. Men will allow women to take the jobs that by the right of being born with testes are truly theres whether capable of doing so or not and men will be empathetic, sympathetic and romantic.
Well, perhaps not!!!!!
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I can see it now, the Government will release funds to build new staircases on all these blocks all over the UK. Each separate premises will have residential sprinklers installed, they will even consider the drainage problem that will ensue for this initiative. Every staircase and corridor will have automatic smoke ventilation, a common fiire alarm system and extinguishers to fight the fire when it occurs.
Of course the residents will always keep the staircases and corridors free from all refuse, junk and other detrius. No fire doors will ever be exchanged for UPVC and they will never be damaged. The outlets for the rising mains will never be damaged or removed and all will be well with the world. There will be no more wars, thanks Mr Blair, peace will be a part of our time, no one will die an accidental death and all will embarce and love one another. Women will not fight for more and more power, prestige and the right to be treated as men. Men will allow women to take the jobs that by the right of being born with testes are truly theres whether capable of doing so or not and men will be empathetic, sympathetic and romantic.
Well, perhaps not!!!!!
And someone will develop a hangover free wine. And politicians will submit honest expenses claims. And pigs will fly.......
But then it is society's fault after all.
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The fire was once again discussed on the local London news earlier this evening.
It was reported that Southwark council and the LFB are still refusing to confirm if a FRA and been conducted at the Camberwell premises since recent alterations. It was also reported that residents within other tower blocks are getting frustated as they have asked formally for confirmation from Southwark council that FRA's have been conducted at the their blocks. Southwark council are refusing to respond to these requests.
The news reporter visited a twenty storey high rise block and found that some of fire doors provided to protect the single staircase were damaged, missing, or wedged open.
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I suspect that reporter was a fire safety proffessional with 200 years experience.
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It was reported that Southwark council and the LFB are still refusing to confirm if a FRA and been conducted at the Camberwell premises since recent alterations. It was also reported that residents within other tower blocks are getting frustated as they have asked formally for confirmation from Southwark council that FRA's have been conducted at the their blocks. Southwark council are refusing to respond to these requests.
Does that all mean there probably isn't one?
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It wouldn't surprise me. Councils and RSL's aren't geared up to deal with the RRO
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In reply to previous posts:
The news reporter most certainly was not someone with Fire Safety experience. However you do not need to have a degree in fire engineering to realise that, quite correctly, a fire door provided on a single protected staircase has been provided for a reason so therefore should not be wedged open. He stood next to it with the TV camera showing the wedged open door. Furthermore the reporter never stated that the Camberwell tower block, nor any other block, had not had a FRA conducted. Just simply that Southwalk have refused to confirm if one has been carried out. It will be for others to make assumptions.
It serves to support the views of some of the other posters on this subject that the problem does not necessarily lie with the design of the building, but typically with the lack of maintainence of the passive fire safety measures provided.
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So on a slight curve, shouldn't the RA take into account the fact its an "unmanaged" public dwelling and most likely people are not going to read, understand or generally obey a "keep shut" sign stuck on a door (if such a sign was ever there), as they are more likely to in an office environment where fire safety is managed, and prompt for additional control measures?
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I think that is a fair statement. The difficult point is how.
I recently wrote an emergency plan for the rp for a high rise block, and documented that the security officer on site during the day should conduct daily recorded checks of the means of escape routes to check for combustible items dumped in them, and the condition of the fire doors provided.
Other than that I'm not sure what other reasonable measures could be taken.
We all know the benefits afforded by the provision of sprinkler systems but I cannot see the government supporting any legislation making the provision of sprinklers a requirement due to the cost to local councils.
The block that I have dealt with in the past was managed by a housing asscociation, with the lease due to expire within 18 months. The rp indicated they would not be renewing the lease due to the cost of maintaining the building and would be handing it back to the local council. The view is that the maintainence costs are already so high that it may be pulled down.
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Makes sense, but not all RSLs have the luxury of a security guard on site.
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I have been told that all West Yorkshire I/Os are dropping their normal inspections and concentrating on high rise flats to go over them with a fine tooth comb.
Expected to take over a year to complete
If an FRS decided to ignore Camberwell and carried on inspecting shops and factories, wouldn't the cry out there then be "Why are the FRS bothering us poor shopkeepers/factory owners when there are people dying in what are clearly worse risks out there?"?
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By the same token Civvy it's important not to have a knee jerk reaction to the situation.
Most places I've recently inspected have said things like " Oh I heard about that terrible incident in Camberwell - poor people" or words to that effect.
But they haven't been saying " why aren't you lot walking around tower blocks instead of bothering us shop keepers / factory owners / care home operators etc" - And I wouldnt expect them to.
As Kurnal has already said the incident in Camberwell, however sad, tragic and horrific does not mean that all high rise blocks are as risky, and we have to be very careful not to fall into the trap of going over the top, panicking, or knee jerking our way into requiring urgent upgrades which in the long run may be expensive and unecessary.
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Besides which Raconteur Retty, who, in the Midlands, would want to have fridges dropped on top of their brigade cars from balconies and find the wheels removed when they come back.
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Sir Ken Knight's prelimanary report into the flats fire is now published
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/cfrareportcamberwell
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Nice...
• Consideration should be given at the time of major refurbishment or upgrading of the electrical installation, to ensuring that the active fire
protection systems are upgraded as appropriate, in particular:
• the installation of hard wired smoke detector(s) at each level within each dwelling in compliance with current standards and,
• using the existing knowledge and emerging technology now available, consideration should be given to providing a link between the individual dwelling and an alarm receiving centre ensuring prompt and accurate call to the fire and rescue service. Such systems also allow for a manual, pre-determined delay of the call transmission to prevent unwanted false alarms.
So what sort of magic box are all of these stand-alone systems going to connect to and who's going to be responsible for maintaining it in that kind of environment ?
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Interesting comment regarding risk assessments and competent persons in that report.
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More nonsense. Loads of stand alone alarms, who is going to ensure the evacuation takes place, is the staircase wide enough for all those people to leave. Do we really want all sorts, children, babies, expectant mothers the aged and people with disabilities evacuating in the early hours of a morning in the cold, the wet or ice and snow. Its another piece of irresponsible reporting that has no bearance now or in the future. LB Southwark would be far better off following L&B stance and have domestic sprinklers installed in each residence. Now that would be a piece of work. The drainage would need some working out though.
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I don't think he is advocating that the detection is linked, just pure stand-alone detection in each flat to bring them up to the standard they would be if they were built now. Nor is he advocating full evac.
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Ok, so we have detection in the common areas but we don't want anyone to take any notice of it!!! and the point is?
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I have had a read of this.
With all these stand alone detectors fitted into the flats, linked to an alarm receiving centre, this centre is going to be dealing with lots of false alarms. Would fire brigade get called every time?!
Sir Ken Knight has stated that a suppression system is required in blocks over 30m, when they aren't required!
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In the case of a tower block which I have had dealings with recently in London, there was self contained domestic smoke detectors fitted within all flats. The problem is that as they were located within a tenants private flat, the rp was unable to confirm that they were still servicable, or even that they were still present. It is seemingly extremely difficult for rp's to ensure that domestic smoke detectors are maintained within a servicable condition if they are located within a private flat.
It has to be accepted that in a fair number of cases tenants cannot be relied upon to maintain domestic smoke detectors located within their flat.
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Ok, so we have detection in the common areas but we don't want anyone to take any notice of it!!! and the point is?
He is not advocating detection in the common areas either as far as I can tell. He always talks about detection "within the dwelling".
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Sir Ken Knight's prelimanary report into the flats fire is now published
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/cfrareportcamberwell
The installation of hard wired smoke detector(s) at each level within each dwelling in compliance with current standards.[/i]
No problem. Thought it would have been done already.
Consideration given to providing a link between the individual dwellings and an alarm receiving centre.
Good idea but really? A consideration only so box ticked.
Maintaining the inherent passive fire safety principles of the building e.g. fire resisting doors, fire stopping provision, smoke ventilation.
Naturally. Building Control issue?
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Heres another fire news story this weekend
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/nottinghamshire/8191115.stm
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Maintaining the inherent passive fire safety principles of the building e.g. fire resisting doors, fire stopping provision, smoke ventilation.
Naturally. Building Control issue?
Hi NT
Only a building control issue in so far as alterations and major refurbs are concerned. We have previously confirmed the legal duties of the RP landlord to carry out a fire risk assessment of the communal areas (Except in Scotland). It is absolutely clear but often overlooked by the tick box merchants that this duty covers service ducts, refuse chutes, substation rooms and ventilation.
Has Northern Ireland legislation followed the English model in respect of flats and common areas?
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Maintaining the inherent passive fire safety principles of the building e.g. fire resisting doors, fire stopping provision, smoke ventilation.
Naturally. Building Control issue?
Hi NT
Only a building control issue in so far as alterations and major refurbs are concerned. We have previously confirmed the legal duties of the RP landlord to carry out a fire risk assessment of the communal areas (Except in Scotland). It is absolutely clear but often overlooked by the tick box merchants that this duty covers service ducts, refuse chutes, substation rooms and ventilation.
Has Northern Ireland legislation followed the English model in respect of flats and common areas?
Hi K
No, I misread this item despite it being a very simple statement. Is that the sign of seniority creeping in? My long term memory is improving somewhat though.
Once BC are done and dusted that's it really. I think technically they may have a year to ensure maintenance of measures but as far as I know this is not pushed.
Issue I had, but still advising on, was residential private apts which were built in phases (4). First phase completed and cert issued. Remaining phases where then completed without notices to BC. Subsequently completed for occupation without BC knowledge (they say) and of course no cert issued.
Compartmentation problems now exist in areas you mention but BC of opinion that as it is over year it has little to do with them other than offering advice. BC have asked managing agents for copy of FRA and I think they are kacking themselves a little. Very hard to miss an apartment block of flats going up in a city centre.
Am waiting instructions to carry out survey of more private apartments. Seems insurance company want the building(s) surveyed for compliance with current B Regs. I do know that they were built within current Regs period so I'm not quite sure what the problem is or why they want it done.
Maybe to increase premiums if weaknesses in compartmentation uncovered.
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"Botched council renovations may have caused Camberwell tower block fire"
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/aug/06/camberwell-fire
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"according to fire safety experts."
"Because the building has only one escape staircase, flats were designed to contain any fire for at least an hour, known as compartmentalistion."
"Webb believes the work compromised fireproofing between flats and the corridor. In his opinion, this allowed a blaze to spread into the ceiling cavity, causing a "flashover" fireball."
Standard media twaddle, IMO.
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Where does it stipulate that residential buildings over 30M need a sprinkler system?
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Hi Big T
See ADB 2006 page 72 para 8.14.
And breathe again- its new build only. Thats the easy bit. To what standard should the sprinkler system be installed? And where? and the water supplies? Thats where it all gets blurred and iffy.Some answers can be found in the ADB but it raises as many questions as answers.
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There are many hundreds of blocks like these all over the UK and one has had a significant fire with life loss. If Sir KK follows the thought process through where does the money come from for all these upgrades?
Local Authorities are already struggling and some are saying that CT will have to rise next year as the Government has already indicated that there will be less for them in 2010/2011. Will PFI work? If not the CT payers will foot a bill for an incident unlikely ever to reoccur and as an occurrence must have been such a small percentage chance that it will not have recorded.
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I do wonder where this wonderful emerging technology is coming from that is mentioned in the report & what will happen when UWFs go through the roof due to the individual flats being linked to an ARC !!!
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There are many hundreds of blocks like these all over the UK and one has had a significant fire with life loss. If Sir KK follows the thought process through where does the money come from for all these upgrades?
Local Authorities are already struggling and some are saying that CT will have to rise next year as the Government has already indicated that there will be less for them in 2010/2011. Will PFI work? If not the CT payers will foot a bill for an incident unlikely ever to reoccur and as an occurrence must have been such a small percentage chance that it will not have recorded.
Where Jokar
Ok there there are a several scissor blocks out there but they are in the minority. Dont get me wrong I do see what you are saying and you are correct, but there arent many hundreds, and i think its important to point that out
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I don't think the comments are specific to the scissor block style flats. The incident itself might have been exacerbated by the layout, but the political fallout is targetted at all flats.
What we have to consider when we look at KK's comments is public opinion. KK is responsible for fire safety, and when 6 people are dead and people were talking about 'mazes' (Don't know how a corridor leading to one stair can be a maze, but there you have it) and 'accidents waiting to happen' he HAS to do something about it. We can argue here all day about what is and isn't reasonable, but there is nothing he could possibly say that would make everyone happy. We are just a small cross section of people, and we are a cross section he is not trying to please or appease with his suggestions. If his suggestions are construed as protecting people in flats from a similar fate then he is succeeding in his political purpose. Actual practicalities are secondary, and by the time they find out that certain aspects are not practical the tide of interest will be focussed elsewhere.
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Civvy
I disagree. KK is in a sense stuck between a rock and a hard place, but i think u under estimate people.
When I was an IO i had many people contact me, mainly joe public with fire safety issues about the places where they lived. Some of those concerns were legitimate, the vast majority werent and a bit of reasurrance based on fire safety facts put their minds at ease.
If you explain thing logically to people they generally make their own minds up. It isn;t about me putting on an act tryong to convince them, I merely put things in laypersons terms for them to make their mind up. KK could do the same but wont because the political pressure wont let him and that im afraid is part of the game our superiors play daily, puppets and p[uppet masters keep the masses happy.
The truth is that there isnt a huge problem with high rise blocks at all and Sir Ken (God bless him) would be singing a different tune if he werent CFRA and HMFSI. DOnt get me wrong KK has done what he had to, but lets face facts what happened was pretty much a one off
Dont forget members of the public may view this forum and it is vital we keep things in perspective and away from Planet Government interference.
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For info
http://www.southwark.gov.uk/Public/NewsArticle.aspx?articleId=39443
davo
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Seen the October private eye? Probably the best article I've seen so far.
Interesting point is that the LA has hired the country's leading corporate manslaughter lawyers......
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http://www.private-eye.co.uk/sections.php?section_link=in_the_back&article=139& (http://www.private-eye.co.uk/sections.php?section_link=in_the_back&article=139&)
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Anybody want to update us on what their FRS is doing about high rise?
davo
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Basically, inspecting all of them.
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Interesting development:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/jan/03/huge-fire-safety-bills-towerblock-residents
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There is to be a program on Radio 4 1230 on Thursday this week on this topic- an investigation by John Waite
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Not a bad bit of investigative journalism, but then BBC are always good at NCA. I got bored though and switched over to radio one for a bit of the old rockaria. I dont listen to radio 4 much as its an old mans station, so I must have missed the prog when Sir Big K said it was unacceptable for an RP not to have an up to date FRA when the Fire Service College had their million pound fire. He did say that didn't he......................???
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Good job there aren't that many fire stations and fire authority premises going up in smoke then or peopel may wonder where their FRA's are as well.
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Have fire risk assessments become some magical paper-based fire extinguisher?
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Could be , some I have seen you might as well use them as a wedge on a fire door
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Funny that because i have thought about putting a tamper seal on some of mine.
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"Southwark Council has said that prior to the Lakanal House fire last July, it had mistakenly relied on the training of its housing officers by London Fire Brigade to meet fire safety requirements for some of its tower blocks." :o
http://www.fseonline.co.uk/articles.asp?article_id=9681&viewcomment=1
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I do not think that training people in fire awareness will get them out of that hole.
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I think you missed the 'prior' to the blaze' part.
I do like that comment: 'mistakenly relied on'
Kinda shows that you can't train people up in risk assessments in a few days.
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No, I did not. Perhaps I needed to follow Colin's lead and be educated in Scotland in order to get the tenses correct. What I think I meant was that having their staff trained on 1 day fire risk and fire awareness courses was not enough training for their staff to become competent fire risk assessors if that was the thought process they were going through at the time. The LFB website quite clearly states the content of these courses and only the naive would believe that you could conduct an FRA from this small amount of training.
Perhaps a bit of mudslinging is going on as a defence mechanism.
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theres a lot of it about.................
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Update........
http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/story.aspx?storycode=6507305
davo
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What duration of course does the panel believe gives someone the expertise to carry out a suitable and sufficient assessment?
I have been called upon to re assess a children's residential home. The current assessment was undertaken by someone who attended a 2.5 day course.
There was no mention of any structural fire safety measures and it listed an assortment of, what he considered, relevant legislation to bulk out the assessment. Some may consider this good practice but the legislation referred to was all English and the assessment was carried out in Northern Ireland.
Clearly, a very informative and educational course.
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How long is a piece of string?
Until someone grasps the nettle in CLG and actually decides on some kind of framework, similar perhaps to NEBOSH / IOSH system then only a court can decide what is or what is not acceptable.
Naturally you would hope that anything involving sleeping risks and hazardous processes would be assessed by someone who has done more than a 2.5 day course.
Its the age old thing that someone risk assessing a corner shop will only need basic knowledge, someone assessing a nuclear power station requires superior knowledge, and a lot of experience .
Also being competent is to know when you would be incompetent to take on something beyond your capabilities.
But as ever NT just like the question I asked about the competency of fire alarm engineers - it's teh generic "how long is a piece of string" answer form me , I'm afraid.